

As for General DeWitt's intention of interning all of the other Japanese residents of the Western Defense Command, the War Department approved the evacuation of those in the eastern half of California only and left undisturbed those in eastern Oregon and Washington, in northern Arizona, and in the other states of the Western Defense Command—except, of course, as General DeWitt applied to them his new authority to exclude suspected individuals from sensitive areas.¹⁰⁷ The final mass evacuation measure nevertheless affected about 10,000 persons and was carried out by direct movements from places of residence to relocation centers.¹⁰⁸

The Western Defense Command completed the evacuation of more than 100,000 persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1 on 7 June, and the removals from Military Area No. 2 in California were virtually complete by early August. The Army kept control of the evacuees until 3 November 1942 when, with the last movement from an assembly center to a relocation center, the War Relocation Authority took over general responsibility for the care and disposition of relocated Japanese.¹⁰⁹

What were the reasons that impelled the Army to carry out the mass evacuation of Japanese residents from the west coast beginning in March 1942? The general answer to this question is that the President and Congress had approved mass evacuation and the Secretary of War and his principal civilian assistant in this matter themselves thought it necessary to carry it out. Mr. Stimson on 16 March (and before the evacuation had begun) referred to the prospect as a "tragedy" that seemed "to be a military necessity" because very large numbers of the Japanese were "located in close proximity to installations of vital importance to the war effort."¹¹⁰ A week later Mr. McCloy reported, after his west coast visit, that there had been no cases of sabotage traceable to the Japanese population, but that "there was much evidence of espionage."¹¹¹

The most damaging tangible evidence against the Japanese was that produced by the intensive searches of their premises by the FBI from early February onward. By May it had seized 2,592 guns of various kinds, 199,000

¹⁰⁷ Rad, WD to CG WDC, 28 May 42, AG 370.05 (11-6-41), sec. 2.

¹⁰⁸ More than half of these were Japanese who had moved voluntarily into the interior of California from Military Area No. 1, the majority of whom moved on the two days between the issuance of the "freeze order" of 27 March and its effective date of 29 March.

¹⁰⁹ War Department, *Final Report*, pts. IV and VI; War Relocation Authority, *WRA*, pp. ix-x, 23; tenBrock *et al.*, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*, pp. 126-34.

¹¹⁰ Ltr, SW to Prof Hocking, 16 Mar 42, SW file, Aliens.

¹¹¹ Notes on War Council, 23 Mar 42, SW Conf, binder 2. No proven instances of espionage after Pearl Harbor among the Japanese population have ever been disclosed.