

gressional delegation had directed the War Department to evacuate the Japanese, and the War Department now detailed its most industrious advocate of mass evacuation to help General DeWitt execute the mandate. And, although there was no threat of an enemy invasion of the west coast that might have stirred disloyalty among some of its Japanese residents, a condition had developed that made some solution of the Japanese problem mandatory.<sup>75</sup>

This condition had been forecast in a careful survey of Pacific coast public opinion made during the week of 7-13 February (and analyzed too late to influence the course of events), which indicated a state of affairs needing "prompt and careful attention," because of the very widely held belief along the coast that the Japanese population was disloyal and a menace to the national security. The report of this survey concluded that "racial or national antagonism seems to account in large part for the unfavorable attitude toward the Japanese" and that the factor of economic competition was relatively minor. It also indicated a much more pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment in southern California than elsewhere along the coast; outside of southern California, less than one-half of those interviewed favored the internment of Japanese aliens, and only 14 percent the internment of Japanese citizens.<sup>76</sup>

By late February a stream of pleas for action was flowing into the War and Justice Departments from California. On 22 February, for example, the Commandant, Eleventh Naval District, sent the following dispatch to Washington:

Situation of Japanese in Southern California very critical. Many are forced to move with no provision as to subsequent housing or means of livelihood. Many families already destitute. All localities object to movement of evacuees into their area. Recommend that the Departments concerned make immediate plans for the evacuation and reestablishment of aliens removed from areas designated by military authorities.<sup>77</sup>

On the succeeding two days the shelling of the Santa Barbara oil installations

<sup>75</sup> On 20 February, the date of the War Department's instructions to General DeWitt, General Marshall concurred unreservedly in a British Chiefs of Staff estimate that, "so long as the United States maintain a battle fleet in the Pacific, large-scale seaborne expeditions against the western seaboard of North America and the employment of capital ships in this area are considered impracticable." (Ltr, Field Marshall Sir John Dill to Gen Marshall, 20 Feb 42 and Memo, Brig Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower to Sir John Dill, 20 Feb 42 both in OCS 21347-7.) In a general estimate of the situation a month later, on 19 March 1942, G-2 held that the maximum foreseeable threat to the Pacific coast was that from carrier-borne air raids against aircraft factories and naval bases. (MIS WD Estimate 2, 19 Mar 42, OPD Exec 10, item 29.)

<sup>76</sup> Confidential Rpt of OFF, 9 Mar 42, recorded in Tel Conv, Col Bendetsen with Mr. Carrington Gill, 9 Mar 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (Bendetsen, Feb-Mar 42).

<sup>77</sup> Quoted in Ltr, SN to Atty Gen, 22 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC.