

from which all persons who did not have permission to enter and remain would be excluded as a measure of military necessity. In his opinion, this plan was clearly legal and he recommended that it be executed by three steps: first, the issuance of an Executive order by the President authorizing the Secretary of War to designate military areas; second, the designation of military areas upon the recommendation of General DeWitt; and, third, the immediate evacuation from areas so designated of all persons to whom it was not proposed to issue licenses to re-enter or remain. Colonel Bendetsen assumed that, if military areas were established on the west coast in place of all Category A areas thus far recommended by General DeWitt, about 30,000 people would have to be evacuated. On the same day, Colonel Bendetsen's division drafted a proposal for applying the military area scheme to the entire nation.⁴²

The Deputy Provost Marshal General, Col. Archer L. Lerch, indorsed Colonel Bendetsen's proposals, and in doing so commented on what he called the "deciding weakening of General DeWitt" on the question of Japanese evacuation, which he considered "most unfortunate." He also thought the plan for resettlement within California being worked out between General DeWitt and the state authorities savored "too much of the spirit of Rotary" and overlooked "the necessary cold-bloodedness of war."⁴³ General Gullion presented a condensed version of Colonel Bendetsen's observations and recommendations to Mr. McCloy on 5 February. He also noted that General DeWitt had changed his position and now appeared to favor a more lenient treatment of the American-born Japanese to be worked out in co-operation with their leaders; in General Gullion's opinion, such co-operation was dangerous and the delay involved was "extremely dangerous."⁴⁴ A revision of his memorandum, with all reference to General DeWitt deleted, became the Provost Marshal General's recommendation of 6 February to Mr. McCloy that steps be taken immediately to eliminate what General Gullion described as the great danger of Japanese-inspired sabotage on the west coast. He advised that these steps should include the internment by the Army of all alien Japanese east of the Sierra Nevada Mountains, together with as many citizen members of their families as would voluntarily

⁴² Memo, Col Bendetsen for PMG, 4 Feb 42, PMG 014.311 Gen P/W; Memo, PMG for CofS, 4 Feb 42, and inclosed draft of TAG letter to corps area commanders, submitted to CCS at 3:00 p.m., 11 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 Gen. On the outcome of the proposal to extend the military area scheme throughout the continental United States, see Chapter II, above, and this chapter, pp. 144-46, below.

⁴³ Memo, Deputy PMG for PMG, 4 Feb 42, PMG 384.4 WDC.

⁴⁴ Memo, PMG for ASW, 5 Feb 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC.