

rounds of ammunitions, 1,652 sticks of dynamite, 1,458 radio receivers, 2,914 cameras, 37 motion picture cameras, and numerous other articles that the alien Japanese had been ordered to turn in at the beginning of January. Nonetheless, after assessing this evidence, Department of Justice officials concluded:

We have not, however, uncovered through these searches any dangerous persons that we could not otherwise know about. We have not found among all the sticks of dynamite and gun powder any evidence that any of it was to be used in bombs. We have not found a single machine gun nor have we found any gun in any circumstances indicating that it was to be used in a manner helpful to our enemies. We have not found a camera which we have reason to believe was for use in espionage.¹¹²

There were better if less tangible grounds for suspecting that some of the Japanese people—citizens as well as aliens—would become disloyal in the event of a Japanese invasion. The Navy report of early February 1942 previously cited concluded that a very small minority (less than 3 percent) of alien and citizen Japanese were so fanatically loyal to Japan that they could be expected to act as saboteurs or enemy agents, and a somewhat larger minority might be passively disloyal, if given the opportunity.¹¹³ On similar grounds the War Relocation Authority concluded that "a selective evacuation of people of Japanese descent from the west coast military area was justified and administratively feasible in the spring of 1942," although it concluded also that a mass evacuation such as was actually carried out was never justified.¹¹⁴ But no military estimate after December 1941 forecast even the possibility of an invasion of the west coast by the Japanese in strength, and all disloyalty among the Japanese remained passive until after their removal to relocation centers.

Although little support for the argument that military necessity required a mass evacuation of the Japanese can be found in contemporary evidence, it might be contended that the co-operation of the white population of the Pacific states in the national defense effort could not have been otherwise assured. By March 1942 a large segment of that population along the coast was determined to be rid of the Japanese, at least for the duration of the war. Prewar antipathies combined with wartime fears into a formidable pressure for removal. Writing in June, Mr. McCloy explained that the nature of the

¹¹² Draft of Memo, early May 42, Atty Gen for President Roosevelt, as quoted in Grodzins, *Japanese Evacuation*, pp. 134-36. A major portion of the first two items listed above was picked up in a raid on a sporting goods shop.

¹¹³ Rpt of Comdr Ringle, no date, copy in ASW 104.311 EAWC.

¹¹⁴ War Relocation Authority *WRA*, p. 182.