


WELEBAETHAN

The background of the cover is a detailed line drawing. On the left, a large, complex truss bridge spans across the frame. Below the bridge, on the left side, is a small, rectangular structure with a chimney, possibly a lighthouse or a small building. To the right of this structure is a body of water, depicted with wavy lines and small, dark, irregular shapes representing rocks or islands. The sky is filled with stylized, swirling clouds. Several birds are shown in flight: one in the upper left, one in the upper right, and one in the lower right. The overall style is that of a hand-drawn illustration.

Journal of History
2000

2000

Welebaethan Staff

Editors

Corey Arellano, Dino E. Buenviaje, Tara L. Camarillo, Kelly Ewing, Kaye Kaufman, Anissa Knoepfel, Allison Laine Medina, David Pearl, Colleen Robledo, Jose Villa, Suzanne Walter, David Wilson

Faculty Advisor

Wendy Elliott-Scheinberg

Advertising

**Young S. Kim
Allison Laine Medina**

Cover Design

Juan Perez

Cover and Preliminary Pages

**Corey Arellano
Anissa Knoepfel
David Pearl
Jose Villa**

Graphics

**Tara L. Camarillo
David Wilson**

Layout

Corey Arellano

Graduate Assistants

**Dino E. Buenviaje
Kelly Ewing
Allison Rubalcava**

Editorial Board

Mike Brown

Graduate Student, History

Kelly F. Ewing

Graduate Student, History

Sharon Evanshine

Graduate Student, History

Dr. Lawrence B. de Graaf

Professor of History

Dr. B. Carmon Hardy

Professor of History

Kaye Kaufman

Undergraduate Student, History

Alexandra Kindell

Graduate Student, History

Sharon Owen

Graduate Student, History

Allison Rubalcava

Graduate Student, History

Dr. Seymour Scheinberg

Professor of History

Wendy Elliott-Scheinberg

Professor of History

Tracy Smith

Alumni, American Studies

Dr. Roshanna Sylvester

Professor of History

The Welebaethan Staff



Welebaethan

Statement of Purpose

Phi Alpha Theta, the International History Honor Society, is a professional organization whose objective is to promote the study of history through encouragement of research, good teaching, publication, and the exchange of learning and thought among historians. The Theta Pi Chapter at California State University, Fullerton (CSUF) constantly strives to bring students, teachers, and writers of history together, both intellectually and socially.

The Theta Pi Chapter, in cooperation with the History Students Association, publishes this journal annually. The journal is not only used as a vehicle for history students to learn editing and publishing skills in preparation for the job market, but also to provide an arena for CSUF students to present their research.

The *Welebaethan* is named in honor of Professor Shirley Weleba. She arrived at CSUF in 1966 as the first department member to specialize in African American history. Shortly after her death in 1973, a group of students and faculty decided to begin publishing an annual journal of history and named it in honor of Dr. Weleba. The first publication of the journal came out in 1974 bearing the name *Welebaethan*, a combination of Professor Weleba's name and the Latin Suffix "ethan" which means "in honor of."

The nationally recognized *Welebaethan* is published annually specifically for the publication of historical topics. Along with traditional research-oriented articles, the journal accepts reviews of books, films, exhibits, and oral histories and historiographical essays. Awards are given to authors for exceptional papers each year. Students who are interested in submitting their work should do so by 5 January 2001. Papers are to be prepared using the *Chicago Manual of Style*, on an IBM Word formatted disk.

The *Welebaethan* disclaims responsibility for statements, whether of fact or opinion, made by contributors.

Pi Alpha Theta- Theta Pi Chapter Officers

Kelly F. Ewing, *President*
Mike Brown, Jamie Knight
Hank Thayer, Ed Thorell
Vice Presidents
Allison Rubalcava, *Treasurer*
Suzanne Salter, *Membership Chair*
Dr. Gordon M. Bakken, *Faculty Advisor*

Acknowledgments

Lawrence B. de Graaf
Professor of History

William Haddad
Chair, History Department

Nancy Carson
History Department Secretary

Jonathan Vo
Publication Services

Kelly Ewing
Graduate Student, History

Juan Perez
Gene Tarango

Contributors List

Mercedes Anderson: graduate student studying public history, twentieth century history, popular culture, and social history. Her future plans are to attain a Masters degree and work in the museum field.

Michael S. Brown: graduate student with an emphasis on American intellectual and modern British history. Teaching at the community college level and working in college administration are in his plans for the future.

Philip Curnutt: history graduate student with an emphasis on the United States twentieth century. After attaining a Ph.D. he plans to become a writer. Philip had dedicated his paper "Okies and Braceros" to the memory of Sheldon Maram, Ph.D.

Erica Darplee: senior studying communications with a minor in history. She plans to pursue a graduate degree in history with an emphasis on World War II, the Holocaust, and twentieth century Europe.

C. Wayne Dawson: teacher at two local community colleges. He received a Masters Degree in history and studied United States foreign relations and early modern Europe.

Carlota Ferreyra Haider: graduate student studying United States cultural history. Her paper "Cultural Chameleons" expresses enthusiasm for an increased understanding of the world around her.

Alexandra Kindell: graduate student studying nineteenth century United States history. Her plans are to become a professor and possibly seek work in editing.

Amy Lefkowitz: graduate student studying American Studies with an emphasis on popular culture. Her future plans include writing, editing, and teaching.

Michelle Mormul: graduate student studying colonial America and modern British history. Her plans for the future are to teach community college while continuing school to attain a Ph.D.

Lauren Parker: graduate student studying early modern European history. After receiving her Masters Degree in May she plans to spend time with her family and study genealogy.

Sally M. Pierotti: graduate student studying the Holocaust and Nazi Germany. She plans to receive a Ph.D. and teach history of the Holocaust, Nazi Germany, and World Wars I and II.

Eric Trimm: graduate student studying United States history. He plans to continue his education and receive a Ph.D. Eric's career plans are to teach history.

Table of Contents

United States History

"To Make Oneself Riche and the World Happie":

*The Long Search for a Viable Northwest
Passage*

Lauren Parker 5

Walking a Thin Line:

*The Religion Clauses and the Question
of Religious Programming in Popular
Media*

Amy Lefkowitz 25

The Sacking Of Caesar:

Truman Dismisses MacArthur

C. Wayne Dawson 39

The Race Not Run:

*Dwight D. Eisenhower and the
American Space Program*

Eric Trimm 53

Disneyheim: When Anaheim

Met Mickey

Mercedes Anderson 65

Okies, Arkies, and

**Braceros: The Strike Against
the Di Giorgio Farm, 1947-1950**

Phil Curnutt 77

**Roaring 20s: Tobacco Profits in
Jamestown**

Michelle Mormul 95

Cultural History

Unpave the Way to Progress:

*Agriculture and the USDA in American
Memory*

Alexandra Kindell 107

European History

Joan of Arc:

Heroine and Heretic

Sharon Evanshine 121

Revolt in Auschwitz:

The Sonderkommando's Final Solution

Erica Darplee

133

The Einsatzgruppen:

Germany's Mobile Killing Unit

Sally Pierotti

151

Book Reviews

American Holocaust:

The Conquest of the New World

Mike Brown 169

Spectacular Realities: Early

Mass Culture in fin-de-siecle Paris

Allison Rubalcava 173

Westering Women and the Frontier Experience, 1800-1915

Sharon Evanshine 177

**Contested Eden: California Before
the Gold Rush**

Carlotta F. Haider 181

EDITORS' NOTE

Publication of the 2000 edition of the *Welebaethan* has been a challenging and rewarding learning experience for all involved. Wendy Elliott-Scheinberg brings several years of professional editing experience to her position as faculty advisor and instructor for the historical editing class. With her guidance and with the essential advice and assistance provided by former *Welebaethan* editors and staff members, we have produced a journal that we feel measures up to the excellent reputation the *Welebaethan* has achieved nationwide.

The *Welebaethan* Advisory Board is made up of California State University Fullerton faculty members, graduate students, and alumni. The board reviewed thirty-eight submissions and chose eleven articles and four book reviews they deemed worthy of publication. The quality of the articles is a reflection of the high standards set by the various university professors for whom these papers were produced.

In choosing a theme for the 2000 edition, we searched for an idea that would adequately tie together our chosen articles. Our cover illustration depicts a bridge joining the Western and Eastern Hemispheres, representing a span that not only penetrates the mists of history through time but also shortens the distance between the Old World and the New World. Our articles tell the stories of what took place both recently and long ago in locations ranging from only a few miles down the freeway to half-way around the globe.

While the *Welebaethan* is a student-produced journal, it also is a collaborative effort among students, faculty, and staff within the history department. We would like to thank our fellow members of the *Welebaethan* staff (each of whom has the title of editor, reflecting the equal efforts put forth in the publication of this journal) for their commitment in accomplishing the various tasks before them. We also would like to thank the professors who volunteered their time to help in the editing process and the history department staff, who provided the necessary tools and information that enabled this edition to reach publication.

We encourage all CSUF students to become more involved in educational pursuits by joining Phi Alpha Theta, by submitting papers for publication, and by becoming a part of the *Welebaethan* staff, as these efforts will greatly enhance your academic career here at California State University, Fullerton.

The Editors of the *Welebaethan*

"To Make Oneself Riche and the World Happie":¹

The Long Search for a Viable Northwest Passage

Lauren Parker

For centuries, in spite of life-threatening danger and insufferable hardship, explorers persisted in their search for a shorter route to China. Author Lauren Parker skillfully employs the writings of the explorers to explain the reasons for their undaunted perseverance. Motivated by a sense of national pride, the notion that a passage already had been discovered but was being kept secret, and a desire for easy access to trade and riches, early explorers established a tradition of courage and endurance that inspired future explorers to continue the search. Careful research reveals stories of adventure and daring through the words of those who were unable to overcome the obstacles that prevented them from traversing the Northwest Passage but whose conviction inspired those who finally succeeded.

Cataia is a country, well known to be described and set forth by all moderne Geographers, whose authoritie in this art beareth most credit and the passage thereunto, by the Northwest from us, through a sea which lieth on the Northside of Labrador, mencioned and proved by no small number of the most expert and best learned amongst them. By whose authoritie, if I (amongst others) have beene moved, to hope of that passage, who can justly blame me.

Sir Humphrey Gilbert, 1566²

Sir Humphrey's comment expresses the spirit and desire that moved men for centuries to endure unbelievable danger and hardship in the hope of discovering a shorter route to China. The following investigation employs the writings of the various explorers to discover why the mariners continued to brave the search for the passage. Why would they return several times to watch their companions rot with scurvy after they had escaped starving, freezing, drowning,

¹Sir Humphrey Gilbert, *A Discourse of a Discoverie 1576* (Amsterdam: Da Capo Press, 1968), 56-8.

²*Ibid.*, ii.

or attack from the Eskimos?³ The impetus to continue the quest for the Northwest Passage can be traced to three factors. The first was national pride in an age when this was a developing concept; the desire to claim for one's own country some new land or route became a powerful motivation. The second was the idea that the passage had been discovered by someone else and was being kept secret. The third was the natural desire for easy access to trade and riches, especially on the part of the French and English, who looked to overcome the advantage that the Spanish and Portuguese had gained.

The Northwest Passage was always assumed to be there, just past the horizon, waiting, not for discovery but for corroboration.⁴ When passage was found around Asia and South America, it seemed plausible that a means to go to the northeast or the northwest would be forthcoming. During the innocent, early days of the Age of Exploration, Europeans learned at terrible cost how difficult it was to sail through the northern seas. Long after the worthlessness of such a passage for commercial and practical purposes was known, the search for the Northwest Passage lingered as a sort of "scientific sporting event."⁵

The route long remained locked in the realms of guesswork, optimism, and obstinacy. Many returned again and again, for the myth had a great hold on the imagination. The next bay or river, or the next, surely would be the opening to Cathay.⁶ As historian George Thomson stated:

The whole enterprise was founded on a misapprehension, a geographical fiction, a fairy tale, springing out of the kinds of stories sailors tell to amaze landmen, or delude other sailors, to which were soon added the inferences, speculations, and downright inventions that scholars manufacture to amaze themselves.⁷

The drama began with the information contained in Sebastian Cabot's sea cards or charts, as described by his navigator, Willes: "The mouth of the Northwest Strait lieth near the 318th meridian between 61 and 64 degrees in elevation, continuing the same treadeth about ten degrees west, where it openeth southerly more and more."⁸ Cabot not only introduced the idea that occupied explorers for more than three centuries, he also indicated the only possible route for its success. One historian noted that "commercial Europe maintained toward the Southeast and Southwest passages, around the Capes of Hope and Horn, a restless toleration - these routes were used for traffic with Asia pending the discovery of something better."⁹

The "magnetism of the North"¹⁰ was not confined to the needle of a compass but also seemed to have a strong attraction to many sorts of men: learned cartographers, greedy stock holding company owners, proud sovereigns, and impulsive explorers. It is a compelling and often tragic tale.

³Bern Keating, *A Northwest Passage: From the Mathew to the Manhattan, 1497 to 1969* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970), 21.

⁴Donald S. Johnson, *Phantom Islands of the Atlantic* (New York: Avon Books, 1994), 96.

⁵Nellis Maynard Crouse, *In Quest of the Western Ocean* (New York: Morrow, 1928), 2.

⁶Brendan Lehane, *A Northwest Passage* (Alexandria: Time-Life, 1981), 18.

⁷George M. Thomson, *A Northwest Passage* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1975), 2.

⁸G. M. Asher, ed., *The Voyages of Henry Hudson the Navigator - The Original Documents* (New York: Franklin, 1860), lxxiii.

⁹Vilhajalmur Stefansson, *Northwest to Fortune* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1958), 49.

¹⁰Thomson, 1.

Cabot and Verrazano

In a letter to the Duke of Milan, John Cabot said:

Once upon a time I was at Mecca, whither the spices are brought by caravan from distant countries, and those who brought them, on being asked where the said spices grow, answered that they did not know, but that other caravans come with this merchandise to them from distant countries, who again say that they are brought to them from other remote regions. And I argue thus, that if the Orientals affirm to the southerners, that these things come from a distance, and so from hand to hand, presupposing the rotundity of the earth, it must be that the last people gets them in the north towards the west.¹¹

Fifteenth century explorers had great faith in Ptolemy's estimate of the earth's circumference at 18,000 miles, which is approximately 6,000 miles too small. By 1498, only six years after Columbus reported reaching Asia, European thinkers realized that the land complex now called America was a barrier across the road to China and would have to be circumvented or traversed, not understanding the vastness of the continent.¹² Cabot himself may have thought the shores of Newfoundland that he reached were part of Asia. In maps drawn in the first half of the sixteenth century, Asia and America were depicted as one large land mass.¹³

Henry VII did not take the opportunity to sponsor Columbus and was unwilling to make the same mistake by ignoring Cabot's proposition to sail to Cathay by the

northwest. When news of the Genoese's discoveries had reached the court of Henry VII, it caused much discussion "insomuch that all men," the Venetian ambassador wrote, "affirmed it to be a thing more divine than human, to sail by the west into the east, where spices growe, by a way that was never knowen before." Cabot hoped to duplicate Columbus's feat, "understanding by reason of the sphere that if he should sail Northwest he might be able to reach India by a shorter route."¹⁴

After discovering Newfoundland, Cabot searched in vain for the opening of a passage. He was forced to return to England when his supplies ran low. Some evidence of a subsequent voyage has been noted, but Cabot drops from history, leaving his son Sebastian to carry on his quest.

These first attempts, in the burst of excitement during the first decades of the Age of Discovery, may be seen in hindsight as a "blind rush at an obstacle, the extent and difficulties of which are not yet understood."¹⁵ When men realized that America was a continent unto itself, they constantly strove to find passages through or around it. The French explorer Verrazano stated in 1522 that it was his intention "to reach Cathay, on the extreme coast of Asia, expecting, however to find in the newly discovered land some such obstacle as it has proved to be, yet did not doubt that I should penetrate by some passage to the eastern ocean."¹⁶ Francis I agreed with Verrazano's optimism and in 1524 sent him to discover the passage. Verrazano instead found New York and the Narragansett Bay.¹⁷ When he returned to North America in 1529, Indians at Delaware Bay told him of a large body of

¹¹Crouse, 31.

¹²Stefannson, 45.


¹³Errol Stevens, "The Asian-American Connection: The Rise and Fall of a Cartographic Idea," *Terrai Incognitae* 21 (1989): 27.

¹⁴Thomas Rundall, *Narratives of Voyages towards the Northwest, in Search of a Passage to Cathay and India, 1496 to 1631* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1849), 4.

¹⁵Asher, xiv.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, lxxix.

¹⁷Lehane, 21.



Map 1. Map of Hieronimo Da Verrazano, 1529. Wellis Maynard Crouse, *In Quest of the Western Ocean*

water to the west. He believed that the land he was on was a six-mile-wide isthmus and the sea beyond it a gulf of the South Sea.¹⁸

Map 1, drawn by Verrazano in 1529, depicts what he believed he had discovered. The Caribbean islands are shown in some detail, as is South America. Florida and Mexico are in an early approximation of their true shape. It is the mythical "Sea of Verrazano" that the explorer "discovered" that led to several decades of confusion and misguided journeys. It also will be seen that Verrazano called North America New France, in deference to his patron, Francis I.

In the forty-year span between Columbus's first voyage in 1492 and Verrazano's death in the Antilles in 1530, three illusions seem to have influenced European minds and kept the quest alive. The first was based on a map that Sebastian Cabot published. He claimed to have accompanied his father, John, in 1497 and described a passage from the area of Hudson's Strait to the Pacific. Second, influential mapmakers like Mercator had come to the conclusion that America was an island that was not connected to Asia across the pole. The third

¹⁸Crouse, 68.

factor that instigated continued exploration was the ceaseless jealousy among the different powers and commercial nations. Cortez complained in the 1520s that some foreign power was keeping knowledge of the strait a secret. Spain, Portugal, France, and England became aware that all were vying for a short passage to the east and would not believe that everyone was failing. Many rumors arose of ships that had completed the passage.¹⁹ The Congress of Baclajos assembled in 1524 to discuss, among other things, the extent of the current geographical knowledge. They determined that a gap signifying a strait existed in the North American continent between 35 and 43 degrees north latitude.²⁰

Sebastian Cabot probably had discovered this strait (later known as Hudson's) in 1509 and tried to sell his secret for the remainder of his life.²¹ After he conquered Tenochtitlan, Cortez reached the west coast of North America and began the construction of ships he hoped to use to sail north until he reached Asia or found a strait connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific.²² In 1524 Esteban Gomez sailed northward from Florida in an effort to find a shorter route to the Spice Islands than that of Magellan. A chronicler stated that Gomez "sailed by day because he knew not the land and because he wished to visit every bay, harbor, river, or inlet to see if he could reach the other coast." Gomez kept up the attempt for ten months.²³

In 1524 Jacques Cartier believed the strait would be found in the vicinity of Newfoundland. The voyages of Verrazano and the explorations of the Spaniards had dem-

¹⁹Asher, xiv.

²⁰Crouse, 63.

²¹Roger Barlow, *A Briefe Summe of Geographie* (London: 1540), xxix.

²²Stevens, 31.

²³L. A. Vigneras, "The Voyage of Esteban Gomez from Florida to the Baccaloes," *Terrae Incognitae* 2 (1970): 25-8.

onstrated the continuity of the American coastline south of the St. Lawrence. Baye des Chaleurs in New Brunswick was the first of several openings that gave Cartier hope of a passage.²⁴ In 1525 Francis I was impressed with Cartier's discoveries and commissioned him to return and search further. Cartier's Indian guides told him that the St. Lawrence was not a strait, but he wanted to see for himself. Verrazano, Cortereal, Cartier, and Gomez all expected to find a broad strait to the eastern (meaning Oriental) sea. Spain was secure in her control of the known western way to the Indies but was concerned by the activities of the other nations. Spain took the precaution of sending ships up the Pacific coast to intercept any Portuguese, French, or English vessels that might emerge from the passage.²⁵

Martin Waldseemüller's map of 1507 was the first to show eastern Asia and America as two distinct continents separated by a broad ocean, although the vast width of America was still undiscovered. Explorers soon found that the cold barren lands of the Northwest Passage had no economic value, although a few determined men like Martin Frobisher were hard to convince. The distant lure of the riches of Cipango and Cathay sufficed to provide the economic means and the incentive to lure men across the ice. Sir Humphrey Gilbert was one of the major propagandists of the cause.²⁶

"A Discourse of a Discoverie"

Before Sir Humphrey Gilbert wrote his famous pamphlet, *A Discourse of a Discoverie*, others continued the quest. In 1527 Robert Thorne, an Englishman, openly en-

couraged his government to pursue discovery of the Northwest Passage. He claimed that such a discovery would enrich his country and make it equal in power to Spain and Portugal. That same year, Henry VIII sent John Rut "with two fair ships, well manned and victualled, having in them divers cunning men." They reached Newfoundland but ended up in Puerto Rico, where Spanish officials inquired about their purpose. Rut replied that "the king of England had fitted us out to go and discover the land of the Great Khan."²⁷ Roger Barlow published *A Briefe Summe of Geographie* in London in 1540. His advice and explanation to Henry VIII included the "Five Ways to Cathay":

It may seeme a meere foolishness and a thing impossible for it to be done and yet notwithstanding no man can tell before that it is put in experience, and yet it is the nearest way (Northwest) to give directly unto the Pole, if so be that there be no land to let the passage. The great salt sea never freeseth, and whereas you doe see the great quantities of Ice on ye coast of Labrador, it is a token that there abates in much land towards the North Pole and is frozen in soundes and rivers.²⁸

The belief that ice could not form in deep sea water was widespread and led many explorers further north than their frail wooden ships could travel. As the Strait of Magellan was closed by Spain and Portugal to all other peaceful traders, English eyes again turned to the northwest.

Sir Humphrey Gilbert published a small pamphlet in 1566 called *A Discourse of a Discoverie* in which he laid out the reasons that the Northwest Passage must be and soon would be discovered and the benefits


²⁴Crouse, 72.

²⁵Ernest Stanley Dodge, *Northwest by Sea* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), 26, 37.

²⁶James A. Williamson, *The Cabot Voyages and Bristol Discovery under Henry VII* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1962), 143-4.

²⁷Crouse, 52-4.

²⁸Barlow, xxix.



Map 2. Sir Humphrey Gilbert Polar View, 1576. David Quinn, *Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert*.

that would derive therefrom. (It will be necessary to quote often from this flowery sixteenth-century booklet to impart a sense of the thinking of the Elizabethan Age).

Gilbert began by declaring that the discovery of a passage was not “rashe or foolishe” but “contrariwise, grounded upon a very sure foundation.” He studied all extant maps and determined that America was an island bounded on the south by the Strait of Magellan, on the west by the Mare de Sur (separating it from Cataia), on the east by the Atlantic, and on the north by the sea that separated America from Greenland. It was there that the passage would be discovered.²⁹ The common belief of the time that the world would display the symmetry of the Creator held that a northwest passage must exist to balance out the one to the southeast.³⁰

Sir Humphrey determined that Plato’s Atlantis and the island of America must be one and the same. He noted that the Spaniards in the New World found coins depicting the image of Augustus Caesar. America had become unknown and had to be rediscovered by Vespucci in 1497. Gilbert concluded that “seeing that Atlantis,

now called America, was ever known to be an island, and in those days navigable round about,” such still must be the case. Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient philosophers agreed with the best modern geographers that made Greenland and America islands “disjoined by a great sea from any part of Asia.”³¹


Learned men of the age agreed, according to Gilbert, that any Englishman who attempted to sail to Cataia would accomplish the passage faster than the Spaniards or Portuguese. Gilbert’s touching reliance on the works of contemporary geographers and cosmographers who copied and promulgated myth and each other’s errors is important. Throughout the sixteenth century, voyages to the northwest were undertaken with little factual evidence in hand. Maps 2 and 3, which were printed in Gilbert’s treatise, point out the errors that were perpetuated. Map 2 shows a polar view from the north depicting a clearly delineated strait traversing all of what is now Canada. Japan is shown a little too close to North America, and Verrazano’s great inland sea of 1524 is clearly marked. Map 3 shows a more traditional Mercator type projection but is also full of fantasy and conjecture. North America is taking on its actual shape; but the mythical Strait of Anian that led to Cathay is shown, and the islands of the Moluccas are placed too far east. Many fictitious islands of the Arctic are depicted, along with Fro-bisher’s conveniently wide straits passing Meta Incognita with a clear path to the west.

As further proof of the existence of a navigable northwest passage, Gilbert cited seven more interesting “facts.” First, the further west one sailed from Iceland, the deeper the seas became, “which giveth us good hope of continuance of the same sea” all the way to the Orient. Second, if America was connected to Asia, people of Cataia would have ventured there. Gilbert also

²⁹Gilbert, 1.

³⁰Stevens, 29.


³¹Gilbert, 4-6.



stated that until this time, the Spanish, Portuguese, and French had not met any "civil people" from other parts of the world in America. Fourth, Coronado had not found a land connection in all of his explorations. Fifth, the currents Cartier discovered must have an outlet north of Labrador. Sixth, the constant currents discovered worldwide must have an outlet through the supposed strait. And finally, Gilbert mentioned several individuals or groups who had traversed the strait: When Coronado found a great sea near the Sierra Nevada, he saw some ships laden with goods from Cathay; Verrazano had found the eastern edge of the sea; Henry VII sent Cabot to discover the passage and described it in his charts, which the Queen kept in her private gallery at Whitehall; and Cabot would have sailed west through the passage except for mutiny.³²

Gilbert also mentioned three friars who sailed the length of the passage and named it Fretum Trium Fratrum. Indians who sailed to Europe in 1160 AD at the time of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa came through the Northwest Passage. These mysterious Indians must have journeyed from that direction; otherwise they would have been "eaten by the Anthropophagi, or man-eaters or been kept as wonders for the gaze." Gilbert added the "fact" that a Portuguese and a Dane named Scolnus already had passed through the strait.³³

By the late 1530s, most mapmakers followed Mercator's model of America and Asia separated by a northern strait and a wide ocean. These maps always showed what was presumably a navigable passage north of America. On Mercator's map of 1538 it was called Fretum Arcticum. Map 4 by Sebastian Munster was published in his widely read *Geographie* (1540) and shows a passage clearly labeled (in Latin), "By this



Map 3. Map of the world showing Frobisher's Straits, 1576. Humphrey Gilbert, *A Discourse of Discoverie*.

strait the way stands open to the Molucas."³⁴ Gilbert took this information to heart and incorporated it into his claim that a Spaniard, Salva Terra, told Gilbert and Henry Sidney that he came from Mare De Sur into Germany through the Northwest Passage. According to Gilbert, "A sea carde made by his own experience and travel in that voyage agreed in all points with Munster's map." In Gilbert's mind the passage was thus proved to exist and to be navigable "both to come and goe."³⁵

With all of this evidence to back his claims, Sir Humphrey Gilbert petitioned Queen Elizabeth:

I am encooraged and mind with Your Majesties license and favor to enterpryse and geve the attempt with all possible spede for the discooverye of A Passage to Catia and all the other ryche partes of the worlde as yet un-founde, which takynge good successe shall be greette honor to your Majestie with ymmortall fame throughout all the world.³⁶


³⁴Stevens, 33.

³⁵Gilbert, 37.

³⁶David Quinn, ed., *Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert* (London: Hakluyt Society, 1938), 108.

³²Ibid., 10-21.

³³Ibid., 22-37.



Map 4. Sebastian Munster. *Typus orbis universalis*, 1540. Seaver Center, Los Angeles, Calif.

If the facts did not convince the Queen and her advisers, Gilbert was not above appealing to pride and greed. He summed up nine benefits that would derive from the English discovery of the Northwest Passage. The first was the ability to gain the wealth of the Orient. Second, the wealth of England ultimately would surpass that of Spain or Portugal. Third, they would gain access to more silk and spices. A fourth consideration was the possibility of colonizing new areas with "some of our outlaw people who are daily consumed with the Gallows." (Here Gilbert foreshadows the settlement of Australia two hundred years in the future.) One colony might be placed in the Sierra Nevada, which would shorten the voyage. A sixth advantage would be the establishment of new markets for English cloth production. The traversing of such a passage would increase the skill of English mariners and the number of ships. There would be more work for the "loiterers" in England. Finally, no injury would come to any "Christian prince" by passing through previously un-

claimed regions.³⁷ If the Queen's Majesty had use of the passage, Spain and Portugal would be "beating the bushe" while Englishmen "catche the birds."³⁸

Gilbert's writings prompted a group of merchant adventurers from London to organize and finance Martin Frobisher's voyages to find the Northwest Passage. The fact that many previous expeditions failed did not diminish the power of the concept or the desire for the great rewards that could ensue.³⁹ In a final appeal to vainglory, Gilbert ended his pamphlet:

These things considered and indifferently wayed together, with the wonderful commodities which this discoverie may bring, especially to this realm of England: I must needs conclude with Hierminus Fracatori (and divers other learned men) who said the this discoverie hath beene reserved for

³⁷ Gilbert, 49.

³⁸ Ibid., 34.

³⁹ Johnson, 64.

some noble Prince, or worthy man, thereby to make himsef rich and the world happie.⁴⁰

It is fascinating that the following statement found in a Viking manuscript from 1240, roughly translated, presages Gilbert's writings of 1566. "The answer to your enquiry as to what people go to seek in Greenland and why they fare thither through such perils is to be sought in man's threefold nature. One motive is fame. A second is curiosity. The third is desire for gain."⁴¹

The Three Voyages of Martin Frobisher

A letter from Don Guzman de Silva, an observer in the Elizabethan court, warned Philip II in 1567: "One infers from what is being said that a shorter route to India must be by the land which they call Labrador, where they will pass through to arrive on the back of the Indies or to the island of Giapon."⁴²

Sir Humphrey Gilbert himself did not undertake the voyage to the Northwest Passage, but Martin Frobisher left in 1576 in his first attempt. Before he departed, Frobisher argued that English mariners knew the way through the passage and that any inhabitants they encountered would be eager for English cloth since they experienced the same climate as England. To further strengthen his argument for the voyage, Frobisher proposed that the natives would embrace Christianity when it was unencumbered by "the incredible absurdities of papistry." In June, when the voyage was undertaken, there were many hours of daylight and at 67 degrees north latitude the voyage

to Cathay would be only 6,000 leagues instead of 15,000 by the Strait of Magellan.⁴³

George Best wrote the history of Frobisher's voyages and in his preface of 1578 summed up the late sixteenth-century view of the enterprise for the Northwest Passage:

By this discourse, it may please your Honour to behold the greate industrie of oure present age, and the invincible minds of our Englishe nation, who have never left anye worthy thing unattempted, nor anye parte almost of the whole world unsearched, whome lately, neyther storms of seas by long and tedious voyages, danger of darke fogs and hidden rocks in unknown coastes, congealed and frozen seas with mountains of fleeting ise, could anye whit dismay, or cause to desiste from intended enterprises; but rather preferring an honourable death before a shameful return. . . So that if the passage to Cataia be made open to us it is proove that the Englishman in his notable discoveries is nothing inferior.⁴⁴

Thus we see Best appealing to those motives of national pride and enterprise noted in the chronicles of other expeditions. Best also pointed out that there would be much to be gained in the New World. Because America was known to be an island, Frobisher thought on his first attempt in 1576 that he would be able to journey northwest to China and then return back to England by the northeast, in other words, a circumnavigation.⁴⁵

The land that Frobisher discovered, termed *Meta Incognita* by Queen Elizabeth, was found to be "well inhabited," proving to Frobisher that the polar regions could be in-

⁴⁰Gilbert, 56-8.

⁴¹Thomson, 1.


⁴²Quinn, 115.

⁴³George Best, *The Three Voyages of Martin Frobisher in Search of a Passage to Cataia, 1576* (New York: Franklin, 1867), 5.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 19.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 35-40.

habited and also traversed by people who were accustomed to them. Frobisher determined to find the passage since "this was the only thing of the worlde that was left yet undone, whereby a notable mind might be made famous and fortunate." This is one of many appeals to self promotion and fame. He named the straits that he discovered "Frobisher's Straits" as they were the opposite of Magellan's.⁴⁶ When Frobisher and his crew returned to England with a "savage" and some ore that some thought contained gold, many hopes were raised of a passage. He declared that a navigable entrance had been found between 60 and 62 degrees north latitude.⁴⁷



Map 5. Abraham Ortelius. Map from his *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, 1570.

One of Frobisher's crewmen, Michael Lok, went so far as to declare in testimony to the state after the first voyage that the captain had put the matter "owt of all dowbt that he hath found the same seas" that pass from North America through to the countries of China and India. After all, said Lok, books of cosmography that may be found in any printer's shop "doo declare the same at large," a striking example of the power of print and the repetition of myth when it concerned sixteenth-century maps


and discoveries. Lok added a disclaimer stating that even if the newfound lands of Baccaloes and Canada were found to extend to the North Pole, thus blocking the way to China (which he had just declared Frobisher had discovered!), plenty of goods and "merchandize" for economic gain were to be found within the cold regions. Lok went on to praise Martin Frobisher for the courage he displayed for the sake of the honor of his country. Lok declared that his own "eloquence and wit are unsufficient duly to declare" all that Frobisher had accomplished.⁴⁸ While he sought backing for annual expeditions, Frobisher gave strong testimony that Frobisher's Straits would lead to the Orient. In the middle of the second expedition he gave up looking for the passage and concentrated on finding more of the "gold ore" that his crew had found in 1576. Frobisher's instructions from the crown for the third voyage were almost exclusively concerned with the establishment of a colony and the digging of gold mines. After provision was made for one hundred men to live and have sufficient "victuals" and protection from the natives, and if "leisure and time permit," Frobisher was to continue westward one hundred leagues until he was certain he was in the South Sea. He probably got as far as Hudson's Bay, for he found that the bay got wider and wider with less ice. He claimed that he was forced to return to England because he had too large a fleet to worry about and remained convinced that this was the way to Cathay.⁴⁹ King Philip II was suspicious enough of Frobisher's success to send a spy on the third voyage of 1578. The spy gave an accurate account of the voyage to the Spanish court, and when the tons of ore that Frobisher brought back turned out to be

⁴⁶Ibid., 45-72.

⁴⁷Asher, cv.

⁴⁸Best, 219.

⁴⁹Ibid., 217.



Map 6. Sir Humphrey Gilbert, 1576. David Quinn, *Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert*.



Map 7. Michael Lok, 1582. David Quinn, *Voyages and Colonising Enterprises of Sir Humphrey Gilbert*.

worthless, Philip turned his attention elsewhere.⁵⁰

Maps 5 through 7 are from the time period of Frobisher's voyages. Map 5, drawn in 1570 by the renowned cartographer Ortelius, shows North America with a clearly delineated passage through the from Humphrey Gilbert's book, discussed above. Here the island of Newfoundland is called Canada and the mythical land of Sanguinay is placed at the eastern edge of the Northwest Passage. On this map it is not so much a passage as it is a wide-open seaway which would be corroborated by Verrazano and Frobisher. Map 7 was drawn either by or for Michael Lok, one of Frobisher's investors and shipmates. Though almost sixty years had passed since Verrazano's discoveries, Lok still shows a large inland sea that can be reached by continuing west through Frobisher's Straits. Interestingly, Lok's map also continues the tradition of depicting some of the phantom islands of the Atlantic, such as Sept Cities, Brasil, and Friesland. Another map from this period is by Englishman John Dee from 1580 (not pictured). Although he shows more accurate detail of the eastern seaboard of North America, there is also much conjecture in way of a wide northwest passage.

Richard Hakluyt and other Propagandists

Richard Hakluyt published an influential work in 1582 entitled *Divers Voyages touching the discoverie of America, and the Ilands adjacent to the same*, in which he related the myth of a Juan Cortereal who sailed in 1574 and discovered a "deepe and broad" passage at 58 degrees north latitude. The passage was claimed to "always trende toward the South," and "they persuaded

themselves verely that there was a way open into the South Sea." Alas, their "victuals" failed them and they were forced to return with "joy." Hakluyt proposed: "This reporte may bee well annexed to the others forprooffe of the likelihood of the passage by the Northwest."⁵¹

In another "epistle," Hakluyt mentioned that Cartier had been told of the land of Sanguinay, where on the coasts westward "there is a sea the end whereof is unknowne unto them." This was probably one of the Great Lakes, but the concept that it was the Pacific did not diminish. Hakluyt also stated that many people of Canada "say that is a months space to saile to a lande where cinnamon and cloves are growing." He offered as further evidence the experiences of Captain Frobisher on one side and Frances Drake "on the backe side of America" that give hope of quick discovery of the passage. Hakluyt concluded:


There is no doubt that there is a straight and short way open into the West even unto Cathay. Into which kingdome, if they take their course aright, they shall gather the most noble merchandize of all the worlde, and shall make the name of Christe to bee knowne unto many idolatrous and heathen people."⁵²

Hakluyt then contradicted this view by stating that perhaps the Englishmen had not yet been successful in their quest because their goal was attainment of wealth rather than the glory of God. Hopefully, the "manifold losses" suffered so far would encourage men to take a "more godly course." Hakluyt's wish never materialized, as few, if any, of the explorers for the Northwest Passage un-

⁵⁰Bernard Allaire and Donald Hogarth, "Martin Frobisher, the Spaniards and a 16th Century Spy," *Terrae Incognitae* 18 (1996): 48-56.

⁵¹Richard Hakluyt, *Divers Voyages Touching the Discoverie of America, and the Ilands Adjacent unto the Same* (London: 1582), 4.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 8.



dertook the attempt either for missionary work or for the honor of deity.

Many Elizabethans continued to push for discovery of the passage. In his preface to a volume of navigation of 1545, John Ramutius wrote of the Northwest Passage:

It seemeth that God doth yet still reserve this great enterprise for some great Prince which for the bringing of the spiceries into Europe were the most easie and shortest of all other wayes hitherto founde out. And surely this enterprise woulde bee the most glorious and of most importance of all other that can be imagined, to make his name great, and fame immortall to all ages to come, farre more then can bee done by any of all these great troubles and warres, which daily are used in Europe among the miserable Christian people.⁵³

In 1550 John Florio wrote *A Shorte and brieve narration of Navigation and Discoveries to the Northwest partes called Newe Fraunce* in which he summed up the explorations of Verrazano and Cartier and wondered why Englishmen were not taking the opportunity to plant colonies in the regions north of Florida. He felt that other Europeans were withholding secrets of navigation that would benefit Englishmen in the quest for the Northwest Passage. If Jacques Cartier lasted a winter in those climes, English explorers should attempt the same for the advancement of their nation. Florio concluded:

I commende this diligent consideration to all such Gentlemen, Merchants, and Pilots, as seeke Gods glory and the happy successe, to the providence of the Almighty, who hath not in vaine stirred uppe the mindes of so many Honourable and Worshipfull persons

to the furtherance of these commendable and worthy Discoveries.⁵⁴

Florio encapsulated all three of the arguments for the continued search for the passage. He spoke to national pride and to the concept that vital information concerning the passage was being withheld from the English. He appealed to the economic interests of planting colonies along the route of the passage. To these, Florio added the responsibility of living up to the prompting of God. Perhaps the Creator reserved his richest rewards for those who dared most and suffered worst.⁵⁵

John Davis and the Strait of Anian

After Frobisher's attempts, "certain honourable personages and worthy gentlemen of the court with divers merchants of London" decided to continue the cause. Moved by "the desire of advancing Gods glory and the good of their native land," they decided that previous efforts had failed not because the passage was a myth but "through neglect of the main objects of the enterprise." In other words, because the explorers focused their efforts to locate gold mines on the windswept islands of Frobisher's Strait, the Northwest Passage still lay waiting for discovery to the west.

In 1585 the merchants provisioned and sent John Davis to the northwest. His first landfall was on the east shore of Greenland where there was "irksome noyce of yce." They named this region Gilbert's Sound and, at 66 degrees north latitude, Davis Straits. The water here was free of ice, and Davis felt he was close to the passage that he sought. The water remained ice-free and seemed to be the color of the

⁵³Ibid., 19.

⁵⁴Ibid., 128.

⁵⁵Thomson, 1.

"mayne ocean." He returned to England confident that the passage was found.⁵⁶

Davis was always searching for the "Polar Basin" that sixteenth-century geographers believed would be perpetually free of ice.⁵⁷ When he returned to England, Davis declared that "a northwest passage is a matter nothing doubtful, but at any time almost to be passed, the sea navigable, void of ice, the air tolerable, and the waters very deep."⁵⁸ Like Frobisher before him, Davis returned confident of having discovered a passage that he never actually sailed through.

By his careful descriptions and observations and by his book on the Northwest Passage, *The World's Hydrographical Description*, Davis kept alive English interest in the possibilities of the Far North.⁵⁹ The merchants who backed him were encouraged by the number of skins and furs Davis obtained from the natives and sent him on a second voyage in 1586. He returned to Gilbert Sound and then sailed to 63 degrees north latitude where there lay what seemed to be a continent of ice. Three of his ships turned back, and Davis pressed on alone in a small "bark of only thirty tunnes." By mid-August, land to the northwest was discovered at 65 degrees north latitude with no land south, and great hopes were raised of "a through passage." By September 5, Davis was forced to return to England and stated that he had "a perfect hope of the passage, finding a mightie great sea lying amongst many islands."⁶⁰

In 1587 Davis's third voyage made it as far as Hudson's Bay, where "to our great admiration wee saw the sea falling down into the gulfes with a mighty overfall and roaring." This time when he returned to

England, he wrote to the chief promoter of the voyage:

Good Mr. Sanderson, with Gods great mercy I have made may safe returne in health, with all my company, and have sailed threescore leagues further then my determination at my departure. I have been at 73 degrees, finding the sea all open. The passage is most probable, the execution easie, as at my coming you shall fully know.⁶¹

Davis certainly was an optimist and later claimed that only "by reason of the Spanish fleet was voyage never sithens attempted."⁶²

The dream was kept alive when persons such as Juan de Fuca claimed that he traversed the Strait of Anian in 1591, an imaginary passage to the Orient that existed on many sixteenth-century maps (see Map 3). In Madrid, Lorenzo Maldonaldo said he had sailed through the Strait of Anian in 1588 and that it was fifteen leagues long and a quarter of a league wide, with six turnings.⁶³

Spaniards who were exploring the western coast of America gradually dispelled the idea that America and Asia were connected, which was corroborated by Drake's expeditions and perpetuated belief in a passage. According to tradition, Philip III of Spain was said to have found hidden away in his dusty archives a narrative that told of certain individuals who were driven by a storm into a great bay in Newfoundland where, after wandering about for some time, they made their way to the Western Sea at 48 degrees north latitude. The king sent Sebastian Vizcaino up the coast of California to find this outlet. Belief in the Strait of Anian did not diminish readily.⁶⁴

⁵⁶Rundall, 36.

⁵⁷Leslie H. Neatby, *In Quest of a Northwest Passage* (New York: Crowell, 1959), 8.

⁵⁸Lehane, 35.

⁵⁹Thomson, 56.


⁶⁰Rundall, 40-5.

⁶¹*Ibid.*, 47-50.

⁶²*Ibid.*

⁶³Thomson, 59-60.

⁶⁴Crouse, 149-51.



Early Seventeenth Century Exploration

At the beginning of the seventeenth century, in spite of numerous setbacks, the spirit of adventure took hold of a new generation of explorers. In 1607 Richard Penkevell applied for a license to discover "the passage into China, Cathay, and the Moluccas by the northward or north westward." In the same decade, George Weymouth signed a contract in which he agreed to go forward by the northwest or wherever he found the passage "to lie towards the ports or kingdoms of Cathay or China or the backside of America so long as he shall find those seas or any part thereof navigable and any possibility to sail a passage through them."⁶⁵ The East India Company showed by "erectynge of Handes" that money should be raised to support Weymouth's quest. They were anxious for him to reach Cathay to "afford a most liberall vent of English clothes to the general advancement of traficke of merchandize of the Realme of England." When Weymouth's ships became surrounded by icebergs, a mutiny ensued. They pushed on to Davis's Inlet, where a furious storm forced their early return to England. The company expected them to be gone for over a year, and everyone was chagrined at their early return.⁶⁶

In 1606 another expedition was financed for exploration of the Northwest Passage under the command of John Knight. He sailed with one ship of forty tons that soon was wrecked by the ice. At an unnamed island, Knight and some of his men went exploring and were never seen again. The eight men who remained miraculously made it back to England in one of the ship's tenders. Many such remarkable stories of foolhardiness, courage, suffering, and sur-

vival are found in the chronicles of these voyages.⁶⁷

Hudson, Button and Baffin

One of the most famous of the failed and tragic expeditions in search of the Northwest Passage is that of Henry Hudson. The independently financed Hudson set sail on the *Discovery* in 1610. He passed through Frobisher's Strait into a large sea, now known as Hudson's Bay.⁶⁸ The French ambassador to the English court described the negotiations regarding Hudson and his findings:

The Englishman reports that having been to the north as far as 80° he has found that the more northward he went, the less cold it became; to find the northern passage with greater ease, we ought not to sail along the coasts in 70° or 73°, as the Dutch have done; on the contrary, we ought to advance into the open sea and so go as far as 81° or 83°, because the sea not being frozen in that latitude, they trust to be able to find the passage.⁶⁹

Hudson was influenced by letters from his friend Captain John Smith in Virginia, who told of a supposed passage somewhere to the north of the colony, an idea based on the old concept of "Verrazano's Sea" and the natives' belief that the Great Lakes constituted a vast western ocean.⁷⁰

Hudson's journal ends abruptly on 3 August 1610. One of his men summed up the next three months of the explorations as wandering "in a labyrinth without end." The ship was hauled aground on November 1, and the crew spent a miserable winter. When the ice thawed on June 18, Hudson

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Rundall, 60-8.

⁶⁷Ibid., 71-3.

⁶⁸Ibid., 76.

⁶⁹Asher, 249.

⁷⁰Lehane, 46.

seemed determined to continue his wanderings. Mutiny broke out and Hudson, his young son, and six other men were put afloat in a small boat and never seen again.⁷¹ The parallel between Hudson and Cabot is close. They both got to a large bay full of floating ice and thought it was the Pacific Ocean. Both were stopped on their way to China by mutiny. Cabot was turned back by his mutineers, but Hudson was murdered by those on the *Discovery*.⁷²


Upon their return to England, Hudson's mutineers told a good story. The men who led the rebellion soon were killed by Eskimos. Those who survived reported that they had sailed through a broad strait into a wide sea, a fact that seemed more important than the abandonment of their captain. Hudson had explored the eastern shore of that sea, and it still seemed reasonable to assume that the western shore would lead to China.⁷³

In 1612 Thomas Button sailed with orders to follow up on the clues discovered by Hudson and not to return "without either the good news of a passage or sufficient assurance of an impossibility."⁷⁴ The patience of the merchants was wearing thin. Henry, Prince of Wales, charged Button to keep better control of his ships and men. Daily religious service was suggested to avoid the tragedies of Hudson's voyage, and Button was warned, "You must be careful to prevent all mutynie amongst your people, and to preserve them from the treacherie and villainie of the Salvages and other Eastern people." Prince Henry offered Button many suggestions for navigation:

We holde it best for you to keepe the Northerne side as most free from the pester of Ice at least till you be past Cape Henry, from thence follow the leading Ice. . .make all haste to Salis-

bury Island between which and the Northern continent you are like to meet a great and hollowe billowe from an opening and flowing Sea. Remember that your end is West. Dispatch the pinnace with advertisement of your entrie into the South Sea.⁷⁵

Button was the first to cross Hudson's Bay from east to west. He and his crew wintered in Port Nelson, where many of the men perished from scurvy. They resumed sailing to the Northwest in June 1613, but eventually returned to England in some disagreement over which islands they had seen. They were determined, however, that they "had proved a new streight." Button's lack of success was not seen as giving a "sufficient assurance of an impossibility" of a passage.⁷⁶ Assurances were derived from the voyage of the practicability of further discovery. Button's observations of the tides at the western end of Hudson's Strait directly influenced the Northwest Company to send out another expedition the following year.⁷⁷



Map 9. Henry Briggs, his map of the North Part of America, 1625. Nellis Maynard Crouse, *In Quest of the Western Ocean*.

Two contemporary writers summed up the ongoing belief in the existence of a viable northwest passage. Thomas Harriott

⁷¹Rundall, 78.

⁷²Williamson, 166.

⁷³Dodge, 127.

⁷⁴Neatby, 32.


⁷⁵Rundall, 80-4.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, 90.

⁷⁷Dodge, 139.

wrote *Three Reasons to Prove that there is a Passage from the Northwest into the South Sea*:

1. The tydes in Port Nelson were constantly fifteen or eighteen foote, which is not found in any Baye throughout the World, but in such areas as Lye open at both ends to the Mayne Ocean.
2. Every strong western wind did bring into that harbor so much water that the tydes were equal to that in the spring.
3. About 60° Button found a strong race of tyde which could be no other thing than the tyde coming from the west to the east.⁷⁸



Map 10. S. De Champlain, Map of New Fance, 1616 *Imago Mundi*, Volume II.

In 1622 Henry Briggs published his *Treatise on a northwest passage to the South Sea through the Continent of Virginia and by Fretum Hudson*. Briggs summed up the opinion of the day that the western extension of Hudson Bay was being confused with the South Sea that lay on the western side of the Virginia mountains. His principal theory, one that Samuel de Champlain adopted, was that contact with the South Sea might be more practical by going up rivers to the mountains and down other rivers to the ocean.⁷⁹ Map 9, drawn by Briggs, shows

Hudson's and Button's Bays as closed. He put Button's evidence of the tides right on the map, along with advice on a "temperate passage to China."

Another explorer, William Baffin, wrote to a group of merchants in 1615: "You are the worthys of our tyme, which are not discouraged with spendinge and losse of many hundred pounds, reaping no other profit butt onlye bare reports, and those little avalyable" regarding the discovery of the passage.⁸⁰ After Baffin's explorations, he determined that the passage, if it existed at all, lay not through Hudson's Bay, but farther north through the Davis Straits. On his second voyage, Baffin gave up on that notion but did have the honor of naming one of the largest islands in the world after himself. Baffin wrote, "How many men have set their whole endeavors to proove a passage to the Northwest? Yea, what great summes of money have been spent about that action." He also blamed the "vainglorious Spaniards" for scattering about false maps and journals to deceive many about the location of the passage.⁸¹

Two more adventurers made brief attempts at discovery. In 1614 Gibbons got as far as Labrador, and in 1619 John Wolstenholme financed a voyage led by Hawkrige but found nothing new.⁸²

Champlain

Samuel de Champlain left many journals and several maps describing his explorations for the French crown in the early seventeenth century. He wrote of the "many princes" who had financed and sponsored voyages to find a northerly route to China in the hope that the route would be shorter and less dangerous. Champlain lamented that "so many voyages and discoveries without

⁷⁸Rundall, 91.

⁷⁹Dodge, 139.

⁸⁰Rundall, 98.

⁸¹Ibid., 145.

⁸²Ibid., 95.

result and attended with so much hardship and expense, have caused us French in late years to attempt a permanent settlement in those lands which we call New France.”⁸³ Champlain was a diligent explorer of the north in the hope of finding a way to the South Sea and of furthering French interests in the colonies of North America.

Upon receiving instructions for his fourth voyage in 1613, Champlain wrote to King Louis XV: “The honor I have received from your Highness in being intrusted with the discovery of New France has inspired in me the desire to pursue with still greater pains and zeal than ever the search for the South Sea.”⁸⁴ Champlain inferred from what the Indians told him that the sea could not be far from the discoveries he had already made. He heard rumors of Hudson’s expedition that led him to think he was on the right track. Champlain ended his search when the rivers became too narrow and were swept by rapids and waterfalls.⁸⁵

In Map 10, drawn by Champlain in 1616, one can see his widespread knowledge of the discoveries of his day. Davis Strait and the “Passage of the English” are noted. Hudson’s Bay opens up to the northwest to a great sea, and one of the Great Lakes is drawn as the eastern entrance of a wide strait to the west. Champlain had seen Panama and never entirely lost hope that the American continent might be just as narrow somewhere else.⁸⁶ His interpreter, Jean Nicolet, spent ten years wandering among the Indians with Champlain. Wherever he went, he carried a flowered robe made of Chinese silk in readiness for the moment

when the French would cross some unmarked border into Cathay and meet a mandarin.⁸⁷

Foxe and James

Luke Foxe and Thomas James left on almost simultaneous voyages in 1632. Foxe had been eager to go to the northwest since 1606 and was fully prepared in 1631. He described the stores of food he took onboard for an eighteen-month journey: “excellent beefe, strong beere, good wheaten breade, good Island ling, butter, cheese, pease, oat-meale, wheatmeale, ayle, spice, fruits and rice.” When Foxe passed through Hudson’s Straits he felt assured that God had sent him into the passage, but by August 21 he and his crew could find no more signs of a through passage.⁸⁸ Foxe never lost his belief in the Northwest Passage, but he never commanded another expedition. He wrote that “God would send some other happy man to find the Passage to Cathay and he that finds it brings home the Golden Fleece.”⁸⁹

The Strange and Dangerous Voyage of Captain Thomas James, as related by him in a book published in 1633, is probably the most amazing tale of all of these journeys of discovery and misfortune. The details of adversity may be omitted without losing the importance of James’s expedition to the history of the northwest. James confidently set sail with only one ship and twenty-five men but was so “pestered with ice” that he realized he could neither find the passage nor return safely to England the first summer. He took the incredible step of actually sinking his ship to save it from the crushing ice. He and his men built a shelter and barely survived the long, dark winter on the ship’s stores. Through great ingenuity and

⁸³Samuel de Champlain, *Les Voyages du Sieur de Champlain 1613* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1966), quoted in W. L. Grant, ed., *Voyages of Samuel Champlain 1604-1618* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1959), 22-3.

⁸⁴Charles W. Colby, *The Founder of New France* (Toronto: Glasgow, 1920), 84.

⁸⁵Champlain quoted in Grant, 227-52.

⁸⁶Thomson, 124.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 125.

⁸⁸Rundall, 152-79.

⁸⁹Thomson, 119.

luck, the ship was brought up, and they struggled back to England the following summer of 1633. After his disastrous experiences, James declared that the Portuguese had stirred up false hopes through their vanity by declaring that a passage to the South Seas existed at 80 degrees north latitude. James knew that neither the Portuguese nor the Spanish had ships strong enough to endure the hardships of sailing through the vast, frozen Arctic regions.⁹⁰

James concluded his extraordinary account with four reasons for deciding that "most probably there is no passage," all of which were based on the evidence he carefully observed from the ocean during his long ordeal. First, James noted that there was a constant tide that flowed to the east out of Hudson Bay. He also observed that there was little evidence of codfish or whales that would inhabit the seas in the region if they were connected to the "mayne


there was a passage to a sea to the west. And fourth, the ice, like the tides, always flowed to the west instead of altering directions.⁹¹

James also noted in his conclusion that if one carefully measured the true distance of Japan from the coastline of California, a strait through the northwest (if one did exist) had to be so long that it would be impossible to traverse in the two short months of August and September when the ice was broken up. It would be a long voyage heading into a prevailing westerly wind. James felt it "better to go one thousand leagues past the Cape of Good Hope than one hundred leagues" in the miserable Arctic waters in which he had suffered. He thought it might be possible that someone else "with a better understanding" would "bring this so long tried Action to Absolute effect" and wished "a happy successe" for any future explorers.⁹²

Map 11 was drawn for James's book about his explorations. He mistakenly places Frobisher's Straits at the tip of Greenland and interestingly calls Hudson's Bay "James his Baye." By James's reckoning, the only outlets out of Baffin's Bay were rivers, and the whole of the northwest seemed to be closed to a westward voyage.

Conclusion

Today we know there is a northwest passage by sea from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans. Its eastern terminus lies in what is now known as Foxe's Basin. It may be surprising to learn that it was not until 1905 that the passage was traversed by the Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen, who went from east to west in a forty-seven-ton sloop not much larger than those of the early explorers but better equipped for ice-breaking. The oil tanker *Manhattan* went



Map 11. Thomas James, 1633. *The Strange and Dangerous Voyage of 1632.*

ocean." The ice he encountered seemed to be too uniform on the surface of the sea; James thought it would be more broken up if

⁹⁰Thomas James, *The Strange and Dangerous Voyage 1633* (Amsterdam: Da Capo, 1968), 1-107.

⁹¹Ibid., 108-10.

⁹²Ibid.

through the passage from Alaska to New York in 1969, but the dangers and rigors of dealing with so much ice have kept the passage from becoming a viable sea lane.

By the nineteenth century it was clear that the passage would have no commercial benefit, but the search continued for the sake of geographical discovery. These later explorers sought a connection to the daring and “sea-doggery” of the Elizabethan voyagers who had left a tradition of courage and endurance. By the time of the famous, doomed Franklin expedition in the 1850s, “success” in navigating the Northwest Passage was redefined as almost a mystical goal that did not even require that the explorers return alive.⁹³

The famous Arctic explorer Captain Edward Parry offered these sentiments more than two hundred years after those “strange and dangerous” voyages:

While thus doing justice to the faithfulness and accuracy with which they recorded their discoveries, one cannot less admire the intrepidity, perseverance, and skill, with which, inadequately furnished as they were, those discoveries were effected, and every difficulty and danger braved. That any man, in a single frail vessel of five-and-twenty tons, ill-found in most respects, and wholly unprovided for wintering having to contend with a thousand real difficulties, as well as with numberless imaginary ones - that any man should, two hundred years ago, have persevered in accomplishing what our old navigators did brings to the mind pride in the accomplishments of our countrymen and humiliation when I consider how little, with all our advantages, we have succeeded in going beyond them.⁹⁴

Parry was right. It is amazing what all of these explorers, from John Cabot to Thomas James, were able to undergo and discover without benefit of engines, vitamin C, proper rigging, the ability to determine their longitude, or a true understanding of what they were up against. It is probably that naivete that inspires all explorers, whether they are going to the moon or to Labrador. The chronological sequence of the maps exhibits the progress made from accepting that phantom islands were randomly scattered about the Atlantic and that the Strait of Anian would lead to Cipango to the careful mapping of Baffin's Bay, even when it seemed to show there was no hope of a northwest passage. The three motives proposed for inciting such foolhardiness—national pride, suspicion, and greed—are human traits that can color any enterprise. We can see the same motivations at work in the struggles of the Cold War and the Space Race. Those northwest wanderers of more than four centuries ago sought an easier way, a shortcut, a different path to glory and riches for their country and for themselves, and it required miles of impenetrable ice to deter them from that path.

⁹³Francis Spufford, *I May Be Some Time Ice and the English Imagination* (New York: Picador, 1997), 51-126.

⁹⁴Rundall, 225.

Walking a Thin Line:

The Religion Clauses and the Question of Religious Programming in Popular Media

Amy Lefkowitz

Three themes are developed in analysis of American religious broadcasting. First, the religion clauses of the U.S. Constitution are examined to provide the framework for understanding the conditions under which religious broadcasters operate. The author, Amy Lefkowitz, discusses the ways in which the constitutional religion clauses have been problematic in the courts and in forming public policy. Next, the role of the religion clauses in religious broadcasting and its regulatory history are discussed. The study then questions the role of religion in radio and television—two commercial mediums driven by market forces.

While flipping through the countless cable channels on television one might land on the Trinity Broadcasting Network and hear televangelists preaching. Determining the place of religion in America's public arena is a source of continual debate. The First Amendment's establishment of the religion clause and the free exercise clause—together called the religion clause¹—actually complicate the issue. In fact, the religion clause, which requires that the "government seek a neutral balance between neither advancing nor inhibiting religion," places regulators and legislators in a precarious position since the question of what actually constitutes advancement or inhibition provokes constant conflict.²

¹Due to the disagreement about whether the referred to section of the First Amendment should be considered as one clause and thus called the "religion clause," or should be viewed as two separate clauses and referred to as the "religion clauses," I have chosen to use the two phrases interchangeably. I consider both to be suitable, and they work stylistically as clause or clauses in different contexts. For more information on this conflict, see Paul J. Weber, ed., *Equal Separation: Understanding the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1990).

²Nancy Reynolds, "Moving Toward Neutrality: The National Telecommunications and Information Administration's New Stance on Sectarian Programming," *Federal Communications Law Journal* 50 (1998): 712.

Religious versus secular broadcasting, particularly for television, further complicates the debate over the religion clause. The authorities of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) fall prey to the religion clause, and they have, or at least exercise, little to no power in regulating religious broadcasting on radio and television. The FCC argues that regulations could either inhibit or advance particular religions. Although the FCC lacks the ability to regulate religious broadcasting, public debate does exist, and the FCC must cope with religious broadcasters to some degree.

Public opinion regarding the methods employed by religious broadcasters and whether religion should be used as an entertainment medium, particularly in the form it often takes (witness Jim and Tammy Fay Bakker), raises questions about religious broadcasting beyond constitutional legality. Religious broadcasters have the same legal rights as any other broadcaster, but the role they play in shaping religion in America should be questioned. Just as secular broadcasters must think about the effect of their presentation of sex and violence, religious broadcasters need to address their presentation of religion and question the use of religion as entertainment.

This study is divided into three sections. The first discusses the religion clauses and how they have continually been a bone of contention in the courts and to the American public. The second examines the history of religious broadcasting and the interaction of broadcasting regulation with the religion clause. The final section explores religion as a commodity and examines the morality of the commercialization of religion.

The Religion Clauses

The debate over religious broadcasting necessarily involves the religion clause. Some use the line between inhibition and establishment to promote or contest the

elimination of religious broadcasting.³ As a result, understanding the debate over the religion clause will help one to understand the difficulties encountered when examining and regulating religious broadcasting.

What qualifies as "religion" is the first conflict in the public policy debate over the religion clause. Although the inclusion of the religion clause in the United States' Constitution demonstrates the framers' concern over the place of religion in government, their failure to clearly define religion makes enforcing the clause difficult. The problem is particularly applicable to the second part of the clause that bars the government from inhibiting the "free exercise" of religion. Without a clear definition of what constitutes religion, it is difficult to determine whether a particular group's religious rights are inhibited. Consequently, the judicial branch frequently decides what qualifies as religion. The result is evident through an examination of several cases attempting to define religion.⁴

The courts have demonstrated changing opinions regarding the definition of religion. A number of judges, many at the Supreme Court level, have written decisions that have set precedent for defining religion and applying the religion clauses in cases brought before the court. A few of the more influential decisions have been handed down in military conscription cases.


Prior to the 1940s, the term religion had a rather narrow meaning. The definition applied primarily to major traditions in-

³For an argument promoting the elimination of broadcasting see Mark P. Gibney and Jeffrey L. Courtright, "Arguments for the Elimination of Religious Broadcasting From Public Airwaves," *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy* 4 (1990): 765-819.

⁴Derek Davis, "The Constitutional Meaning of 'Religion': A History and Critique," in *The Role of Government in Monitoring and Regulating Religion in Public Life*, ed. James E. Wood and Derek Davis (Waco, Tex.: J.M. Dawson Institute of Church and State Studies, Baylor University, 1993), 89-90.

cluding Christianity and Judaism. This narrow definition changed in the 1940s when several major cases led to a more inclusive definition of religion. In *United States v. Kauten*, a conscientious objector was convicted for refusing to submit to induction. Since Kauten was an atheist, the court ruled that his beliefs were philosophical and political rather than religious and therefore did not qualify as a religious objection to war. Although the court convicted him, they also proposed that "something less than a belief in God may qualify as religion." Religion, they conjectured, may not require a belief in a Supreme Being but may involve something such as a conscience or "inward mentor" not necessarily called "God." This decision, among others, limited the courts' ability to decide whether or not a religious belief was "true." The definition was loosened, thus widening what deserved protection under the law. Other cases throughout the 1960s increasingly protected nontraditional beliefs maintaining an open-minded interpretation of religion in the court system.⁵

Clarification of the religious clauses has not been achieved by broadening the definition of religion, nor have the courts' application of the clauses been eased. For example, in *Malnak v. Yogi* (1977) the teaching of Transcendental Meditation (TM) in a New Jersey public school was found to violate the establishment clause. Regardless of the school district's argument that TM does not constitute a religion, under the broadened definition of religions, TM met the defining criteria. Yet, when the judge who handed down the decision attempted to clearly define terms such as "ultimate concern" and "parallel belief," both of which had been used to see whether a nontraditional belief constituted a religion, a narrowing of the definition resulted. Rather than clarifying the situation, the narrowed



Federal Communications Commission Building. Available from <http://www.fcc.gov>.

definition of religion is equally problematic as the broadened definition. "Religious" practices that might receive protection under the broad definition may fail to be protected under the narrow definition.⁶

Once the definition of religion has been established, the question of what constitutes a violation of the clause remains, and civil religion has made this abundantly clear. Although America is a pluralistic society, its foundation is rooted in Protestantism. As a result, customs considered to be religious practices may be so integrated into American tradition that they are viewed as acceptable public practices. Many examples can be found during the Christmas season. The lighting of the national Christmas tree at the White House, the presidential Christmas address, the myriad of public Christmas decorations, and parades are all public ways in which Christmas is celebrated each year. Although President Carter began the tradition of lighting a menorah alongside the tree in 1979, both traditions have religious roots. The presence of the tree and the menorah on government property, supported by government funds, is problematic considering the religion clauses. Yet, year after year the

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., 105-6.

President lights the tree to little protest. The incorporation of "God" in our pledge of allegiance to the flag and on U.S. currency is evidence that religious based displays are part of America's civil religion.⁷



Example of a stained glass nativity scene.

http://www.matthesumc.org/stained_glass3html..

On the other hand, the heated debate over crèches (nativity scenes) in public places is one Christmastime conflict where civil religion and the religion clauses clash. Separatists adamantly oppose public displays of crèches arguing that they violate church and state separation. In many past cases the courts have agreed. Although Christmas is

⁷President Coolidge began the tradition of lighting the National Christmas Tree in 1923 and gave the first presidential Christmas address in 1927. Albert J. Menendez, *The December Wars: Religious Symbols and Ceremonies in the Public Square* (New York: Prometheus Books, 1993), 66-75; Stephen Nissenbaum, *The Battle for Christmas* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997).

in many ways considered an American public holiday, nativity scenes with their explicit religious nature are somehow less acceptable than Santa Claus.⁸

Public displays, both the accepted and the contested, demonstrate the problems that arise in applying the religion clauses. Religion occupies a precarious position in America, a pluralistic but predominantly Christian nation. Other issues, including school prayer, continually stimulate a re-evaluation of the role religion plays in public life. The religion clause should clarify the role of religion in American life, but its intrinsic conflict forces the courts to walk the thin line between the inhibition and advancement of a religious belief.

The religion clauses place regulators, legislators, and the judicial system on unsteady ground. Whether an action or belief violates either the establishment clause or the free exercise clause is decided on a case by case basis and has sparked controversy and fervent debate. Public policy regarding religion is full of contradictions and gray areas. Due to the precarious position of religion and the difficulty in applying the religion clauses, religious broadcasting has faced problems, been widely discussed, and finds both support and protest.

The Electronic Church and Regulating Religious Broadcasting

Religion has been a part of radio and television from their very beginnings. The first broadcast heard by sailors at sea contained a religious message. Early television movies used biblical stories for material, and evidenced by the recent television movies "Noah's Ark" and "Mary, Mother of Jesus," the trend has continued. Many television families have been portrayed in religious services or as part of religious organizations, and frequently shows have moral messages

⁸Menendez, 66-75; Ann McDaniel, "The Lord's Day in Court," *Newsweek* 17 December 1984: 57.

that closely parallel what is taught through traditional religious means.⁹

Televangelists, however, directly and specifically preach the gospel using different formats and styles. Although they have premeditated occurrences on their broadcasts (e.g., in Billy Graham's specials people are purposely placed within the television audience to come forward when conversion is called for), these broadcasts are for the most part seen as real, much like a church service or revival meeting.¹⁰ They speak directly to the audience, compelling listeners and viewers to further their faith or seek conversion to the religion being preached.

Religious broadcasting has faced difficulties as a result of its place on public airwaves, its troublesome history of financial mismanagement, and the outlandish portrayal of religion. Throughout its history, religious broadcasting has experienced complete freedom and severe restrictions. Regulation of religious broadcasting has undergone numerous phases. Within each phase, certain broadcasters have risen to prominence, while others have fallen from favor or faced insurmountable legal troubles. Although religious broadcasters have always encountered criticism, since the late 1970s they have faced caustic protest and inspired controversy. The protest and controversy are due primarily to the broadcasters' entrance into politics, their helping to form the New Christian Right in 1980, and to financial and sex scandals.¹¹ Prior to this time,

religious broadcasters had problems just trying to be a part of the public airwaves.

Religious broadcasting began on Christmas Eve 1906 with the first wireless voice broadcast featuring a violin playing "O Holy Night," the reading of the Nativity passage from the Gospel of Luke, and a woman singing a religious song. Throughout the early 1900s amateurs experimented with radio broadcasting, and eventually, a number of broadcasting networks, including the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), were formed. By 1920 many stations had regular broadcasts and many aired religious programs. During these early stages of radio, all broadcasting essentially was unregulated; anyone with the capacity to broadcast could send out a program, including people or stations wanting to broadcast religious material. This early phase of broadcasting saw a rapid increase in the number of stations, from the first radio broadcast in 1906 to one regular station in 1920, 382 in 1922, and 600 in 1924. By 1927 there were 732 stations regularly broadcasting radio programs. Although many stations' broadcasts contained religious content, religious broadcasters saw the potential of the radio to reach a wide audience and seized the opportunity to create their own programs and stations. In 1924, KFUP (Keep Forward, Upward, Onward) became the first religious station, and by 1925 religious organizations owned about sixty-three stations.¹²

As broadcasters battled over radio frequencies, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover called for regulation. For example,

⁹Jeffrey K. Hadden and Charles E. Swann, *Prime Time Preachers: The Rising Power of Televangelism* (Reading, Pa.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1981); R. Laurence Moore, *Selling God: American Religion in the Marketplace of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Jay Newman, *Religion vs. Television: Competitors in Cultural Context* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1996).

¹⁰Hadden and Swann, 21-2.

¹¹Jeffrey K. Hadden, "Regulating Religious Broadcasting: Some Old Patterns and New Trends," in *The Role of Government in Monitoring and Regulating*

Religion in Public Life, ed. James E. Wood and Derek Davis (Waco, Tex.: J. M. Dawson Institute of Church and State Studies, Baylor University, 1993), 179-204; Hadden and Swann, 1-16.

¹²Hadden and Swann, 8-9; statistics from Hadden, 180; William F. Fore, *Television and Religion: The Shaping of Faith, Values, and Culture* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1987), 77.

in 1925 Hoover ordered the station of Los Angeles radio evangelist Aimee Semple McPherson closed. Her broadcasts were transmitted over many frequencies, disrupting other programmer's broadcasts, and her messages were objectionable to some. Upon hearing Hoover's order, McPherson sent a raging telegram back to him demanding that he open the station at once as her work was ordained not by any agency, but by God. In the end Hoover was forced to reopen the station, as he did not have the authority to restrict and regulate station licenses or program content.

The case of McPherson is seen by many scholars as a telling incident in the history of religious broadcasting. The difficulty with religious broadcasting is that many, like McPherson, feel that they are ordained by God to preach the gospel. Through the medium of radio, religious broadcasters can reach a gigantic audience and oppose regulations that would inhibit their quest to reach the American public. They are not relying on the constitutional right to broadcast but on the "biblical commandment to preach the Gospel." The results of this perspective would be seen much later as televangelists refused to allow regulators to look into their affairs.¹³

The McPherson incident led to the Radio Act of 1927 that established the Federal Radio Commission (FRC) (which later became the FCC) to deal with licensing. "In the granting of a license or transfer of a station, the guiding standard was to be the 'public interest, convenience or necessity.'" Fulfilling the "public interest" portion of the licensing requirement helped religious broadcasters to receive airtime, often in the form of "sustaining" or free time. In the late 1920s and into the 1930s, commercial radio began to take control of the airwaves, and many religious institutions were forced to sell their stations; however, many continued

to receive free airtime on stations for broadcasting religious services. The stations and networks were faced with the dilemma of doling out air time, which led to the formation of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ on the national level, as well as several local and regional councils of churches to advise stations. Many of these councils were dominated by mainline Protestant denominations, and as a result, most of the religious broadcasting was mainline, keeping evangelists on the sidelines.¹⁴

Some religious broadcasters, including Michigan based Father Charles E. Coughlin, attempted to combat the situation by purchasing airtime. But as networks became dissatisfied with the content of these religious programs (i.e., Coughlin's often political and anti-Semitic messages), they adopted policies similar to NBC's that formally limited religious broadcasters' access to their airwaves. NBC determined at the outset not to accept paid religious broadcasting. Time allocated for religious broadcasting would be free and it would be available 'only [to] the central national agencies of great religious faiths.' As a result, the only way for many evangelicals to broadcast was to receive free time, and since many stations and networks gave this time only to mainline Protestants, their access was severely limited. Additionally, the FRC used its power to regulate and restrict religious broadcasters.¹⁵

Unlike NBC, the Mutual Broadcasting Network (MBN), created in 1935, accepted paid religious broadcasting and seemed a haven for the evangelicals who wished to spread the gospel. Charles E. Fuller, a major influence on later televangelists, was MBN's biggest customer in the

¹³Hadden, 183.

¹⁴Erik Barnouw, *Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of American Television* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990): 58-9; Fore, 77-9.


¹⁵Fore, 78; quote from Hadden, 185; Hadden and Swann.

early 1940s and had success with his *Old-Fashioned Revival Hour*. In 1943, however, the MBN became more restrictive and broadcasters no longer could solicit funds on the air, making it hard for many to continue broadcasting. Beginning with the creation of the FRC in 1927 and continuing into the mid-1950s, access to the airwaves was limited for evangelicals; however, a significant event in the history of religious broadcasting came in April 1944 when 150 evangelical broadcasters formed the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB), which eventually would play a pivotal role in the debates over religious broadcasting regulation.¹⁶

Fortunately for evangelical broadcasters, a FCC decision in 1960 led to a free market environment.¹⁷ As mentioned earlier, to obtain a broadcast license, a station had to demonstrate that it served the public interest. Religious broadcasting met this requirement, and until 1960 stations had given them sustaining time. They then limited access to this free time to mainline broadcasters to the exclusion of those outside the mainline. In 1960, however, the FCC ruled that “there was no intrinsic relationship between sustaining time and public service.” The ruling “meant that local stations could sell air time for religious programs and still get ‘public interest credit’ in the eyes of the FCC.” Now evangelicals could compete for airtime by capitalizing on the desire for paid programs that would have the added benefit of meeting public interest requirements. This, of course, began intense competition for airtime.¹⁸

Evangelical broadcasters quickly became the majority in religious broadcasting. Since they could appeal to audiences for funds, religious broadcasters could stay on the air as long as they were successful fund-

raisers. Though they did not solicit commercial advertising, advertising was implied in the solicitation of funds. A number of televangelists experienced widespread success and reached their goal of spreading the



Pat Robertson, a nationally known evangelist. http://www.the700club.org/about/bios/pat_robertson.asp.

gospel to larger audiences. Some had begun to have success prior to the 1960 decision, and the ability to buy time on more stations expanded that success.

Although religious broadcasting began on radio, it gained enormous popularity on television. Television combined spoken words with visual images, and the rapid expansion of television into American homes in the late 1940s and early 1950s provided a valuable forum for religious broadcasters. As a result, what viewers were seeing became just as important as what they were hearing. Without a catchy visual image to capture a viewer's attention, the televangelists' sermons lacked impact. Televangelists, therefore, adapted their programs to the new medium and dominated the airwaves.

¹⁶Hadden and Swann, 78; Hadden, 187.

¹⁷The FCC replaced the FRC with the passage of The Communications Act of 1934. Barnouw, 73-6.

¹⁸Hadden, 188.

The names of many televangelists popular in the early years are still heard today, their popularity spanning decades. Billy Graham enjoyed wide success and visibility in 1949, and although he has never had a regular program, his specials continue to draw large viewing audiences. By 1980 Jeffrey Hadden and Charles Swann, authors of *Prime Time Preachers: The Rising Power of Televangelism*, already had heralded Graham as "unquestionably the most highly visible and preeminent religious figure in the U.S." Oral Roberts came to national attention in the late 1940s by traveling the revival circuit. He began his television program in 1954, and like others who followed, his popularity enabled him to expand his empire beyond television. Roberts's ministry boasted a university and a hospital.¹⁹



Aimee Semple McPherson, an evangelist and founder of the Foursquare Gospel Church.
<http://www.padfield.com/debates/bogard.html>

Rex Humbard established the Calvary Chapel in 1953 and in 1954 began his television show featuring his entire family. Jerry Falwell, clearly one of today's most influential religious figures, established a


church in 1956 and incorporated radio and television programming. Jim Bakker, one of the televangelists utilizing a talk show format, began the *700 Club* in 1966 and in the 1970s began the *Praise the Lord (PTL) Club*. He helped establish the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) in 1960 along with Pat Robertson, who took over the *700 Club*. Robert Schuller was one of the few extraordinarily popular mainline televangelists. With his *Hour of Power*, full of "possibility thinking," Schuller began broadcasting in 1970 and in 1980 established the Crystal Cathedral in Orange County. Jimmy Swaggart, James Robinson, Ernest Angley, Paul and Jan Crouch—the list of televangelists is endless. All of these people were indebted to their forefathers/mothers—Aimee Semple McPherson and Charles Fuller, and to Bishop Fulton Sheen, who "showed all would-be religious broadcasters that a powerful preacher can make it on television"²⁰

The success and power of the televangelists is due largely to powerful National Religion Broadcasting (NRB), which began to gain strength in 1956 under the leadership of James De Forest Murch. A fight ensued for evangelicals' access to the airwaves through articles in the leading trade journal, *Broadcasting*, and by gaining seats on the FCC board. The association held (and continues to hold) a luncheon for FCC commissioners every year, and the president of the United States attends the NRB's annual meetings.

The government's desire to regulate broadcasting has continued to impact the NRB and religious broadcasters. Mainline Protestant and Catholic groups have protested the evangelical domination of the airwaves, arguing that those who hold licenses should be obliged to offer sustaining airtime to religious broadcasters to serve the "public trust" and that mainline churches should re-

¹⁹Ibid., 20-4, quote from 20.

²⁰Ibid. 24-45; Fore, 78-9.



ceive all sustaining airtime. Their protest is not surprising since it was the opening of paid time broadcasting that nearly drove them off the air. Mainline churches argue that "televangelists are scoundrels using a medium that is inherently corrupting" and encourage the regulation and weakening of evangelical broadcasters. The proliferation of evangelical radio and television stations in spite of the battle waged against them demonstrates their continuing power.²¹

In light of the religion clause, it is no surprise that the FCC has, or at least exercises, little power in regulating religion on the airwaves. Although the FCC issues licenses, it cannot give or revoke a license based on the religious content of a broadcast, as evidenced in 1975 when an unfounded rumor sent shock waves through the religious broadcasting community. It was claimed that Madalyn Murray O'Hair, an atheist whose protest led to the eventual banning of school prayer, filed a petition to end all religious broadcasting. Hundreds of thousands of outraged listeners and viewers sent angry letters to the FCC in protest. The FCC estimated that by the end of August they had received over 1.5 million letters, the greatest amount of mail ever received by a regulatory agency.²²

Though the agency still receives mail concerning the petition, the circumstances were not as they seemed. A petition was filed that had some ramifications for religious broadcasting, but it had no connection with Madalyn Murray O'Hair and did not specifically call for the banning of all religious broadcasting. Furthermore, the FCC denied the petition on 1 August 1975, making the protests irrelevant. The ramifications of the incident are important, however, since the FCC still has to respond to letters, and more recently to e-mails, and explain

the way in which its hands are tied by the religion clauses.²³

What actually occurred in this incident is that the petition filed did not call for an across the board ban on all religious broadcasting but requested a "freeze on all applications by religious Bible, Christian, and other sectarian schools, colleges, and institutes for reserved educational FM and TV channels."²⁴ As educational broadcasters and self-declared enemies of religious broadcasting, Lorenzo Milam and Jeremy Lansman, the real filers of the petition, were seeking to limit access to educational stations. As journalist Walter Shapiro argues, they also were seeking to get the attention of the religious broadcasting community. They did not expect their petition to be accepted; their "idea of fun [was] to bedevil the FCC." In their petition, Milam and Lansman voiced a loud argument for the regulation and/or elimination of religious broadcasting:

*[R]eligious broadcasters have shown a remarkable cancer-like growth into the "educational" portions of the FM and TV bands. They control endless monies from "free-will" contributions, thrive on mindless, banal programming aimed at some spiritless, oleaginous God, and show the same spirit as McDonald's Hamburger Co. in their efforts to dominate American radio and television.*²⁵

Milam and Lansman sought to freeze the applications by religious organizations and urged the FCC to "[commence] an in-

²¹Hadden and Swann, 7; Hadden, 188.

²²Walter Shapiro, "The Liberal Plot to Kill God," *Washington Monthly* 7, no. 8 (1975): 21-2.

²³"ASD Collected Decision: August 13, 1975— . . . Request for Freeze on Government Owned and Controlled Groups and Religious 'Bible,' Christian and Other Sectarian Schools, Colleges and Institutions for Reserved Educational FM and TV Channels—RM-2493-ASD (FCC)," 1975; available from <http://www.fcc.gov/mmb/asd/decdoc/letter/1975-08-13religious.html>; Internet; accessed 14 September 1999.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Shapiro, 23-4.

quiry leading toward changes in the rules to place certain limitations on which educational organizations might be considered eligible to hold station authorizations."²⁶ Although stations were not required to give religious broadcasters sustaining time per the 1960 FCC decision, since it qualified as serving the public interest, religious programming could compete for sustaining time on educational channels. One could argue, therefore, that educational programmers like Lansman and Milam, who also were eligible for sustaining time, would benefit from eliminating their competition.

The FCC's response to the petition demonstrates the role of the religion clause in limiting its power to regulate. In its *Memorandum Opinion and Order* adopted on 1 August 1975, paragraph 21 states:

Petitioners would have us disqualify all religiously-affiliated organizations and institutions from eligibility to operate on reserved channels. In effect, they would have us practice discrimination against a school or university simply by virtue of the fact that it is owned and operated by a sectarian organization. As a government agency, the Commission is enjoined by the First Amendment to observe a stance of neutrality toward religion, acting neither to promote nor inhibit religion.

This passage is the key to understanding religious broadcasting regulation. The FCC (and any other agency) is severely limited by the religion clause, and any action taken by the FCC to regulate religion on the radio or on television might be construed as advancing or inhibiting religion. As illustrated earlier, a neutral approach is deemed necessary and seen by the FCC as the only viable option. On a current FCC website link, the agency maintains that it "cannot direct any broadcaster to present, or refrain from pre-

senting, announcements or programs on religion, and the FCC cannot act as an arbitrator on the insights or accuracy of such material." It goes on to point out that as with all broadcasting, the individual broadcaster ultimately is responsible for selecting programming. Along with the religion clause, freedom of speech and the inability to censor impede the government's power to regulate religious broadcasting.²⁷

The Lansman/Milam petition and the controversy it provoked pushed the FCC to clearly limit its role in the regulation of religious broadcasting. But in the 1970s and the last two decades of the twentieth century, religious broadcasting has had to deal with unmatched controversy. Outsiders are not always the ones stirring up trouble, however. Televangelists often create their own problems and give critics ample material for protest.

Although the 1987 financial and sex scandals of Jim Bakker and Jimmy Swaggart received significant attention and caused serious questioning of the government's role in regulating religious broadcasting, compelling questions about televangelism began in the late 1970s and grew increasingly strong during the election of 1980. During the 1970s, mainline Protestants were joined by other critical voices in attacking the "electronic church." On 13 April 1980, Rex Humbard, whose syndicated radio and television programs were broadcast throughout the world and translated into seven languages, made a plea for contributions to save his ministry, and the response—four million dollars—did just that. It was soon learned, however, that Humbard and two of his sons had purchased a house and condominiums valued at \$650,000, with down payments of \$17,500 paid in cash. Although

²⁶"ASD Collected Decision."

²⁷Ibid.; "Religious Broadcasting Rumor Denied"; available from <http://www.fcc.gov/mmb/enf/forms/rm02493.html>; Internet; accessed 14 September 1999.

Humbard claimed he used his own money for the real estate, *The Cleveland Press* article that exposed him raised questions as to how money raised by televangelists in the name of religion is spent. This question was raised continually throughout the 1980s and 1990s.²⁸

Jim Bakker, host of the *PTL Club* television show, was having troubles of his own. A 1979 article in the *Charlotte Observer* alleged that Bakker had solicited funds on the air to send PTL broadcasts to south Korea and the Middle East but instead had spent the collected money to pay PTL bills. The FCC became involved since PTL was a licensee of television station WJAN and as such could be found in violation of the federal Criminal Code section that prohibits "fraud by wire, radio or television." If PTL were found in violation of the code due to fraudulent fundraising by radio, the station's license could be revoked.²⁹


Although the FCC suspected that the radio station was guilty of fraud, which would lead to an investigation of its financial records, the situation became complicated by the fact that the station was owned by a religious organization. In this case, religious broadcasting and religious affairs were inextricably bound, and the FCC's demand for *PTL's* financial records

was seen by the accused organization as an unconstitutional governmental entrance into protected religious affairs.³⁰ As evidenced in the Aimee Semple McPherson case, religious broadcasters and religious organizations resent governmental attempts to investigate their affairs.

To bring a rapid close to this potential nightmare for both PTL and the FCC, PTL decided to liquidate its television station and give its license to another religious

broadcaster. To the chagrin of many protestors who followed the case, the FCC allowed this transfer of license and considered the case closed, foreshadowing the way in which the FCC would continue to deal with religious broadcasting. "The Commission's efforts to distance itself from involvement in decisions affecting religious broadcasting are not unique to PTL/WJAN," James Wood points out in his book, *The Role of Government in Monitoring and Regulating Religion in Public Life*. "History shows that the FCC traditionally has treated allegations regarding the practices of religious broadcasters with particular deference

toward the broadcasters," and the FCC "has consistently avoided decisions on religious programs as such."³¹ Rather than becoming



Aimee Semple McPherson based the Foursquare Gospel on principles of belief in the literal infallibility of the Bible, conversion, physical healing through faith, and return of Christ to earth.

<http://www.ascensionresearch.org/aimeehtml>.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Ibid.; James E. Wood, "Government Intervention in Religious Affairs: An Introduction," in *The Role of Government in Monitoring and Regulating Religion in Public Life*, ed. James Woods and Derek Davis (Waco, Tex.: J.M. Dawson Institute of Church and State Studies, Baylor University, 1993), 2.

²⁸Hadden and Swann, 1-3, quote from 2.

²⁹Ronald Garay, "Government Regulation and Religious Broadcasting in the Matter of PTL/WJAN," *Journal of Church and State* 29, no. 2 (1987): 270.

enmeshed in the struggle to regulate religious broadcasting, the FCC took a neutral stance that essentially its response to the Milam/Lansman controversy, because of the religion clause, not getting involved seemed the easiest response.

Not everyone supports the approach taken by the FCC. Some argue that through its noninterference, the FCC is violating the establishment clause.³² Others want answers to the question of where the money goes. It is no secret that religious broadcasters need financial support from their viewers to stay on the air, but the fact that they use religion to ask for the money is cause for concern. Additionally, the tax-exempt status of many religious broadcasters who are linked to religious institutions keeps both the government and the public on alert. If the money is not being used in an appropriate manner, the station/program should lose its license. If the program intertwines religion and government by overtly discussing politics or in any way becoming involved in politics, the tax-exempt issue becomes compounded by the issue of the religion clauses.

The mixing of religion and government was a source of criticism during the 1980 election when televangelists played a role in forming the New Christian Right. Some broadcasters had been meeting with candidates, while others were beginning to mobilize listeners and viewers. In April 1980, two hundred thousand evangelical Christians were involved in the Washington for Jesus program. Led by televangelist Jerry Falwell, the Moral Majority attended the Republican National Convention, from which their conservative agenda was promoted throughout the country. The goal of the televangelists appeared to have extended

beyond saving souls and now reached out to save America.³³

Evaluating Religious Broadcasting

Public response to religious broadcasting has been mixed. Institutions created by televangelists have been enormously successful. Their requests for funds bring in millions of dollars, and their visits to cities around the country draw huge crowds, attesting to their popularity. Billy Graham often is listed as one of the country's most influential men, and Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority has had a tremendous political impact.³⁴

But there are those who dislike televangelism. The election of Ronald Reagan and a Republican Congress was considered to have been largely attributable to the work of the televangelist-led New Christian Right/Moral Majority. It appeared the religious broadcasters were doing more than spreading the gospel; they now were attempting to shape political beliefs and in so doing to shape the course of American politics. Adding his voice to the protests of mainline Protestants and Catholics, Norman Lear began People for the American Way, a group of liberals who sought to keep religious plurality a part of America by keeping the New Christian Right in check.³⁵

The major objection to religious broadcasting is not the mere presence of religion on the airwaves but the popular, slick televangelists who get into trouble for their financial and political involvement while working from a non-profit arena, and in so doing, push the boundaries of the religion clauses. The FCC's failure to regulate religious broadcasting also raises questions

³²See Linda Jo Lacey, "The Electric Church: An FCC-'Established' Institution," *Federal Communications Law Journal*, 31 (1979).

³³Hadden and Swann, 5.

³⁴See Hadden and Swann, and Fore.

³⁵Hadden and Swann, 5-8, 13-14.



concerning interpreting and enforcing the religion clauses.³⁶

It seems, however, that the questions of whether religious broadcasting should be regulated or how it should be regulated need to be replaced with a more fundamental question: Does religion have a place on radio and television? Beyond questions of financial mismanagement and political involvement lies the larger question of how televangelism has affected religion in the lives of Americans. In 1980 authors Hadden and Swann already were examining the impact of religious broadcasting and foreshadowing what was to come:

Church pastors today are having to face the fact that electronic religion is changing the way millions experience worship, even church. Even if their people do not stay home to watch television preachers, the electronic church has altered the expectations both of the role of the preacher and the content of religious services.³⁷

As Americans became more accustomed to the flashy preaching of televangelists, the larger religious communities began to feel their force.

The newest trend in religious broadcasting is the emergence of television programs that are part of regular secular broadcasting but have a largely religious theme or content. The problems associated with religion on television become more pronounced when it is clear they are using religion as a hook to entice viewers. Though their messages may be altruistic and promote morality, they are being broadcast through a commercial medium that pro-

motes consumption. In this sense, religion becomes a part of that commercialism.³⁸

This new trend causes concern for many critics. Cultural analyst Neil Postman argues that "television is most useful when presenting 'junk entertainment,' for when it co-opts serious modes of discourse it turns them into 'entertainment packages.'" ³⁹ Religion presented as an "entertainment package" may not be the best way to serve the viewers or the best way to promote the desired messages. The same argument can be made against religious broadcasters. Although some offer religion in a straightforward manner, most turn religion into entertainment to keep audiences interested and watching. While this may be the most effective way to present the gospel to the widest audience possible, it may not be an effective method of persuading people toward genuine faith. Legally, religious broadcasters have the right to broadcast whatever they choose; however, just as secular broadcasters need to consider the impact of sexual and violent content on their viewers, religious broadcasters need to consider the impact of spreading religion through a commercial medium.

Religious broadcasters are faced with the same regulations as all other broadcasters, but, as Jeffrey Hadden has observed,

³⁸This is a very recent phenomenon represented by shows like *Touched by an Angel* and *7th Heaven*. For a brief sample of articles that are noting this trend see: Lewis Beale, "Goodness! New TV Net Makes a Show of Values, Broadcaster Will Serve Up Wholesomeness in Family PAX," *New York Daily News*, 21 July 1998, 33; Laurie Goodstein, "Has Television Found Religion? Not Exactly," *New York Times* 30 November 1997, sec. 2, p.37; Mark A. Perigard, "Will Viewers be Ready When the Saints Come Marchin' In?" *Boston Herald*, 14 September 1997, 006; "Providence Answers NBC's Prayers," *The Toronto Star*, 17 February 1999, Entertainment Section.; Howard Rosenberg, "In the Temple of Television," *Los Angeles Times* 31 December 1997, sec. F, p.1; "Study Reveals Networks Airing More About Religion," *Seattle Times*, 27 June 1998, sec. A, p.10.

³⁹Newman, 10-1.

³⁶See Gibney and Courtright for their complete argument for the elimination of broadcasting that hinges on support from the religion clauses.

³⁷Hadden and Swann, 10.

if the radio and television preachers sometimes appear to be operating in a relatively unfettered fashion, it is because broadcasting in the United States operates with greater latitude and freedom from government interference than broadcasting in any other nation. The religious broadcasters are a mirror image of the broadcast industry itself.⁴⁰

Religious broadcasters need to question whether or not that is what they aspire to be.

Religious broadcasting is problematic in that the televangelists present religion in a way that is counter to other religious teachings. Like all religious leaders, televangelists who deliver messages against materialism, immorality, and gluttony should "practice what they preach." This becomes more relevant on television where the image often overwhelms the message. Men and women who preach in silk robes with jewels hanging from every exposed part of their bodies and who wear wigs of astronomical proportions and colors should consider what message they are sending to their viewers. Televangelists deserve to live comfortably if they have earned it, but if their million dollar homes are financed by viewer contributions, what message are they sending? The religion clauses allow great flexibility for religious broadcasters, but as they package religion for commercial consumption, televangelists should consider whether religion should be made a commodity.

⁴⁰Hadden, "Regulating Religious Broadcasting," 190.

The Sacking of Caesar: Truman Dismisses MacArthur

C. Wayne Dawson

In 1951, General Douglas MacArthur publicly criticized President Harry Truman's failure to expand the Korean War by blockading Chinese ports and bombing Manchurian strongholds. President Truman, on the other hand, determined that limited war and containment of the Red Chinese forces would be a more prudent policy. The author presents evidence revealing that part of the friction that developed between the two men derived from the fact that MacArthur, like Julius Caesar, hoped to win political stature through his military achievements. A mixture of pride and ambition led the General to be vocally insubordinate to his Commander-in Chief leading to one of the most spectacular public downfalls of the twentieth century.

Q: Mr. President, I know why you fired General MacArthur, but if you don't mind, I'd like to hear it in your own words.

A: I fired him because he wouldn't respect the authority of the President. That's the answer to that. I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law for generals. If it was, half to three-quarters of them would be in jail.¹

—Former President Harry Truman.

In every war in which we have heretofore engaged, we have counterbalanced manpower with the doctrine of attack through our matchless scientific development. Yet, in Korea, we are admittedly applying the doctrine of passive defense which in all history has never won a war—a doctrine which has been responsible for more military disaster than all other reasons combined. Does experience teach us nothing?²

—Gen. Douglas MacArthur's speech before the
Texas State Legislature, 13 June 1951.

On 11 June 1951, President Harry Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur from his command over United Nations (U.N.) forces in Korea. This climaxed many long months of friction between the two men who held very different views of how to resolve the conflict

¹ Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Berkeley Medallion Books, 1974), 308.

² Major Vorin E. Whan Jr., ed., *A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 265-6.

in Korea. As the President explained to the nation on the day he fired the General:

I believe that we must try to limit the war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.³

On the other hand, General MacArthur, in his 19 April 1951 address before Congress, derided this policy of limited war as "appeasement" which has never "led to more than a sham peace." He advocated a naval blockade of the Chinese coast, utilizing Jiang Jieshi's Nationalist forces "against the common enemy," and destruction of Chinese bases in Manchuria.⁴ The General, while serving as commander of the UN forces in Korea, expressed these convictions repeatedly and publicly, in violation of the President's explicit orders.

This study will depict MacArthur's efforts to pressure President Truman into changing from a policy of limited war and containment in Korea to that of an aggressive expansion of the conflict. MacArthur, as some have noted, comported himself publicly as an American Caesar: assuming

that his military prowess and fame would catapult him into a position of political prominence.⁵ Truman's dismissal of MacArthur was necessary to avert the possibility of international catastrophe.

On 25 June 1950, 75,000 North Korean troops struck across the thirty-eighth parallel: the line dividing their sector from South Korea. Led by thickly armored tanks and heavy artillery, the troops of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) swept the army of the Republic of Korea (ROK) before them.⁶ The invasion caught the President and his staff totally off guard. Ironically, the CIA as late as 15 June had concluded that North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung had considered an invasion but decided to call it off.⁷

Equating the North Korean incursion with the predatory tactics of Hitler and Mussolini, President Truman surprised the Communists by reacting decisively. He immediately recalled the lessons of appeasement from World War II, "and I wasn't going to let that happen. Not while I was president."⁸ He swiftly ordered air, ground, and naval units to the peninsula, and sent the Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait, ordering it to keep both the Nationalists and Communists apart. Truman announced his decisions just six months after

³*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Truman, 1951* (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service), 226.

⁴Maj. Vorin E. Whan Jr., "Old Soldiers Never Die" (address delivered before a joint session of the two houses of Congress in the hall of the House of Representatives, 19 April 1951), 250-1.

⁵ For an expansion of this theme, see William R. Manchester's *American Caesar, Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978). Manchester's book, however, is of limited scholarly value and prone to take poetic license on a number of occasions.

⁶ Thomas Paterson, J. Gary Clifford and Ken Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895* 4th ed., (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1995), 316.


⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 75; James I. Matray, "Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea," *Journal of American History* 66 (September, 1979): 317.

⁸ Miller, 294; Gaddis, 75.

proclaiming the end of American involvement in the Chinese Civil War.⁹

U.S. General of the Armies and Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur viewed events with glee from his Tokyo headquarters. Eager to join in the fray, he later termed the turn of events as "Mar's last gift to an old warrior."¹⁰ In the months prior to the war, the General had pressed for a plan to transfer weapons from Japan to Taiwan, raise a volunteer American air force, and arm anti-Communist guerrillas on the mainland. The Truman Administration was willing to meet him halfway by increasing military aid to forces on the island. However, MacArthur did not approve of State Department attempts to unseat the autocratic Nationalist leader, Jiang Jieshi,¹¹ in order to create a democratic and independent Taiwan. With Korea erupting, the seventy year-old General sensed a golden opportunity to roll back Communist influence in Asia and remedy the ills of a moribund American foreign policy. At that point, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had to abandon his hopes of cutting Taiwan adrift.¹²

Mao Tse-tung began changing gears as the U.S. Seventh Fleet cruised into the Taiwan Strait, thereby thwarting his hopes for conquest of the island. He relocated troop concentrations that had been previ-



The North Korean drive across the 38th parallel prompted the U.S. led "police action" by the United Nations in 1951.

George Brown Tindall and David Emory Shi, *America: A Narrative History*.

ously massed opposite Taiwan on the mainland. They remained in that position until their later entry into Korea. Mao had expected that Kim Il Sung's invasion would siphon off American protection of Taiwan but now realized that the opposite had happened.¹³

Three days after North Korean troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, Mao took note of increased American military assistance to Taiwan, the Philippines, and the French in Indochina. He interpreted these activities as an attempt to encircle China and to ultimately overthrow the Chinese revolution. He began thereafter to speak in terms of confronting the U.S. on Korean soil.¹⁴ Unfortunately, Mao relied on Soviet sources for his information, which greatly exaggerated U.S. intentions. The absence of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China also led to the State Department persisting in its fantasy that the People's Republic of China (PRC) was more

⁹Warren I. Cohen, "U.S., China and the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1979," *Centennial Review* 24 (1980): 129, 134.

¹⁰Michael Schaller, *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 181.

¹¹Jiang Jieshi was the Chinese leader of the Nationalist Party [Guomindang] who left China and fled to Taiwan shortly before the communist forces defeated the Nationalists in 1949.

¹²Gaddis, 78; Schaller, 179, 183, 192.

¹³Whiting, 64-5.

¹⁴Gaddis, 78.

Chinese than Communist, thus anticipating an imminent split between Mao and Stalin. It was mutual delusion.¹⁵

General MacArthur was appointed commander over U.N. forces on 8 July. At first, the tide of battle went against the ROK resistance, which dissolved into a retreat to the south until reinforced by the American Eighth Army. By August, the combined forces formed a defensive line in the south-east portion of Korea: the Pusan perimeter. Wasting no time, MacArthur had already begun to plot his counterattack.¹⁶

On 31 July, MacArthur visited Taiwan when it was still American policy to remove Jiang from power. He lauded the Nationalist leader's "indomitable determination to resist Communist domination," and declared "arrangements have been completed for effective coordination between American forces under my command and those of the Chinese government." He thereupon requested jet fighters (at least one analyst says that he actually transferred the aircraft without authorization) for Nationalist protection.¹⁷

¹⁵Michael A. Krasner, "Foreign Policy Stereotypes: The Decision to Cross the Yalu," *Military review* 52 (October 1972): 24; Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (N.Y.: MacMillan, 1960): 168-70.

¹⁶Schaller, 192-3; William Whitney Stueck, Jr., *American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 210-1.

¹⁷Cohen, William, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*, 3^d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 203. Cohen says that MacArthur actually transferred three squadrons of American jet fighters to Taiwan without the President's or the Pentagon's knowledge, further exacerbating Mao's fears of an American invasion of China; Geoffrey Perret, *Old Soldiers Never Die: The Life of Douglas MacArthur* (Holbrook, Mass.: Adams Media, 1996), 549. Perret states that MacArthur assumed that Truman's attempt to neutralize Taiwan would fail, and decided to have American jet fighter pilots pay "familiarization" visits to the island; Schaller, 194; Stueck, 211.

Truman rebuked him sharply, reminding MacArthur that the Taiwan Strait remained neutralized; "No one other than the President as the Commander-in-chief," he said, possessed "authority to order or authorize preventive action against concentrations on the Chinese mainland."¹⁸ In August, thirty-seven American officers examined Jiang's forces and evaluated their combat readiness as "so low that they could not be depended upon to defend the island [of Formosa]." Indeed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) feared that, based upon the Nationalist's unreliability and widespread defections during the Chinese Civil War, arms supplied to their forces might end up in the hands of the PRC.¹⁹

This was not the first time that friction had occurred between Truman and MacArthur. Shortly after the end of World War II, Truman had "requested" and "advised" the General on several occasions to return home for consultations from Japan, where he was in charge of the American occupation. MacArthur loftily rebuffed the overtures, claiming that the Japanese situation was "extraordinarily dangerous" and required his presence. This was notwithstanding that Roosevelt, Marshall, and Eisenhower had all left their stations at various times during World War II to confer with one another. MacArthur also embarrassed the President when he publicly stated that his occupation forces in Japan could be

¹⁸Schaller, 194.

¹⁹U.S. Congress, Senate, *Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session, to Conduct an Inquiry into the Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignments in that Area Declassified Hearings-Transcripts, Records of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951), 928; "The MacArthur Hearings of 1951: The Secret Testimony," *Military Affairs* 39 (December, 1975): 171.

The Sacking of Caesar

substantially reduced at the same time that the President requested Congress to extend the peace time draft. The relationship between the two men did not improve when the General signaled his political opposition to Truman by running in the 1948 Republican Wisconsin presidential primary. Much like Caesar, he was a general with political ambitions. Truman attempted to replace

Lowe to speak with MacArthur. The commander extolled Truman's Korea policy, but took issue with his stand on Taiwan and China. MacArthur promised that he would "obey any orders that he received from the President," but added that such obedience would be "without full conviction." He suggested that "it might be a good idea" to permit Jiang to attack the mainland. Either he



Political Cartoonists depict opposing viewpoints on MacArthur's United Nations leadership position.
The Annals of America, Vol. 17, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1968.

MacArthur later that year with General Lucius Clay, the hero of the Berlin airlift. Clay refused the assignment. Instead, he opted for early retirement, which thwarted Truman's plans to retire MacArthur. The two adversaries remained resentfully bound to one another.²⁰

Shortly after MacArthur's statements of support for Jiang, Averell Harriman, the President's special adviser, went with General Matthew Ridgway and General Frank

would win or you could "get rid of him that way." It is probable that MacArthur had already authorized American-Nationalist covert actions against the mainland.²¹

After Harriman and company departed, MacArthur continued to publicly lash out at the proponents of containment, saying his trip to Taiwan had been "maliciously misrepresented." These and other incendiary remarks were but a prelude to his next offensive against the State Department.

²⁰Perret, 497-500, 530-1; Schaller, 136-7, 149-50.

²¹Schaller, 195-6; Steuck, 212-3.



The Taiwan issue resurfaced on 20 August when MacArthur responded to an invitation to send a message to a Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) convention. The general delivered a blistering assessment of Truman's Taiwan policy. Speaking of Taiwan falling prey to an invasion, he warned:

Formosa [Taiwan] in the hands of such a hostile power could be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate defensive or counter-offensive operations based on Okinawa and the Philippines . . .

Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia. Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient.

He softened his remarks by praising Truman for lighting "a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly toward extinction."²² However, Truman was not mollified. MacArthur outraged not only Harriman and Acheson, but the JCS as well, since he drew upon classified documents to make his address.²³ Acheson stated that the day before the communication was released, U.N. Ambassador Warren Austin had communicated to the U.N. Secretary General that the U.S. had limited purposes regarding Formosa. The President agreed with his advisors that MacArthur was guilty of insubordination and ordered that he withdraw his statement. Truman later wrote that he considered firing MacArthur at this point but had refrained out of regard for the General's feelings.²⁴

²²Whan, 220-2.

²³Schaller, 197.

²⁴Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969) 423-4; Krasner, 23; Miller, 312-3; Harry S.

Joseph Malik, the Soviet U.N. Representative, returned to the U.N. in August. He denounced America in general but made no specific threats. This, among other signs, seemed to signal a Communist desire for détente. Other Russian spokesmen hinted at settling the conflict. The Chinese expressed outrage but hesitated to enter the war as long as U.N. armies stayed south of the parallel. Their remarks also seemed to suggest desire for a settlement, but Truman turned a deaf ear to these overtures because of other plans that were underway.²⁵

For one, MacArthur was preparing a surprise landing in the enemy's rear at Inchon. Additionally, due to the war, the arms buildup initiated by NSC 68 was just shifting into high gear.²⁶ Truman used the war as a vehicle to add muscle to NATO and rearm West Germany. Newly installed Secretary of Defense George Marshall hoped that the war would not end before the American public received "a full understanding of the problems we face ahead of us." The last thing Truman wanted to hear from Congressional critics at this time was that he sold Korea down the river the same way he "lost" China.²⁷

An additional reason Truman and his aides refused to enter into negotiations was that they were in the process of shaping a

Truman, *Memoirs, Vol. Two: Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), 356.

²⁵Schaller, 199; Steuck, 208.

²⁶NSC-68 contained the recommendations of the President's National Security Council that led to a tripling of the US defense budget and spurred development of the hydrogen bomb. It was a significant departure from Truman's previously limited policy of containing communism. See National Security Counsel, *NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (14 April 1950): A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of 31 January 1950, Terms of Reference*, (Washington, D.C.: GPO), 2 of 13, available on HTTP //:www.seattleu.edu/artsci/departments/history/us1945/docs/nsc68-1.htm.

²⁷Gaddis, 84; Schaller, 199.

strategy to unify the entire peninsula under the Republic of Korea. George Kennan protested that allowing MacArthur to push into North Korea was a sharp departure from the doctrine of containment; according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), this new policy risked provoking Russian and Chinese intervention. These concerns were drowned out by the stronger voice of John M. Allison, Director of the Office of North-eastern Affairs, who began pushing the State Department into a more aggressive posture. On 1 July, he stated to Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk:

I am convinced that there will be no permanent peace and stability in Korea as long as the artificial division at the 38th parallel continues. I believe that the time has come when we must be bold and willing to take more risks than we have and, while I certainly would not advocate saying in the [Truman's] speech that we would proceed beyond the 38th parallel, nevertheless we should not commit ourselves at this time not to do so.²⁸

MacArthur had the same goal in mind in July. His proposed landing at Inchon would serve to "compose and unite" Korea.²⁹ MacArthur's recommendations, and those of State Department advisors Allison, Rusk, Jessup, and Davies, added to the momentum of NSC 68, which in turn weighed greatly on Truman. These pressures began to slowly influence the President who as yet had not decided whether to pursue an aggressive strategy in Korea. Gradually, the only high ranking State Department official

left to oppose crossing over the thirty-eighth parallel was Kennan, the author of containment. By August, he had left the State Department.³⁰

On 15 September 1950, 70,000 American soldiers of X Corps made a daring landing at Inchon and pushed the North Koreans back. They swept into Seoul in less than two weeks, linking up with the U.N. forces that had broken out of the Pusan perimeter. The JCS had expressed reservations about MacArthur's plans for Inchon until he gave an electrifying speech in which he stated, "We shall land at Inchon, and I shall crush them." The JCS originally urged caution lest the move antagonize China. After Inchon, however, the committee enthusiastically endorsed expansion of the war.³¹ Once again, the General's rhetorical and tactical skills, employed so effectively during World War II, triumphed.³²

MacArthur's smashing success convinced Truman to invade North Korea and unify the peninsula. America would no longer limit itself to the mere containment of North Korea. By October, the combined U.N. forces had crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and began to threaten the North Korean armies with extinction. Why did Truman allow American troops to cross the parallel when so many foreign diplomats and the Chinese themselves warned of PRC intervention?³³ The best answer advanced from the literature surveyed for this study suggests that to a large extent, Truman and Acheson were both captive of the same mystique that emanated from the China Lobby. This romantic notion was that the U.S. and China still had a "special" relationship, a unique bond between the two peoples that transcended ideology. The Chinese government, it was reasoned, was Chinese first,

²⁸"U.S. Department of State, "John M. Allison to Dean Rusk, July 1 1950, Department of State," *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, vol. 7 Korea (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976): 272; Schaller, 200; Steuck, 205.

²⁹Department of State, "MacArthur to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9 July 1950, Department of State" *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, vol. 7, 336.

³⁰Cohen, "Cold War in Asia," 134; Steuck, 205-19.

³¹Matray, 328; Steuck, 223.

³²Matray, 326.

³³Steuck, 231.



and Marxist second. It was only a matter of time before China would split off from this alien Russian philosophy and return to the embrace of a like-minded America. As Acheson said to Eric Sevareid:

Now, I give the Peiping [Peking] credit for being intelligent enough to see what is happening to them. Why should they want to further their own dismemberment and destruction by getting at cross purposes with all the free nations of the world who are inherently their friends and always have been friends of the Chinese as against this imperialism coming down from the Soviet Union I cannot see. And since there is nothing in it for them, I don't see why they should yield to what is undoubtedly pressures from the Communist movement to get into the Korean row.³⁴

Additional reasons compelled Truman to abandon containment by crossing over the parallel. There were Congressional critics like McCarthy who accused him of being "soft on Communism." To others, the sacrifice of tens of thousands of American lives did not seem to be satisfied by a restoration of the *status quo* in Korea. The aggressors must be punished.³⁵ Accordingly, Secretary Marshall cabled MacArthur on 29 September to say, "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the thirty-eighth parallel."³⁶

The advance across the parallel won widespread approval back home from Republicans and Democrats alike. U.N. forces pressed northward toward the Chinese-

Korean border.³⁷ Truman and his advisors did not perceive the invasion of North Korea as aggression, but rather as an effort to consolidate a fractured country and instill liberal, democratic institutions. Korean unification would showcase the blessings of self-determination, and achieve a crowning victory over Communism.³⁸

Yet, Truman had not lost his con-



President Harry S. Truman discusses Wake Island with General Douglas MacArthur in October 1950. *The Annals of America*, Vol. 17, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1968.

cerns over Chinese involvement, or the upcoming congressional elections. He initially resisted the idea put forward by his staff to publicly confer with MacArthur as "too political, too much showmanship," but finally agreed to do it to help his party. On 15 October, he met with the victorious general for what largely amounted to a photo opportunity on Wake Island. Truman had been out of the headlines for a spell, and meeting him there during a campaign tour seemed appropriate when the fighting in Korea remained intense. A brief, somewhat superficial, conference with MacArthur managed to nicely accomplish the objective.³⁹

One significant exchange that did occur at Wake, however, was MacArthur's

³⁴U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 23 (18 September 1950): 460-4; Krasner, 24-6.

³⁵Krasner, 23; Steuck, 204.

³⁶U.S. Department of State, "The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur), September 29, 1950," *Foreign Relations of the United States* 1950, 826.

³⁷Matray, 332.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 333.

³⁹John Edward Wiltz, "Truman and MacArthur: The Wake Island Meeting," *Military Affairs* 42 (December, 1978): 170, 175; Shaller, 205; Steuck, 238.

reassurance to Truman that Chinese troops would probably not become involved in the conflict, despite Zhou Enlai's statements threatening intervention. Should they try, MacArthur would defeat them: "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter." He also predicted that the war would end by Thanksgiving. In his memoirs, Truman listed his concern over Chinese involvement as one of the reasons he went to Wake.⁴⁰

MacArthur also said that he had been made "a chump" when he allowed his name to be put forward in the 1948 presidential primary. He apologized to Truman for his correspondence with the VFW, which the President said had been forgotten. Ironically, MacArthur left the conference with a greater assurance in his freedom to make strategic decisions; Truman left with more confidence in the General. Less than two weeks after the Wake Conference, U.N. interrogation of prisoners revealed that Chinese units had begun crossing Korea's northern border with Manchuria—the Yalu River—one day after MacArthur reassured Truman about their entry into the war.⁴¹

In response to MacArthur's alarming plea of 6 November, Truman removed prior restraints on bombing bridges spanning the Yalu; it was now clear that Chinese soldiers were crossing the border en masse. Washington subsequently sounded out its U.N. allies over the prospect of pursuing attacking Chinese aircraft back to their Manchurian bases. The British and French vigorously opposed this policy, warning that it might

destroy the fledgling European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance.⁴²

The Chinese unexpectedly toned down their offensive for three weeks in November. On 24 November, MacArthur launched his "end the war" offensive, stating that "we can get the boys home by Christmas." The same day he was handed an intelligence report that said "at a minimum" the Chinese would increase their activities in Korea shortly to immobilize U.N. forces. It cautioned that Chinese possessed sufficient strength to force the U.N. into withdrawing into a defensive posture. The next day, over 350,000 North Korean and Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) began cascading down over the Allied Army.⁴³

The international situation grew tense. On 5 December, President Truman issued an order to prevent American officials abroad from speaking in such a way as to irritate the situation with the Chinese and Russians by implying that the United States would seek to widen the war. He ordered that "no speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State."⁴⁴ The once triumphant general, seeing his forces reel in retreat, began blaming his plight on those in government who tied his hands.⁴⁵ However, General Omar Bradley, head of the JCS, hurled the blame back at MacArthur. He decried the way that those in Washington "let ourselves be misled by MacArthur's wildly erroneous estimates of the situation and his eloquent rhetoric, as well as too much wishful thinking on our own."⁴⁶

Once again, the tide of battle turned. The U.N. retreat continued until January of

⁴⁰"Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) Sept. 30, 1950," *U.S. Foreign Relations, 1950* 7: 829; and "Memorandum of Conversation by Merchant to Rusk, Oct. 3, 1950" 7: 848; Schaller, 20; Steuck, 240; Truman, 362-6.

⁴¹ Steuck, 238-9; Truman, 373.

⁴² Schaller, 210; Truman, 376, 381-2.

⁴³ Schaller, 212.

⁴⁴ Truman, 383.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon Schuster, 1983), 594.

1951, when a series of well executed counter-attacks by General Ridgway stopped the Chinese offensive along a line roughly corresponding to the thirty-eighth parallel. Washington returned to a policy of containment and sought an armistice to return Korea to its pre-war boundaries. MacArthur seethed with rage, taking violent exception to this strategy. By then, however, he had lost his former luster of invincibility that enabled him to intimidate the JCS and others in government. His aggressive push to the Yalu had provoked the Chinese, whose army humiliated America. No longer could the general portray himself as a flawless strategist.⁴⁷

According to his memoirs, MacArthur formulated a plan in February and the Spring of 1951 to end the war in ten days and "sever Korea from Manchuria by laying a field of radioactive waste . . . across the lines of enemy supply." In 1952, he urged president-elect Eisenhower to create a "belt of radioactive cobalt" along the Chinese border and follow it up with an invasion by American marines and Nationalist forces. He elaborated on this plan in a pair of interviews in 1954 when he claimed that he wanted to drop up to fifty atomic bombs on Manchuria prior to re-invading North Korea. He told Senator Vandenberg in 1950 that since Manchurian and Siberian connections with Korea were made chiefly through tunnels and bridges, "he saw a unique opportunity for the use of the atomic bomb to deal a crippling blow to those supply routes."⁴⁸ MacArthur's cavalier attitude toward atomic strategy was unsettling to friend and foe alike.

Then, on 13 February, MacArthur issued a release to the press that took another

swipe at the administration's policy of limited war:

The concept advanced by some that that we should establish a line across Korea and enter into positional warfare is unrealistic and illusory. It fails completely to take into account the length of such a line at the narrowest lateral, the rugged terrain which is involved, and the relatively small force that could be committed to the purpose. The attempt to engage in such strategy would insure the destruction of our forces piecemeal.⁴⁹

On 20 March, the JCS informed MacArthur that the President was planning a peace initiative towards China. MacArthur responded by transmitting a message to the American and Chinese government via press release. He stated that the enemy "by now must be painfully aware that that a decision by the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war in Korea, through an expansion of its military operations to its coastal and interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse." When Peking recognized this, the war would be resolved "without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly linked to Korea, such as Taiwan or China's seat in the United Nations." MacArthur's intimates later confirmed that this was a bald attempt to undermine the President.⁵⁰ MacArthur's taunting of the Chinese could only excite their fears of a U.S. invasion of their country, and ran in direct opposition to Truman's efforts to calm hostilities through a cease-fire.

The President had stated repeatedly, as he did on 16 November, 1950:

Speaking for the United States Government and people, I can I can give

⁴⁷Schaller, 227-30.

⁴⁸Schaller, 193; see also "Memorandum on Ending the Korean War," 14 December 1952; Ann Whitman Files, Eisenhower Papers; *Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), 384; Paterson, 322.

⁴⁹Whan, 234.

⁵⁰Acheson, 518-9; Schaller, 232-3; Truman, 441.

assurance that we support and are acting within the limits of United Nations policy in Korea, and that we have never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities to China. So far as the United States is concerned, I wish to state unequivocally that because of our deep devotion to the cause of world peace and our long-standing friendship with the people of China we will take every honorable step to prevent any extension of the hostilities in the Far East.⁵¹

Acheson said that MacArthur "perpetrated a major act of sabotage of a Government operation." He then went on to quote the telegram which Truman sent the General on March 24:

The President has directed that your attention be called to his order as transmitted 6 December 1950. In view of the information given you 20 March 1951 [the peace initiative] any further statements by you must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of 6 December.⁵²

Why would an experienced commander like MacArthur publicly oppose his Commander-in-Chief so boldly? MacArthur had entertained presidential aspirations in 1944, 1948, and did so again in 1952. It did not fit his dashing public image to be known as the general who oversaw a military stalemate. He was then seventy years old and used to running the Asian theater his way. Truman had allowed him to rule occupied Japan after World War II without interference, like an American Caesar. The President had tolerated MacArthur's outspoken criticism of his China policy before congressional visitors. Why should MacArthur change his ways now? He was con-

vinced that he knew "the Oriental mind" far better than anyone in Washington; it was his duty to educate his superiors, who were often too intimidated to oppose the popular World War II hero. Perhaps these factors made him feel invulnerable to Truman, or left him apathetic over the possibility of being relieved.⁵³

The President's 24 March telegram had drawn a line in the sand; once more MacArthur decided to cross over it. It was to be his last flouting of civilian control over the military. On 5 April, Joseph Martin Jr., minority leader in the House of Representatives, read a letter in Congress that MacArthur had sent him. The General had responded in the letter to the question of whether it was sheer folly not to use Chinese Nationalist soldiers in Korea. MacArthur replied:

Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition. It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms, while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable; win it, and Europe most probably would avoid war yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.⁵⁴

MacArthur had ample opportunity to recall his letter to Martin after Truman warned him again about making public declarations contrary to administration policy, but MacArthur saw no reason obey. He did

⁵¹"The President's News Conference of November 16, 1950," *Public Papers of the President*, 711.
⁵²Acheson, 518-9; Truman, 443.

⁵³Schaller, 196, 236-7, 250-1; Steuck, 188.

⁵⁴"MacArthur Wants Chiang Army Used," *New York Times* 6 April 1951, sec. 1, p. 5; Truman, 445.

not even respond to Martin's offer to keep the letter confidential.⁵⁵

Truman conferred with Acheson, Bradley, Marshall and Harriman the next day. Harriman offered his opinion that MacArthur should have been recalled in 1949, when he refused to return to the U.S. Acheson voted for dismissal, but advised seeking the counsel of the JCS first. Bradley concurred. After reviewing the record the next day, General Marshall said that MacArthur should have been relieved two years prior. By 9 April, Bradley and the JCS voted unanimously that MacArthur must go. Truman signed the papers the next day and appointed General Ridgway to succeed MacArthur. Secretary of the Army General Pace was ordered to deliver the message, but communications broke down and Pace never received the message. When a reporter from the *Chicago Tribune* began asking questions about the termination, the Administration feared that MacArthur would get the upper hand in the situation and resign on his own, perhaps issuing statements damaging to the President. A hasty press conference was called on 11 April and the President's decision was made public. MacArthur learned of his firing that day through an aide who had heard it over a radio broadcast. The General had been publicly humiliated by not receiving the news first from a military spokesman.⁵⁶ Truman had been successful in asserting civilian control over the military, but clumsily.

MacArthur's public challenges to Truman and the State Department were

more than just insubordination; they were an attempt to pressure the President into expanding the war by calling for attacks on mainland China. MacArthur's loose tongue shook the confidence of many allies in Truman's leadership.⁵⁷ The President would have been foolish to allow the general to dismantle his foreign policy. Had the U.S. disregarded the Sino-Soviet Pact of 1950 and attacked China, as MacArthur advocated, a larger war could have spread to Japan and Europe with nuclear consequences.

The General's stability as a leader was also at question, given his propensity to act independent of the government. At the time of his dismissal, U.S. military leaders noted with alarm that the Soviet Union had begun massing submarines in two locations at the same time that the Chinese were increasing larger amounts of aircraft and troops in Manchuria. Truman feared a major Sino-Soviet push to expel the U.S. not just from Korea, but Japan as well.⁵⁸ Truman had previously hinted that the U.S. might use the atomic bomb in Korea, and even flew the non-nuclear components of atomic weapons to a staging area, but took no further action.⁵⁹ But now, with the prospect of superpower confrontation in Asia facing him, the President took steps to transfer nine atomic weapons from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to military control. AEC Chairman Gordon Dean did not trust atomic weapons in MacArthur's hands and cautioned the President about the exchange. Truman signed an order effecting the transfer on 6 April, just hours after assembling his advisors to discuss MacArthur's dismissal. Roger M. Anders, historian of the Atomic Energy Commission writes "Coinciding with President Truman's final rupture

⁵⁵Schaller, 234-5; U.S. Congress, Senate, "Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of the General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from His Assignment in that Area, Part 1," (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1981), 113-4.

⁵⁶Truman, 447-9; Schaller, 238-9.

⁵⁷Acheson, 527; Gaddis, 106; Steuck, 248.

⁵⁸Roger M. Anders, (U.S. Dept. of Energy) "The Atomic Bomb and the Korean War: Gordon Dean and the Issue of Civilian Control." *Military Affairs* 52 (January 1998): 1.

⁵⁹Anders, 2.

The Sacking of Caesar

with MacArthur, the crises with its specter of nuclear war may have been a factor in Truman's decision to relieve the General."⁶⁰ Given MacArthur's remarks about "laying a belt of cobalt" across the Korean border and his resistance to governmental oversight, he may have ended up engaging the Soviet bloc in an atomic duel, or at minimum, an expanded and bloodier war in Asia. Truman cautiously retained nuclear weapons as a last resort for defense, whereas MacArthur was anxious to use them offensively. The President sacked MacArthur not just to save U.S. interests in Korea but to also avert the possibility of instigating a massive land war in Asia or a global nuclear conflict. Truman's carefully exercised prudence insured that the Korean conflict was successfully contained.

MacArthur's complaints of having his hands tied by Washington were also shortsighted, and ignored the fact that the Chinese were also abiding by the terms of limited war. As General Omar Bradley testified at hearings before Congress when speaking of the Chinese, "they have not used air against our front-line troops, against our lines of communication in Korea, our ports; they have [not] used air against our bases in Japan or against our naval forces." Later, he maintained "we are fighting under rather favorable rules for ourselves." As General Hoyt Vandenberg said, "the sanctuary business, as it is called, is operating on both sides."⁶¹

General Bradley said that an expansion of the Korean conflict leading to a confrontation with the Soviet Union would be "the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy." Historian Marc Trachtenberg explains that Bradley meant that *the right war* would be against the Soviets, *the right place* would be at the Russian core, not the Korean periphery, and *the right time* would arrive only af-



Early in 1951 General Douglas MacArthur was honored by a parade after his return to the United States. *The Annals of America*, Vol. 17, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1968.

ter the buildup recommended under NSC 68 was fully implemented.⁶²

America could not count on deterring a world war by virtue of its nuclear hegemony in 1951. Soviet intelligence and American sources have calculated that Russia absorbed devastation equal to America's entire 1949 nuclear arsenal in the first four months of its struggle with Germany in World War II, and still managed to triumph.⁶³

Neither of the two combatants extracted victory from MacArthur's dismissal. The General returned home to a raucous ticker-tape parade and was promptly invited to be the keynote speaker at the 1951 Republican Convention. Like Caesar, he expected that his military accomplishments would lead to political elevation, but a draft for the nomination, like those of 1944 and 1948, went nowhere. Shortly afterward MacArthur retired from public life.⁶⁴

Truman also suffered from his quarrel with MacArthur. It dissolved the former Congressional bipartisanship he enjoyed. That, and the stalemate that set in on the Korean front contributed materially to the De-

⁶⁰Ibid., 4-5.

⁶¹"Declassified Hearings Transcripts," 2436, 3945-6.

⁶²Paterson, 323.

⁶³Gaddis, 112

⁶⁴Miller, 335; Schaller, 250-1.



mocratic defeat in the 1952 presidential election.⁶⁵

South Korea happily retained its independence, due to Truman's decisive action in meeting the North Korean invasion. The true winners of the battle between the President and the General were the thousands, perhaps millions of men who owe their lives to the ejection of a general who was too eager to sacrifice them on an altar of glory. "Caesar" had been removed so that the country might live.

⁶⁵James M. McCormick and Eugene Wittkopf, "Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988 (in Articles)," *Journal of Politics* 52 (November, 1990): 1085-6.

The Race Not Run

Dwight D. Eisenhower and the American space Program

Eric Trimm

The 1950s were a period of intense competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. No area of that competition was as publicized and analyzed as were the respective space programs of the two nations. The Soviets thought of space as an arena in which to show parity with the United States. Dwight D. Eisenhower saw space as just one of the many priorities competing for funding, one that did not seem all that important until the Soviets got there first.

From its humble beginnings as a collection of colonies, America has always had a frontier. The legacy of many presidents is tied to the expansion of the American domain, Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase, Polk and Texas, even Johnson and Alaska. It is ironic that the last great frontier would be pioneered under a president with no such lofty ambitions for territorial expansion. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower the United States was locked in a battle with the Soviet Union for global influence. For Eisenhower, space was not a goal to be achieved, but was merely another realm in which the East vs. West competition would be played out, and in the context of that competition the use of space for national defense would have priority over space exploration. The space program as it developed during his administration was not visionary, nor was it motivated by grand ideals of exploration and discovery. Instead, it was grounded in political expediency and the needs of national security. Initially space research was an outgrowth of national security, but the challenge posed by Sputnik would shape space policy in ways that Eisenhower did not originally envision. His policies would influence presidents long after his administration had ended.

Space policy languished far down the list of government priorities when Eisenhower assumed office. In 1949 President Truman, in a bid to reduce spending, had drastically cut back funding for the missile research being done by the Army and the Navy. The Air force, which might have been expected to embrace the new weapon, instead preferred manned bombers. When the Korean War began, even less money was allocated for research of any kind. Research in the civilian sector was almost non-existent.¹

Similar to President Truman, Eisenhower also regarded space research to be a lesser

Robert A. Divine, *The Sputnik Challenge* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 21.

priority. The administration had two areas of concern, foreign policy and the economy.² In both cases Eisenhower was unhappy with what he had inherited. Foreign affairs under the Truman administration were dominated by the policy of containment. Initially, other means of dealing with the Soviet Union were sought, but events during the late 1940s suggested that the Soviets were bent on world domination, necessitating a more aggressive approach.³

Containment grew out of a set of principles formed by the National Security Council (NSC) in 1950. These principles, contained in the document NSC 68, proposed that the Communist threat be met everywhere and by whatever force necessary to contain it. The underlying theory was that the free world was reeling from Communist gains in Eastern Europe, China, and elsewhere.

Furthermore, these successes had been so overwhelming that even the appearance of further Communist encroachment would weaken the west.⁴ To counter this precarious world balance, the United States would need to make every effort, and bear any burden to prevent the further expansion of Communism. If this meant subordinating the economy to foreign policy with deficit spending to uphold the policy of containment, so be it. Truman's advisors were convinced that the

U.S. could bear any short-term financial pressures because, in their opinion, long-term economic growth would offset them.

Eisenhower agreed with the sentiment, if not the free-spending method of containment, and in May of 1953 he asked the National War College to develop a "New Look" for national defense strategy.⁵ The "New Look" evolved through three stages until finally emerging as NSC 162/2. It established the goal of countering the Soviets while avoiding economic disruption. Doing



Russia's Sputnik accomplishment stimulated creative innovations among U.S. businesses.

Peter Jennings and Todd Brewster, *The Century*.

this would require a massive retaliatory capability as well as a strong economy. NSC 162/2 recommended a strategy of covert activity aimed at Soviet bloc countries. Although there was little chance of dislodging any nations from the Soviet sphere of influence, it was thought that an ac-

tive campaign to "discredit Soviet prestige and ideology" would undermine any attempts

to spread Communism.⁶

The paper also advocated the use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons in the event of a general war. This was seen to have two advantages: First, atomic weapons were very cost effective. Both the weapons and the delivery systems would cost far less than a large conventional build-up. Second, it was thought that foreknowledge of U.S. doctrine to use nuclear weapons would give the Soviets pause, since any act of aggression would be met with an atomic attack.


²Paul Johnson, *A History of the American People* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 830-2.

³Robert H. Ferrell, *American Diplomacy: The Twentieth Century* (New York: Norton, 1988), 251.

⁴Richard A. Melanson, David Mayers, eds., *Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the 1950's* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1987), 37.

⁵ Ibid., 51.

⁶David L. Snead, *The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1999), 30-1.



American space goals changed during the 1950s, as a consumer oriented magazine depicts. Peter Jennings and Todd Brewster, *The Century*.

This would limit their scope of action and further inhibit aggression.⁷

Eisenhower embraced this doctrine as an effective strategy for national defense. The reliance on nuclear weapons was troubling but unavoidable. Under NSC162/2 the value of U.S. forces rested on the ability to deter war, not win it, since any future war would likely be catastrophic. Both Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, believed that the Kremlin would behave rationally and that the United States would have time to build a credible missile force before the Soviets did.⁸

The point of departure from the previous policy was in the amount of money that would be spent on defense. The econ-

omy was the second major area of concern for Eisenhower, and he had drawn a line on further spending increases because of his belief that economic health was intimately linked to national security. This essentially reversed Truman's policy; instead of subordinating the economy to foreign policy, it subordinated foreign policy to the economy.

Actually, Eisenhower took this reasoning one step further, to him; the economy was foreign policy. He thought that the United States could be as weakened by fiscal irresponsibility as it could by Soviet expansion. During a campaign speech in September 1952 he had said:

The real problem is to build the defense with wisdom and efficiency. We must achieve both security and solvency. In fact, the foundation of military strength is economic strength. A bankrupt America is more the Soviet goal than an America conquered on the field of battle.⁹

Few contemporaries gave Eisenhower unflinching praise for his defense policy. In fact, few people in his own administration cared for it.¹⁰ British Rear Admiral Sir Anthony, an early opponent of the "New Look" policies wrote in 1956:

All our fighting should be limited (in weapons, targets, area, and time) to the minimum force necessary to deter and repel aggression, prevent any unnecessary extension of the conflict and permit a return to negotiations at the earliest opportunity.¹¹

Henry Kissinger, one of the harshest critics would later write:

⁹ Snead, 20.

¹⁰ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 376.


¹¹ Snead, 86.

⁷ Ibid., 31.
⁸ Melanson and Mayers, 340.

Nuclear weapons, which throughout the decade of America's nuclear monopoly and near-monopoly had seemed to provide a quick and relatively inexpensive path to security, would, in the age of approaching nuclear parity, increasingly circumscribe America's willingness to run risks and thereby constrain its freedom of diplomatic maneuver.¹²

To the critics of the "New Look," the weakness lay in the problem of implementing containment with only the maximum force available to police it. Nuclear weapons did not provide a proportionate response to situations like the Berlin crisis, or the invasion of Hungary. The real failure of Eisenhower's policies was his inability to envision limited conventional military force or the threat thereof, as a diplomatic tool.

Some modern historians such as Walter A. McDougall have pointed out that the support cost and pay scales of the American military did make the reliance on nuclear weapons attractive.¹³ Additionally, the development of space technology as a result of the "New Look" led to the airborne and satellite reconnaissance capabilities that enabled the Eisenhower administration to specifically fund the programs needed to counter Soviet forces.¹⁴



Defense spending during the Eisenhower administration. Kennedy, 1987.

By 1955, Eisenhower's program for the economy was already showing the results he desired. Spending on national security had been cut from \$50.3 billion in fiscal 1953, down to \$40.6 billion in 1955, a reduction of just over 20 percent.¹⁵ An \$8.1 billion cut in military spending represented the bulk of the savings. But just as the economy began heading in the desired direction, events in the Soviet Union threatened to force a reassessment of the administration's priorities.

Two developments in the Soviet Union troubled the administration. The first had been the successful test of a hydrogen bomb in 1953. Because hydrogen bombs were much smaller and lighter than the earlier atomic weapons, Soviet bombers would be able to carry more of them.¹⁶ The next year the second troubling development appeared in the form of both medium and long range bombers with the ability to deliver hydrogen bombs to the United States. Eisenhower did not believe that the Soviets were going to

launch an all out nuclear attack on the U.S. But on the other hand could he really be sure? One military report suggested that the Soviets did not believe they possessed the strength necessary to launch an attack until 1957.¹⁷

The Air Force thought otherwise. Observing bomber flybys during a military air parade in Moscow in 1954, an Air Force attaché saw what he thought were many

¹²Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 573.

¹³Walter A. McDougall, *The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age* (New York: Basic Books, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 267.

¹⁴William E. Burrows, *Deep Black: The Startling Truth Behind America's Top-Secret Spy Satellites* (New York: Random House; Berkley, 1986), 98.

¹⁵Shirley Anne Warshaw, ed., *Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 126.

¹⁶Ferrell, 314.

¹⁷Snead, 34.

large formations of Soviet bombers. In reality he saw the same planes repeatedly flying by in an elaborate charade to fool the West into thinking that the Soviet Union had more bombers than it did. The Soviets were subsequently estimated to have between 600 to 800 bombers in service, with 25 more being produced every month. These figures were then leaked to the press, creating a public furor over a supposed "bomber gap."¹⁸

Eisenhower did not believe in a "bomber gap," however, he was concerned about the possibility of a surprise nuclear attack. In July of 1954, Eisenhower formed a panel to study the Soviet threat after taking the advice of Lee Dubridge, who was The Chairman of the Presidential Scientific Advisory Committee. He then asked James Killian, The President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to serve as chairman of the newly formed Technological Capabilities Panel. The Panel, which met from September 1954 to February 1955, soon became known as the Killian committee and would have a far reaching impact on Space Policy.¹⁹

The panel's report identified four periods that it said would occur during the development of both U.S. and Soviet military capabilities in the foreseeable future. Period one began in late 1954 and only stretched to early 1955. This period would be characterized by a large superiority in U.S. nuclear capability that in the event of war would almost certainly prevail.

Period two would range from 1956 to the end of the decade. During this time, the United States would enjoy its largest strategic advantage as weapons then under development came on line, representing an advantage that could even overcome a surprise attack by the Soviets.

The third period, in the years following 1960, would be up for grabs. During this period the Soviets would begin to acquire very powerful nuclear weapons and more delivery systems to use them. These would present a real danger to the United States that had not already begun to make changes to its strategic defense capability as well as to offensive striking power.

Period four would be the point in the not too distant future when both sides possessed enough offensive striking power to overwhelm their opponent's defenses. Because both sides would have the capability to detect an incoming attack, an attack by one side would result in retaliation and the ensuing destruction of both.²⁰

To counter the developing Soviet threat, the Killian panel had several recommendations. First, missile research needed to be enlarged and accelerated. The panel recognized the need for both intercontinental ballistic missile and medium-range ballistic missiles, but they also urged that the Strategic Air Command take steps to reduce the vulnerability of its aircraft by dispersing them and keeping some airborne at all times.²¹

A major portion of the panel's report dealt with intelligence and the collection of it. Much of the report on this subject remains classified to this day, but the portions of it that are open to public record reflect its far reaching ramifications for space policy. Chief among the proposals was the need to develop an airborne reconnaissance capability. Initially this would have to be done with manned aircraft, but by hastening work on the missile programs and other technologies necessary to loft objects into space, it had been hoped that satellites would soon be able to conduct this mission.²²

²⁰James R. Killian, *Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), 73-5.

²¹*Ibid.*, 76-7.

²²Burrows, 67-8.

¹⁸Burrows, 64-5.
¹⁹Snead, 35.

The panel's report began producing results immediately. The U-2 spyplane was quickly put into production and began flying missions through Soviet airspace in June of 1956. At the same time the Air Force was given permission to proceed with a program to field a spy satellite.²³ This project, named WS-117L, was well funded and was intended to be in service within five years. Everyone was certain that a U-2 would be brought down eventually, and once spoiled by the intelligence it provided, going without it was unthinkable. Therefore the U-2 was only a temporary solution; a working satellite needed to be developed quickly.

But even the seemingly invulnerable spy satellite had a potential problem, the legality of flying *it* over another nation. The U-2 necessarily violated Soviet airspace in order to obtain the photographs and other intelligence it gathered. This was illegal under international law and had the potential for a major diplomatic incident should a U-2 ever be brought down. What had not yet been defined, was how far out a nation's sovereign airspace extended. The laws of physics dictated that a satellite must circle the earth in order to stay in orbit, thus having to fly over many nations. Even as serious talk about the legality of spy satellites began, a project that could establish the legality of orbital satellites was beginning to take shape.

In 1950 a group of scientist gathered at the home of James Van Allen and together they conceived of the idea to designate the year 1957 as an International Polar Year. The precedent for this was the two International Polar Years that had been held in 1882 and 1932. The year 1957, it was predicted, would be a year of great solar activity. By the time the idea had reached full fruition, it had become the International Geophysical Year, or IGY, and involved scientific organizations worldwide, some of



The launching of Sputnik by the Soviets nullified the competition between branches of U.S. Armed Forces to launch the first satellite.


Walter A. McDougall. *The Heavens and the Earth: a Political History of the Space Age.*

whom felt that it offered an opportune time to place a satellite into earth's orbit.²⁴ As the various scientific organizations lobbied the federal government for funding and permission to attempt a launch, the national security establishment seized upon the plan as a way of establishing the legality of orbiting satellites. This meeting of science and national security would eventually establish an uneasy marriage that continues to the present day.

There were already two competing satellite proposals, one by the Army and the other by the Navy. The Army project was called Orbiter, and relied on the Redstone, a rocket that had evolved from the German V-2 which had already had a successful test program. This was not surprising since the leading engineers from that program were Germans who had arranged to be "captured"

²³McDougall, 117.

²⁴Ibid., 118.



by the U.S. Army in the waning days of World War II.²⁵ The Navy rocket was the Vanguard, a built from scratch project that featured many new and untried engineering techniques.

The plan was for one of the competing rockets to launch a satellite containing a science package designed by the IGY committee.²⁶ An advisory group from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory had been convened to decide which booster to use for the satellite. By this time the competition had gained one more competitor as the Air Force weighed in with its huge Atlas ICBM. However, their entry was quickly discounted as unlikely to be ready for launch before the end of the International Geophysical Year. The group eventually decided in favor of the Navy Vanguard.²⁷ The Army was furious and demanded another competition fearing that this was the first step in cutting it out of the space business. It proved to be and a few years later Wernher von Braun and his team would be transferred to NASA.²⁸

On 4 October 1957, the squabbling over which service would provide a launcher vanished. A satellite was launched that day, but it came from the steppes of Kazakhstan inside the Soviet Union. Sputnik, or "companion," actually passed over the United States twice before anybody knew it was there.²⁹ The satellite itself was a simple affair containing only the radio transmitter that broadcast a beep...beep...beep to the earth below. Needless to say that the reaction in Washington proved to be anything but simple.

Eisenhower's response was framed both by his cost-consciousness and his shock at America's wounded pride. In his press conference that day he repeatedly emphasized the amount of money being spent on satellite and rocket research, expressing that in his view all of that money should result in real scientific return. Eisenhower's point, which most Americans missed, was that the Soviets had sent up something that resembled nothing more than a radio station circling the earth. The U.S. satellite was going to be much more sophisticated, containing scientific packages that would expand man's knowledge of the heavens. He also emphasized that the United States had not considered itself in a race to launch a satellite first.³⁰ Later, as news began to leak that the Army's Redstone could have launched a satellite a year earlier, the White House released a statement explaining its decision to separate the Navy and Army programs. The White House argued that the Navy program was meant to "accent the scientific purposes of the satellite," and it was separate from the Army program in order to "avoid interference with top priority missile programs." The main theme of the statement was that progress on satellite development should not be correlated to progress on the ballistic missile programs.³¹

Privately, Eisenhower expressed a mixture of surprise and relief. He was surprised that the American people were so affected by Sputnik and he wondered at their psychological vulnerability.³² But there was also an upside. By launching a satellite first, the Soviets had established the precedent for

²⁵Ibid., 44.

²⁶Ibid., 121.

²⁷Ibid., 122.

²⁸Roger E. Bilstein, *Orders of Magnitude: A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915-1990*^{3rd} ed., The NASA History Series (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1989), 49.


²⁹William E. Burrows, *This New Ocean* (New York: Random House, 1998), 183.

³⁰U.S. President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1958) Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958; John Logsdon, et al, eds., *Exploring the Unknown*, vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1996), 720.

³¹Ibid., 734-5.

³²McDougall, 148.

satellite overflight, paving the way for orbital reconnaissance.³³



The Soviet lead in the space race challenged the U.S.'s dominant position in World Supremacy. Walter A. McDougall.

The Heavens and the Earth: a Political History of the Space Age.

In reality, the administration had known that the Soviets were probably going to launch a satellite first. Back in June the first Soviet SS-6 missile had been photographed on its launch pad by a high-flying U-2. Forewarned of its launch, a U.S. intelligence facility in Turkey had tracked the missile during its test flight on 3 August and again during a second test three weeks later. The intelligence gathered indicated that the missile was capable of putting a satellite into orbit.³⁴ In July, Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA sent a letter to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Donald Quarles, to inform him that the Soviets were on the verge of launching a satellite.³⁵

Congressional opinion, fueled by the media and public uproar, was less sanguine.

On the Hill it was believed that a decisive threat had been posed, not only to American prestige, but possible even to its very survival. This became particularly manifested in the opinion of Senate majority leader Lyndon Baines Johnson, who said:

The Roman Empire was dominant because it could build roads, later--when it moved to the sea--the British Empire was dominant because it had ships. In the air age we were powerful because we had airplanes. Now the Communists have established a foothold in outer space. It is not very reassuring to be told that next year we will put a better satellite into the air. Perhaps it will also have chrome trim and automatic windshield wipers.³⁶

Johnson sensed a political opportunity and he made the most of it. Hearings were planned to begin in November, but before they could get underway, the Soviets struck again. Sputnik Two was launched on 3 November. It weighed over a thousand pounds and carried the earth's first traveler to outer space, a dog named Laika.³⁷ The hearings began on 25 November, and although presumably bipartisan, were obviously meant to embarrass the administration. Witness after witness testified to the growing Soviet lead in science, technology, and, it was feared, global supremacy.³⁸

In December leaks began to emerge concerning yet another blue-ribbon panel that Eisenhower had commissioned to study national security. In this case the issue had been civil defense, although to Eisenhower's displeasure, the committee had far exceeded the mandate to embrace issues covering the entire spectrum of national defense. Established on 4 April, the Gaither Committee

³³Divine, 6.

³⁴Burrows, 91.

³⁵Allen W. Dulles, to the Honorable Donald Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, 5 July 1957, in Logsdon.

³⁶Tom Wolfe, *The Right Stuff*(New York: Bantam, 1979), 57.

³⁷McDougall, 150.

³⁸*Ibid.*, 152.

included many of the familiar faces from the earlier Killian panel. In its final form the report painted a dire picture of the fate of the United States following a Soviet nuclear attack. Predicting massive casualties, the report recommended a severe overhaul of the nation's strategic forces including a large increase in the production of ballistic missiles and a nationwide bomb shelter program that would cost \$25 billion.³⁹

For Eisenhower the leaks could not have occurred at a worse time. With the nation reeling over Sputnik, news that a Soviet attack would result in the virtual destruction of the United States was the last thing he wanted the public to hear. He now faced the challenge of responding to the Soviet space program without rearranging his priorities to do it. Eisenhower became dedicated to space, but only insofar as it could be used for spy satellites and ballistic missiles. Eisenhower often worried about the Soviet military threat and his interest in and funding of space related projects had been directed almost entirely in that direction. To that end space technologies were an outgrowth of the needs of national security as it responded to Soviet advances. His vision did not extend to doing things just to show that they could be done. The entire IGY satellite project had been useful primarily to pave the way for spy satellites and he didn't want to spend a lot of money just to prove that the United States was equal to the Soviet Union.


Eisenhower began to craft a response to Sputnik that would not necessitate a major change in his economic or defense poli-

cies. It would be characterized not as a reorganization of national goals, but rather by a number of small political maneuverings designed to buy time while the storm passed. During his radio and television address on 7 November, he announced the creation of the office of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, a post that would be filled by Dr. James Killian, President of MIT.⁴⁰ A week later, he began to discuss the importance of education.⁴¹ Both

of these moves reflected an attempt to move the national debate beyond defense issues, to one of education and a need for more science in the classroom.⁴²

Eisenhower still faced the question of the military's role in space. Some in the defense de-

partment were already imagining schemes as far out as a manned lunar base from which would rain certain destruction should the Soviet Union ever launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States.⁴³ Fearing a call to greatly increase defense spending, he decided to increase the funding for military research and development.⁴⁴ This was accomplished along with another of Eisenhower's goals, a reorganization of the military. In August of 1958 the administration and congress authorized a reorganized



U.S. R&D spending (military and civilian), 1953-1961. Paul Kennedy, *The rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.

⁴⁰Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Announcement of Killian Appointment" (Radio and Television Address on Science in National Security, 7 November 1957), in Logsdon.

⁴¹Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Our Future Security" (Radio and Television Address, 13 November 1957), in Logsdon.

⁴²Warshaw, 112.

⁴³Burrows, 215.

⁴⁴McDougall, 176.

defense department that was unified under the Secretary of Defense, who would also receive and distribute all funds allocated for the military. In order that research and development might be more efficiently managed, Eisenhower's bill centralized its funding.⁴⁵

There remained the issue of which government agency would take the lead in space exploration. In the wake of Sputnik there was no question but that the United States had to push forward in space in order not to be perceived as falling behind the Soviet Union. Eisenhower felt that military research should receive the highest priority, but that a need existed for a civilian space program.⁴⁶ Based on the recommendations of his Presidential Science Advisory Council, Eisenhower decided to convert an existing agency, the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics, into the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).⁴⁷

During the time in which the Space Act was being drafted, Eisenhower had once again turned to the national security establishment to project a course for the United States to follow in space. NSC 5814 was one of the most influential documents in the history of space policy. It noted that the Soviet Union had reaped political benefits from its early success and predicted that if the trend continued it would undermine U.S. prestige. The report went on to distinguish between civilian and military use of space by separating ballistic missiles from space policy.⁴⁸ The effect of this was that any United Nations brokered space treaty would not be recognized by the United States as

affecting missiles in any way.⁴⁹ Looking ahead, the report recommended a variety of uses for space, and suggested that a role would exist for manned spaceflight.

From its inception NASA began to plan manned missions into space. Project Mercury, the first series of manned flights started to gear up only one week after the agency's birth. If NASA felt a sense of urgency, Eisenhower did not. T. Keith Glennan, NASA's first administrator remarked in his diary that the President was not concerned with Soviet advances, but rather with the nature of scientific progress in the United States.⁵⁰ Eisenhower favored NASA's manned program because he felt it would be cheaper than funding a similar program for the armed services.

Eisenhower continued to be concerned about the nation's economy, worrying that a crash program to "catch up" in space would damage it. He passed on fielding a generation of ballistic missiles based on the existing technology. Instead he decided to wait for the second generation of missiles which, with their solid propellant, would not have to be fueled prior to launch but would instead be able to launch immediately.⁵¹ Other parts of the defense budget were increased, but only in response to specific needs.

Because Eisenhower still appeared to be sedately responding to Soviet challenges, Democratic charges of a "missile gap" loomed up before the presidential elections. As before with the "bomber gap," Eisenhower knew it was a groundless accusation. But again this knowledge had been gained from U-2 photography, the existence of which he was unwilling to reveal, even to assist the vice-president in his bid for the

⁴⁵Ibid., 162.

⁴⁶Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace 1956-1961* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 257.

⁴⁷National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Public Law 85-568, 72 Statute, 426, Available <http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/history/spaceact.html>.

⁴⁸National Security Council, NSC 5814, U.S. Policy on Outer Space, 20 June 1958, in Logsdon.

⁴⁹McDougall, 180.

⁵⁰T. Keith Glennan, *The Birth of NASA: The Diary of T. Keith Glennan*, ed. J.D. Hunley (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1993), 2.

⁵¹Divine, 122.

White House.⁵² Privately, Eisenhower felt Truman had not paid enough attention to missile research, stating in his biography *Waging Peace*, that the United States was six years behind before he even got into office.

Although his critics still felt that he was moving at a snail's pace on space issues, in reality Eisenhower had made a dramatic leap in policy. Prior to this point, funding had been provided only to programs that directly responded to known Soviet threats. Creating a civilian agency with a manned space program was a response to a perception of Soviet leadership in the area of space. While this turnaround could hardly be called a full circle back to the early days of Truman's containment policy, it proved to be a significant step towards placating fears of Soviet advances in science and weapons technology.

Following Kennedy's election, his Secretary of State, Robert McNamara, admitted during a press conference that there had been no "missile gap," temporarily causing a fuss in the Washington press corps that soon passed.⁵³ The McNamara gaffe is a telling example of the success of Eisenhower's space policies. The short-term results were unspectacular, but in the long term the groundwork he laid benefited many presidents following his term. The development of satellite reconnaissance has aided every administration since Kennedy's, and NASA has developed into a successful civilian space program.

Eisenhower's policies were successful because they were meant to benefit America in the long term. There is no great achievement such as Apollo to remember him by. But the policies he promoted during

his term made it possible for his successors to run the race in space that he chose not to.

⁵²Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: The U-2 Affair* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 154.

⁵³Michael R. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960-1963* (New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991), 65-6.



When Disneyland opened on 17 1955, the public response was so overwhelming that the gates were flooded and the I-5 was backed up for miles. Peter Jennings and Todd Brewster, *The Century*.

Disneyheim: When Anaheim Met Mickey

Mercedes Anderson

When driving through Anaheim, one can almost forget that not so long ago, there were orange groves in place of malls and a time before the Magic Kingdom. Author Mercedes Anderson traces the history of the city of Anaheim's relationship with the Walt Disney Company, a history of big business in collaboration with machine politics. She argues whether Disney has exerted a significant amount of influence in its relationship with Anaheim over the past few decades. The author concludes that Anaheim and Disney have maintained a symbiotic relationship by which both have exerted influence upon each other when their interests suited them but have also been independent when it was desired.

Once Upon a Time in the Orange Groves...

In Anaheim, tourism has been the main industry since the building of Disneyland. But Disney imposed order only within the walls of his own property; the neon signs of the motels and quick-order chain restaurants surrounded the Magic Kingdom with visual disharmony.


-- Karl A. Lamb, As Orange Goes¹

For both the Walt Disney Company and the city of Anaheim, two things are central--money and people. The Walt Disney Company is investing more than a billion dollars into a new Anaheim resort. Anaheim, dependent on tourism revenue, needs this growth to exist. At stake is the patronage of twelve million people.² Anaheim's rapid expansion from an agricultural economy to one dependent on tourist dollars forces a closer examination of the relationship between the company and the town. Although this growth reflects broader Orange County trends, the responsibility lies with whomever brought the traffic, noise, whomever brought the traffic, noise,

Karl A. Lamb, *As Orange Goes; Twelve California Families and the Future of American Politics* (New York: Norton, 1974), 24.

Ricky Young, "Anaheim Official Says That Plan Is Doable," *Orange County Register*, 13 December 1991, sec. B,

and urban blight.³ A natural question is one of control; “Does Disney control Anaheim?” or “Does Anaheim control Disney?” The relationship between The Walt Disney Company and Anaheim reflects more than fifty years of development, emotion, and possibility. The result is that Anaheim and the Walt Disney Company work on two levels, individually as a city or company and on mutual reliance as lure for tourists.



Walt Disney describes Disneyland to his television audience. Dave Smith and Steven Clark, *Disney: The First 100 Years*.

crops to include walnuts, chili peppers, and oranges. This diversification signaled the beginning of a new city and new county with Orange's separation from Los Angeles County in 1889.⁶

Oranges and agriculture continued to influence Anaheim well into the next century, even as Disney and his cohorts secretly scouted locations for Walt's amuse-

The Perfect Small Town

Walt Disney chose Anaheim for the same reason Anaheim decided to expand its industrial capabilities—the city was a small agricultural town. It was not unlike Disney's hometown of Marceline, Missouri, which offered open spaces, orange groves, and a small town community life.⁴ The town was founded in 1857 by people of German descent from San Francisco. Buying land from Juan Pacifico Ontiveres' Spanish grant, the Rancho San Juan Cajon de Santa Ana, they farmed and planted vineyards.⁵ After fighting the usual battle for water rights and the failure of the grape crop, Anaheim's residents diversified their

ment park. The city developed steadily throughout the twentieth century, transforming from a farm town to a small city. The city paved the streets, installed streetlights, and developed a commercial district along Center Street. The population grew from 1,000 in 1900 to 5,500 in the twenties. Also in the 1920s, Anaheim foreshadowed its tourism ties by hosting the California Valencia Orange Show.⁷ Although the city began to branch out to diversify economically, Anaheim continued to rely on agriculture and oranges. The instability of this situation was brought home on numerous occasions. For instance oranges were not selling and were dumped despite a starving populace during the Great Depression, and viruses were a constant threat to the crop.⁸ The city leaders realized that they needed a better answer. Anaheim's leaders felt that the key to economic stability was bringing in forms of industry. Following the Second World War they actively

³Ramon G. McLeod, “A Marriage of Convenience,” *Orange County Register*, 2 June 1985, sec. C, 10; David Haldane and Janet Wilson, “Obstacle Course for Anaheim's Motorist,” *Los Angeles Times*, 30 August 1998, sec. A, 22.

⁴Geoff Black and Bret Colson, *Dreams to Reality: A Profile of Modern Day Anaheim* (Tucson, Ariz.: Pioneer Publications, 1993), 3-4.

⁵*Historical Sketch: A Community Guide to Orange County*, 13 May 1980: 3; John Westcott, *Anaheim: City of Dreams* (Windsor: 1990), 13.

⁶*Ibid.*, 39-42; Black and Colson, 10.


⁷Westcott, 50.

⁸*Ibid.*, 66-7.

worked to attract large corporations. They offered both cheap land and a new freeway as incentives. It was here that the Chamber of Commerce, the Santa Ana Freeway (I-5) and Disney collided.⁹

Walt's Little Project

As Anaheim poised to offer itself to business in order to stimulate growth, Walt Disney began to think about his next venture. The lore surrounding the development of Disneyland is full of stories, often repeated, about creating a family park rather than a carnival midway and expanding the Disney empire. Disney decided in the early 1950s to create a small amusement park attraction on a small plot of land across from his Burbank Studio.¹⁰ The city of Burbank was less than impressed. They feared the amusement park would be "a permanent carnival" and, after all, Disney's forte was cartoons and not construction.¹¹ Disney refused to give in and started to scout other Southern California locations. He enlisted



Walt Disney's proposed theme park in Burbank across the street from his studios.

Beth Dunlop, *Building a Dream: The Art of Disney Architecture*.

the Stanford Research Institute to research sites and created Walt E. Disney Enterprises (WED) to work on designing the park.¹² At

this point Orange County and Anaheim entered the story. The Stanford researchers studied various locations in the "Southland" for characteristics such as land price and temperature before settling on the sparsely populated yet conveniently located area that was close to the soon-to-be completed freeway in Orange County.¹³ The small town of Anaheim, with vast amounts of cheap farmland, offered everything Disney wanted. Disney and his cohorts set about securing funding for the project and negotiating a deal with the city.

Disney's kingdom would forever change his "perfect" small town. Deciding on Anaheim for the escape it provided from Los Angeles as well as its building space, Disney, the City Council, and land owning farmers set about making Disneyland a reality.¹⁴ The first obstacle was Anaheim's mayor, who feared the amusement park concept would cheapen the town's image.¹⁵ Disney was able to win him over in a private meeting filled with reassurances. Disney and the Company needed \$17 million to build the park and arranged "park sponsorships" from leading American companies in an exchange of sorts. Companies bought into Disneyland and received some sort of compensation either from the park or from the Disney Company. The most well-known was the American Broadcasting Corporation's propaganda filled *Disneyland* show for original Disney Company programming.¹⁶

The first tract Disney selected in Anaheim (145 acres on Ball Road) fell through when farmers refused to sell. Anaheim rushed to keep the Disney Company interested with a second 160 acres piece

McLeod.

⁹Dave Smith and Steven Clark, *Disney: The First 100 Years* (New York, Disney Enterprises: 1999), 71-2.

¹⁰Black and Colson, 2.

¹¹Richard Schickel, *The Disney Version: The Life, Times, Art, and Commerce of Walt Disney*, 3d.ed.




(Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1997), 310-1; Smith and Clark, 72.

¹³Schickel, 311.

¹⁴Black and Colson, 3-4.

¹⁵Westcott, 76.

¹⁶Schickel, 312-3; Smith and Clark, 75.



A sequence of aerial photographs showing stages of Disneyland's construction from orange groves (top left) to the construction of Main Street (bottom right). Beth Dunlop, *Building a Dream: The Art of Disney Architecture*.

south of Ball Road.¹⁷ The city, hoping to bring industry to its agricultural burg, sealed its fate with the Disney Company deal. The farmers, twenty in all, slowly worked toward arrangements with Disney for their land.¹⁸ The second site was a workable choice for the city, but it had two key issues to deal with—Cerritos Avenue cut through it, and the land was not actually part of Anaheim.¹⁹ Anaheim, wanting this deal to go through, made the first of many deals to secure the city's future with the Disney Company. The city bypassed any obstacles to the project—such as residents rejecting an “amusement” park like they did in Burbank, and getting a water company to service the unincorporated area—by gerrymandering the election to get “a reasonable assurance of victory” with the results of fifty-six to two.²⁰

Ironically, Disney did not want to build a cheap “amusement” park with a carnival atmosphere. He wanted to build a

family attraction. The whole idea was to build a place where people could escape and a family could have clean fun.²¹ It took the company exactly one year to transform seventeen orange groves into Walt Disney's Magic Kingdom.²²

The construction of Disneyland served two purposes for Disney. The first was the creation of a family environment unlike the carnival-type places where he took his own children; although some would argue that it also gave Disney's company increased market penetration with American children by playing on the Parent-Child dynamic.²³ The second purpose was to give Disney an outlet for his planning desires and to create a home for his characters that he had designed. Disneyland was a space where he could convey his version of American life, a place where “American

¹⁷McLeod.

¹⁸Schickel, 311-2.

¹⁹McLeod.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Black and Colson, 2; Schickel, 310.

²²David Koenig, *Mouse Tales: A Behind-The-Ears Look at Disneyland* (Irvine, Calif.: Bonaventure, 1994), 19.

²³Schickel, 17.

values” were present.²⁴ It was this desire for control and order that ultimately altered the relationship between the city of Anaheim, Disney, and The Walt Disney Company.²⁵ Though Anaheim viewed increased tourism as an opportunity for more economic growth and actively worked to enhance tourist revenue, Disney grew unhappy with the resulting sprawl.

The Honeymoon Is Over

The ten years following completion of Disneyland were happy years for both the city and the park. Disneyland’s construction brought in people to build, people to live, and other businesses to work. Anaheim’s size in 1955 was four times what it had been in 1953.²⁶ Anaheim spent time trying to make Disney and the company happy, including swinging legislation in the company’s favor, and by instituting the Anaheim Way, patterned after the Company’s own Disney University training to make the Anaheim experience seam endless.²⁷ However, the changes during this period resulted in alienation. The Disney Company succeeded in attracting more businesses to Anaheim than the orange groves had.²⁸ What had been a small town was soon replaced with a decentralized collection of tourist traps near the park and an increasingly inadequate city center.²⁹ While The interests of Anaheim and Disney (both

Anaheim reveled in the booming economy, Disney hated it:

In July, 1966, he told a group of journalists that at least part of his recent intensive interest in city planning stemmed from his dismay at the unplanned sprawl of Los Angeles, which he observed as he drove about the city.³⁰



Disneyland finally opens to the public on 17 July 1955. Beth Dunlop, *Building a Dream: The Art of Disney Architecture*.

Walt and The Disney Company) split over this issue, creating a strain that presently continues.

Disney felt that the “touristy” environment surrounding the park cheapened the park’s atmosphere.³¹ He idealized small town life and used his *Main Street, USA* to recreate and introduce this life to his park guests.³² To his dismay, Anaheim’s small town feeling quickly disappeared. As the urbanization and eventual decay increased in Anaheim, Disney and the Walt Disney Company turned away from Anaheim and

²⁴Richard Francaviglia, “History After Disney: The Significance of ‘Imagineered’ Historical Places,” *The Public Historian* 17, no. 4, (1995): 71.

²⁵Schickel, 24.

²⁶Black and Colson, 10.

²⁷McLeod, sec. C, 1.

²⁸Black and Colson, 10.

²⁹Ibid., 13.

³⁰Schickel, 24.


³¹Black and Colson, 14.

³²Francaviglia, 70-1.

looked ahead. Not only was Disney dissatisfied with the urban sprawl, but he was also dissatisfied with the lost opportunity. The businesses that developed outside the park--hotels, restaurants, and shops--were beyond his control. Disneyland took in \$273 million, however, another \$555 million was made just outside the gates.³³ The company's next major project, the development of the Walt Disney World complex in Orlando, Florida, offered Disney what he could not get in Anaheim--enough land to control the parks, properties, and surrounding environments.³⁴ How much land would guarantee control? Disney bought almost 30,000 acres in Florida. Called the Reedy Creek Development area, it encompassed enough land to be its own incorporated area.³⁵ Anaheim, pleased with the increased tourism and revenues, continued to expand its economic base. This proved detrimental to its relationship with Disney and The Walt Disney Company. The city created the Anaheim Visitor and Convention bureau in 1961 and worked to create a stable tourism base to lure major hotels to an area that could now support these year round. This included building the Anaheim Convention Center in 1967 to appeal to "family" businesses and businessmen as well as the families the Disney Company wooed.

These attempts to expand Anaheim's economic base could not change the new realities of the city. While new industrial businesses moved onto the farmland, the center of the city grew increasingly blighted.³⁶ The city made attempts to revitalize Anaheim's symbolic heart with Project Alpha during the 1970s. This included the building of a new civic center and industrial corridor.³⁷ Despite these efforts,

urban decay remained a problem accompanied by other developments, including increased crime, lack of space, and prostitution.³⁸ The Walt Disney Company, following Disney's death in 1966, continued to fo-



Walt and Roy Disney join the Governor of Florida to announce Walt Disney World.

Dave Smith and Steven Clark, *Disney: The First 100 Years*.

cus its attention elsewhere. It continued to expand its other property holdings and dealt internally with a hostile take over bid and restructuring in the early 1980s.³⁹ Anaheim increasingly felt abandoned by the company.

Anaheim was actually far from alone in developing growing pains at this point in time. The urban growth with which the city was struggling was not different from that of other cities in Orange County.⁴⁰ Orange County was in a unique position in that its economy evolved much more quickly from an agricultural to a post-industrial society than the rest of the nation--a transition of forty years in Orange County in comparison with one that took one-hundred years for the United States.⁴¹ The evolution changed Orange County from a small bedroom community of Los Angeles into a massive sprawling series of decen-

³³Schickel, 358.

³⁴McLeod, sec. C, 1.

³⁵Schickel, 359.

³⁶Black and Colson, 21; Westcott, 81.


³⁷Black and Colson, 27.

³⁸McLeod, sec. C, 10.; Black and Colson, 21-3.

³⁹Koenig, 36-7.

⁴⁰Black and Colson, 22.


⁴¹Rob Kling, Spencer Olin, and Mark Poster, *Postsuburban California: The Transformation of Orange County Since World War II* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 1-3.



tralized communities.⁴² Orange County built and expanded its industrial base with the rise of the defense industry during the Second World War and the Cold War. The aerospace industry also played a key role in Orange County's defense economy. Today, Anaheim's second largest private employer is Boeing North America, employing 4,000 people.⁴³ Following the rise of the defense industry, the development of Western 'Sun-belt' cities and consequential migration brought more industry and growth into Orange County.⁴⁴ By the time Disney was scouting a sleepy town for his amusement park, Anaheim was on the verge of changing anyway. One wonders if his perfect small town ever existed. Orange County and its cities were rapidly evolving into a "complex and decentralized mixture of urban, suburban, and rural spaces."⁴⁵ The problems that Disney encountered in Florida and Anaheim were not really different from the growth and development problems experienced throughout the county. Anaheim's main industrial preference was tourism. It was quickly becoming dependent on the tourist dollar and a service-oriented economy. Then where does the blame lie?

Faced with little interest from the Disney Company in Anaheim, the city had to deal with the repercussions of its move to industrialize. Ironically, economic stability had spawned other unforeseen problems. Although the city now had other types of industry, the tourism industry quickly domi-

nated, just as the orange crop had done during Anaheim's agricultural days. Despite efforts to revitalize the downtown area of Anaheim, attention continued to focus on the sections surrounding Disneyland and the Convention Center. Although the tourist centers remained viable, chaos marked by people, cars, and crime raged outside these areas.⁴⁶ The area around the park and Convention Center fared only slightly better. It



The site for Walt Disney World. Dave Smith and Steven Clark, *Disney: The First 100 Years*.

was likened to 'glitter gulch', and constituted a mess of tacky strip malls, fast food restaurants, and souvenir stands.⁴⁷

Anaheim was becoming a war zone, where gangs, traffic, families, and conventioners collided.⁴⁸ Even worse, the city that had made a name as a family destination experienced a shocking rise in prostitution tied to the convention business. The mid-1980s found the heaviest concentration of prostitutes in Orange County around the Convention Center and area hotels.⁴⁹ A city official saw the rise as a "small annoyance, the price of doing business." However, bail amounts for prostitution were accordingly set five times higher than other Orange County cities.⁵⁰ Anaheim's dependence on tourism echoed the larger shift in Orange County's

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³City of Anaheim, *City of Anaheim Demographics* [database on-line]; available from <http://www.demographics/index.html>.

⁴⁴Carl Abbott, *The Metropolitan Frontier: Cities in the Modern American West* (Tucson, Ariz.: University of Arizona, 1993), 72-3, 158.

⁴⁵Kling, Olin, and Poster, 3.

⁴⁶McLeod, sec. C, 10; Black and Colson, 21-3.

⁴⁷McLeod, sec. C, 1.

⁴⁸Matt Lait, "Disney Wages Own War on Crime," *Los Angeles Times* 27 February 1994, sec. A, 25.

⁴⁹McLeod, sec. C, 10.

⁵⁰Ibid.

economy to a post-suburban service and information society.⁵¹ Anaheim did not have the better part of the deal. Tied to the tourist dollar, it was part of the lower end of the service economy. Although the Disney Company did make small improvements to the park, its attention was obviously elsewhere, and Anaheim was not pleased.⁵² When the Disney Company negotiated to buy the Disneyland Hotel and lease the Queen Mary from the Wrather Company, Anaheim suddenly found itself fighting to keep the Company and Disneyland in the city.⁵³

A Great Big Beautiful Tomorrow

In 1987, the Disney Company finally moved in to buy the Disneyland Hotel from the Wrather Company. The Disney Company never owned the hotel, and with the success of its multi-layered Florida business, wanted to take over the property. The deal included the lease to the Long Beach attraction, the Cunard ship Queen Mary. The Disney Company, intent on securing the best deal, threatened to cut off Disneyland's monorail service to the Wrather-owned hotel until Wrather lowered the asking price.⁵⁴ Both of these acquisitions offered the Disney Company opportunities to expand their Southern California holdings and liken them to their diversified Florida holdings.

Two plans slowly emerged, and the bait was offered to the cities - the chance to increase their tourism and be linked or remain linked to the Disney name.⁵⁵ Anaheim was taunted into the second project by the Disney Company's dissatisfaction with the Anaheim-Disneyland area. There was a

threat that the company would pull out entirely, although how serious this was is unclear. The Disney Company announced in the early 1990s that it had two plans: building Anaheim's "second gate" and developing a nautical theme park at a site to be named Port Disney on Long Beach's waterfront.

While the company researched the impact and expense of both options, Anaheim and Long Beach were wondering which project, if any, would be built? The Walt Disney Company kept its responses coy, responding that both were possible, but only one would be built at a time.⁵⁶ Long Beach, desperate for the increased tourist revenues, tried everything to bring the Disney Company to a decision, including what one councilman called "...questionable negotiating tactics."⁵⁷ In the end, Anaheim won. Long Beach's waterfront offered nothing to the Disney Company except red tape generated by twenty-seven regulatory agencies, which ultimately terminated the Port Disney option. The Disney Company eventually let the lease lapse on the Queen Mary.⁵⁸ Anaheim's governmental support was able to recapture the Disney Company's interest with plans such as improvements to city structures and infrastructures. The Disney Company plans included hotels and the development of an Epcot Center West (Westcot) with various international exhibits. Central to the Disney Company's decision was the opportunity to recreate its Florida Resort experience, which would keep tourists busy for days.⁵⁹ Disneyland existed merely as a singular attraction at this

⁵¹Kling, Olin, and Poster, 12.

⁵²McLeod, sec. C, 1.

⁵³Koenig, 220.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Laura-Lynne Powell, "Cities Know Their Cost won't be Mickey Mouse," *Orange County Register*, 10 May 1991, sec. A, 23.

⁵⁶Jeff Rowe, "Disney Outlines \$3 Billion Project," *Orange County Register*, 9 May 1991, sec. A 1, 18.

⁵⁷Rowe, "Disney Gives Up on Developing Long Beach Site," *Orange County Register*, 7 March 1992, sec. A, 1.

⁵⁸Young, "Disney Will Build Resort In Anaheim," *Orange County Register*, 13 December 1991, sec. A, 8; Koenig, 220.

⁵⁹Rowe, sec. A, 18.

time, however, the Company wanted to keep tourists interested and onsite for a longer period.

Anaheim's willingness to get the "second gate", Westcot, stems from the improvements the Disney Company planned with the \$3 billion complex. As Anaheim City Councilman Bob Simpson explained in describing the area around the park, "It's frankly ugly."⁶⁰ The area surrounding the park and Convention Center continued to be "touristy" and generally run down. Time and urbanization had left their mark on the area.

The promise of improvements such as moving power lines, replanting, and surfacing streets did much to sway the City Council in favor of the Disney Company. The plans for Westcot included "a garden district awash in trees," which was the antithesis of the concrete that remained.⁶¹ However, the residents were unsure. There had been anti-Disney sentiment since the Company's arrival to purchase the first 145 acres. Citizens were denied the opportunity to oppose the park's plans when the election was gerrymandered in the 1950s.⁶² Resentment steadily increased as the Disney Company made plans to expand. Disgusted with years of noise and problems with Disneyland, residents mobilized into groups such as Anaheim Homeowners Maintaining Their Environment (HOME) and raised their voices.⁶³ These residents were concerned with the impact of construction, traffic, and increased tourism on the city.⁶⁴ The city and the park moved slowly towards expansion amid plans, EIRs, and city council meetings.

Unhappily Ever After?

The move to expand Disneyland brought to the surface much anxiety in Anaheim. The Walt Disney Company has always viewed expansion as a necessary step to secure a larger and more profitable tourist base. Expansion, however, has been a series of struggles involving purchasing land and securing the changes they considered necessary. The city of Anaheim has faced backlash from its residents concerning every aspect of the projects, from construction noise to funding.⁶⁵ It also has come to realize how dependent it is on Disneyland and tourism. The residents of Anaheim struggle to live with the evolving cityscape. In a report from *The Orange County Register* following a June 1991 City Council meeting, the strain over the expansion was clearly evident.

"I'm concerned about the noise from the proposed amphitheater. The music is already so loud that I can hear it at night. Sometimes I feel like I'm in a Mary Poppins movie."

-- Donald Calderwood,
resident of nearby Golden
Skies Mobile Home Park

"Get rid of the sleazy honky tonk atmosphere around the park. My husband and I just visited Disney World in Florida. What astounded us most was that 43 square miles of swamp land, alligators, and snakes had been turned into the most lush park imaginable."

-- Ruth Siegall, Margie
Lane Resident⁶⁶

Anaheim's second gate should open by Spring 2001. The Westcot project - Disneyland Resort has evolved into Disney's

⁶⁰Young, "Disney Will Build Resort."

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²McLeod, sec. C, 10-1.


⁶³Louise Woo, "Anaheim Looks Past the Glitter," *Orange County Register*, 9 May 1991.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Black and Colson, 40.

⁶⁶Young, "Anaheim Residents let Disney know Concerns about Westcot," *Orange County Register*, 6 June 1991, sec. B, 14.

California Adventure - Anaheim Resort. The new project, coming in at \$1.7 billion, will include a second theme park and hotel celebrating California's history, and a shopping/entertainment complex.⁶⁷ The new park will focus on the 'Golden State', with attractions built around state icons such as



Mickey Mouse. Available on <http://geocities.com/Hollywood/set>.

Hollywood, Cannery Row, and the Sierras. Central to this development are the changes to the area surrounding Disneyland similar to the ones planned with the Westcot Park. These improvements include road redesign, underground power lines, new landscaping, even uniform building distances from the sidewalk, and uniform signs for all businesses.⁶⁸

The improvements seem to benefit all involved in Anaheim. The Walt Disney Company gains a second park and a vacation destination much like Florida. Anaheim gets additional tourist revenue and much needed structural improvements, including freeway expansion of the I-5 and a much-needed face-lift. Additionally, these improvements are being paid for without additional taxes for residents. The money comes from a hotel-bed tax, revenue bonds, Convention Center parking structure reserves, and federal, state, and regional funding.⁶⁹

⁶⁷City of Anaheim, *The Anaheim Resort—Financial Summary* [database on-line]; available from <http://www.anaheimresort.com/overview/summary>.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Ibid.

The reality of life in Anaheim during construction is an entirely different story. It is constant chaos.

Anaheim is currently in the middle of construction, and the resulting changes include streets being repaved, constant heavy construction, and a constantly changing traffic situation. The city is in a continual state of flux and is now faced with the reality of building a second theme park. The development has required the Disney Company and Anaheim to absorb new businesses or annex needed land.⁷⁰ This has left many people unhappy with these changes, including the residents of an RV-park on land annexed for a parking structure.⁷¹ The infrastructure changes, coupled with massive freeway improvements have made the simple act of driving through the area impossible. Transportation problems affect residents and tourists, forcing everyone to allow extra time as the situation changes day-to-day. Residents are extremely displeased, and blame both Anaheim and the Disney Company.⁷² A closer examination of the situation reveals there are two undeniable factors working in Anaheim: first, that they are forever tied to the tourism industry now and in need of that money, and second, the city's infrastructure as well as environment are badly in need of repair.⁷³ Essentially, Anaheim's problem is the conflict between its needs and how these needs relate to the Disney Company.

At the beginning of this paper a question was asked, and that question was "Does Disney own Anaheim?" This answer is not a simple yes or no. First, it is impor-

⁷⁰Kathleen Murray, "Merchants, Lodging Operators Laud Expansion Plan," *Orange County Register*, 13 December 1991; *Orange County Register*, "It Takes Space to Imagineer Anew—About 100 acres," 13 December 1991, sec. B, 4.

⁷¹Eric Schine, "Hell No, We Won't Go—Mickey!" *Business Week*, 4 November 1996, 9.

⁷²Haldane and Wilson, sec. A, 3.

⁷³Ibid.

tant to understand that Anaheim created the situation in which it now finds itself. The city has grown dependent on its tourist dollar. It wants more tourism and more tourist revenue, with the example of Disney's Anaheim Resort complex offering an additional \$10 million annually.⁷⁴ In this instance, the Disney Company pulls Anaheim's puppet strings. The city needs tourism and it needs Disneyland and its parent company. The effort to update its economy from agriculture to industry worked wonderfully. The Anaheim City Council offered cheap available land and pursued various companies with vigor.⁷⁵ It essentially seduced Disney into the area, squashing any opposition.⁷⁶ Now the city of Anaheim is stuck with Disney. Of the city's 143,000 employed residents, 28 percent work in the service economy.⁷⁷ Disneyland Park is its largest employer with 12,000 people, and another 1,700 are employed at the Disneyland Hotel.⁷⁸ The improvements being done with the construction of Disney's California Adventure are sorely needed if the city wants to ensure tourist dollars by keeping the area up-to-date. This makes Anaheim's uneasiness over the improvements appear to be little more than whining. Construction, though a headache, is necessary for Anaheim's tourism revenue:

widening streets, improving underground utilities, installing bus turnouts, and beautifying streets through landscaping - all of which requires massive digging, blocking of driveways and, in some areas, the temporary removal of sidewalks.⁷⁹

Anaheim is also a heavily baited hook for the Walt Disney Company. The second part of the affirmative in Disney Company 'control' is the time and money involved in the amusement park. In addition to the amount already tied to the original Disneyland Park, the possible revenue from



Anaheim homeowners voice their displeasure with Disney's proposed three billion dollar Westcot Center. David Koenig, *Mouse Tales: a Behind-the-Ears Look at Disneyland*.

the second park is an undeniable factor in calculating the Walt Disney Company's efforts in Anaheim. The estimate of twelve million visitors annually buying into not only a second theme park at \$40 a head but also a new "Disney tourist destination" seems irresistible.⁸⁰ The possible "Disney World" vacation package, which includes the building of both Disney's California Adventure and Downtown Disney, has forced the company to invest heavily in the area. Due to this investment, they work hard to keep their goals Anaheim's goals. After all, what keeps the Disney Company happy should keep Anaheim happy. Their goals are ultimately the same--to lure more visitors in for longer periods of time. Early in the development of the second gate (Westcot at the time), there was talk of a direct off-ramp from the I-5 to Disneyland at Disney's California Adventure garage. At the time, Caltrans politely responded that they were in-

⁷⁴City of Anaheim, *Financial Summary*.

⁷⁵McLeod, sec. C, 10.

⁷⁶Ibid.

⁷⁷City of Anaheim, *Demographics*.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Haldane and Wilson, sec. A, 22.

⁸⁰Young, "Anaheim Official."

vestigating the plans and that it "can't provide special off-ramps just to serve specific businesses."⁸¹ Nevertheless, the world's largest parking lot with a direct I-5 off-ramp should open in June 2000.

The Mouse and the Town

The problems that the city of Anaheim is facing go far beyond a connection with Mickey. Because the company only controls the two hundred acres near Katella and Harbor, Anaheim still ultimately retains control and the ability to decide whatever it wants. The problems and changes that have occurred since the 1950s did not happen just because the Disney Company came to town. The "blighted" city core and urban sprawl of Anaheim occurred not only within the city limits but also all over Orange County and the rest of the United States. Although the economy shifted rapidly from an industrial to a post-industrial society in Orange County, the city of Anaheim did not benefit.⁸²

The focus on the Disneyland/Convention Center area had a direct impact on the decline of the city core. Anaheim's economy did not adapt as well as other economies in Orange County. Having focused on tourism, which is not as "high-tech" or profitable as the information sector of an information and service oriented economy, Anaheim did however create its own niche in Orange County as a major tourist center. Anaheim's Convention Center even drew such a comparison to Las Vegas that Anaheim was once considered to be the "Las Vegas for families."⁸³ Currently, however, both towns are currently reversing their norms: Las Vegas is seeking more family business while Anaheim (including

Disney) is seeking the adult market.⁸⁴ Disney's California Adventure will even include a wine-tasting attraction, breaking the park's tradition of not selling alcohol to customers.⁸⁵ This is a definite shift from the normally "family" friendly tourism Anaheim has cultivated. This shift is also occurring on its own because the city's convention clientele has contributed to the rise of prostitution and the two infamous adult bookstores downtown.⁸⁶ While Anaheim focused on tourists, it neglected its base residents and the city's core. Although the city tried to combat these problems, it could not really fight change. Much of the reaction against the blight and congestion, as seen by groups such as Anaheim HOME and Westcot 2000, is just as much about unhappiness over the changes taking place in the city as it is about "Disneyfication".⁸⁷ This reaction is not all against the Disney Company; it is about what happened when Anaheim grew up.

On 17 July 1955 Walt Disney, at Disneyland's opening ceremonies, declared that "Disneyland will never be completed, as long as there is imagination left in the world."⁸⁸ This appears to be correct since rides are continually being added or removed, lands are being refurbished, and development is continuing with the new park, Disney's California Adventure. Anaheim itself is also constantly evolving. The city and the park are intertwined and divergent. Does the Disney Company control Anaheim? Does Anaheim control the Disney Company? Neither implication is accurate. They exist mutually; dependent when required and independent when desired.

⁸¹Woo, sec. B, .3.

⁸²Kling, Olin, and Poster, 1-3.

⁸³Abbott, 84.

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Scott E. Reckard, "Disneyland, Winery Team for Attraction," *Los Angeles Times* 1 May 1998, sec. D, 2.

⁸⁶Black and Colson, 22.

⁸⁷Westcott, 85-6.

⁸⁸Schickel, 315.

Okies, Arkies, and Braceros:

The Strike Against the Di Giorgio Farm, 1947-1950

Phil Curnutt

Although the New Deal era of the 1930s witnessed the rise of unionization and recognition of rights for industrial and urban workers, the plight of agricultural laborers remained virtually ignored. Phil Curnutt explores the rise of the agricultural labor movement in the 1940s, beginning with the formation of the National Farm Labor Union in 1947 and its first concerted effort, the Di Giorgio Farm Strike. He contends that this strike succeeded in drawing national attention to the case of agricultural workers by igniting a thirty-year battle for recognition from both employers and the government. It is a topic that continues to be relevant today.

In 1947 the National Farm Labor Union (NFLU) of the American Federation of Labor (AF of L) was formed, headed by Henry Leland (H. L.) Mitchell. Mitchell founded the biracial Southern Tenant Farmers Union (STFU), which had struggled against the inequities of the tenant farm system in the rural south during the Depression. Invited to California by Okie¹ migrant farm workers who were familiar with the STFU's non-violent, inclusive, and socialistic methods of operation, the NFLU organized Local 218 with workers at the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation's operations in Kern County, south of Bakersfield. In late 1947 when Local 218's repeated efforts to gain attention to their grievances by the Di Giorgio Farm's management failed, the union declared its first labor action, a strike against the farm.

Local 218's strike lasted nearly three years, drew nationwide attention, became the subject of a film and a Congressional hearing, and attracted the wrath of the powerful Associated Farmers of California. In the end Local 218 was forced to withdraw its pickets, but only after firing the first salvos of a thirty-year struggle for recognition of the rights of farm labor. Local 218's desperate endeavor faltered under the triple blows of employer non-recognition and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the availability of a compliant substitute workforce, and by the independent nature of the Okies whose need to put food on their families' tables became paramount over their struggle for respect from their employer.

¹The term "Okie" is a derogatory term for the migrants from Oklahoma, Arkansas, Missouri, and Texas who flooded into California during the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Before the NFLU arrived in California, farm labor had witnessed considerable efforts at union organizing. Before the Depression the “walkin’ men” of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), the Wobblies, “raised hell” in the fields and orchards along the Pacific Coast. During the Depression the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (CAWIU), backed by the Communist Party, led a series of violent strikes against the corporate farms in the San Joaquin Valley. The CAWIU waged twenty-five strikes involving 37,550 workers and although partial wage increases were obtained, the union dissolved in 1935 after its leadership was



A bracero thinning sugar beet with the short hoe. <http://www.farmworkers.org/shorthoe.html>.


imprisoned on charges of criminal syndicalism.²

²National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor, *Farm Labor Organizing, 1905-1967: A Brief History* (New York: National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor, 1967), 16. Criminal syndicalism was a nineteenth century concept of a world wide, centrally controlled agenda led by anarchists, socialists, and communists directed at overthrowing the capitalist economic structure through the control of the labor unions. Following WWI, both the state and federal levels passed anti-syndicalism legislation directed mainly at the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), but subsequently used when communist involvement was discovered in any union organization. The California Criminal Syndicalism Act of 1919 led to the demise of CAWIU.

One aspect that made organizing farm labor in California difficult was the ethnic makeup of the workforce. Beginning in the nineteenth century, California farmers relied upon immigrants for labor: first Chinese, then Japanese, Filipino, and even Sikh. Mexican immigrants began to play an important part in harvest labor during the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) as they fled the chaos of their homeland. Their numbers began to accelerate in the 1930s when the promise of the revolution failed to materialize for the *campesinos*.³ The farmers played these groups against each other to their own advantage as well as keeping them separated in ethnic specific labor camps ostensibly because they required different food. In the eyes of union organizers, it was to eliminate communication between the groups—a divide and conquer tactic.

The Great Depression witnessed another migration into California, this time an internal migration from the drought-ravaged south, especially from the states of Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, and Missouri. The bulk of these “Dust Bowl migrants,” as they were mistakenly named, headed for the San Joaquin Valley, drawn by a network of friends and relatives who had migrated earlier in the century and by the promise of work that they were familiar with, farm labor and cotton harvesting. Okies flooded into the San Joaquin Valley, especially the southern end. By the 1940 census the valley’s population had grown by 39 percent, compared to Los Angeles County’s growth of 26 percent and the state of California by 21 percent. Kern County saw its population burgeon by 64 percent, adding fifty-two

³Richard H. Hancock, *The Role of the Bracero in the Economic and Cultural Dynamics of Mexico: A Case Study of Chihuahua* (Stanford, Calif.: Hispanic American Society, 1959), 33. The term “campesino” is Spanish for peasant.



thousand new residents to the cotton growing area.⁴

The Second World War increased the number of *braceros*, providing a new complexity to the California farm labor mix. With the internment of the Japanese-Americans and the attraction of the Okies to Los Angeles and San Francisco to work in the war industries, the farmers found themselves with a severe shortage of labor. Into this gap stepped the government of Mexico, offering its citizens as contract labor to the farmers of the United States. The World War II *bracero* program operated under wartime authorization from 1942 until 1946, and then under a series of continuing legislation until 1951, when Public Law 78 passed due to pressure from labor shortages caused by the Korean War. Public Law 78 continued in effect until 1964 when the program finally ended. Under the *bracero* program an average of 17,570 Mexicans were recruited annually during the war years, with the number increasing to 33,000 in 1946 and 53,000 in 1947.⁵

Supported by the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a Congress sympathetic to the plight of labor, and the blood, sweat, and tears of union organizers, the years of the Great Depression witnessed significant advances in the organization of labor into viable unions. By 1950 over 40 percent of the American labor force belonged to a union: steelworkers, autoworkers, miners, meat packers, assembly workers; all were organized and represented. The Wagner Act, passed in 1935, first codified the rights of labor unions, which were reaffirmed again in 1947 with the institution of the Taft-Hartley Act. The single glaring ex-

ception to the roll call of organized industries remained that of agricultural labor. Except for a modicum of success in the packing houses, the agricultural industry was virtually devoid of union representation. Ten simple words written into the Wagner Act and then duplicated by the writers of Taft-Hartley doomed farm workers, "... shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer."⁶ This exemption denied farm laborers the rights afforded all other laborers in the United States, which in effect gave their employers the right to ignore their efforts to organize and to literally deny the existence of their unions.

The Di Giorgio Farm

After we get the land, fruit is nothing
but water, and labor, and more labor
and freight.

Joseph Di Giorgio⁷

The Di Giorgio property spreads across eleven thousand acres of flat land six miles long by three miles wide southeast of Bakersfield, California, surrounded by the communities of Arvin, Lamont, and Weedpatch. In 1919, when Joseph Di Giorgio purchased the initial 4,300 acres at \$90 per acre, it was desert land, covered with sage brush.⁸ In 1947, after an investment of \$1.5 million for deep well irrigation, the Di Giorgio farmland increased in value to over \$2,000 per acre and ranked as one of the most productive farms in California.⁹ The farm's principal crops included grapes, plums, pears, cotton, asparagus, potatoes, and peanuts; the necessity of maintaining

⁴James N. Gregory, *American Exodus: The Dust Bowl Migration and Okie Culture in California* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 83.

⁵Otey M. Scruggs, *Braceros, "Wetbacks," and the Farm Labor Problem: Mexican Agricultural Labor in the United States, 1942-1954* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1988), 347.

⁶National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor, 8.

⁷"Joseph Di Giorgio: A Bounding Fruit Man's Whirlwind Courtship of Free Enterprise," *Fortune Magazine*, August 1946, 97.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹"County Asparagus Crop is a Success," *Bakersfield Californian*, 12 May 1942, 7.

year-round production in order to maximize profit and efficiency determined the mix.¹⁰

Joseph Di Giorgio, a Sicilian immigrant from Cefalu, was dispatched to the United States in 1889 by his brother Salvatore, the head of the Cefalu cooperative packing house, with a boatload of lemons bound for the American market. Salvatore became dissatisfied with the cooperative's broker in Baltimore, Maryland, and felt that family involvement was necessary. Joseph was fourteen and a half years old when he arrived in the United States, but with the help of Cefalutanos who had preceded him, he was able to establish a storefront lemon market in Baltimore, and by 1891 became the prime distributor for Cefalu lemons in the United States. With the profit from the lemon sales Di Giorgio branched out into bananas from Jamaica and Cuba and then copying the European system, set up the Baltimore Fruit Auction as a method of selling fresh fruit upon its arrival in the city from its producers. Along with other investors Joseph established fruit auctions in New York, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and St. Louis, selling produce and fruit from Florida, California, Washington, Oregon, Italy, and the Caribbean.¹¹

By 1896 at age twenty-one Joseph Di Giorgio was a millionaire and director of the Monumental Trust Company of Baltimore, but he was only beginning.¹² In 1910 the United States Supreme Court issued an anti-trust decision against the Armour Meat Packing Company and family, causing it to divest itself of the Earl Fruit Company of Sacramento, California. The Earl Fruit Company became the dominant packing

company in California and combined with Armour's ownership of refrigerated railroad cars that shipped the fruit to the eastern market, it made an extremely lucrative operation for the Armour family. Di Giorgio, realizing the potential of owning a sizable share of the California market, put together a loan package borrowed from the various railroads that would be hauling the freight and purchased the Earl Fruit Company from Armour, virtually monopolizing the fruit market between the west and east coasts.¹³

One of the hidden assets of the Earl Fruit Company was not realized until after the First World War. In order to secure business in the highly competitive packing business, the company found it necessary to finance the growers that it served. The Earl Fruit Company loaned growers the capital needed to plant and harvest the crop with the loan being repaid from the proceeds when the fruit was sold; the farmer's land secured the deal. When hard times hit after the war the company found itself foreclosing on more and more of its customers, and by 1920 Di Giorgio determined that the future was in owning the farms as well as the packing companies and auction exchanges. In 1920 the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation was created in order to consolidate the myriad holdings which Di Giorgio had acquired and to raise funds for purchasing the acreage which became the Di Giorgio Farm.¹⁴

The Di Giorgio Farm typified California agribusiness where large scale farms totaled only 3 percent of the farms in the state but produced 30 percent of the agricultural products in value.¹⁵ By 1947 Di Giorgio holdings on the west coast totaled 24,000 acres including the 11,000 acres of the Di Giorgio Farm at Arvin, the Sierra

¹⁰ "Joseph Di Giorgio," 6.


¹¹ Robert Di Giorgio and Joseph A. Di Giorgio. "The Di Giorgios: From Fruit Merchants to Corporate Innovators," introduction by Rudolph A. Peterson, interview by Ruth Teiser: Regional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1983: 3-5.

¹² Ibid., 21.

¹³ Ibid., 6-7.

¹⁴ Ibid., 7-8.

¹⁵ Dorothea Lange and Paul Shuster Taylor, *An American Exodus: A Record of Human Erosion* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939), 145.



Vista Ranch's 4,500 acres near Delano and 1,500 acres planted in citrus trees near Borrego. Other holdings included a box factory to supply the company's various packing houses, 37.5 percent of the Italian-Swiss Colony Wine Corporation, and a twenty-million gallon winery, considered the world's largest when built in 1945. Di Giorgio continued to hold interest in five of the twelve major fruit outlets in the United States and served as a member of the Associated Farmers of California and other associations of farmers and fruit growers. This entrenchment in agribusiness led to an indictment by the federal government in 1941 for "conspiracy to fix, control, regulate and stabilize prices . . . by controlling and restricting the channels and methods of distribution." Di Giorgio pleaded *nolo contendere* and the judge fined him for his participation in the conspiracy.¹⁶

Like the agricultural workforce throughout the San Joaquin Valley, a mixture of Filipino, Anglo-American, Mexican-American, and Mexican nationals labored on the Di Giorgio Farm, although by 1948 three-quarters of the workforce were Okies who had returned from the defense industry after World War II.¹⁷ Resident workers who lived on the farm in housing supplied by Di Giorgio or resided in Arvin, Lamont, and Weedpatch performed the bulk of the work. Filipinos, whose numbers had declined by this period, performed specialty tasks such as asparagus harvesting, while the Mexicans and Americans performed field tasks such as irrigating, hoeing, and cultivating, as well as working in the packing houses during the harvest. During the harvest period the

farm employed over 2,700 people, including the wives and children of the permanent workers and contracted labor from the surrounding area. In the dormant period, late winter and early spring, the workforce fell to as low as two hundred.¹⁸

Proud of his farm and of his workers, Joseph Di Giorgio stated, "Some of my men have been working for me almost 20 years . . . Their families have intermarried. You know we're really building a city here," to a reporter for the magazine *California* in a 1940 interview. To further the welfare of the workers the farm also provided a medical clinic, as well as donated land to the Kern County School system for a school for the children of his employees.¹⁹

Di Giorgio's paternalism made labor organizing difficult enough, but in the mid-1930s during the height of the CAWIU's efforts, Di Giorgio confronted the organizers and his workers face to face. Sending his foremen away, Joseph Di Giorgio told his men,

These men from the city tell me you want a union If you do, you can. Joseph Di Giorgio had no slaves You know that one day the fruit is green, the next it's ready, and the third it's rotting How can you have a union? If you think you can, go ahead and try it. If this farm goes to hell your jobs do too.²⁰

When laborers voted only two of 2,400 employees chose to go union. "Good," responded Di Giorgio, "On the Di Giorgio Farms we grow crops--and Americans."²¹

¹⁶Ulla E. Bauers Jr., "The Di Giorgio Strike" (M.A. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1949), 11-3.

¹⁷William H. Metzler and Afife F. Sayin, *The Agricultural Labor Force in the San Joaquin Valley: Characteristics, Employment, Mobility* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1948), 17.

¹⁸Di Giorgio, 43-5.

¹⁹Kenneth Crist, "Banana Hoister to Fruit King: The Life Story of Joe Di Giorgio Reads Like One of the Alger Books" *California, Magazine of the Pacific*, January 1940.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹*Ibid.*

Okies, Arkies, and Texans

They drove through Tehachapi in the morning glow, and the sun came up behind them, and then--suddenly they saw the great valley below them. Al jammed on the brake and stopped in the middle of the road, and, 'Jesus Christ! Look!' he said. The vineyards, the orchards, the great flat valley, green and beautiful, the trees set in rows, and the farm houses.

And Pa said, 'God Almighty!' The distant cities, the little towns in the orchard land, and the morning sun, golden on the valley. . .

Pa sighed, 'I never knewed they was anything like her.' The peach trees and the walnut groves, and the dark green patches of oranges. And the red roofs among the trees, and barns--rich barns²². . .

When the fictional Joad family topped Tehachapi Pass and gazed upon the promised land, the verdant green fields they looked over would have been the Di Giorgio Farm. Residents of Arvin and Lamont served as the primary source of labor for Di Giorgio; the towns' populations, primarily after 1930, increased with

the influx of migrants from the states of Oklahoma, Arkansas, Texas, and Missouri.²³ Although termed "Dust Bowl migrants" this nomen-


clature mislabels the primary reason the migrants left and the region from whence they came. The climatic disaster called the "Dust Bowl" occurred primarily on the central Great Plains, in western Kansas and eastern Colorado and the panhandles of Oklahoma, Texas, and Nebraska. The migrants to California were principally from eastern Oklahoma and Texas, eastern and north-central Arkansas, and southeastern Missouri. Although their home states suffered from the same drought that created the Dust Bowl, their reason for leaving resulted from a lack of work due to the Great Depression and changing agricultural practices in the rich cotton producing areas of the western Mississippi River Delta and the Red River Valley in Texas and Oklahoma.²⁴

Of the approximately one-and-a-half million south-westerners who fled their home states between 1930 and 1950 nearly one million settled in California, joining the over 430 thousand who had proceeded them

during the previous twenty years.²⁵ This early exodus, drawn by the establishment of the cotton agri-industry in California, established the chains and support networks that helped the new arrivals find work and shelter.²⁶ But the tremendous volume of people moving west in the

1930s taxed the burgeoning social net of California, creating an atmosphere hostile to

the "Okies" and "Arkies," as derogatorily called by their unwilling hosts.²⁷



"Okies Headin' West" Photo by Dorothea Lange.
Courtesy Library of Congress, USF34-16681

²²John Steinbeck, *The Grapes of Wrath* (New York: Penguin Books, 1939), 309-10.

²³Walter Goldschmidt, *As You Sow: The Studies in the Social Consequences of Agribusiness* (Montclair, N.J., Allanheld, Osmun, 1978), 325.

²⁴Gregory, 11.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 6.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 28.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 78.



The Great Depression hit California severely in the early 1930s with unemployment rising to 29 percent in 1933 before falling to 19 percent in 1937 and 14 percent in 1940, just below the national average. Critics blamed the influx of newcomers to California for the state of affairs, even going to the extent of posting a billboard along Route 66 just outside Tulsa, Oklahoma, which read:

NO JOBS in California
If YOU are looking for work--KEEP
OUT
6 Men for Every Job
No State Relief Available for Non-
Residents²⁸

But, as bad as conditions were in California, the situation in the south was more desperate.

Since the abolition of slavery at the end of the Civil War, the norms for southern agriculture had been sharecropping and tenant farming. West of the Mississippi this system of subletting land by farm operators from plantation owners continued until the Depression and the institution of the agricultural reform by the Roosevelt administration in 1934. The primary characteristic of this system forced dependence of the operator for financing, seed, and equipment from the owner, who then received a considerable percentage of the crop either in cash from the tenant, or a portion of the crop from the sharecropper. In either case the operator found himself at the mercy of the plantation owner who usually owned the cotton gin that processed the cotton, and who also sat on the agricultural associations that determined the price paid for the cotton.²⁹

²⁸Ibid., 22.

²⁹Stuart Jamieson, *Labor Unionism in American Agriculture*, Chicano Heritage, ed. Carlos E. Cortes (New York: Arno Press, 1976), 282-3.

When the Depression struck along with drought in the early 1930s, the bottom fell out of the cotton market and prices fell from sixteen cents per pound in 1929 to below seven cents per pound in 1932.³⁰ The Roosevelt administration responded to this and other emergencies in agribusiness by implementing the Agricultural Adjustments Act (AAA), which offered cash subsidies to farm and plantation owners who agreed to take land out of production. In the southern cotton belt a decrease in cotton producing acreage from forty-three million acres in 1929 to twenty-nine million in 1933 resulted in the displacement of nearly one million croppers, tenants, and farm laborers, with those fortunate enough to find land left unsure of their future.³¹

The introduction of the tractor in the 1920s compounded the situation in the south. This movement towards increased mechanization enabled fewer workers to farm a larger area, especially in cotton production where most of the labor involved was in hoeing and weeding. The tenants called the conversion being "tractored out," causing one to lament in 1938:

I can count 23 farmers in the west half of this county that have had to leave the farms to give three men more land. Was [sic] waiting to see what would be the outcome of my hunt for a place, and the outlook right now is that I will move to town and sell my teams, tools, and cows. I have hunted from Childress, Texas, to Haskell, Texas, a distance of 200 miles, and the answer is the same.

I can stay off the relief until the first of the year. After that don't know. I've got to make a move, but I don't know where to.³²

³⁰Gregory, 12.

³¹Jamieson, 286-7.

³²Lange and Taylor, 82.

For nearly one million tenants and sharecroppers from the deltas of the Arkansas and Red rivers the move was to California.

The Braceros and Mojados³³

Farewell to my Juan, farewell Angelina
Adios mis amigos, Jesus y Maria.
You won't have your names when you
ride the big airplane,
All they will call you will be 'deportees'...

'Plane Wreck at Los Gatos'
Woody Guthrie³⁴

Woody Guthrie wrote "Plane Wreck at Los Gatos" after hearing the radio report of the crash of a twin engine DC-3 in Fresno County's Los Gatos Canyon in 1948. The fatalities included twenty-eight Mexican nationals on their way home after having been apprehended and deported by officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Guthrie wrote the song in response to a news report which stated, "It's not such a tragedy since they were just deportees." This haunting refrain is still sung at United Farm Worker fundraisers today.³⁵ Unfortunately, the sentiments of the announcer reflected those of the farm owners and labor contractors of the San Joaquin Valley in 1948 who exploited

Mexican nationals, both *braceros* and *mojados*.

Formally instituted in 1943, the *Bracero* Program supplied farm and eventually industrial labor for the war economy of the United States by its ally Mexico. By 1943 the United States had begun experiencing acute labor shortages, especially for farm labor in California, as the Okies who had dominated the agricultural workforce began flocking to the coastal cities around San Francisco Bay, Los Angeles, and San Diego to work in the defense industry during World War II. As early as June 1941, Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins predicted a shortage of 1,408,600 defense industry workers while General Lewis B. Hershey, director of the Selective Service System, reported that over one million agricultural workers had left the farms for the cities.³⁶

The Mexican government stepped into this breach, agreeing in July of 1942 to supply contracted labor to the United States with certain guarantees concerning transportation, written contracts, living conditions, minimum wages, terms of employment, and most importantly, equal treatment of both Mexican and American labor. This equal treatment clause supposedly in-

ured that Mexican laborers would not be used to replace domestic labor when it was available or used to lower wage scales.³⁷



Bracero card issued to Jesus Campoya in 1951 in El Paso, Texas. <http://farmworkers.org/bracero.html>.

³³The term "mojados" refers to illegal entrants to the United States.

³⁴Arturo Rodriguez, "UFW and Friends Continue Drive," *Bakersfield Californian*, 14 March 1998, sec. B, p. 5.

³⁵*Ibid.*

³⁶Peter N. Kirsten, *Anglo over Bracero: A History of the Mexican Worker in the United States from Roosevelt to Nixon* (San Francisco: R and R Research Associates, 1977), 12.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 16.



The Farm Security Administration first administered the program during the war years, followed by the War Food Administration's Office of Labor. Although the war ended in 1945, the foreign labor program continued to be funded by Congress until 28 April 1947 when Public Law 40 discontinued its operation as of 31 December the same year. Under heavy pressure from agricultural groups a subsequent agreement, quickly negotiated with Mexico, went into effect on 21 February 1948. Significantly this new agreement defined the employer not as the United States government as previously stated, but ordered the individual workers' contracts to be on a worker-to-employer basis.³⁸ The *bracero's* fate fell into the hands of the farm owners and their representatives, who in California were the Associated Farmers.

The most important persons in this whole program were the *braceros*. Although they came from every state of Mexico, 74 percent of all *braceros* provided between 1942 and 1954 came from the seven states of Chihuahua, Durango, Zacatecas, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, and Aguascalientes. These states, whose primary industry was agriculture, had not experienced locally any of Mexico's 178 percent increase in gross national profit from 1939 to 1956. Investment had gone primarily to heavy industry and the rapid rise of profits had been gained through an inflationary policy that had a corresponding negative impact on real wages. During this period real wages for Mexican agricultural, urban, industrial, and government workers declined by an average of 37 percent while profit to the owners and stockholders increased by 69 percent.³⁹

Population growth of over 62 percent during this same period of wage erosion compounded the difficulties of the *campesi-*

nos. The areas hit hardest by this combination included the states that supplied the majority of *braceros*, the predominantly agricultural states of the Bajio: Guanajuato, Michoacan, and Jalisco. Although Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas had tried to fulfill the promise of the revolution by distributing forty-nine million acres of land to nearly one-third of the population during his term, by the late 1940s the population explosion negated his land reform. The *ejidos*⁴⁰ established by the land reforms of Cardenas and his successors, were developed upon land that had been cultivated for hundreds if not thousands of years without efficient fertilization, rendering it commercially non-productive. The rapid population increase exacerbated the situation by leaving little land for subsequent inheritance, resulting in a rural population without subsistence in wages or arable land. This population was ripe for migration.⁴¹

The consequence of the economic situation in Mexico was not unlike that of the conditions facing the Okies and Arkies of the United States: not enough arable land and wages so low that one could not keep food on the family table. At least the Okies could pack up their belongings and their families in the back of a Model T and set out on Route 66 for California; for the Mexicans, the route was more complex. If they wanted to become *braceros*, first they had to live in an area with a quota, and then they had to be selected, which could be facilitated by the payment of bribes to the proper official.⁴² If all legal means failed, the border between Mexico and the southwest United States posed little obstacle.

³⁸Ibid., 64-5.

³⁹Hancock, 29-31.

⁴⁰"Ejidos" are collectively owned farms created by the land reforms of Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas in the 1930s.

⁴¹Michael C. Sherman and William L. Meyer, *The Course of Mexican History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 598-600.

⁴²Hancock, 21.

Between 1942 and 1950 deportations and voluntary departures to Mexico of *mojados* increased from 5,100 to over 500 thousand per year.⁴³ This added to the legally contracted *braceros* who numbered from 52,098 in 1943 to 143,455 in 1949. The total Mexican national workforce available to agribusiness in the United States in 1948 totaled over 200 thousand and more than doubled to over 500 thousand by 1950 and then doubled again by 1953 to over one million.⁴⁴



Notice passed in California during the Great Depression shows the sign maker's pejorative attitude. <http://www.farmworkers.org/bracerop.html>.

A study conducted in 1957 reported that the average daily wage in the United States for agricultural labor was \$5.80 for eight hours work compared to 7.86 pesos (\$.63) for comparable work in Mexico.⁴⁵ Even with deductions for room and board, 303,054 *braceros* returned \$189,276,862 to Mexico between August 1942 and December 1945.⁴⁶ Assuming that ratio continued, by the mid 1950s the 4 percent of the Mexican population that found work in the United States supported over 10 percent of the total rural Mexican population to varying degrees.⁴⁷

The average daily wage for California agricultural labor during this same pe-

riod was \$8.90 and although California was farther from the principal supply area, nearly one-third of the Mexican migrants moved to its Imperial and San Joaquin Valleys.⁴⁸ As for the Okies, California became the promised land for the *braceros* as well, but when they arrived they found themselves competing for the same work. In 1947 the NFLU found itself at the fulcrum of the desperate struggle between the Okies and *braceros* whom both relied upon the farm owners for their daily bread.

The Strike of Local 218

Mr. Nixon. As a matter of fact, as I understand it, from the testimony of one of the previous witnesses, you came to Di Giorgio 10 years ago yourself?

Mr. Price. Approximately 10 years ago.

Mr. Nixon. What did you earn when you first came? Do you recall?

Mr. Price. I believe it was 25 cents, and it may have been times in there over 25. I know we cut juice grapes in the field for 25 cents an hour, or \$2 a day.

Mr. Nixon. That was 10 years ago?

Mr. Price. Approximately.

Mr. Nixon. Now it is 80 cents?

Mr. Price. Eighty cents; yes.

Mr. Nixon. That is a little over three times as much.

Mr. Price. Groceries is more than that.⁴⁹

This exchange between Congressman Richard Nixon and James Price, President of Local 218, occurred during testi-

⁴³Manuel Garcia y Griego, *The Importation of Mexican Contract Laborers to the United States, 1942-1964: Antecedents, Operation and Legacy* (San Diego: University of California, San Diego, 1980), 205.

⁴⁴Hancock, 17.


⁴⁵Ibid., 29.

⁴⁶Ibid., 36.

⁴⁷Ibid., 41.

⁴⁸Ibid., 20,27.

⁴⁹U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Education and Labor, *Investigation of Labor Management Relations: Hearings before a Special Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 12 and 13 November 1949, 700.



mony before the Special Investigating Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor on 12 and 13 November 1949. The subcommittee had formed to investigate the effect of federal projects on public schools, but as it traveled to California for this purpose, the subcommittee had been given the additional task of stopping in Bakersfield and investigating the Di Giorgio strike at the behest of the Republican dominated California delegation.⁵⁰ After two days of testimony and a tour of the Di Giorgio operations, the committee continued on its way, leaving the impression that this ended the investigation. Ernesto Galarza, director of research for the NFLU, testified at the hearing and remembered that Committee Chairman Cleveland M. Bailey told him that, "all this is nonsense."⁵¹ In reality it ended the strike and effectively the NFLU.

Jimmy Price was typical of the 1,100 members of Local 218 and employees of Di Giorgio; a twelve year resident of California, Price had been born and raised in Oklahoma. A spot check of the picket line at the entrance to the Di Giorgio Farm on 1 April 1948 found eleven of the twelve union representatives came from Oklahoma and the other from Arkansas.⁵² At the onset of the strike on 1 October 1947 Price had worked for Di Giorgio ten years, six of them as shed foreman.⁵³ His experiences in the packing shed had given him a close and personal view of the Di Giorgio operation and quali-

fied him to be spokesperson for Local 218 during the committee hearings.

Price indicated in his opening statement, "I can't give it to you in a few words you would like for me to relate to you because I haven't got no high education. I am going to give it to you the best I can."⁵⁴ Price though was nevertheless eloquent as he explained the grievances of the union against Di Giorgio. First on Price's list was working conditions:

We have a situation at Di Giorgio which is a cold-storage operation. . . . You know, gentlemen, the temperature is 32 degrees in this storage. You know, you get put in a room where it is 32 degrees, from on top where the temperature is 110 to 115. You furnish your own clothes to go in there. You get paid no more for going in and operating and working on the inside of this very unpleasant place. You get the same price the other people are getting. It is a hard job. And also, that you take in the packing house where the women work. Part of the shed has some cooling facilities, and part of the shed hasn't, and you take the San Joaquin Valley during the time of the fruit season here. . . . five to six hundred people in the packing house and no cooling facilities. That gets pretty rough.⁵⁵

Price added that only two foremen supervised the 50 to 500 workers, which he characterized as, "too many jobs for two men to look after. It takes more men for an operation like that, unless it works your pants off, and that is just what it does."⁵⁶

Price continued, relating an encounter where two "old grand ladies" took a few minutes to kneel in prayer on a Sunday

⁵⁰Ernesto Galarza, *Spiders in the House and Workers in the Field* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1970), 36.

⁵¹Ernesto Galarza, *The Burning Light: Action and Organizing in the Mexican Community in California*, an oral history conducted in 1977, 1978, and 1981 by Gabrielle Morris and Timothy Beard: Regional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, 1982: 13.

⁵²U.S. Congress, 1949, 574.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 690.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*

⁵⁵The Okies pronounce the name Di Giorgio "Die George."

⁵⁶U.S. Congress, 1949, 691.

morning on which they were forced to work. "[A]nd a fellow who is a watchman at Di Giorgio . . . made the statement, 'That is one thing you have to do,' but told them they just couldn't get the job done and would have to move on."⁵⁷ This same issue of company inflexibility arose when workers were refused time off to vote.

Price related another instance about the firing of two men over a nickel an hour raise. Price was intimately involved with this episode, as the foreman who wrote out "those little yellow slips" after taking the request to the Di Giorgio management. "I was given the order by Mr. [Max] Newman and Mr. Bradley Hamilson [sic] to fire those guys for asking for a nickel more on the hour, and that is what I did," Price testified. He continued, "There was also women discharged for asking a few cents raise for working in the potatoes, and the raise they asked for, they wanted to get what they were getting over at Edison."⁵⁸

Price's next area of contention dealt with housing and the condition of the Di Giorgio owned properties supplied to their workers. After the strike began Di Giorgio made a concerted effort to improve the housing, which Price acknowledged, but as to his experience he related:

When I first moved on Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., I was moved into 2 rooms of an apartment which consisted of 12 rooms. There were six families living in this bunkhouse. Two bunkhouses close together and there were six families in each one of those bunkhouses and I think there were one sink at the end of this bunkhouse for the six families. There were 2 toilets, that serviced those 12 families in those two bunkhouses, also serviced some two-room shacks adjoining the bunkhouses, and 7 tent houses adjoining the

2 two-room shacks . . . They had two showers for all those houses . . . with no hot water.⁵⁹

He continued that after a promotion he was moved out of the bunkhouse and into a two-room shack and after being promoted to foreman into a little better house, yet, "I still didn't have no warm water, no bathing facilities. Toilet facilities we had; we had to cross the street, go through your neighbor's yard and a few outdoor buildings scattered along the edge of a grape patch."⁶⁰

But in Jimmy Price's mind the most serious grievance against the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation was lack of respect for a fellow American. Early in his statement, Price told of the company's refusal to allow time to vote:

You know, although we did come from Oklahoma and Arkansas, we are citizens, and we love to have that privilege to go vote, because we like to be a part of this good old United States also, even though we are having a pretty rough time getting to be.⁶¹

When he related an incident about his order to fire two men because they asked for a nickel raise, he concluded the story: "But something I don't like, and I think any American citizen should have the right, when he gets fired, should have the right to know what he gets fired for, but on Di Giorgio, you didn't."⁶²

Price considered that by far the greatest disrespect shown by Di Giorgio towards its American employees was the hiring of Mexican nationals:

As American people, farm workers who have been denied all these privi-

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Ibid., 692.

⁵⁹Ibid., 692-3.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid., 691.

⁶²Ibid., 692.



leges, we find out that the Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. from time to time are hiring 'wetbacks'--Mexicans who were in this country illegal . . . and so I can't see any point where an organization has got the name of the Di Giorgio Fruit Corp., that had neglected its workers and said that it is one big, happy family, can deny the workers, which, Mr. Chairman, I am trying to say that we the people of Local 218, the people that were on the picket line were Di Giorgio workers, and we couldn't see where our own people, citizens of the United States, were deprived of the privileges to work and their jobs filled by people who were not citizens. There is nothing fair about it. Anybody knows that it wouldn't be fair for a 'wetback' to take the place of an American citizen [emphasis added].⁶³

Price concluded his remarks with an appeal to the committee to allow the farm laborers the same opportunities afforded any American, "an opportunity to advance in life a little bit . . . to send our kids to school, clothe them properly, and a decent home to live in," and an organization for "the guy that does the old heavy-heavy."⁶⁴

When the management of Di Giorgio Farms was presented with Local 218's grievance list, it remained silent and continued to ignore the union efforts at negotiation throughout the strike. The public response to the company was that there was no strike. Max Newman, superintendent of the farm, told the *Bakersfield Californian* on 2 October 1947, the day after the strike started, that,

This morning the entrances to our ranch were picketed by strangers. We have had no dispute with our employees [sic], and our operations are continu-

ing. Most of our employees [sic] have been with us for years and they are continuing to work.

Joseph Di Giorgio announced through his lawyers in corporate headquarters in New York City that, "There is no strike. There are no issues."⁶⁵

On 11 October 1947 the *Bakersfield Californian*, published an article headlined, "Some Employees [sic] on Farm Content with Job Income," expressing the view of a few of the Di Giorgio workers still on the job. Troy Kizer, a truck driver for the farm for nine years, told of a confrontation with pickets and explained, "I didn't like the way them fellers acted in the first place when they started this strike . . . I'm now making 90 cents an hour and I like to work for these people. But these agitators started slipping around and trying to get us all to quit work. As for me I'm making a good living and I'm satisfied." John Sprouse, a swamper for the company, told the reporter that, "I've been here nine years and I don't figure to go on no strike now . . . Most of the people on that picket line have only been here a couple of months and couldn't hold a good job anywhere else except here."⁶⁶

When interviewed for the *Bakersfield Odyssey Program* in 1981 James Lackey, who worked for Di Giorgio before the war, expressed his lack of interest in the union, "I didn't see anybody taking advantage of anyone . . . It was friendly and the bosses were good. In fact I talked to the old man Di Giorgio, the one that owned it, and little Joe (nephew of the owner) . . . They was just like common people. All the bosses were swell."⁶⁷ Lackey, who returned to Bakersfield after the war and joined the

⁶³Ibid., 695.

⁶⁴Ibid., 697.

⁶⁵Ernesto Galarza, "Big Farm Strike," *The Commonwealth*, 4 June 1948, 178-82.

⁶⁶"Some Employees [sic] on Farm Content with Job Income," *Bakersfield Californian*, 11 October 1947, 7.

⁶⁷Gregory, 164.

pipefitters union, still had relatives working at Di Giorgio in 1947. Katie Lackey told the reporter for the *Bakersfield Californian* for its 11 October 1947 article that she and her husband were furnished a house on the ranch, "It's got six rooms, its a nice place with a fine yard and we rent it for \$3 per month. My husband also works here and we like it."

Obviously there were major differences of opinion among the workers at the Di Giorgio Farm concerning both the need for a union and working conditions, enough so that work on the farm continued, although not without some initial disruption. A count of workers in the Di Giorgio shed reported by the *Bakersfield Californian* on 11 October 1947, eleven days after the strike began, found 250 men and women working; however Max Newman stated that eight hundred were at work throughout the farm that day. The primary reason for the corporation's continued operation was the presence of an abundance of available substitute labor in the San Joaquin Valley at the time of the strike. Ernesto Galarza reported to *The Commonweal*, a publication of the Catholic Church, that on 5 March 1948 an official of the state employment department stated that there were fifty thousand unemployed in seven San Joaquin Valley counties. Galarza pointed out that this figure only counted those who had "registered at some point" and didn't include "skipped" *braceros*, *mojados*, and "thousands of men and women of all groups who are in transit on trains, in buses and in their own dilapidated cars at any given moment of the slack season." Galarza estimated, "a reservoir of some seventy-five thousand men and women from which Di Giorgio can draw fresh supplies for his strike breaking crews."⁶⁸

On the first day of the strike 130 Mexican nationals (*braceros*) were employed by Di Giorgio and as reported by the

union, joined the initial walkout. They returned to work the next day after a visit from a representative of the Mexican government and the Department of Agriculture who administered the program. On 3 October the NFLU charged the Department of Agriculture with supplying the *braceros* as strike breakers to the farm, and an ensuing investigation led to the removal of the *braceros* by order of the Mexican government on 11 November 1947. To fill this void Di Giorgio resorted to the use of *mojados*, which the union promptly reported to the INS and whose agents subsequently raided the ranch repeatedly over the next two years. In a letter dated 23 August 1949, W. F. Kelly, district supervisor for the INS in Los Angeles, reported to Watson B. Miller, Chief of the Immigration Services in Washington, D.C., that, "Since the middle of 1947, the ranch has been visited by our officers 19 times and 315 aliens have been apprehended."⁶⁹ In addition the corporation dispatched a supervisory employee of the company, Walt Palladino, to Texas, the primary crossing point for *mojados*, to recruit workers who were not told they were to be used as strike breakers. El Paso police, tipped to Palladino's venture, arrested him and returned him to California for prosecution.⁷⁰ The union also accused the farm of smuggling illegal workers from their Borrego operation in the Imperial Valley, but these charges were not confirmed.⁷¹

Another serious threat to the union was the action of the Associated Farmers of California, an organization of twenty thousand farmers who formed in 1934, "as a result of disturbances that had tended to prevent the harvesting of crops and their movement to market."⁷² These disturbances

⁶⁹U.S. Congress 1949, 615-6.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 565.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, 579.

⁷²Clarke H. Chambers, *California Farm Organizations: A Historical Study of the Grange, The Farm*

⁶⁸Galarza, "Big Farm."

were the strikes of the CAWIU, which were met by armed vigilantes organized by the Associated Farmers. In Stockton in April 1937 and again in Madera in October 1939 strikers were attacked by "farmers armed with pick handles, rubber hoses, auto cranks, and fan belts," breaking up a mass meeting of the union.⁷³ By 1948 the Associated Farmers had become more sophisticated in their methods, relying now upon lawyers, publicists, and compliant politicians, but as the NFLU understood, the potential for violence remained.

On the surface the Associated Farmers operated on dues from their members, but as Robert Schmeiser, past president of the organization, testified to the committee, the twenty thousand members paid in only \$40,000 yearly. As the organization paid out \$10,000 to their lobbyist in Sacramento, as well as employed a general manager, field secretary, and several clerical workers and maintained a headquarters, this \$40,000 did not seem adequate.⁷⁴ Insight to this anomaly is gained from testimony from Joseph Di Giorgio given before the U. S. Senate Committee for the Investigation of Free Speech and Rights of Labor chaired by Robert LaFollette in 1939 following the violence in Stockton and Madera. W. B. Camp, treasurer of the Associated Farmers, asked Di Giorgio to help raise funds to hire a publicist, an idea Di Giorgio had raised at a meeting of the organization. Since it was his idea, Di Giorgio wrote a letter to some of his business acquaintances hoping to raise \$5,000 to support the young man presented by Camp. Di Giorgio's letter raised \$10,000 from a list of twenty companies including the Santa Fe Railroad, San Joaquin Light and Power, Union Pacific Railroad, the California Fruit Exchange, Kern County Land

Company, and Safeway Stores, a virtual "who's who" of California corporations.⁷⁵

During testimony before the committee in Bakersfield in 1949 on how the Associated Farmers were first organized, Schmeiser revealed another insight into the machinations of the organization. Schmeiser mentioned John Phillips, the first organizer for the Associated Farmers and in 1949, a Congressman representing Riverside, California. Chairman Bailey interjected at this point that he remembered that Representative Phillips had led the floor debate for an amendment to the appropriation for the National Labor Relations Board prohibiting spending any funds appropriated to it for holding investigations or elections in farm labor disputes. When questioned further by Bailey, Schmeiser acknowledged that former Congressmen Lee and Alfred Elliott from California were also members of the Associated Farmers, whom Bailey recalled had been the original authors of the amendment before they had been defeated in the 1948 election. As Bailey commented, "If one waits long enough we always find the answer to most questions."⁷⁶

In the case of the Di Giorgio strike, the Associated Farmers were responsible for the publication and distribution of *A Community Aroused*, a retort from the "Kern County Concerned Citizens Committee" to a newspaper commentary written by Harold L. Ickes, former Secretary of Labor. The *Atlanta Constitution* published Ickes' "Views on the desperate plight of migrant farm workers, the 'notorious Associated Farmers,' and the Di Giorgio strike," on Thanksgiving Day, 27 November 1947.⁷⁷ Organized by the same W. B. Camp who asked

Bureau and the Associated Farmers (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1952), 79.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴U.S. Congress 1949, 621-2.

⁷⁵U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, *Hearing on Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor*, 76 Cong., 2nd sess., 1940, 17650-1.

⁷⁶U.S. Congress 1949, 628.

⁷⁷Ernesto Galarza, *Farm Workers and Agri-business in California, 1947-1960* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 106.

Joseph Di Giorgio to raise funds for the Associated Farmers, the citizens committee defended the Di Giorgio Farm against the accusations of Ickes, branding the strike as “an invasion of Kern County agriculture headed by outsiders . . . using similar tactics to Communist agitators . . . in an attempt to organize . . . and impose industrial unionism on seasonal agriculture.”⁷⁸

On 2 February 1948 the Associated Farmers intensified its campaign when in a press release Robert Schmeiser accused H. L. Mitchell, president of the NFLU, of being a “Communist-fronter.”

Joseph Di Giorgio further stated in an interview on 9 February that, “We know that this agitation is Communist-inspired by subversive elements,” and in March Congressman Alfred Elliott, demanding an investigation by the House, said that, “Communist activities are connected with the Di Giorgio picketing.”⁷⁹

However, a subsequent investigation by the California Senate Un-American Activities Committee, chaired by Jack R. Tenney, completely cleared the NFLU of all charges.⁸⁰ In addition, Congressman Richard Nixon noted during the committee hearings that an informal investigation of the NFLU by the House Un-American Activities Committee, of which he was a member, had also found no Communist involvement in the union.⁸¹

A far more serious blow to Local 218 came at the hands of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) when it allowed Di

Giorgio to file unfair labor practice charges against the union under provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act on 8 June 1948. At this point in the strike the union had extended its picket lines to include the Di Giorgio Winery and attracted the help of fellow unions in San Francisco and Los Angeles which refused to handle Di Giorgio shipments because they were considered “hot cargo.” Di Giorgio, sensing that he would have to sit down and negotiate with the union, appealed to the NRLB and as Alexander Schullman, council for the union put it, “The Myrmi-



Truckload of migrants on way to work in fields. <http://www.farmworkers.org/bracerop.html>.

dons of the (NLRB’s) General Counsel, with vaunting pride and alacrity, broke their necks with a speed unheard of.”⁸² On 4 July an injunction against the NFLU forced the union to remove its secondary pickets. As of the hearings in Bakersfield in November 1949 the injunction still stood awaiting a hearing

by the Board even though it had been declared invalid by a NLRB examiner. Because of this decision the union remained alone in its fight against the forces of a powerful corporation, the Associated Farmers of California, and even the United States government in the form of the NRLB.⁸³

The strike of Local 218 continued for another six months after the close of the subcommittee hearings on 13 November 1949. The final denouement came in the form of a \$2 million libel suit filed against the representatives of the union for statements allegedly made against Di Giorgio

⁷⁸Kern County Special Citizens Committee, *A Community Aroused* (Bakersfield, Calif.: Kern County Special Citizens Committee, 1947).

⁷⁹U.S. Congress 1949, 573.

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Ibid., 591.

⁸²Ibid., 711.

⁸³Ibid.

Fruit Corporation in a twenty minute film, *Poverty in the Valley of Plenty*. Produced in 1948 by the Hollywood Film Council (AF of L) in response to *A Community Aroused* the film makers intended to document the plight of both migratory labor and Local 218. Filmed in Arvin, Weedpatch, and Lamont, it depicted the living conditions of the Di Giorgio workers and invoked the memory of Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*.⁸⁴

The wrath that the film attracted from the Di Giorgio Corporation proved fatal. Backed by a "report" purported to be from the Congressional subcommittee, which never issues an actual report, the libel suit was brought against the NFLU, the Central Labor Council of Los Angeles, and the Hollywood Film Council (AF of L) by the corporation on 9 November 1949. Subsequently, the NFLU concluded that it had insufficient funds to defend itself and in an out-of-court settlement agreed to withdraw its pickets, end the action against Di Giorgio, and destroy all copies of *Poverty in the Valley of Plenty*.⁸⁵

On 7 May 1950 the strike of Local 218 against the Di Giorgio Fruit Corporation came to an ignominious close when the lone picket packed up her belongings and departed for home, leaving behind only the telephone pole which she used for a backrest. Although the Local had held out for over two years against heavy odds, H. L. Mitchell made the final decision to end the struggle and conserve the NFLU's resources for a better opportunity in the future. Ernesto Galarza believed that the loss of the Di Giorgio strike doomed the NFLU because, buoyed by their success, the Associated Farmers spearheaded the drive to codify Public Law 78 in 1951, which extended the *Bracero* program until 1964. With *braceros*

the farmers could outlast any strike brought against them.⁸⁶

Conclusion

The NFLU continued to organize following the Di Giorgio strike and it met some success with minor actions in the Imperial Valley and in the potato farms around Los Banos. During one such action by cotton pickers in 1949 a young man named Cesar Chavez experienced his first taste of union leadership heading up a caravan of strikers sent out on the country roads to tell pickers who had not left the fields about the strike.⁸⁷ But with such a large supply of workers willing to cross the picket lines and with the *bracero* program codified by Public Law 78 limited the union's options.

For Ernesto Galarza the most troubling aspect of the failed Di Giorgio action seemed to be the limited commitment of organized labor. Although the local councils of San Francisco and Los Angeles sent aid to the struggling Local 218 when the California State Federation of Labor leadership faced a \$2 million lawsuit, they quickly capitulated to the demands of the Di Giorgio Corporation, leaving the NFLU alone in its struggle.⁸⁸

In 1952 the NFLU was renamed the National Agricultural Workers Union (NAWU) at their convention in New Orleans. In California the union's action focused on illuminating the fallacies and unfairness of the *bracero* program while continuing to organize. Although both these goals were attained they were not successful in the fundamental function of unionism, obtaining bargaining contracts with the employers. In the eyes of the national leadership, this became a fatal failure and the NAWU folded into the Agricultural Work-

⁸⁴Galarza, *Spiders in the House*, 30-1.

⁸⁵Ibid., chap. 3, passim.

⁸⁶Galarza, *The Burning Light*, 19.

⁸⁷National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor, 39.

⁸⁸Galarza, *Farm Workers*, 116.



ers Organizing Committee (AWOC) in 1959. Subsequently, AWOC met its demise, ironically, at the hands of the Di Giorgio Corporation after resurrecting a banned copy of *Poverty in the Valley of Plenty*. Di Giorgio quickly filed suit and won, which cost AWOC \$60,000 of its precious funds and the faith of the national leadership. By the end of 1961 AWOC remained alive in name only.⁸⁹

For the Okies the defeat seemed even greater. Fifty families had been thrown off the Di Giorgio Farm at the beginning of the strike, and by the end several hundred former employees had been fired and forced to leave Arvin, Lamont, and Weedpatch in search of work.⁹⁰ Although a solid core had remained true to the union until the bitter end, many continued to be loyal to Di Giorgio, aided by an abundance of hungry unemployed Okies ready to accept work despite the strike. Okie independence left too few strikers holding out against the power brought to bear against them.

Ernesto Galarza, concluded his section on the Di Giorgio strike in *Farm Workers and Agri-Business in California, 1947-1960*, with these words:

Many of the most active strikers left Kern County to settle in farm communities throughout the state. They carried the feeling of veteranship and confidence that men have when they fix not on how small they were but on how big their antagonist and how well they had stood up to him. Throughout the years that followed they were to be found in the midst of all the encounters that are narrated in the following pages. They did not again act on the scale of the Arvin Strike, but they spread into all the strongholds of agri-business—El Centro, Coachella, Borrego Valley, Delano, Fresno,

Salinas, Santa Clara, Stockton, Tracy, and Yuba City, 'talking union' in all of them.⁹¹

⁸⁹Ibid., 322-37, passim.

⁹⁰Ibid., 14.

⁹¹Ibid., 117.

The Roaring 20s: Tobacco Profits in Jamestown

Michelle Mormul

The tobacco plantations of colonial James Towne, Virginia, exemplified a successful overseas colony, as well as an elite social class. Michelle Mormul discusses the development of the James Towne tobacco industry and its effects on the growing population during the 1620s. She explains how the colony's profits, acquired from tobacco cultivation, fell into the hands of a few individuals as a result of an "economic cash-cow" and why more colonists did not succeed in their attempts. Michelle concludes with the contention that the James Towne tobacco industry further expanded the quest for land acquisition over new markets, from which extant countries could generate profits.

"The Queen said pleasantly, that she had heard of many laborers in the fire, that turned their gold into smoke, but Raleigh was the first who had turned smoke into gold."¹

Who profited from the roaring 1620s in James Towne Virginia Colony? Was it the company that sent out men and supplies to the disease-infested place? Was it the crown who took over the rule of the colony after the company's failure? This paper will prove it was neither of these, but rather a web of profiteers in official positions who made use of their standing in the community to extract profits. These people took the greater part of the tobacco that should have been ameliorating the lives of the colonists and shareholders of the company. In James Towne, the men who controlled the distribution of goods controlled prices and earnings.

Richard Hakluyt helped to elicit excitement for future English colonies in North America. As a member of the London Company, he was a propagandist of immense persistence, who never traveled to the far lands of which he wrote. It was necessary to entice the great London City merchants with capital connections to form a new mechanism called a joint stock company. These investors, called adventurers, contributed without traveling to the new colony.

¹ William Smith, *The History of the First Discovery and Settlement of Virginia Being an Essay Towards a General History of this Colony* (1747)(Spartanburg, S.C.: Reprint Company, 1965), 21.

There was also a running lottery that collected auxiliary money for the settlement.² King James established patents in 1606 for the London Company (South Virginia Company) and the Plymouth Company between 34 and 45 degrees latitude.³

The Virginia Colony was established on a peninsula in 1607 (that later became an island). The potential to produce naval stores and goods for re-export to Europe became an attraction of this new dominion. An economic, as well as strategic, campaign against Spain began with the creation of the colony, which consisted of no exploitable labor force, unlike the Spanish held territories of New Spain. Sparse and few Indian settlements existed throughout the land. Fortunately, England experienced high unemployment during the early seventeenth century, thereby attracting settlers to a new life.⁴

John Rolfe promoted the colony and created a strain of tobacco that invigorated the economy. Until Rolfe's contribution, the Indians of this area smoked a bitter strain of tobacco called *Nicotiana rustica*. Rolfe introduced *Nicotiana tabacum* from the West Indies, which had a smoother smoke. In his strategically circulated letter, "True Relation on the State of Virginia" (1616), he refuted charges that Virginia was unfit for colonization and asserted that past failures and difficulties had been from mismanagement and negligence. That statement led to renewed enthusiasm for the enterprise among the stockholders of the insolvent company.⁵ By the proclamation of 1620, the "lotteries were

more and more an inconvenience and hindrance to the multitude of our subjects," and on 20 March 1620 at the request of the commons, Parliament said there would be no more lotteries to support the settlement.⁶

Itinerant workers comprised 60 to 70 percent of the James Towne population and made it into a short pilgrimage to get rich quick and leave.⁷ Most of the newcomers stayed a short time in James Towne proper then moved onto tobacco plantations. The village became a mere transfer post where bowling and drinking served as the main recreations.⁸

London merchants sent out great quantities of liquor at exorbitant prices, which aroused public criticism. This atmosphere of drinking bred a coarse and vulgar populace in the community. John Pory complained to an English lord in 1619, "at my first coming hither, the solitary uncouthness of this place . . . did not a little vex me."⁹ In 1620 John Rolfe wrote to Sir Edwin Sandys, treasurer of the Virginia Company, of the low caliber early Jamestonians, "I speake on my owne experience for these eleven years, I never amongst so few, have seen so many false hearted, envious, and malicious people (yea amongst some who march in the better rank)."¹⁰

There were no social organizations within the community to enhance the lives of the inhabitants. Some planters, merchants, and officials acquired land and attained social position, power, and wealth. They manipulated provincial and local government to protect their special privileges and proper-

² John Horace Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 213-4.

³ Richard Hakluyt, *Divers Voyages Touching the Discovery of America and the Islands Adjacent* (1582) (New York: Burt Franklin, 1850), xiv.

⁴ Parry, 213, 215.

⁵ John Rolfe, *A True Relation of the State of Virginia* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1971), xxii.

⁶ John Carter Brown Library, *Three Proclamations Concerning the Lottery for Virginia 1613-1621* (Providence, R. I.: Merrymount Press, 1907), taken from the proclamations of 1613 and 1620, which had no page numbering.

⁷ Carl Bridenbaugh, *Jamestown 1544-1699* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 128.

⁸ Ibid, 119.

⁹ Ibid, 118.

¹⁰ Ibid, 121.



An idealist's drawing supposedly representing individuals planting and harvesting crops during an early stage of development in the English colony at Jamestown, Virginia.

<http://members.tripod.com/rsmith20/jamestown.html>

ties. Most people who went to the colony did not achieve independence and security, even after their terms of indenture ended.¹¹ The colony quickly became socially unbalanced. Through connections with England and access to the governor and council in Virginia, men could put themselves in an advantageous situation to make money or get out of trouble. The general assembly noted that "persons of quality . . . being not fit to undergoe corporal punishment" should either be fined or imprisoned, but not whipped.¹²

A chronology of the major happenings during the roaring twenties in James Towne began with the convening of the general assembly of Virginia on 30 July

1619, which was the first representative assembly in British North America. On 30 August 1619, a Dutch ship landed the first twenty black men from Africa at James Towne. On 21 December 1621, the ship *Warwick* arrived with thirty-eight maids for wives. The Virginia Company announced its plan to send over one hundred young maids a year to encourage home building and a more permanent settlement. Women had been in the colony as early as 1608, yet not in great numbers. On 22 March 1622 a carefully planned Indian attack wiped out nearly one-third of the twelve hundred settlers on the peninsula, including all of the inhabitants at Henrico, a settlement to the north planned for an intended college. Due to slow profits, on 9 May 1623, the privy council began steps to take over the colony by cre-

¹¹Ibid, 151.

¹²Ibid, 59.

ating a commission to investigate the Virginia Company; on 24 May 1624, the crown assumed control of the colony. With this royal charter came the inalienable rights of Englishmen.

Charles I revived the general assembly on 10 March 1628 and claimed the right to draw up legislation thereafter, which led to continuing disputes over the division of governmental power with a series of royal governors.¹³ The governor and two or three members of his council resided in James Towne regularly. The rest of the members of the council met every three months. After the dissolution of the Virginia Company, the assembly met only when called by the governor. (The assembly met annually before the colony came under rule by the crown.) The courts were busy in the 1620s. Courts and judicial affairs expanded beyond the boundaries of James Towne proper to alleviate the burden of a huge court business. Two other locations held monthly courts to hear small cases.¹⁴

The first colonists to come to Virginia already were addicted consumers of Spanish tobacco, despite King James's detest of smoking.¹⁵ James I wrote the book "A Counterblaste To Tobacco," (1604) which condemned the plant.¹⁶ Despite the king's hatred of the drug, many addicts spread the cultural use of tobacco into daily life. The small quantity consumed can be judged from the smoking pipes found. The

luxury of imbibing became available mostly to the middle classes in towns.¹⁷

The influx of commerce from the tobacco profits improved the lives of Jamestonians culturally and materially. On 27 March 1625, James I died and Charles I became king.¹⁸ Under James I, England did not have the economic prosperity that flourished under Elizabeth I, yet in James Towne commerce grew. From 1619-1623 forty-two sailing ships of "great burthen" arrived. In the previous four years, no more than twelve came to trade with the city.¹⁹ Small furnishings were ordered from England to adorn the interior of the wretched buildings: the beds being the most important piece of furniture in the home. Additional items of value purchased from the mother country consisted of chests for their best linen, fine garments, carpets, tableware, brass utensils, and pewter tankards equal to those in England. John Preen sent four consignments of English goods between 1625-1628. Colonists were better supplied with necessities and luxuries than previously.²⁰

John Rolfe introduced Orinoco tobacco to the mainland from Trinidad in 1610-1611.²¹ This plant's sweetness differed from the tobacco common to the mainland region of Virginia. The indigenous Indians grew tobacco in this region, but it had a bitter taste to it. The Indians cured and dried it, and made it into a bran or dust.²²

¹³Ellen Lloyd Trover, *Chronology and Documentary Handbook of the State of Virginia* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1979), 3.

¹⁴Bridenbaugh, 110.

¹⁵James Deetz, Flowerdew Hundred, *The Archaeology of a Virginia Plantation, 1619-1864* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995), 4.

¹⁶Ivor Noel Hume, *The Virginia Adventure: Roanoke to James Towne: an Archaeological and Historical Odyssey* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1994), Chapter 4 note 22.

¹⁷James Edwin Tharold Rogers, *A History of Agriculture and Prices in England: from the year after the Oxford parliament (1259) to the commencement of the war (1743)* (Vaduz, Liechtenstein: Kraus Reprint, 1963), 468.

¹⁸Philip L. Barbour, *Pocahontas and Her World; a Chronicle of America's first settlement in which is Related the Story of the Indians and the Englishmen, Particularly Captain John Smith, Captain Samuel Argall, and Master John Rolfe* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 221.

¹⁹Bridenbaugh, 144.

²⁰Ibid, 144-5.

²¹Deetz, 73.

²²Smith, 19.

Colonists obtained tobacco and sassafras (used in rootbeer) from the Indians. Tobacco became the Virginia settlers' lone money crop; it laid the foundation for the southern plantation economy and created countless cultural implications in the southern states.²³

One of the most significant illustrations of a market takeover is the rapidity with which Virginian tobacco superseded Spanish tobacco.²⁴ From the inception of the colony, the Virginia Company owned all property, and agriculture was unsuccessful. But in 1614 Sir Thomas Dale, the acting governor of James Towne, ruled that the colonists could farm for their own profit. The year 1614 marked the inauguration of the tobacco trade with London when the "Elizabeth" reached the port of London with the colony's first export of the new tobacco strain. George Yeardley, the acting governor, received the credit for turning the tobacco plant into the prime staple of the Old Dominion; thus, when Samuel Argall arrived in James Towne, he found "the marketplace and streets, and all other spare places planted with tobacco."²⁵ Three men could do independently what thirty did in a common garden before. By 1617 indentured servants fulfilled their obligations to the Virginia Company. Those settlers who arrived before 1616 received one hundred acres fee simple, and by 1618 private enterprise triumphed over the semi-military work gangs.²⁶

As early as 1616, John Rolfe stated that people were spending too much time and labor planting tobacco because of the

vendability in England; thus, they neglected their tillage of corn and fell into want. Finally, Sir Thomas Dale enacted a statute stating that no one could plant tobacco unless they manured and maintained two acres of ground with corn for themselves and every manservant, yearly. If they did this, they could plant as much tobacco as they pleased; if not, all their tobacco would be forfeited to the colony.²⁷ In 1620 the colony reported unprecedented harvests although there was an epidemic that summer. John Rolfe reported to the company an abundance of corn and sturgeon, and the leaders wrote that they were well fed in the winter of 1619-1620. At the same time, they traded beads from England with the Indians for corn. They also borrowed corn from the Chesapeake Bay colony.²⁸ The get-rich-quick mentality started off well; in England some of this mentality was contagious. Before enacting laws which prohibited tobacco cultivation in England, many hundreds of acres were prepared and employed as tobacco plantations in Gloucester, Devon, Somerset, and Oxfordshire at great profits. Sold under the fraudulent name of Spanish tobacco, English tobacco brought a higher market price due to its association with the West Indies.²⁹

Tobacco seedlings, once planted, demanded intense labor; until it was packed in the hogs-head. Indentured servants worked daily in the rows of tobacco, stooping to de-worm and weed it. Many people grew sick with fever and perished.³⁰ Special drying racks, barns, and casks, which were different than the average tools of the

²³John L. Cotter, *Archeological Excavations at Jamestown, Colonial National Historic Park and Jamestown National Historic Site* (Washington: National Park Service, U. S. Department of the Interior, 1958), 163.

²⁴Rogers, 782.

²⁵Bridenbaugh, 37, 40-1.

²⁶Edward S. Morgan, "The First Boom 1618-1630," *William and Mary Quarterly* 3d ser., 28, no. 2 (April 1971): 169-70.

²⁷Rolfe, 8.

²⁸Morgan, 172.

²⁹So says Lord Morton as stated during the Civil War. The law mentioned was 12 Chas II cap. 34. Rogers, 64.

³⁰William Bullock, *Virginia Impartially Examined, and Left to Publick View, to be Considered by all Judicious and Honest Men* (London: John Hammond, 19 April 1649), 11.

farmer, became imperative in the processing of tobacco.³¹ September and October were the months of the tobacco harvest, and in December it was prepared for the homeward freight. The ships returned in February, March, or April.³² People in England thought it took a year to travel from England to Virginia because the tobacco ripened only once a year.³³ In 1619 John Rolfe stated that one man could raise four acres of corn and one thousand tobacco plants. These one thousand plants equaled one hundred twelve pounds of tobacco, which sold for £150 per chest full.³⁴ The secretary's office at James Towne issued the acreage from the head right.³⁵ The head right, created by statute, provided fifty acres of land to anyone who paid passage for each individual, free-man, servant, or slave brought into Virginia. The principal wealth in

the New World consisted of servants. In England, planters hired indentured servants for a year which included clothing and housing.³⁶

Geographic areas designated as "hundreds" separated plantations into properties. In England, it was an area larger than a parish but smaller than a county and capable of raising one hundred militiamen. One hundred militiamen could not be raised in Virginia, however, due to the colony's high death rate. The use of the term "hundred" probably worked as a propaganda ploy used to create a favorable view of Virginia when merchants and tradersmen heard about it in England.³⁷

The earthfast buildings of James Towne and its environs were linked to the tobacco monoculture.³⁸ This construction — sticks and mud used as building implements, as

opposed to brick — made sense in terms of spending priorities in a situation where most investment was committed to raising tobacco. This assured that the equipment maintenance did not require any significant cash expense for the service. Earthfast buildings maintained the social relationships among the members of the community. In exchange for services, favors, or other courtesies, rendered to the house carpenter,



Capt. John Smith, whose efforts helped save the settlement at Jamestown in the colony of Virginia. <http://www.nypl.org/research/chss/spe/art/print/exhibits/drydunk/counterb.htm>.

³¹Cotter, 162.

³²Bullock, 46.

³³Ibid, 11.

³⁴Plus or minus forty or fifty, one could grow 3,000 plants to the acre. Modern thinking is for 2723 plants to the acre with each plant sixteen square feet, which equals 43,560 square feet. Noel Hume, 367. Some other examples of some rare, highly productive cases: In 1623 one man could plant two thousand plants of tobacco, which would give five hundred weight: a man names Brewster, with three others, produced 2,800 weight; and in 1619 John Pory cleared two hundred pounds sterling. Another with six servants cleared one hundred pounds sterling in a year. Morgan, 178.

³⁵Bridenbaugh, 59.

³⁶Morgan, 176-7.

³⁷Deetz, 19.

³⁸Ibid, 52.

repairs could be obtained for no monetary charge, a reciprocal social situation that kept houses and equipment in reasonable working order with no monetary transactions involved.³⁹

John Rolfe felt that the tobacco produced in Virginia could compare in quality with the best grown in the West Indies.⁴⁰ During the beginning of this industry, 1615-1622, the Virginia colony produced sixty thousand pounds of tobacco; yet for the same time period, the average of tobacco imported from Spain was sixty thousand pounds per year. The tobacco produced in the West Indies was of a much higher grade. In 1628 alone fifty thousand pounds were exported from the English colony, eight times the amount denoted in the official reports for a decade earlier.⁴¹ In the later years of 1637-1640, 1,395,063 pounds were produced for export. The records of the Virginia Company state that there was probably as much introduced by smugglers.⁴² The quantities of tobacco exported from the Virginia colony eventually surpassed Rolfe's dreams for the plant.

After the 1622 massacre of over three hundred colonists by the Indians of the area, many Englishmen turned away from their duty as militia guardians of the community during the truce and turned their concentration to the cultivation of tobacco. They neglected to position themselves on the defense or keep arms equipped and ready because of the inflation in tobacco prices.⁴³ The tobacco producers wanted the most expansive market possible for their product; yet in October 1621, a definitive

order from the king required that all tobacco be brought to England. This type of order applied to tobacco long before it pertained to other commodities.⁴⁴ In the summer of 1627, the famous John Smith, one of the founding members of the community who had been away a number of years, heard from friend, Nathaniel Causey, that tobacco had become the sole commodity in which any interest was shown.⁴⁵

The profits from tobacco did not always go to ameliorate the coffers of the Virginia Company, its investors, or the king's treasury. The men who capitalized on this rise in money flow were the shipmasters, the Dutch, the cape merchants, governors and council members, and the resellers at monopoly prices. These men reaped the profits from the rise in tobacco prices through control of the delivery systems and control of the wholesale distribution market within the colony. Masters of ships, merchants, and chief mariners acquired land easily upon going ashore. Resident merchants, like Master Menefie, were the ones most favorably situated to receive one or more plantations, along with social prestige and power.⁴⁶

Merchants from the outposts tended to arrive earlier than the majority of the London ships, and these peddlers made their market by spreading news that not much tobacco was wanted that year.⁴⁷ The floating taverns that patrolled the waters looking for drinking customers seized the tobacco before it could reach the cape merchant, resulting in a loss to investors in England because they did not get the wholesale markup profit on the tobacco. Numerous ships sailed into the James River where men drank, reveled in their new found wealth, and squan-

³⁹Ibid, 55.

⁴⁰Rolfe, 5.

⁴¹L. C. Gray, "The Market Surplus Problems of Colonial Tobacco," *William and Mary Quarterly* 2d ser., 7, no. 4 (October 1927): 232.

⁴²Gray, 231.

⁴³William Shea, *The Virginia Militia in the Seventeenth Century* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), 46.

⁴⁴Gray, 238.

⁴⁵Philip L. Barbour, *The Three Worlds of Captain John Smith* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), 380.

⁴⁶Bridenbaugh, 59.

⁴⁷Gray, 243.

dered their tobacco. Complaints from Virginians reached England about their compatriots who arrived at the merchandise-laden ships first, bought the goods at low prices, then resold goods at monopoly prices.⁴⁸

In 1623 tobacco was traded at less than a shilling per pound, half of what it was worth because of the bartering within the colony.⁴⁹ The general assembly of 1624 James Towne proclaimed that ship masters were not to break bulk or undertake private sales of their cargo without first touching at James Towne and procuring permission from the governor and council.⁵⁰ These other dealers were trying to obtain some of the wealth circulating within the economy. Plantations began to appear along the adjacent York River after 1630, and masters' vessels began to sail directly to them for tobacco, without calling at James Towne first. Not until 1632 was a statute enacted requiring docking first at James Towne. If a ship did not dock first at James Towne, the punishment was one month's imprisonment. Residents and owners of property could dock from the open sea and unlade their goods: which became the reason why so many English ship captains acquired land in the colony.⁵¹

Although authorities did not sanction Dutch ships stopping at the colony, the planters enjoyed dealing with them, despite the rule that all products of the colony be routed through England's ports, because they called more often and brought more goods than the English.⁵² This divergence was bad for the company and the crown because they did not reap the benefits of the retail profit; yet it was good for the colonists because the Dutch charges for carrying away goods, such as tobacco, were lower, and the

Dutch allowed long term credit--which was usually two years.⁵³ The Dutch competition reduced dependence on the casual appearance of a single ship, and during the Dutch wars the fleet came alongside the trading vessels for protection.⁵⁴

The cape merchant, governor, and council maintained advantageous positions to steer the profits from others. The term cape merchant, or "capo" in Portuguese, meant head merchant.⁵⁵ The cape merchant made numerous attempts to prevent quantity purchases of commodities in order to control the market at monopoly prices. These acts also prevented merchants from buying or diverting goods. Earlier attempts to establish other port towns or concentration markets failed because of merchant influence.⁵⁶ George Menefie, a get-rich-quick gentleman arrived on the "Samuel" in 1622. He became a burgess by 1629, and in 1635 was on the council of state. He became the town's principal merchant in servants and tobacco and supplier of blacks.⁵⁷ Profits from tobacco kept everyone scrambling to buy servants and to grow as many plants as conceivable.⁵⁸

In 1624 the Virginia Company, which started the colony at James Towne, terminated in bankruptcy and the royal officials took over. King James I dissolved the company when he discovered what was happening with the enterprise. Quarreling ensued among the factions of the company. The king wanted to maximize his revenues from customs duties on tobacco, even though he despised the commodity. He also noted a lack of control in the colony since the Indian massacre in 1622, as well as the

⁴⁸Morgan, 182.

⁴⁹Ibid, 177.

⁵⁰Bridenbaugh, 144.

⁵¹Ibid, 145.

⁵²Ibid, 146.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Gray, 242.

⁵⁵Deetz, 20.

⁵⁶Gray, 242.

⁵⁷Bridenbaugh, 58.

⁵⁸Morgan, 177-8.

mass of unprepared and unprovisioned settlers sent by Sir Edwin Sandys.⁵⁹

The death rate had an effect on the prosperity of the inhabitants in James Towne. Between 1620 and 1630, the greatest loss of life occurred between the years 1621 and 1623, during which time the company estimated the population to be about 3,000. In the winter of 1623, more people died of starvation than were slaughtered by Opechancanough's braves, who had killed between three and four hundred settlers the previous summer. An influx of people into James Towne from the surrounding area for safety reasons, combined with the loss of crops, malnutrition, famine, and uneasy peace, contributed to privation. George Baldwin commented that such base people lived all over and that they would let a man starve without coming to his aid.⁶⁰ Most of the interior of the fort gave into tobacco growing at this time, so many of the dwellings outside of the palisades were exposed to danger from the Indians.⁶¹ Three to four thousand English residents died in Virginia during the twenties.⁶² Many more people died of disease than made fortunes in James Towne.

During the twenties, tobacco prices rose so high that there was a mad rush to grow the profitable herb. In 1619 the best grade sold for three shillings per pound at export. In 1623 it decreased to one and one-half shillings per pound and in 1624 it rose to two shillings per pound. Finally in 1625, it rose to its highest point of three shillings per pound. Other reported figures were as high as eighteen shillings per pound in the early 1620s. The English market also experienced an inflationary period during this time. In the English "Book of Rates" Virginia tobacco is listed at ten shillings per

pound, although it actually sold for half that amount in the latter part of 1619.⁶³ In the first half of the twenties, it sold for eight shillings per pound in the London market. The Virginia Company allowed three shillings for the best grade and eighteen pence for the lower grade tobacco, traded in the company's warehouse.⁶⁴

During the harsh winter of 1622-1623, because of the desolate times brought on by the Indian massacre, English meal sold going for thirty shillings per bushel and Indian corn ten to fifteen shillings per bushel. Times became so rough that by April 1623 Indian maize rose to twenty to thirty shillings per bushel. In another instance, thirty shillings per bushel of corn and ten pounds of tobacco sold for ten to fifteen shillings. Thus the one thousand bushels borrowed from the Chesapeake during this time of want, cost ten thousand pounds of tobacco, which was worth five hundred to one thousand pounds.⁶⁵

The Tudor book of rates, revised for 1604, listed the imports of tobacco leaves at six shillings, eight pence to the pound.⁶⁶ In 1615 tobacco duties charged two shillings per pound, in 1620 one shilling per pound, and in 1623 nine pence per pound (three pence for customs and six pence for impost). In 1632 they were four pence per pound and in 1644 fell to one pence per pound and two pence per pound for excise.⁶⁷ Before 1685, the duties or customs on Spanish tobacco were six pence per pound and on plantation tobacco from the colonies one pence. Tobacco revenue in 1623 England was £8,380, and by 1635 it had risen to £10,000.

Tobacco was the medium for bartering and exchange in Virginia's domestic

⁶³Gray, 231-2.

⁶⁴Ibid, 232.

⁶⁵Morgan, 182-3.

⁶⁶T. S. William, ed., *A Tudor Book of Rates*(France: University of Manchester University Press, 1962), xli.

⁶⁷Gray, 239.

⁵⁹Ibid, 171.

⁶⁰Bridenbaugh, 48-9.

⁶¹Hume, 370.

⁶²Morgan, 170.

affairs, as well as in foreign trade. When the colony printed money in the later years, it had a tobacco leaf on the front, which symbolized the monetary value of the plant. Colonists paid their debts in tobacco at twelve pence per pound, while in the country it sold for one pence.⁶⁸ Men even bought wives with the medium. In a letter of 21 August 1621, the company wrote of sending a widow and eleven maids to James Towne. Every man who married a maid had to pay 120 pounds of the best tobacco. If any of the women died on the way, the price of the rest of the maids went up to compensate for the lost value of the cargo.⁶⁹ In 1624 militia officers calculated the time a soldier spent on duty and charged those who stayed at home the amount they owed. The officers accepted tobacco as payment. Later that century, the men who performed militia duty received a certain amount of tobacco in lieu of having work done by their neighbors on their property.⁷⁰ If a colonist failed to attend church on Sunday, the fee was one pound of tobacco, and they charged fifty pounds for one month's absence. No planter could sell his tobacco before paying his church dues. In each plantation, a designated layman collected the minister's share from the best quality tobacco and corn. In 1619 the first enacted poll tax was one pound of the best tobacco for every man and manservant above the age of sixteen.⁷¹

Volume increased dramatically as the price went up. Ships took away 2,500 pounds of tobacco in 1616. In 1617 the tonnage increased to 18,839. By the year 1618,

49,668 pounds were exported and in 1628 they took away 552,871 pounds. In the census of 1626, twenty-five of the holdings were for fifty acres or less. Seventy-three of the holdings were for one hundred acres or more. Most others consisted of less than three hundred acres. In total, 224 proprietors lived in the colony. The total acreage in use at that time was 34,472. The average farm spanned approximately 154 acres in size.⁷² An example from one of the largest plantations is from the Flowerdew Hundred, where in 1624 sixty inhabitants produced tobacco valued at £10,000.⁷³ This is not to say that other commodities did not do well; for example, grazing animals did well and required less effort than growing tobacco. Available English vessels always waited to transport salted meat, hides, and tallow. Unfortunately, artisan trades proved unsuccessful in the colony.⁷⁴ Silk was so highly prized that the crown offered a bounty of fifty pounds of tobacco for each pound of silk produced in the colony, yet neither industry got off the ground because of the furor for tobacco growing.⁷⁵ In the old South cotton was king, but in the even older South, tobacco was king.

Outside factors affected the period after the roaring twenties. By 1633 four additional tobacco warehouses existed besides those in James Towne, and the town's monopoly on tobacco trade ended.⁷⁶ By 1639 sworn overseers inspected the quality and weight of the tobacco. In 1640 Governor Wyatt made a proclamation limiting the number of tobacco plants to one thousand per farmer, thus effectively ordering the colonists to plant more corn.⁷⁷ New competition came from other English owned islands like St. Kitts, Nevis, and Barbados;

⁶⁸Bullock, 10.

⁶⁹Edward D. Neill, *The History of the Virginia Company of London, With Letters To and From the First Colony Never Before Reprinted* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1968), 234.

⁷⁰Shea, 81.

⁷¹Alf J. Mapp, *The Virginia Experiment, The Old Dominion's Role on the Making of America 1607-1781* (Lonham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1985), 47, 91, 101.

⁷²Mapp, 90.

⁷³Deetz, 20.

⁷⁴Bridenbaugh, 41.

⁷⁵Mapp, 95.

⁷⁶Bridenbaugh, 145.

⁷⁷Ibid, 42.

which had begun to grow tobacco on small farms in the second quarter of the seventeenth century. By 1639 the dry leaf glutted

affairs. The evidence from glass bottle fragments and pieces of clay pipe indicate that farmers migrated to the mainland, leaving the peninsula to the county.⁸⁰ During



Jamestown, Virginia today, a view showing lush foliage. The first permanent English colony was established there in 1607. http://scholar2lib.vt.edu/imagebase_new/norfolksouthern/F1/ns5707.JPG

European markets.⁷⁸ During the 1620s, the commercial enterprise consisted of transient laborers; however, by the end of the English Civil War, James Towne became a self-governing royal colony with a permanent population and a functioning economic system based on tobacco cultivation. In 1630 Governor Harvey noticed that people insisted on making Virginia their country. He requested that the crown send skilled tradesmen to the colony because they wanted to build houses of decorum and commodity.⁷⁹

James Towne proper grew into a true center for business transactions and state

the period from 1620 to 1650 the stem bore holes of the clay smoking tobacco pipes were eight-sixty-fourths in diameter, but during later times the stem bore holes grew smaller due to the expense of the smoke.⁸¹

Through 1649, William Bullock wrote propaganda which told of gold and silver mines in Virginia. He disguised his lie by stating that to discover them would bring disaster, "for all princes and potentates claim interest in gold and silver, which they reach with their swords." He refused to elaborate. The Virginia book of propaganda included a statement that if a man brought two servants and himself he would receive "150 acres forever. His crop allowed him to buy a house and treble his strength in ser-

⁷⁸Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 151.

⁷⁹Shea, 49-50, Taken from Harvey to privy council May 29, 1630, CO 1/5 ff 203-204.

⁸⁰Cotter, 162.

⁸¹Deetz, 7.

vants; and next year he became a gentleman."⁸² The dream was still alive, even though the bottom had fallen out of the tobacco market.

The men who controlled Virginia's government and commerce garnered the earnings and revenue from the bonanza of tobacco culture through the proprietorship of the consignment methods and dominion over the distribution within the colony, including the shipping market. Many people sought their fortunes in Virginia, but only a few became wealthy. Corruption within the higher ranks caused wealth to recirculate within the top strata of inhabitants. Word spread in England that people could get rich if they went to the new land, but once they arrived, they found that tobacco work was harder than expected. These indentured servants who worked the soil and, more often than not, died from disease, rarely made a fortune from tobacco. The money men, through scheming and well placed friendships, retained the wealth while the company that set up the settlement failed due to loss of profits.

The traditional social roles of the seventeenth century, rich over poor, landed over landless, became embedded in the James Towne mentality soon after the colony was established as an economic model for English colonies. The manipulation by the local provincial government in the first half of the 1620s set up a system of profit for the chosen elite within the community. On the one hand, the secretary's office held the seat of power of distribution of land, which controlled the acreage. On the other, the merchants who brought the servants to the colony held the power of labor, the true test of wealth in an agrarian society. Bartering within the colony contributed to the lowered value of the tobacco trade and offset the worth of the commodity within the

colony, allowing wealth to be siphoned off by others.

Private interests squeezed all they could out of James Towne during the 1620s. This ran parallel to Spain's inability to create a coherent economic policy. According to Eric Wolf, the imperial bureaucracy acted as a conduit for siphoning wealth into Italian, South German, and Dutch coffers.⁸³ Neither the Virginia Company nor the crown created a self-sustaining, revenue enhancing, economic cash cow. The wealth created by the one commodity of tobacco was more of a smoke screen to show how successful an English colony could be. In economic terms, none of the European countries made any real money from their colonies overseas. The competition sought to prove who could get there first and to show that one country had more territory and possessions than the other did. Profits were made in James Towne, but they did not reach the hands of those who worked the land.

⁸²Bullock, 11, 37.

⁸³Wolf, 113.

Unpave the Way to Progress: Agriculture and the USDA in American Memory

Alexandra Kindell

In this article, the author uses collective memory as a device to identify the rationale used by agricultural leaders to demand a department of agriculture and to demonstrate the distinctive place it has in American society. Agricultural leaders' reasons for establishing the department, which now affects millions of peoples lives, seem incongruous with its day-to-day operation in the twentieth century. This is not a traditional research paper in regards to the scope and the treatment of the topic, although Kindell does use previously unpublished primary sources in her analysis. Rather it is an attempt to bring attention to an almost invisible, yet important, aspect of American history, agriculture.

The ground breaking for the United States Holocaust Museum commenced on 16 October 1985. Its location on the Mall in Washington, D.C. was seen as an incorporation of the memory of the Holocaust by making it a concern of the entire American population.¹ In order to build the museum in this site, two buildings were taken off the National Register of Historic Places and torn down. These buildings were annexes to the Department of Agriculture. The annexes reminded some survivors of Auschwitz barracks, and they talked about using them for the museums.² The mix of incongruous themes, agriculture and the holocaust, is only possible because these annexes were a part of history not thought of much anymore. They belonged to a time that is lost, when the Department of Agriculture was started because the country was made up of mostly farmers. Just as these buildings had to be replaced to make room for another, one memory had to give way for another. Since not everything can be remembered, at some point, new memories will replace older, more remote memories. The Holocaust is evidence of the horrors of industrial strength. At one time, not only was America predominately agricultural, a group of agriculture reformers farm press authors and editors, agricultural society officers, and some politicians resisted the change that created a country as urban and industrial as any in Europe. One of these people was Isaac Newton.

¹Hyman Bookbinder of the American Jewish Committee quoted in Edward T. Linenthal, *Preserving Memory: The Struggle to Create Americas Holocaust Museum* (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 58.

²Linenthal, 74.

Isaac Newton and the Department of Agriculture

A successful Pennsylvania dairy farmer, he brought to the commissionership the virtues and handicaps of a self-made man. Newton set objectives for the Department: to collect and publish statistical and other useful agricultural information . . . and to serve as the farmers' friend and adviser in Washington. He went far toward attaining these goals and gave the Department a research and educational bent.

Historians of the USDA, 1972³


Mr. Newton has nothing to do with these things [good aspects of the department], except to make himself a nuisance, and interfere with their better operation, as he has with the able chemist, Dr. Erni, who, for faithfulness, has lost his position. Mr. Newton has kept his own place, though notoriously inefficient and a disgrace to their country, which has such an illiterate, thick-headed man in so responsible a place, simply by the diligent [*sic*] use of *means* fruits to this Senator, flowers to the wife of another, delicacies to the White House, a sinecure clerkship to the lazy cousin of some one of influence, and so on.

American Agriculturalist,
six months before
Newton's death⁴

In mentioning Isaac Newton (1800-1867), it is quite natural that most people think of Sir Isaac Newton who died seventy-three years before the first commissioner of the United States Department of Agriculture

³Wayne D. Rasmussen and Gladys L. Baker, *The Department of Agriculture* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 6-7.

⁴*American Agriculturalist*, January 1867, 66.



Isaac Newton (1800-1867), the first commissioner of the United States Department of Agriculture. National Archives

(USDA) was born. That is understandable since Sir Isaac Newton played an important part in the scientific world view that was very much a part of this nation's advancement from a loose coalition of farming colonies. However, the first commissioner is generally forgotten in the history of the USDA, and there appears to be no article or book written solely about him.⁵ As author Marc Bloch so aptly put it, the *Aidol* of the historian tribe may be called the obsession with origins, but for whatever reason this is not true of Newton.⁶ There are many reasons why some things are remembered and some forgotten. Historians are often indirectly the

⁵The only exception of this is a four-page unpublished biographical statement by his granddaughter, see Amanda Almira Newton, *Isaac Newton, First United States Commissioner of Agriculture* (N.p.: n.p., 1926), National Agricultural Library. She and her father, Isaac Newton Jr., both worked in the department after her grandfather died.

⁶Marc Block, *The Historian's Craft* (New York: Vintage Books, 1953), 29.

gatekeepers of American memory. Isaac Newton has been generally forgotten despite the fact that his life was intertwined with such notables as Abraham and Mary Lincoln, Simon Cameron, and O. H. Kelley, the founder of the Grange. In and of himself, the memory of Newton does little for the study of history. However, his role in the early Department of Agriculture can serve as a marker to look at a different time in America. Who wanted a department? Why did it happen during the Civil War when the number of farmers had already begun to drop? What did they expect of the new commissioner and why? As seen in the above quotes, there have been very different views of Newton's role in American agriculture. In the search for a usable past, one should look at Newton as a part of the defining moment in American agriculture, and at the reasons he was overlooked by the gatekeepers of the department's history. In the search for that, it is imperative to look at how the agricultural leaders tried to manipulate the interpretations of historical events to create an American collective memory that would always remember the farmer.

Washington, the First Farmer

It is as a soldier, and as a statesman that we are most familiar with him. On the questions of war and politics none in the main appeal from him. Why should not also the agriculturalists place great dependence in him? Washington was one of the first, if not the first farmer of his day. Agriculture was his first and favorite study.

Southern Planter, 1848 ⁷

The story begins long before Isaac Newton went to Washington, D.C. to head the newly established Department of Agri-

culture. Farm leaders requested aid from the government for many years. The earliest suggestion came from George Washington, and no one has forgotten that agricultural leaders and historians alike.⁸ However, after the colonies broke from the seemingly oppressive, bureaucratic Mother Country, American government inevitably was limited, and one group such as farmers would not gain this kind of special treatment they sought in the form of a separate department even though George was a farmer too. It was during the 1840s and 1850s that agricultural reformers pushed for a department. Editors of the farm press consistently employed the memory of Washington to support their ideas, including representation for farmers. The way they used his memory can be discussed best in the terms of what historian John Bodnar calls *public memory*. In *Making of America* he explains: Public memory is a body of beliefs and ideas about the past that help a public or society understand its past, present, and by implication, its future.⁹ The editors of journals and agricultural society reports wrote about Washington, quoted Washington and published his letters to English agriculturalists. They used his words and images with the intention to remind people of the importance of agriculture to the founding, and therefore to the continuation, of the nation.

George Washington's image as a farmer was used to link ideas of the virtue of farming for the nation, and give legitimacy

⁸Arthur P. Chew, *The Response of Government to Agriculture* (Washington: G.P.O., 1937), 9; Rasmussen and Baker, 4; *The Southern Planter*, May 1848, 159; *Cultivator*, December 1849, 362; *Ohio Cultivator*, February 1854, 43; *Transactions of the New Hampshire State Agricultural Society for 1851*, 134. These are just a few of the references that can be found in the extant journals and transactions of societies.

⁹John Bodnar, *Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 15.

⁷*The Southern Planter*, May 1848, 159.

to demands for a governmental department or aid to agricultural education. Ironically, more often, twentieth-century historians equate agrarianism with Thomas Jefferson because his views were well publicized during the Jacksonian Era when his memoirs

country as the first president, and he farmed the land. Second, Washington had characteristics, whether real or mythical, that agricultural leaders wanted to see in all farmers. He symbolized patriotism and represented the felicity of good farming. Therefore, it



The full "Country Gentleman" vignette featuring George Washington as the ultimate country gentleman. *The Country Gentleman*.

were published and used by the Democratic Party.¹⁰ Jefferson was, and still is, well known for promoting agrarianism as a more acceptable means for a national economy as opposed to the urban-industrial economy he saw in Europe. It is strange then that something so ingrained in our present memory was not as prevalent to the agricultural leaders of the nineteenth century. However, Washington made a better model for several reasons. First, his memory was more universally shared by the nation. His memory had not been so closely identified with the animosity of political partisanship as Jefferson's had in the 1830s.¹¹ Northern and Southern agricultural papers alike printed accounts of Washington's farming abilities. Not only was he a founder of the nation, he was identified with all aspects of the new nation.¹² He fought in the war, he led the

was easy to equate farming, especially good farming, with patriotism. They professed model farmers settle on reasonable sized farms, use sound farming practices, and train their children to do the same. To the orators and authors of the time, the reality appeared much different; in their minds, most farmed by tradition or superstition, exploited the land, and left as soon as a profit could be made. Washington embodied the enlightened, successful farmer and recalling his memory in this manner suited their purposes. As Bodnar points out, public memory is not so much about the past as it is about the present where one group has something to gain. And in this case, farming reformers in every region used his name to support their ideas.

More Jeffersonian than Jefferson

No matter what Thomas Jefferson said about the value of rural America, he could not stop industrialization from occurring. He also did not enact or support policies that he thought would disrupt the American economy, such as dismantling the Hamiltonian system that he disliked in theory. He knew that trying to undo what Alexander Hamilton had already put in place

¹⁰See Merrill D. Peterson, *The Jeffersonian Image in the American Mind* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²For examples of this see *The Cultivator*, July 1848 and December 1863; *The Southern Planter*, January 1857 and December 1859; and the *Journal of Agriculture* published by the United States Agricultural Society, which was made up of representatives from every region.

would ultimately hurt farmers.¹³ The agricultural leaders of the mid-nineteenth century were not so compromising (nor practical) of their principles. From their writings, it appears, that they felt the nation should remain agricultural and rural. Leaders in both the North and South saw the population shifting to the city. An article in *The Southern Planter* proclaimed that the United States could never be largely a manufacturing population.¹⁴ The *Maine Farmer* stated, "Under the combined influence of city life and commercial pursuits, the nation is beginning to wane."¹⁵ The New Hampshire Agricultural Society recorded in their view New Hampshire was, and would be to all time, emphatically an agricultural State.¹⁶ Even though this sentiment is for the state, it is still an example of an attitude that things either would never change or should never change not an attitude that modern readers usually associate with the North. This attitude can also be seen in the farm press's description of the city. People who left the farm for the city, they said, became clerks, beggars, or even worse, lawyers (all of whom did not know the honest value of labor or the pleasures of the country).¹⁷

Many agricultural writers echoed Jefferson's agrarian, anti-urban views, but they felt that any means should be taken to keep America rural. The means differed by region, but the end result *remained the same*. In the North, the demands were for a federal department of agriculture, governmental aid for agricultural education and scientific research. In the South, the demands were for state aid for agricultural sci-

ence and education as opposed to federal aid. Northern leaders would eventually see many of their demands come to fruition in the form of legislation enacted during the Civil War when there were no southern congressmen to protest federal interference in state agriculture.

The Antidote that Contained a Disease

Michael Kammen notes in his work on tradition in American culture that for much of our history we have shared a passionate commitment to progress; yet we have usually been most comfortable with the status quo. This is true for the agricultural leaders who in contrast to their static attitude about agriculture as a foundation for the nation promoted the idea of *progress* in their demands for governmental aid in science and education. The nineteenth century, unlike the eighteenth, was a time of rapid change.¹⁸ Concerning the use of science in agriculture, reformer's attitudes were consistent with the times. They embraced a change from backward, primitive farming that characterized American agriculture up to that point. American agriculture had been defined by an abundance of land and a lack of labor. Soil exhaustive practices were just as prevalent in the North as in the South, even though southern agriculture is better known for its abuse of the soil. Editors encouraged the use of chemistry for soil analysis, geology, physiology, entomology, and any other scientific activity in order to increase productivity.¹⁹ Productivity was

¹³Peterson, 24-5, 77.

¹⁴*The Southern Planter*, September 1851, 364.


¹⁵*Maine Farmer*, 17 July 1856.

¹⁶*Transactions of the New Hampshire State Agricultural Society for 1850*, 107.

¹⁷*The Cultivator*, December 1849, 362; *The Southern Planter*, January 1848, 3-4, February 1850, 86; *Transaction of the New Hampshire State Agricultural Society for 1854*, 251-9.

¹⁸Michael Kammen, *Mystic Chords of Memory* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 6; Robert H. Wiebe, *The Segmented Society: An Introduction to the Meaning of America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 19-20.

¹⁹*Transactions of the New Hampshire State Agricultural Society for 1850*, 41-9; Jesse Buel, *An Address Delivered Before the Berkshire Agricultural Society* (Pittsfield: Phineas Allen and Son, 1837), 13-25; *The*



The “Pennsylvania Farm Journal” ran two articles that included these illustrations of what a well managed and poorly managed farm would look like. The *Pennsylvania Farm Journal*

bound to help the farmer, and to keep him from abandoning his farm to go west. Leaders also disliked the backwardness of American farmers for another reason.

Repeatedly, in the agricultural papers, one can find references to people leaving the farm for the city. The authors surmised that young men had no reason to stay on the farm. Agricultural writers were well aware of the quickly changing time they lived in. They saw progress in all fields of industry and the advancement of knowledge, except in agriculture:

their knowledge of farming is generally limited to the experience and the practice pursued by their parents and guardians. Too often now, it is to be feared, the child looks upon the employment, as a mere servile labor, rather than a pleasant occupation, and one of all other best suited to his happiness. Being entirely ignorant of the first elements of Agriculture, as a science, he scarcely knows for what end his labor is bestowed.²⁰

Country Gentleman, February 10, 1859, 90. There are many more examples, including many articles on the hot topic of manure.

²⁰*The Cultivator*, August 1848, 250.

During the 1840s and 1850s, leaders found this to be one of the reasons people left the farm, and the only cure would be an education based on sound, scientific principles. They wanted change so things could stay the same.

Eye Sharpening and Moon Farming

Farm leaders greatest obstacle to the advancement of agriculture was farmers who eschewed scientific agriculture or book farming that deviated from tradition. The leaders were mostly gentlemen farmers, farm press editors, and politicians who understood the value of the farm vote.²¹ Gentlemen farmers were educated or at least amenable to scientific methods and experimentation, wealthy (to some extent), and had the time to participate in agricultural societies or write for local farm papers. Isaac Newton, for instance, had several

²¹These men can also be viewed, in the terms of John Bodnar, as the cultural leaders. Their role in society, and the creation of collective memory, is to elicit loyalty to larger political structures and existing institutions. In this case, the role of agriculture in the nation was both. The leaders viewed agriculture as the foundation for everything political, financial, social, and moral.

(family and hired) laborers on his farm. He was a member of several societies, including the Pennsylvania State Agricultural Society, the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture, and the United States Agricultural Society. Well known for his Quakerism, he often interceded on behalf of other Quakers who could not fight in the Civil War due to their religious beliefs.²² He lived in Springfield, Pennsylvania, just southwest of Philadelphia in the Delaware Valley, but he had the time to travel to Philadelphia and Washington, D.C. to attend society meetings. One newspaper reported his farming techniques as successful and called him a model farmer.²³ It was reported that he sent meat and cheese to the White House as well as a pony to Abraham Lincoln's son, Tad. As a member of the Philadelphia Society, he served on a committee that took on the responsibility of getting seeds from the Patent Office for experimental research. He promised Commissioner, Thomas Ewbank that he would send full details of results from their experiments and offered his assistance in the future. Newton also had time to be politically active. He traveled to Illinois to meet President-Elect Abraham Lincoln in order to urge him to appoint Simon Cameron to rep-

resent Pennsylvania in the presidential cabinet.²⁴

The dirt farmer led a different life from the gentleman farmer. However, it is difficult to define exactly what life was truly like since he is only known from what was written to him or about him. Many of the activities that Isaac Newton was involved in did not interest the dirt farmer. The agricultural press dealt with the fear of book farming and many superstitions that continued to be believed despite their best efforts. Almost every farm paper printed at least one article, usually one per issue, on transmutation. There was a belief that a weed called chess would grow on the same stalk as wheat or that part of the wheat would *mutate* into chess. Farmers wrote to the papers saying that they had an example of this, to which one editor replied,

produce the wheat stalks with the heads of chess growing on them, and all must admit the doctrine is proved conclusively. But so far as our knowledge extends, and we have been engaged in examining the matter for about 20 years, no such thing has ever been produced, nor do we suppose it ever will be.²⁵

Editors contended with other issues that they felt necessary to address, including the value of brushing teeth at least once a day at the bare minimum and advising people to avoid such quackery as eye sharpening. While it is unclear from the papers what eye sharpening is, it remains an excellent example of the backwardness agricultural reformers battled. Moon farming was a serious impediment to agriculture all over the United

²²Daniel Bassuk, *Abraham Lincoln and the Quakers* (Wallingford, Penn.: Pendle Hill, 1987); Roy P. Basler, ed. *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953).

²³For accounts of Newton's prosperity see *Delaware County Republican* of Chester, Penn., 16 March 1838; 12 July 1867; 26 February 1864; and *The Cultivator* (October 1861, 324) quoted the *Germantown Telegraph* regarding Newton's skill and prosperity when he was appointed to the Patent Office; A model farm was defined by *The Cultivator* (January 1856, 15) as a farm that used the best practices available at the time, and it, therefore, made a profit. The profit was almost as important to agricultural reformers as the psychic value. Reports of farmers who succeeded using new techniques were promoted as examples to be imitated; Newton, 3.

²⁴Isaac Newton to Thomas Ewbank, 9 October 1852, Incoming Records of the Patent Office, 1839-1860, RG 16, National Archives; Newton to Simon Cameron, 9 February 1861, Simon Cameron Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁵*The Cultivator*, December 1849, 378.

States. Farmers insisted on planting and harvesting based on moon cycles. Farmers Almanacs were widely read and were filled with astronomical data used for such purposes which resulted in crops rotting in the field while farmers waited for the right position of the moon.²⁶ Leaders saw a real need to educate the dirt farmer, partly to help the people currently on the farm, but also to inform the population that seemed so backward in a time of such great progress.

Mount Vernon Agricultural College

Mount Vernon is now a popular tourist site. Tourists can catch a tour bus, for a fee, from the Washington Monument to Washington's farm in Virginia. Mount Vernon did not become a part of the historical pilgrimage until the 1890s. Until then its fate was unknown and its condition was described with words such as desolation, ruin, and dilapidated.²⁷ During the 1840s-50s, the same time that its condition was being lamented, farm leaders were advocating its use as an agricultural college. Despite the condition of Mount Vernon, apparently its purchase price was prohibitive to any of those who proposed its purchase. This upset one editor so much that he wrote: "This is another National Humbug. The price demanded for this estate is entirely above the hope of economical investment as well as the spirit of democratic labor."²⁸

There was plenty of land in the 1840s and 1850s available for purchase at a lower price, but locations such as Mount

Vernon holds memories that can be interpreted differently by groups to suit their needs. Farm leaders believe that the people leaving for the city and fewer numbers settling in the country, as well as increasing governmental economic protections for industry was a detriment to agriculture as a whole. Seeing these changes as a loss of status of the farmer in American society, they needed a beacon to attract attention. For the nation, Mount Vernon was a shrine of national patriotism. Agricultural reformers realized they could use Mount Vernon in this manner to attach prestige and dignity to agricultural education by attaching the image of Washington as a farmer to agricultural advancement.²⁹ If memory is perceived to be located in specific places or objects, Mount Vernon reified this image of George Washington as the first farmer. The need for education and scientific research was real. While the site of Mount Vernon for an agricultural college was impractical economically, it was important to invoking the prestige and ideals of Washington.³⁰

Superman of Agriculture

Without encouragement of Agriculture, and thereby increasing the number of its people, any country, however blessed by nature must continue poor.

Swift³¹

Because they sensed losing status in society, farm leaders made some seemingly incongruous demands. Before the Civil War, there were many petitions to Congress

²⁶Albert Lowther Demaree, *The American Agricultural Press, 1819-1860* (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1974), 9-10; *American Agriculturalist*, May 1866, 171; O.H. Kelley gives an excellent description of the dirt farmer in his work, *Origin and Progress of the Order of the Patrons of Husbandry in the United States: A History from 1866 to 1873* (Philadelphia: J.A. Wagenseller, 1875), 17-8. He says that it was this farmer that the Department of Agriculture, farm press and agricultural societies had not helped and who needed help.

²⁷Kammen, 54.

²⁸*The Ohio Cultivator*, March 15, 1854, 84.

²⁹Kammen, 202; *The Cultivator*, January 1854, 10; *The Southern Planter*, May 1851, 136; *Journal of Agriculture* (U.S.A.S.), 1854, 25.


³⁰Marita Sturken, *Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the Aids Epidemic and the Politics of Remembering* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 11.

³¹Printed in the Thomas Jefferson wing of the Library of Congress. Washington, D.C.

for a federal department of agriculture. These petitions came from state legislatures, groups of citizens, and agricultural societies. In 1849, the journal *Working Farmer* was started with the intent of being an organ to bring about a department. In 1852, the United States Agricultural Society was started with its main goal being the same. The reasons for the incongruity of this demand cannot be clear without a review of government activities prior to 1862; farm leaders expectations; and the latter's disappointment in its performance.

Prior to 1862 and the creation of the USDA, there were limited efforts on behalf of agriculture. The Patent Office collected and published statistics and distributed seeds for experimental purposes. It collected a large agricultural library used for checking patent claims and for aiding the writing of the annual agricultural report. This work began unofficially in 1837 when the Commissioner of Patents Henry Leavitt Ellsworth took the initiative to start this work. In 1839, Congress made the first government appropriation to agriculture for what Ellsworth started two years earlier. The Patent Office's work expanded during the 1840s and 1850s and is considered by historians as the predecessor of the USDA. Under the Patent Office commissioner, a clerk headed the agricultural bureau. As the nation entered the war, the clerk in 1861 stepped down, not because he wanted to, but because he was John C. Calhoun's son-in-law and was obligated to return to South Carolina. Appointed in his place, Isaac Newton became the last chief clerk of the Patent Office's agricultural bureau before the establishment of the independent department.

Agricultural leaders discussed the work of the Patent Office. Most were unhappy with it. It published statistical information annually along with the agricultural articles; however, these reports were at-



The logo for the department includes two dates. The date the department was started (1862) and the date it was reorganized (1889). National Archives

tacked consistently for the quality of the production (stylistically), the relevance of the articles and the cost to the public. One clerk was even accused of plagiarism. The distribution of seeds also was attacked: The Agricultural Division of the Patent Office is played out, and the National Seed Store is to be closed. We are glad this piece of charlatanism is likely to be squelched out, and the cause of agriculture delivered from the laps of such nurses. There is some discrepancy as to why the farm press was so adamantly against the seed distribution. Editors argued that the Patent Office distributed common or impractical varieties of seeds. They also claimed seed distribution was harmful to the seed growers. Considering the government probably bought their seeds from American seedsmen, that argument does not hold up.³² However, the agents of agricultural journals at times distributed seeds to entice farmers into subscribing; therefore, the free distribu-

³²There are several letters to the patent commissioner from agriculturalists, in the National Archives, recommending local seedsmen for patronage by the government, see RG 16.



The employees of the Department of Agriculture, circa 1865. Isaac Newton is seated in the middle.
National Archives

tion by the government competed with the farm press, not the seed growers.³³

At first much of this work was welcomed by farm leaders; early supporters of the seed policy included Isaac Newton and O. H. Kelley. Newton boldly spoke for everyone when he said that the distribution of seeds would be Universally approved by the Agriculturalists of our Country.³⁴ However, as time went on it seemed that the work did not make any great advances for agriculture. Leaders had their own suggestions on how the government could better spend the Patent Office agricultural funds. The editor of

The Cultivator figured that the money for the reports could be used to support an agricultural college. Another proposal came from the United States Agricultural Society which suggested it should have received the Patent Office funds in the same manner as the state societies received funding from their legislatures.³⁵

As the complaints about the Patent Office increased, the demand for an independent department increased. A well-hole at the bottom of a Patent Office was no longer acceptable, James Mapes of the U.S. Agricultural Society said, What they wanted was a full Department of Agriculture, and would have nothing less. Farmers had been bamboozled long enough, and put off by politicians. When bills for a department of agriculture were announced, the editors of the farm press seemed to approve what was proposed. The one theme that pervaded any

³³*The Cultivator*, January 1852, 57; *The Cultivator*, January 1854, 10; *The Ohio Cultivator*, 1 June 1858; *American Agriculturalist*, July 1861; *The Ohio Cultivator*, 1 November 1859; for evidence of the purchase of seeds from American growers, see letters to the commissioner of patents in Incoming Records of the Patent Office, 1839-1860, RG 16, National Archives.

³⁴Newton to Ewbank, 9 October 1852 and O. H. Kelley to Charles Mason, Incoming Records of the Patent Office, 1839-1860, RG 16, National Archives.

³⁵*The Cultivator*, January 1854; *Journal of Agriculture*, 1853, 7.

discussion of a new department was the desire that the head would have a cabinet position and would represent the farmer in the councils and policy of the nation. In the form of legislation, they received much of what they asked for: the Department of Agriculture provided a place for farmers in the government, the Homestead Act gave land to farmers, the Morrill Act provided for educating farmers, and the Pacific Railroad Act was another step in the movement of farmers goods. The leaders wanted someone who could do the impossible. What they really wanted was someone who could turn back time and stop the changes they saw happening.³⁶

The War of Northern Industrial Aggression

Farm leaders argued that agriculture was the most important part of the national economy. The city was a place to send their goods, but urban dwelling was not really a legitimate way of life. They saw the changes happening in society. Older settlements were becoming more urban, and some people were moving west to make money off the newly opened productive land. In response to this, they wanted governmental aid to education and scientific research, and a department of agriculture. However, these efforts did not ebb the tide of industrialization. In some ways, the Civil War thwarted industrial growth, but in far more ways it spurred it. Much of production was diverted to supply military needs; however, there was an increase in production for the government. Lincoln encouraged new inventions hoping to end the war sooner. He also signed legislation for the Pacific Railway Act of 1862. The expansion of railroads impacted the nation in several ways. The railroad was the only industry that could be

classified as big business prior to 1861. The administration of the railroad industry was a model for monopolies and trusts that defined the Gilded Age. The Transcontinental Railroad added to the expansion of markets in the U.S. as well as all the industries that were needed to supply the railroad, including steel, coal, and lumber. Farms that were economically and physically destroyed had to replace worn out and damaged equipment. The budding companies of Cyrus McCormick and John Deere found markets in these areas as well as the expanding West. There may have been a lag in manufacturing during the war, but there were also new markets in a nation bowing to the industrialism that won the war and captured the cultural memory of the nation.³⁷

Marita Sturken examines cultural memories role in producing concepts of nation and of an American people. Normally, culture is seen as defined by ethnicity or by location, not necessarily occupation. However, agriculture had, and still has, its own culture. Agricultural leaders viewed farming as an occupation and lifestyle which differed from that of city denizens. Farm leaders used the image of George Washington to remind people of the role agriculture played in America. Cultural memory often forms around a traumatic event shared by the nation because it exposes the fractures of a culture. The Civil War exposed our greatest political, cultural, and economic fracture. It can be argued that the trauma of the Civil War blurred the cultural memory of agrarian America. After the war, the national cul-

³⁷Patrick O'Brien, *The Economic Effects of the American Civil War* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1988), 9-10; Howard K. Beale, *The Tariff and Reconstruction* @ in Ralph Andreado, ed., *The Economic Impact of the American Civil War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1967), 131-3; see Robert V. Bruce, *Lincoln and the Tools of War* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956); Glenn Porter, *The Rise of Big Buisness, 1860-1920* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson), 29.

³⁶*Journal of Agriculture*, 1854, 39; *The Cultivator*, May 1853, 161.

tural memory of the nation was increasingly developing into an industrial one. Industrialism was becoming established in the 1840s and 1850s, but the war, just as earlier wars had done, was a harbinger of our industrial future.

Sturken explains that we need coherence and continuity in our lives, in our sense of the past, present and future, and that produces forgetting. The new collective memory was being developed by our cultural leaders. Events like the World's Fair promoted progress economic and material growth. Congressional acts dealing with the Fair gave insight to this role of cultural molding: the displays were to illustrate the function and administrative faculty of the Government in time of peace and its resources as a war power, tending to demonstrate the nature of our institutions and their adaptation to the wants of the people. This was a vision to unite a country that was still devastated by divisions of class and race. These fairs provided an opportunity to reaffirm their collective national identity in an updated synthesis of progress. The ideal of the country, after the Civil War, was no longer Jefferson's nation of yeoman farmers, but that of a powerful nation that could protect itself from within and without.³⁸


After the breach of national cohesion, however tenuous it was, rebuilding was needed. On the issue of Northern and Southern differences and animosities, there were attempts at reconciliation through the end of the century.³⁹ The people of the different regions of the country had to find new ways of interacting with each other, including how each region looked at the meaning of its and the nation's past. Agricultural leaders could no longer expect farming to be exalted by the nation for the same reason.

Agriculture would have to find its place in an industrial economy. The culture of agricultural America still lives in some regions, but it has become a part of our national past and is usually thought of nostalgically.

In response to the ever increasing reality of an industrial oriented America, farm leaders shifted gears in the form of the Grange and the Populist movement. Both of these movements represented a new attitude by agricultural leaders about the meaning of aid to farmers. No longer could agricultural societies and journals expect the average farmer to adopt progressive means just because they said it was necessary. The Civil War was a watershed for agriculture. The legislation and events of that time are seen as causing America's agricultural revolution. The laws establishing the Department of Agriculture and land-grant colleges, prescribed the cure for what ailed American agriculture the lack of progress. The Golden Age for America's agriculture did not come until World War I, after scientific agriculture made a real impact on how American food was grown. Before the Civil War farm leaders saw the slippage of the farmer in status, their efforts for a department of agriculture and education were gained during the war. However, people like O. H. Kelley realized that these things were just not enough. When planning the Grange, he described to William Saunders what he saw after his tour of different regions: "I find there is a great lack of interest on the part of farmers, a visible want of energy of their part to favor progressive agriculture. I think we can revolutionize all this, and I suggest the project of organizing an Order to embrace in its membership only those persons directly interested in cultivating the soil. Those he referred to were the non-progressive farmers that he ascertained as the majority and who still needed help, not the gentlemen farmers who swelled the ranks of agricultural societies and ex-

³⁸Sturken, 1-8; Bodnar, 13-4; Robert W. Rydell, *All the World's a Fair: Visions of Empire at America* (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1984).

³⁹Kammen, 102-15.



This is a drawing of the first building solely for the use of the USDA, circa 1870. Note the large green house to the right. National Archives

hibitions.⁴⁰ These same farmers fueled the Populist Movement in the 1870s and 1890s. Leaders no longer had to deal with many of the old sectional and political issues that divided farmers. These national organizations tried to appeal one last time to ingrain agriculture in American memory, but by 1900, farmers knew that they were just small businessmen.⁴¹

Riots, Tricky Dick, Depression and the Farm

In our modern pluralistic societies, the idea of a total history supported by a global memory has given way to de-centered microhistories and a multiplicity of memories. Spurred on by the will to remember

Geneviève Fabre and
Robert O'Meally⁴²

Agriculture in the collective memory of the nation is filtered, in the twentieth century, through the events that capture our attention. The 1960s shattered the cohesion that had been carefully constructed after the Civil War. The true pluralism of the nation was seen as groups of women and people of non-Anglo-Saxon ancestry demanded attention to their problems. The focus was on the city, and during that decade the new field of urban history grew out of the need to understand what was happening. As urban history became established, agricultural history declined in popularity. Unless there were problems, agricultural issues no longer attracted the attention of the public.⁴³ During the 1970s, agriculture boomed as Richard Nixon used farm products as power in his foreign diplomatic relations, and the aftermath of this boom, as with most booms, was an agricultural depression that imperiled the family farm. Without a clear understanding of why, Americans have an affection for the family farm. During the eighties, musicians made an effort in the form of a concert called Farm Aid--to provide financial assistance to those on the verge of losing their

⁴⁰Kelley, 17-9.

⁴¹Roy V. Scott, *The Reluctant Farmer* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), 38.

⁴²Geneviève Fabre and Robert O'Meally, *History and Memory in African-American Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 7.

⁴³Wiebe, 6-10; Fabre and O'Meally, 45.

farms to foreclosure. Farm Aid was an effort to support a moral, social, democratic ideal like other concerts, such as Live Aid, Free Tibet and Lillith Faire have done since. The agricultural depression caused one author to ask, Should we save the family farm? And the answer he came up with was yes. However, until there is a threat to the family farm or our food supply, agriculture is not a daily concern of most Americans. In a sense, it has been forgotten by the majority.⁴⁴

The USDA affects every American's life, not only farmers. When the department was started Lincoln called it the People's Department because over half of the people were farmers. Its duties were to distribute seeds and plants and to acquire and diffuse information. Wayne Rasmussen argued in his 1990 article that despite the fact that the number of farmers was down to two percent of the population, the department would always be the people's department.⁴⁵ The difference is that it is now a consumer's department. The farmer's place in an industrial society is no longer the foundation of but the feeder of society, and the USDA has helped agriculture fill that role in the twentieth century. The USDA oversees the inspection of the countries meat, it manages the national forests, and it even conducts a graduate program. It operates almost invisibly until something happens. For instance, in April 1998, a disgruntled USDA employee went into an Inglewood, California branch office and killed three coworkers. The USDA's work is as much in the city as it is in the country. The Beagle Brigade sniffs luggage for illegal importation of fruits and vegetables in airports and ports across the country. In one manner it pro-

tections American agriculture; in another it protects consumers costs. What farm leaders had hoped would be a spokesman for a way of life is now integrated in the industrial network and is just another government agency. This is a far cry from what agricultural reformers 130 years earlier expected of a department of agriculture.

Agriculture has become a part of our simpler past, and it remains as nostalgia for most urbanites. Farm nostalgia comes at a time when the public is confused by science or has scared us. Scientists report conflicting findings about our foods or predict impending doom by ecological disaster. The holocaust gave us vivid images of the perversion of science and technology. Nineteenth-century America had no idea of where the road of progress would lead us, but the agricultural leaders did not want the country to change. As for Isaac Newton, the Pennsylvanian dairyman was only commissioner of the USDA for five years. In the heavy heat of a D.C. summer, he went out to save some wheat sample from an approaching thunderstorm. He died after suffering from a consequent sunstroke. He almost slipped through the cracks of history because he was an unfortunate figure that could not please his detractors. When he is remembered, it is because of what he did for his fellow Quakers and not for what he accomplished for farmers.⁴⁶ Agricultural reformers hoped he would plead for agriculture, but one man could not keep agriculture in the memory of the nation, so it could not keep the memory of him.

⁴⁴David Moberg, "Should We Save the Family Farm?" *Dissent* (Spring 1988), 205.

⁴⁵Wayne D. Rasmussen, "The People's Department: Myth or Reality?" *Agricultural History* 64 (2): 291-9.

⁴⁶Daniel Bassuk, *Abraham Lincoln and the Quakers* (Wallingford, Penn.: Pendle Hill, 1987), 19-23. Newton used his access to President Lincoln to argue on behalf of Quakers jailed for their refusal to participate in the war. He personally pleaded for intervention on their behalf. He also gained access for anti-slavery advocates who wanted to lay their wishes directly before the president. See also letters between Lincoln and Eliza Gurney in the Robert Todd Lincoln Collection.

Joan of Arc: Heroine and Heretic

Sharon Evanshine

Joan of Arc is the symbol of loyalty and courage for the Middle Ages. Author Sharon Evanshine reveals the person behind the icon, giving us insight into the magnitude of her bravery and religious devotion. She traces Joan's activities from her first vision, through her difficulties in attaining credibility, to her remarkable impact on the French army, and to her dignity in the face of martyrdom.

Joan of Arc (c.1412-1431) was not merely a legend, but a significant historical figure; thus any discussion of her story must consider the historical matrix of her time. During the first half of the fifteenth century France was not yet a nation. The kingdom lacked a common language, and boundaries were vague and changing. The king was forced to compete within each province with other noble lords and dukes, independent cities, and the English for authority over a medieval world.¹ The Kings of France and England were embroiled in the Hundred Years' War, a feudal struggle lasting more than four generations between the Plantagenet and Valois dynasties beginning with Edward III (1327-1377) of England and Philip VI (1328-1350) of France.² It was Edward's paradoxical dual position as an independent sovereign King of England and a subordinate vassal of the King of France, which initiated the conflict.³ France, more populated and wealthier than England, was invaded by English armies. England had the advantage of being an island, being more centralized, and having more capable rulers. Charles V, (1337-1380)

¹Charles C. Lowell, *Joan of Arc* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), 1.

²Edourd Perroy, *The Hundred Years War* with a forward by David C. Douglas (London: Eyre and Spottiswoods, 1962), 33).

³David C. Douglas, foreword to *The Hundred Years War* by Edourd Perroy (London: Eyre and Spottiswoods, 1962), xi.

who recovered most of the territory lost to Edward III, was France's only able ruler between 1328 and 1422.⁴

The reign of his son, Charles VI (1368-1422), who came to the throne as a minor and later suffered from mental illness, was characterized by extreme disunity. The king's uncles and relatives competed relentlessly for power. Their continual disputes evolved into a feud between the two strongest, the king's brother, the Duke of Orleans, and his uncle, the Duke of Burgundy.⁵ This deadly rivalry continued for years, involving their sons and relatives, resulting in treachery, assassination, and murder. Each faction attempted to use the monarch and the young dauphin as a tool in obtaining and holding power. During this conflict, which developed into a civil war, the advantage shifted back and forth between the two adversaries. It was this division in the royal house that made it possible for Henry V (1413-1422) to make an alliance with the powerful Duke of Burgundy and conquer Normandy as well as other French provinces that he claimed had been taken from his ancestors unjustly.⁶

After the Duke of Burgundy was murdered by the opposing Armagnac faction in revenge for the assassination of the Duke of Orleans, the new Duke of Burgundy,

Philip the Good, led the Burgundian faction to ally with Henry V. Thus, there were three main partitions of France after the English invasion. These were the provinces conquered by Henry of Lancaster; those controlled by the Duke of Burgundy, and those loyal to the Dauphin Charles VII. (1403-1461)⁷

In 1420, the Treaty of Troyes declared Henry V heir to the throne of France in place of the Dauphin Charles. The Plantagenet claim to the French throne reached back to the time of Edward III when the last Capetian king had died without an heir and the French assembly had chosen Philip VI of Valois over Edward III. This questionable decision set the stage for the dynastic rivalry that existed for years. When Henry married Catherine, the daughter of Charles VI, the king and queen disinherited their son and replaced him with their son-in-law.⁸

Henry seemed close to vanquishing France when he died suddenly, to be followed

shortly by the aged King Charles. Lord Bedford, brother of Henry V, and regent in France, proclaimed the infant son of Henry and Catherine the King of England and France. In order to make the dual monarchy a reality, however, the dauphin, who also



The murder of the Duke of Burgundy plunged France even deeper into warfare. Painting by Jan van Eyck. Marina Warner, *Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism*.

⁴Lowell, 2.

⁵Ibid. 3.

⁶Ibid. 7.

⁷Perroy, 224.

⁸Ibid. 243.

claimed the throne of France as Charles VII, had to be overthrown.⁹

In the course of the war, attitudes changed. In the beginning, when Edward III had conquered territory, it had been the conquest of a Plantagenet French-speaking prince rather than that of an English monarch. The lives of the people had changed little from one sovereign to another since most of the provinces remained French in administration, language, and traditions. Most of the peasants rarely looked beyond their own villages and desired nothing more than to escape the death and misery of war.¹⁰ When the Treaty of Troyes declared Henry the heir to the throne of France,

the French people accepted it because they hoped that order would be restored after the turmoil of civil and foreign war. As the war continued, hostility and hatred grew into a kind of nationalism, not a modern patriotism, but a combination of dynastic loyalty and local pride. Many cities had been besieged and the countryside was ruined by soldiers who would fight for pay and plunder on either side, yet out of this devastation emerged the beginnings of a national consciousness.¹¹ Before this was achieved, however, the English laid siege to the city of Orleans, which was the key to the Loire Valley. Both sides felt that the fall of this city would destroy any possible chance for Charles VII and give final victory to the Lancastrians.¹²



St. Michael, the patron saint of France, was the first voice to tell Joan her mission was to save France. Painting by Gentile da Fabriano. Marina Warner, *Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism*.

This was the stage upon which Joan of Arc made her appearance. After she departed, the king she had chosen to support wore the French crown and represented the nation of France. It is for this reason that history perceives her a national heroine¹³

Joan of Arc (c.1412-1431) believed that she was authorized by God to raise the siege of Orleans, crown the dauphin Charles at Rheims, and force the English out of France. Through the strength of her personality and her convictions, her brief career and passionate sacrifice signaled the eventual French recovery. By convincing others, she inspired devotion, rallying the courage of the French soldiers while inciting trepidation in

the hearts of their enemies. Halting the English victory, giving the King of Bourges the prestige of a coronation, and awakening national feeling in the people of France, Joan of Arc's inter-

vention was decisive in turning the tide of the Hundred Years' War before being captured and turned over to the Inquisition. In order to discredit the claim of Charles VII to the throne of France, Joan was placed on trial for heresy and burned at the stake. Joan of Arc's final victory was a triumph of character. She displayed courage, confidence, and determination. Twenty-five years later, after having consolidated his power, Charles initiated a second trial, which reversed the verdict, thus exonerating Joan and legitimizing the crown of France.

⁹Ibid. 269.

¹⁰Ibid. 211.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid. 278.

¹³Jules Michelet, *Joan of Arc*, trans. Albert Guerard (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1957), 165.



Routes followed by Joan of Arc in her campaign to save France. Albert Bigelow Paine, *Joan of Arc: Maid of France*.

Joan of Arc journey began as an illiterate peasant living in obscurity in remote Domremy under the subjection of her parents. As a child, Joan understood that her village of Domremy was loyal to Charles VII and that the neighboring village across the river sympathized with the Burgundians. The children of the two villages often fought over this difference, becoming “battered and bloody.”¹⁴ In 1427 and 1428, the Anglo-Burgundians campaigned throughout eastern

France, threatening the nearby town of Vaucouleurs with siege, causing Joan and her family, along with the peasants of Domremy, to take refuge in the walled town of Neufchateau. When they returned, their village had been burned.¹⁵

The voices that Joan first heard at the age of thirteen telling her to take Charles’s side were merely expressing her own feelings. They instructed her to save France by

raising the siege of Orleans and to go to Robert of Baudricourt and ask for an escort to the dauphin.¹⁶ These saintly visions were a sacred, private, religious experience which she was reluctant to share but which influenced her actions and behavior for the rest of her life.¹⁷ The unwavering strength and sincerity of Joan’s belief in the reality of her voices and visions is reflected in these words: “I have seen them with my own eyes and I believe that it is they as firmly as I do that God exists.”¹⁸ She was intensely pious, often on her knees in prayer, taking frequent pilgrimages to a favorite chapel, and going to confession regularly. Her friends and neighbors teased her for her piety, complaining that she was “too much so.”¹⁹

¹⁶Jules Quicherat, *Proces de condamnation et de rehabilitation de Jeanne d’Arc*, as quoted in Francis C. Lowell, *Joan of Arc* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1896), 35.

¹⁷Pierre Tisset and Yvonne Lanhers, *Proces de condamnation de Jeanne d’Arc*, as quoted in Edward Lucie-Smith, 15.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 20.

¹⁹Quicherat II, as quoted in Lucie Smith, 14

¹⁴Edward Lucie-Smith, *Joan of Arc* (London: Allan Lane, 1976), 22.

¹⁵Lowell, 32.



Though she spoke of her visions rarely, they created a powerful determination for her to act on their commands. She believed that she was to fulfill the well-known prophecy that France, lost by a woman, would be saved by a virgin,²⁰ and she demonstrated her determination by resisting her parent's efforts to arrange a betrothal at a time when most daughters would have felt compelled to accept a marriage.

In our modern world, Joan's visions would undoubtedly be regarded as hallucinations but in the Middle Ages people readily believed in the intervention of the supernatural in the world through individuals. Joan's challenge was to convince her contemporaries that her inspiration derived from God and not from the devil.²¹

Joan's strong personality is shown by the relative ease with which she overcame all obstacles to her mission and converted a numerous variety of individuals to her cause. Her first easy convert was her cousin, Durand Laxart, a simple peasant, who agreed to accompany her to Vaucouleurs where Joan hoped to convince Baudricourt to provide her with an escort to Charles.²² The unscrupulous, professional captain of the garrison of Vaucouleurs was much more difficult to convince. The skeptical soldier listened as she explained her divine mission with confidence: "I am come before you from my Lord, so that you may tell the dauphin to be of good heart, and not to cease the war against his enemies. Before mid Lent the Lord will give him help. ...the dauphin will be made king; and it is I who will take him to the coronation."²³ Then, Baudricourt told Laxart to return her to her

father for a good whipping.²⁴ This discouraging and humiliating response did not stop her. She was determined to find an escort to Chinon, and her strong compelling personality convinced the people in the small town to believe in her.²⁵ Eventually, through repeated appeals, Joan's demeanor and confidence as well as the enthusiasm of the townspeople contributed to the reluctant yielding of Baudricourt, and he agreed, as a kind of experiment, to send her to Chinon to see Charles. According to Pope Pius II (1458-1464), Joan convinced Baudricourt that it was the will of God that the kingdom of France be saved by divine aid through a woman.²⁶

On 12 February 1429, Joan departed for Chinon with an escort of six armed men. She wore men's clothing as a practical means of living safely among men.²⁷ Both Nouillonpont and Poulengy described the divine love and confidence Joan inspired in them on the eleven-day journey over three hundred miles through country filled with soldiers and outlaws, denying any physical

²⁴Quicherat IV, as referred to in Lowell, 40.

²⁵Lowell, 41-43; Catherine le Royer, wife of a respectable citizen with whom Joan lodged for more than a week; John Fournier, a curate who determined that she was not possessed by an evil spirit; John of Metz, a coarse, lawless soldier, who began with curiosity and mockery but ended by swearing allegiance; Bertrand of Poulengy, another rude soldier who joined as her escort; James Alain, a friend of Laxart who agreed to help; Jean de Nouillonpont, a member of the garrison, who was convinced by her declaration that she would be with the king by Lent if she must wear her legs down to the knees because no one else in the world could recover the kingdom of France; all became thoroughly convinced in the validity of her mission; Ibid.

²⁶Pius II, *Commentaries*, trans. Florence Allan Gragg (Northampton, Ma.: Dept. of History of Smith College, 1937-57), 436.

²⁷Lowell, 44.

²⁰Quicherat II, as quoted in Lucie-Smith, 26; The woman in the traditional prophecy was Charles VII's infamous mother, Queen Isabeau of Bavaria; Lucie-Smith, 27.

²¹Lucie-Smith, 36.

²²Lowell, 38.

²³Quicherat II, as quoted in Lucie-Smith, 30.

desire towards her and calling her "an emissary of God."²⁸

Joan won her second battle by making a favorable impression on the king. Those watching their private conversation recalled the change of expression on his face as his depression lifted and he appeared joyful.²⁹ This was no small accomplishment in the treacherous court of the weak, idle, and luxurious king, under the influence of his greedy favorite, La Tremoille. Charles was indecisive and cautious of accepting Joan's help, requiring her to be questioned by his clergy before their meeting. Joan testified that the king was given a sign before he would believe in her.³⁰ Although she refused to reveal what it was, one speculation was her reassurance of his legitimacy, and many believed in its existence, including the Bastard of Orleans. He related this to the historian, Thomas Basin, who wrote that Joan had revealed "things so secret and hidden that none save Charles could have had knowledge of them, save by divine revelation."³¹ In two weeks, Joan convinced the king that she had miraculously read his innermost thoughts, his confessor of her orthodoxy, the captains in the hope of saving Orleans, and the common people of her mission to crown the dauphin.³²

Though impressed, the king investigated Joan thoroughly; he sent friars to Domremy,³³ wrote to the Pope,³⁴ and had

her examined by a church council in Poitiers.³⁵ Her lively responses at the interrogation by the distinguished doctors gives us some understanding of how she fascinated and converted to her cause a variety of townspeople at Poitiers, including counselors, ladies, and men-at-arms.³⁶ At one point, a professor objected that if God wished to free the people of France there was no need for soldiers. Joan answered, "In God's name the men-at-arms will fight, and God will give the victory."³⁷ When asked for a sign to justify the king's trust, she responded, "In God's name, I have not come to show signs in Poitiers; but lead me to Orleans and I will show you the signs for which I am sent."³⁸ The decision of the council was that the desperate condition of the kingdom and the urgent need of the city of Orleans made it desirable that no possible chance should be neglected. They advised the king to grant her request and to send her to Orleans with men and supplies.³⁹ After the verdict at Poitiers, Joan was given a retinue, fashionable clothes, and armor, all indicative of her new status, importance, and position.

The raising of the siege of Orleans was the turning point in the last part of the Hundred Years' War. Its events dramatically illustrated Joan of Arc's inspiration of the French troops and the halting of the English on their road to victory. Until her appearance, the English had dominated the war and their superior morale was likely to result in success.⁴⁰ The Anglo-Burgundians

²⁸Quicherat II, as quoted in Lucie-Smith, 53.

²⁹Quicherat III, as referred to in Lucie-Smith, 60.

³⁰Tisset and Lanhers, as referred to in Lucie-Smith, 61.

³¹Thomas Basin, *Histoire de Charles VII*, trans. And e. Charles Samaran (Paris: 1933,1944), as quoted in Lucie-Smith, 62.

³²Lowell, 61.

³³Quicherat III, as quoted in Lucie-Smith, 76.

³⁴Antonio Morosini, *Chronique d'Antonio Morosini—Extraits relatifs a l'histoire de France*, ed. G. Lefevre-Pontalis (Paris, 1898-1902), as referred to in Lucie-Smith, 76.

³⁵Lowell, 65-67.


³⁶Quicherat IV, *Chronique de la Pucelle*, as quoted to in Lucie-Smith, 75.

³⁷Quicherat III, as quoted in Lucie-Smith, 73; Lowell, 66.

³⁸Lowell, 67.

³⁹Quicherat III, as referred to in Lucie-Smith, 81; Lowell, 68.

⁴⁰Carleton E. Williams, *My Lord of Bedford* (London: Longmans, 1963), 159.



controlled the north, including the rich province of Flanders, while the city of Orleans was the key to the south of France. The recent attempt by Charles to relieve the city had failed in the battle of the Herrings and the entire Valois faction was disheartened. Margaret La Touroulde eloquently described their depression and discouragement at the time of Joan's arrival at Chinon and asserted her own confidence in the divine nature of Joan's mission.⁴¹ Indeed, Charles was considering flight to safety in Scotland, while the city of Orleans was expected to fall to the English, rendering defeat to the Valois.

Orleans, built on a plateau and encircled by thirty-foot high walls, enclosed about a hundred acres of land yet contained over thirty thousand people crowded in closely packed houses. It was well supplied and formidably defended by the successful general, the Bastard of Orleans.⁴² The Eng-

lish lacked the men for a close siege, but they maintained a string of forts around the city, preventing the arrival of large quantities of provisions, though individuals and smaller amounts of supplies penetrated the blockade while the English awaited reinforcements.⁴³

Joan's influence at Orleans was responsible for the French victory. Without her presence it is unlikely that the troops would have entered the city or the battles would have taken place. Although the French were as strong as the English in numbers, the captains were reluctant to engage in battle because of their recent defeat, and they feared that they lacked the strength to enter the city if attacked by the English. The enemy's main force was situated on the north side of the Loire with smaller numbers at a few posts on the south. Since the French captains approached Orleans on the south side of the river, they probably planned to deliver the supplies by river without entering the city. Joan had expected to arrive on the same side of the river as Orleans and to fight to enter the city. Reproaching Dunois for the deception, Joan stated that they had harmed themselves by ignoring the advice of God, impressing him with her demeanor and with the miraculous change in the wind that allowed the delivery of the supplies by water.⁴⁴ The English did

⁴¹Quicherat III, as quoted in Lucie-Smith, 64, 65; Her words were: "When Joan came to the king at Chinon, I was at Bourges where the queen was. At that time there was in his kingdom and in those parts in obedience to the king such calamity and lack of money that it was piteous, and indeed those true to their allegiance to the king were in despair. I know it because my husband was at that time Receiver General and, of both the king's money and his own, he had not four crowns. And the city of Orleans was besieged by the English and there was no means of going to its aid. And it was in the midst of this calamity that Joan came, and I believe it firmly, she came from God and was sent to raise up the king and the people still within his allegiance, for at that time there was no help but God;" Ibid.

⁴²Williams, 161; The Bastard of Orleans, later Count Dunois, was the illegitimate son of Louis of Orleans and the leader of his family since his brothers were prisoners in England. He had first heard about Joan in rumors from Gien, where she had spoken of her mission on the way to Chinon. He was curious and sent a messenger to the king to find out the truth. The messenger

was present when Joan arrived and reported back to him. He became close to Joan and asserted confidently that she was sent by God and that her military victories were the result of divine inspiration; Quicherat, as referred to in Lucie-Smith, 53, 54, 62.

⁴³Lucie-Smith, 91.

⁴⁴Lowell, 96; When Dunois attempted to placate her, she burst out in a commanding tone which explains why she was obeyed: "The counsel of the Lord God is wiser and surer than yours. You thought you had deceived me, but it is you who have deceived yourselves, for I am bringing you better help than you ever got from any soldier or any city. It is the help of the King of Heaven...";

not interfere with the delivery of the provisions, perhaps because it was obvious that the army could not enter Orleans and would retreat. The Bastard urged Joan to enter the city with him, and the army agreed to cross the river at Blois and return to Orleans with more supplies on the north side of the river.⁴⁵

Tremendous enthusiasm and excitement accompanied Joan's entrance into Orleans. The people rejoiced "as if they had seen God descend among them" and tried to touch her or her horse as she rode in full armor, carrying a white banner.⁴⁶ After her arrival, the people "believed that God was on their side and that the final victory would be theirs."⁴⁷ The door of the house she stayed in was almost broken by the crowd, and she was unable to move freely through the streets without being surrounded.⁴⁸

The English allowed Joan to make an inspection of their positions without harming her or the common people who followed her, though they were vulnerable to attack. This lack of initiative reveals the change in psychological advantage that had occurred since Joan's arrival.⁴⁹ The English allowed the army convoy from Blois to enter the city without attempting to fight, preferring to wait for reinforcements.⁵⁰ Since the whole purpose of the siege had been to prevent the delivery of large quantities of provisions and troops, and the French had recently been defeated trying to send relief and had feared to force passage into the city, this reluctance on the part of the English to attack reveals the significance of Joan's arrival on the attitudes



Ruben's painting features Joan kneeling beneath Orleans's patron saints, Aignan and Euvette. Marina Warner, *Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism*.

of both sides of the conflict. There were now about five thousand troops in Orleans and several thousand armed citizens. This was likely more numerous than the English force. Yet, because of the prestige of the English, their expected reinforcement, and the lack of resources on the part of the French, the city was still considered in grave danger.⁵¹ Two factors, which contributed to Joan's ability to reverse the advantage, were the irreparable loss to the English by the death of their general, Salisbury,⁵² and the Duke of Burgundy's withdrawal of his troops from the English forces due to a dispute with Bedford.⁵³

The first battle of the relief of Orleans was initiated by the excited citizens of Orleans, who were driven into a frenzy of anticipation by Joan's arrival and the army's entrance into the city after so many months of siege. They surged spontaneously out of the Burgundy gate toward the small English garrison entrenched at the fort of Saint-

Quicherat III, as quoted in Lucie-Smith, 99, 100.

⁴⁵Lowell, 97.

⁴⁶Ibid., 98.

⁴⁷Williams, 168.

⁴⁸Quicherat IV, *Journal du siege*, as referred to in Lowell, 99.

⁴⁹Lucie-Smith, 106.

⁵⁰Quicherat III, as referred to in Lucie-Smith, 106.

⁵¹B. de Molandon, *L'armee anglaise*, as referred to in Lowell, 101.

⁵²Williams, 162.

⁵³Lowell, 92.

Loup, which was isolated on the northeast side of the city.⁵⁴ Joan participated in its capture, which had a tremendous effect on the morale of the French troops, though the fort itself was unimportant.⁵⁵

Five days later, the French attacked and defeated the fort, Les Augustins, as Joan encouraged the soldiers around her by shouting: "Go forward boldly in the name of God!"⁵⁶ Her power to influence events lay in her potential to act as a catalyst in the actions of countless others. The soldiers competed with one another to prove who was the most courageous and by extreme effort and skilled marksmanship they managed to gain entry into the fortress at Les Augustins.⁵⁷

After the victory at Les Augustins, the captains decided that the French forces were inferior and wanted to wait for reinforcements from the king, but the citizens were in a ferment of excitement after the victory and opposed the decision not to fight. They had been besieged for seven months, waiting for the king to do something. Joan seemed to be a gift from Heaven, and they turned to her for leadership. She told the council: "You have been to your council, and I to mine. And believe me, the counsel of my Lord will be put into effect, while your counsel will perish."⁵⁸ The council recalled their decision, and the next day the garrison of Les Tourelles was forced to surrender after being surrounded and set on fire.⁵⁹ Thus, Joan intervened at a critical moment and influenced the events of the battle. Though wounded, she fought on, inspiring others when the attack seemed to



This banner was commissioned by the City of Orleans in appreciation for the raising of the siege. Marina Warner, *Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism*.

have no hope of victory, until the fortress was captured.

After the dramatic French victories of Saint Loup, Les Augustins, and Les Tourelles, the English general, Suffolk, was so demoralized that he felt it was hopeless to continue the siege. He and his troops retreated to Jargeau, complaining that the fighting spirit that Joan of Arc instilled in her troops made them seem invincible.⁶⁰ Thus, the siege of Orleans was raised.

The news of the relief of Orleans caused a tremendous sensation in neighboring countries and was considered a decisive

⁵⁴Lucie-Smith, 107.

⁵⁵Williams, 169.

⁵⁶Quicherat III, as quoted in Lucie-Smith, 112-113.

⁵⁷Lucie-Smith, 114.

⁵⁸Quicherat III, Pasquerel, as quoted in Lowell, 106.

⁵⁹Williams, 169.

⁶⁰Ibid; Bedford describes the transformation accomplished by Joan: "...the which stroke and discomfiture not only lessened in great part the number of your people there but as well withdrew the courage of the remnant in marvellous wise; and couraged the adverse party and enemys to assemble them forthwith in great number;" Proceedings and Ordinances of the Privy Council of England IV.

event. The people of Orleans were certain that Joan had been the reason for their victory; she became an immediate heroine, and they never wavered in their loyalty even when she was burned as a heretic.⁶¹

After Orleans, the French attacked the towns along the Loire River, which were held by the English. The army, led by Alencon and accompanied by Joan, laid siege to Jargeau and Beaugency yet was hesitant to attack despite its 8,000 men. It was the passionate speech of Joan of Arc that inspired the soldiers to storm and capture the cities.⁶² After Beaugency, the French decided to pursue the English army of Fastolf and Talbot. This decision was another turning point in the war because it was the first time in many years that Charles's forces had taken the offensive for more than a limited objective against the English. Joan played an instrumental part in this decision by supplying the impulse that urged the army to action.⁶³ The English army was defeated at Patay, and the generals Talbot and Scales were captured.⁶⁴ These victories increased Joan's reputation even though she had played only a small part at Beaugency and none at Patay. The fact that she had been present had contributed to the fire and enthusiasm of the men who fought. Recruits rushed to serve in their king's army at their own expense.⁶⁵

⁶¹Lucie-Smith, 125.

⁶²Williams, 170.

⁶³Quicherat III, as quoted in Lucie-Smith, 140; She encouraged the men who hesitated, urging: "In God's name, we must fight them. If they were hanging in the clouds we should get them, for God has sent them to us to punish them;" Ibid.

⁶⁴Williams, 172.

⁶⁵Quicherat IV, Jean Chartier, as quoted in Lucie-Smith, 147; The chronicler Cagny wrote: "Although the king had no money whatsoever wherewith to pay its charges, no--none of the knights, squires, men-at-arms or footsoldiers--refused to go and serve the king in his travels with the Pucelle, saying that they would go

The march of the 12,000-man coronation army to Rheims illustrated the awakening of national feeling in the people of France. Although it appeared madness to advance a hundred miles through hostile country, the fortified towns, though officially recognizing English rule, were ambivalent. As the war had dragged on for so many years, French patriotism had been aroused. The men of Champagne were beginning to feel the absurdity of fighting for a foreigner against a victorious countryman.⁶⁶ They seemed to know that they would become subjects of Charles some day and offered little resistance. Joan exercised resolution at the five-day siege of Troyes, and with its fall, opposition to Charles collapsed.


Since 1422, both Charles VII and Henry VI had claimed the throne of France, but neither had been anointed with the holy oils of Rheims in the traditional ceremony, which bestowed God's approval on a French king.⁶⁷ This coronation ceremony, anointing and crowning the dauphin Charles, accomplished at the instigation of Joan of Arc, occurred on Sunday, July 17, 1429, at Rheims Cathedral by the archbishop, Regnault de Chartres.⁶⁸ Charles's coronation transformed him from a despised fugitive, disinherited by

wherever she wanted to go;" John Holland-Smith, *Joan of Arc* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1973), 76.

⁶⁶Lowell, 145.

⁶⁷Holland-Smith, *Joan of Arc*, 77; According to Joan, there was only one king in France, God himself. It was His right to choose who would rule as his regent. She is reported to have told Charles at Chinon, "I am come with a mission from God to bring help to you and to the kingdom, and the king of heaven orders you through me to be anointed and crowned at Rheims, and to be the lieutenant of the king of heaven who is the king of France." Jules Quicherat, *Proces de condamnation et de rehabilitation de Jeanne d'Arc dite la Pucelle*, (Paris: 1841-9), vol. 3, 103.

⁶⁸Lucie-Smith, 161.



his parents and derisively called the King of Bourges, into a legitimately crowned and consecrated sovereign King of France, anointed by the traditional rites of the Church and recognized by the majority of his subjects.⁶⁹ This event gave him an incalculable moral advantage over the absent Henry VI, and it gave the French people a king they could use as a symbol of resistance against the English.⁷⁰

At Rheims, Joan's reputation had reached its height. Her accomplishments included halting the English victory by relieving the siege of Orleans, gaining considerable territory for Charles in the Loire valley and on route to Rheims by winning some major battles, and crowning the king with the traditional anointing ceremony. These actions were enough to change the whole climate of morale in France. Following the consecration at Rheims, towns and cities pledged their allegiance to Charles as the anointed king.⁷¹

Just at the moment the French appeared invincible, when Charles had gained momentum and the cities of northern France were voluntarily offering him their keys, he made a series of imprudent truces that paralyzed his offensive and sabotaged the efforts of Joan.⁷² She lost influence over events as the hostility of La Temoille asserted itself against the threat of her victories, urging appeasement of the Duke of Burgundy. This gave Bedford time to raise another army and obtain reinforcements for Paris.⁷³ Had Charles utilized Joan's influence and taken advantage of his own prestige and momentum, it is likely that the English would have been forced out of France in 1429 instead of twenty years later.

Joan was defeated at Paris, captured at Compiegne, tried for heresy in Rouen, and burned at the stake. The hatred and violence of her enemies demonstrated their awareness of her influence. The trial for heresy, which attempted to tarnish her reputation, indicated the depth of the anxiety that her success was causing to the English. They believed that nothing less than branding Joan as a witch and a heretic would erase the power of her glorious image. Charles's claim to the throne was to be discredited and ridicule brought upon him by condemning Joan.

Though she suffered defeat, capture, condemnation, and death, the memory of Joan's actions was ineffaceable. The cruel martyrdom of her passionate death contributed to her continuing influence long after her ashes were thrown in the Seine. Though the French may not have achieved their recovery until years after her astonishing victories, her actions signaled that final victory and her death encouraged patriotism when she no longer could.⁷⁴

Her sacrifice was ignored with indifference by the king she had exalted until he initiated the rehabilitation trial, which reversed her condemnation twenty-five years later as a means of removing the stain which her judgment had placed on his crown. The King of France did not want people to be able to say that a witch and a heretic had crowned him. In 1450, Guillaume Bouille received orders from Charles to discredit the fraudulent trial and absolve his good name from Joan's disgrace.⁷⁵

Joan's ultimate victory was a triumph of character. The strength of her personality, the determination of her convictions, and the courage of her death have

⁶⁹Williams, 177.

⁷⁰Holland-Smith, 79.

⁷¹Ibid., 78.

⁷²Williams, 177.

⁷³Ibid., 178.

⁷⁴David C. Douglas, forward to *The Hundred Years' War* by Perroy, xxi.

⁷⁵Marina Warner, *Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 189.

commanded the admiration of generations for more than five centuries. Joan of Arc is an enduring historical figure.

Revolt in Auschwitz:

The Sonderkommando's Final Solution

Erica Darplee

Auschwitz and the Holocaust are words that describe a time of unprecedented barbarity in human history. When visiting Auschwitz, the visitor is immediately overwhelmed by its history as a place where over one million people died for no other reason than they were "different." In all the savagery of Auschwitz, there was one moment when a group of people refused to die in vain. Author Erica Darplee gives a chronological account of a revolt instigated by camp workers to tell the world of their courage.

In the history of Auschwitz there was only one isolated instance when a revolt on a mass scale occurred. 7 October 1944 was the fateful day when over 400 members of the *Sonderkommando*¹ lost their lives in a desperate struggle for freedom against the SS.² This report is an effort to expose the truth surrounding those events. The uprising was an accumulation of many factors that led to the inmates last effort to free themselves and strike back at the SS for enslaving them and murdering millions of their brethren. There are many people and events connected with the uprising, including the members of the underground movement in Auschwitz and their plans for coordinated revolt, the women smugglers at the *Pulverraum*³ who made it possible for inmates to have access to materials used to make arms and grenades (albeit a small supply), and the *Sonderkommando* members themselves who were faced with a last minute decision to join in the revolt or remain passive and watch their comrades go to the slaughter.

¹The German word for "Special Squad."

²Danuta Czech, *Auschwitz Chronicle* (New York: Henry Holt, 1989), 725.; Lore Shelley, *The Union Kommando in Auschwitz: The Auschwitz Munition Factory through the Eyes of Its Former Slave Laborers* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1996), 317.

³This is the German word used to describe the room where gunpowder was ground and handled in the making of explosives.

Background of Sonderkommando and Their Respective Living Conditions

To understand the position of those men employed in the *Sonderkommando* one must first understand the circumstances under which they lived. The *Sonderkommando* was a "Special Squad" of men who were selected by the SS upon arrival in Auschwitz. Most men assigned to the squad were young and strong, and had no knowledge of the camp because the SS picked them off the RSHA⁴ transports as soon as they arrived.⁵ They had the task of cremating the remains of those murdered in the gas chambers, as well as the inmates who died of other causes within the camp. The men spoke many languages and were often able to calm those going to their deaths in the chambers, which the SS found useful because they preferred that operations within the camp went smoothly. Most of these men were Jewish, although there were a few Soviet POWs and Poles among the ranks. All of the men assigned to this kommando felt intense psychological pressure and grief over the job they had to perform.⁶ They were also aware that the Germans took great pains to cover their deeds. After each death campaign, the ranks of the *Sonderkommando* were liquidated; this would ensure that no eyewitnesses were left to attest to the crimes committed by the Nazis.⁷ The first *Sonderkommando* was gassed in August of 1942; a sec-

ond was killed on 3 December 1942.⁸ However, there were some men who were spared because they had special skills: stokers, inmate officials and mechanics.⁹

Those men selected to join the ranks of the *Sonderkommando* had, by far, the most gruesome task of all the inmates employed within Auschwitz. The reason that some men felt lucky to be a part of the kommando was the privileges they enjoyed. The SS were much kinder to the *Sonderkommando* than most other groups within the camp. They had better living conditions, ate better food, were able to organize¹⁰ items fairly easily and had much more freedom within their area of the camp. In the beginning, the *Sonderkommando* were assigned to barracks in Auschwitz, in June of 1944 they were moved to the area of the crematoriums where each man had his own bed and could sleep in his own pajamas from Canada.¹¹ The good treatment of the men came from the theory that the better the inmates were treated, the less likely that they would revolt.¹² Salmen Lewenthal writes, "... there was always someone who felt bound with the camp, one by good food, another by a girl he was in love with."¹³ Nevertheless, there wasn't a group in the camp more aware of what fate awaited them at the

⁴The acronym RSHA stands for *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* -- Reich Security Main Office. This is the government office where the transports were coordinated.

⁵Yisreal Gutman and Micheal Berenbaum, *Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 498.

⁶Ibid, 499.

⁷Ibid, 498-9.

⁸Jozef Garlinski, *Fighting Auschwitz: The Resistance Movement in the Concentration Camp* (London: Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1975), 245.

⁹Gutman, *Anatomy*, 499.

¹⁰The term "organize" was used among camp inmates to describe the stealing of articles within camp.

¹¹Inmates named a section of Auschwitz "Canada"; this was where the personal items of the dead were sorted and stored.

¹²For an extensive explanation about how the *Sonderkommando* lived and was treated see Garlinski, *Fighting Auschwitz* 245-6; Gutman, *Anatomy*, 499.

¹³Jadwiga Bezwirska, et al., eds. *Amidst a Nightmare of Crime: Manuscripts of Members of Sonderkommando*. (Oswiecim: Publications of State Museum at Oswiecim, 1973), 153.

hands of the Nazis than the *Sonderkommando*.

Roots of the Resistance Movement and Its Leaders

Upon the opening of the gates of Auschwitz, a resistance movement took shape among the camp's inmates. Most of the men involved were Polish military and political prisoners who were experienced activists.¹⁴ Auschwitz was situated on Polish territory, just 37 miles west of Krakow.¹⁵ Most of these Poles had strong contacts with the outside world and could arrange the exchange of items and information.¹⁶ In the beginning Jews were not admitted to the resistance, but as time wore on, more and more men were recruited for various duties in and around the camp. The resistance organized food and items for survival, helped inmates escape, kept records of transports (among these records they also accounted for those gassed upon arrival), and made a detailed plan for a mass revolt that would envelop the entire camp.¹⁷ *Kampfgruppe Auschwitz* (fighting group) was formed on 1 May 1943 by Jozef Cyrankiewicz, who later became Prime Minister of Communist Poland. Mr. Cyrankiewicz was a very important figure in the underground movement in Auschwitz. He not only controlled operations within the camp, but also directed un-

derground activities in Krakow.¹⁸ Although *Kampfgruppe* did have a few important key members to begin with, it did not have much support from other groups active in the camp. It was not until the rumor began to circulate about a mass annihilation of the camp that the resistance groups began to join forces.¹⁹

There were many people who directly contributed to the resistance movement, which inevitably connects them with the *Sonderkommando* uprising. Yehuda Laufer and Israel Gutman were two inmates who had connections to the underground and who were involved in the organization of explosives. They worked together in the Union factory where ammunitions were made for the Nazi war effort. These two established a connection with Noah Zabłudowicz who was directly responsible for the gunpowder smuggling that began out of the munitions department of the factory. Noah had a connection with Roza Robota, a girl from his hometown in Ciechanow, Poland.²⁰ She had been shipped, along with her entire family, to Auschwitz in November 1942. She was assigned to work in the *Bekleidungsstelle* (clothing supply section), while the rest of her family perished.²¹ She had connections with the women employed in the *Pulverraum* because they shared the same barracks, and many of those girls were also

¹⁸Hawes, 71-3.

¹⁹Refers to the order given to Hoss to draft a plan to blow up the camp, but the order was abandoned according to Hawes, 72-5; Muller openly discusses the plan to liquidate the camp and states that Hauptscharführer Moll was in charge of executing the order. See Filip Muller, *Eyewitness Auschwitz: Three Years in the Gas Chambers* (New York: Stein and Day, 1979), 144.

²⁰See testimony of Zabłudowicz in Shelley, 293-4; Judy Cohen, *Holocaust Educator: Women of Valor* available from <http://www.interlog.com/~mighty>.

²¹Yuri Suhl, *They Fought Back: The Story of Jewish Resistance in Nazi Europe* (New York: Crown Publishers, 1967), 219-20; Cohen, accessed on 11 November 1999.

Auschwitz: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 114; Yisrael Gutman, *Fighters among the Ruins: The Story of Jewish Heroism during World War II* (Washington D.C.: B'nai B'rith Books, 1988), 181.

¹⁵See Maps in United States History of the Holocaust Museum, *Historical Atlas of the Holocaust* (New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1996), 93; Michael J. Lyons, *World War II: A Short History* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1999), 16.

¹⁶Pawelczynska, 114.

¹⁷See Stephen Hawes, and Ralph White, *Resistance in Europe: 1939-1945* (London: Penguin Books, 1975), 61; Gutman, 182.



Two ovens in the crematoria with charred remains discovered after Nazis fled the Auschwitz death camp.

<http://www.historyplace.com/worldwar2/holocaust/h-crem-destroy.html>.

from Ciechanow. Through Roza many other women were brought into the movement: Estera Wajcblum, Regina Safirsztajn, Ala Gertner, Chaya Kroin and many others. These were the women who worked with the explosives and some of these were also the ones punished by the Nazis in the subsequent investigations.

Original Plans for a Full Scale Revolt and Their Origins

The idea of a mass revolt and escape was important to inmates, not only to gain freedom, but because they thought the SS would blow up the entire camp, killing all of its inhabitants upon their retreat.²² The in-

²²The Nazis took great pains to cover their deeds as they did not want the western world to find out about

mates were aware that Commandant Hoss had been given orders to draft a plan for liquidation of the entire camp, and in fact he did make plans for such an operation. As the threat of the Russians²³ drew ever closer, this became more of a concern to the underground within the camp. The resistance was not aware these plans had been abandoned; therefore they went on with their preparations.²⁴ A concise plan of attack and escape

their crimes in running the death camps. Orders were issued to the Commandant of Auschwitz to draft a plan that would decimate the camp. This would prevent the Allies from ever knowing of its existence. This same plan would also kill any survivors of the camp still incarcerated in its boundaries.

²³The Russian front was drawing closer to Auschwitz at this late stage in the war. The Russians were the Allied force that liberated the camp in early 1945.

²⁴Plans were drafted to destroy the camp but orders from the Nazi hierarchy stated that these plans would be abandoned. See Hawes, *Resistance*, 72-75.

was drafted by Joseph Pilecki,²⁵ one of the first to establish a resistance movement in Auschwitz, which involved mass cooperation of many inmates in various strategic points in camp. This plan also included those members of the *Sonderkommando* involved with *Kampfgruppe Auschwitz*. The original date set for revolt was a Friday in mid-June of 1944.²⁶ At the last moment, the revolt was called off by leaders of the resistance, and towards the end of June the *Sonderkommando* was moved to Birkenau. This meant they were isolated from the rest of the camp, making their contact with other inmates much more difficult.²⁷

An ambitious plan such as this would have no chance of success without the coordination of many men and the "organization" of arms. There were many methods the resistance employed to attain various weapons for their use. The resistance was able to retain some pistols,²⁸ but organization of gunpowder for the resistance is the concern of this report. The location of a store of gunpowder in Auschwitz was located in the *Weischel-Union Metallwerke* (Union munitions factory). The actual room where the powder was measured out and worked with, the *Pulverraum*, was a workroom for the women.²⁹ The resistance contacted Zabłudowicz and enlisted him to join the resistance. He was assigned to a kommando as an electrician that went into Birkenau everyday and this enabled him to make contact with the *Sonderkommando*; his job as an electrician in camp ultimately allowed him to go into whichever section of the camp he pleased. They gave him the tasks of reporting the numbers of RSHA trans-

ports arriving, and to "get in touch with persons who work at the powder pavilion at the Union factory. They should smuggle out some gun powder and deliver it to the camp."³⁰ Meanwhile, Israel Gutman and Yehuda Laufer were also enlisted to smuggle quantities of gunpowder from the Union. Gutman and Laufer were both employed as locksmiths in the Union factory. Their efforts came to nothing because of the strict control the SS had over the women, they were not allowed to socialize with the men of the factory. Overseers carefully guarded the girls employed in the *Pulverraum*. Gutman, and Laufer consulted with Zabłudowicz, and it was decided that he would make contact with the girls of the factory.³¹

Contact with the Women of the Union Factory and Paths of Smuggling

Zabludowicz was lucky in that he had free movement in and around the various camps within Auschwitz. He then decided to make contact with Roza Robota. Roza promised to help and with her connections she succeeded in getting the cooperation of many of the women. It was only a matter of days before the gunpowder started to make its way throughout various channels in the camp.³²

Roza made many contacts within the Union, and it is estimated that at one time around twenty girls were involved in the smuggling of gunpowder.³³ Roza approached Ala Gertner who lived in the same block as she. Ala agreed to help Roza recruit girls from the factory. Ala approached Mala Weinstein, who worked in the *Pulverraum* at the time. Weinstein agreed to the plan and went on to enlist the help of Regina Safirsz-

²⁵Pilecki was an original founder of the resistance movement in Auschwitz; He was an officer of the Polish Home Army and went on undercover assignment in Auschwitz. See Hawes, *Resistance*, 60-75.

²⁶Muller, 144; Garlinski, 247.

²⁷Muller, 147; Garlinski, 247.

²⁸Gutman, 182.

²⁹See testimony of Gutman in Shelley, 153-4.

³⁰See testimony of Zabłudowicz in Shelley, 293.

³¹Compare testimonies of Gutman, Laufer, and Zabłudowicz in Shelley, 153-4, 181, 293-4.

³²*Ibid.*

³³*Ibid.*

tajn and Estera Wajcblum, who also worked in the powder room. For awhile these three were all engaged in smuggling.³⁴ They would steal a few spoonfuls of powder and put them in tiny cloth sacks hidden in their dresses. There was such strict control of the quantity of powder the girls were allowed to work with that it was hard to take very much very often. Weinstein states in her testimony:

... Estusia (Estera) Wajcblum appeared to be worthy of confidence. Indeed, I later realized that she was the most active and the shrewdest of the three of us. It was her idea to steal the gunpowder directly from the fireproof safe where it was kept. This safe stood in a room next to the one in which we worked, and the key to it was always kept by the foreman. It happened, however, that he sometimes left the keys on the table or forgot to lock the safe. Estusia always knew how to exploit these moments of forgetfulness on the part of the foreman.³⁵

Once the girls had the powder concealed on their persons, they had to somehow get it back to the barracks without being discovered. All the girls took part in smuggling the powder back to the camp. Once in the camp, they handed the powder off to Ala, who would pass it on to Roza.³⁶ Or sometimes Estera would ask Marta Cige (a friend of hers) to hold on to the little packages for a while, and in time either Estera or Roza would come to pick them up.³⁷

Roza also approached one of her former coworkers from the clothing detail, Chaya Kroin. Kroin agreed to help smuggle the powder. She had recently been transferred to the munitions factory, but still shared the same barracks as Roza. In the

factory, Kroin arranged a completely different set of workers to smuggle dynamite out of the factory. They organized small dynamite disks and hid them at their workstations during their shifts. At the end of the workday Kroin would collect the disks to take back to the barracks. She concealed the dynamite in a small piece of cloth that she sewed into her clothes, "The dynamite was taken to Block 15 from where Roza Robota picked it up."³⁸

When Roza was requested to help smuggle gunpowder out of the munitions factory, it was originally intended for use by the resistance fighters in Auschwitz. There were strategic places in the camp and in the factory where the explosives were deposited for drop-off and pickup by participating prisoners.³⁹ Laufer and Gutman were two men who were responsible for transporting powder from the factory to their barracks. They had tinsmiths fashion false bottoms in their soup bowls where they would hide the small packages containing the explosives. There were many others who contributed to arming the camp population. Moishe Kulka remembers:

The entire work was carried on during the night-shift when control was not so strict. In the morning, when the night-shift left the plant, I waited around. A Hungarian Jew I knew handed me a half loaf of bread. Concealed in the bread was a small package of explosives. I kept it near my workbench

³⁴See testimony of Mala Weinstein in Shelley, 140-1.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid.

³⁷See testimony of Marta Cige in Shelley, 301.

³⁸For a complete description see testimony of Kroin in Shelley, 236-8.

³⁹One survivor recalls that during her time in the Union she was asked to work in the Pulverraum for a short time because one of the girls was out sick. While working there she was enlisted by the other girls to smuggle out sticks of dynamite and hide them in a lamp at her other work desk. A man named Robert would come pick the sticks up from there. S., Helen, interview with SHOAH Visual History Foundation, 28, April 1996, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA. Timecode 04:06:59:04 - 04:13:01:18.

and later passed it on to a German Jew who worked on the railway.⁴⁰

Union Contact with the *Sonderkommando*

Roza handled the transfer of powder to the men in the *Sonderkommando*. Roza had a boyfriend in camp, Godl Silver, who had been with her from the time they had lived in Ciechanow. Silver was a locksmith in camp, which gave him the freedom of movement from one place to another. Members of the *Sonderkommando* established contact with Silver and asked him to arrange the transfer of gunpowder to their ranks.⁴¹ Silver went frequently into the women's camp. He passed the message onto Roza and she arranged it.⁴² There were a few different ways she passed the powder on as described by some people who were involved in the smuggling. Yuri Suhl writes, "Rosa (Roza) was the direct link with the *Sonderkommando*. The explosives she received were hidden in the handcarts on which the corpses of those who had died overnight in the barracks were taken to the crematorium."⁴³ Marta Cige writes in her testimony that she had a discussion with Estera (Wajcblum) who said, "Regina and I took the gun powder and gave it to Roza Robota. Roza delivered it to the men of the *Sonderkommando* when they came to bring the clothes."⁴⁴ Both methods of transporting the explosives were relatively safe. Roza

wanted to pass the powder on to others as soon as possible to avoid being caught with it. It stands to reason that at the first possible opportunity she would put the powder on whichever cart was going back to the crematoriums, depending on the time of day she received the packages. A member of the *Sonderkommando* named Wrubel⁴⁵ would receive the powder and pass it off to the Russian Timofei Borodin who was an expert at assembling bombs which he made using old sardine tins.⁴⁶

The First Attempt at Revolt

The first serious plans for revolt took shape in the early summer, and as mentioned before, the date was set for mid-June 1944.⁴⁷ Those participating in the uprising called themselves Battle Group Auschwitz.⁴⁸ They had coordinated a complex plan involving inmates from all locations in camp, including the *Sonderkommando*. This plan took months to take shape because the underground would postpone the operation, waiting for the Russians⁴⁹ to move closer to the camp. This did make sense because other inmates in Auschwitz did not feel the danger that the *Sonderkommando* did; they were not posed with an immediate threat.⁵⁰ Salmen

⁴⁵See Footnote 38 for reference to Wrubel.

⁴⁶Most sources agree on the path the explosives took, the tins used to fashion them into bombs, and the prisoners directly involved. See Suhl, 220; Gutman, 500; Cohen, website on-line.

⁴⁷See footnote 17.

⁴⁸Some refer to the group taking part in the revolt as Battle Group Auschwitz, but the action stemmed from *Kampfgruppe Auschwitz*. See Gutman, 500.

⁴⁹This is in reference to the Russian front.

⁵⁰The *Sonderkommando* were threatened because when there was no work to do in their squad they were not needed; therefore the Nazis regularly liquidated them as well. At this time work in the crematoriums was slowing down and there was less to do. Compare Muller, 154-5; Testimony of Gutman in

⁴⁰Suhl, 221.

⁴¹Silver not only set up the transfer of gunpowder, but he participated in the smuggling. Roza would receive the packages and pass them onto Silver who would give them to Jukel Wrubel (who was a member of the *Sonderkommando*). During the interrogations after the uprising Roza would reveal Wrubel's name to the SS, but only after being certain he'd been killed in the fight. See Shelley, 391, endnote 12.

⁴²See testimony of Zabłudowicz in Shelley, 294.

⁴³Suhl, 221.

⁴⁴See testimony of Marta Cige in Shelley, 302.

Lewenthal writes, "All our Kommando had always been of the opinion that we were in a much greater danger than all the other prisoners in the camp, much more even than the Jews in the camp . . . And therefore we saw no chance for us in the [Russian] approaching front; on the contrary, we came to the conclusion that we had to carry out our action earlier, if we still wanted to accomplish anything in our life-time."⁵¹ The underground did have an excellent point in regards to waiting for the front to move closer. The nearer the Soviets were, the better chance the inmates would have of reaching them and finding a safe haven. However, the *Sonderkommando* pushed the resistance and hounded them until they finally set a date. The day arrived, and all men involved were ready to carry out their assigned missions; the time was set for 9 pm. Messages were carried back and forth; at 2 pm all was well, but just before 9 pm something went awry, and the plan was suddenly called off.⁵²

Sonderkommando Make Their Own Plans to Revolt

This was devastating to many prisoners, but nobody was as upset by the abandonment of the plan as the *Sonderkommando*. Lewenthal writes, "To tell the truth our boys simply wept because they knew such actions should not be postponed or else they would never come off as they were planned . . . This waiting did not at all enhance our chance of saving ourselves, not one among us would even try to dream of it, but it augmented the chances of success for the entire action."⁵³ The leaders of the re-

sistance assured the *Sonderkommando* that the time would come, and they would do everything possible to make it successful. Months passed as the resistance placated the *Sonderkommando* with promises of an action. It was during this interim period when the men of the special squad made their own plans to revolt.⁵⁴ The summer of 1944 was when the Nazis began the campaign to wipe out the Hungarian Jews. Preparations began 8 May 1944 when the former commandant *SS Obersturmbannfuhrer* Rudolf Hoss returned to take charge of the new operation.⁵⁵ During this time, the crematoriums were operating at full capacity, and the *Sonderkommando* was working night and day to keep up with the mass of bodies literally heaped upon them. Towards the end of the summer, the transports of Hungarians slowed down immensely, and there was much less work to do. It was at this point in time that the *Sonderkommando* became particularly worried about their survival.⁵⁶

One man particularly important to the *Sonderkommando* was the head *Kapo* of crematorium IV: *Kapo* Kaminski. After the failure of the first attempt at uprising, he was one of the key figures involved in devising a plan of attack for the *Sonderkommando*.⁵⁷ Kaminski arrived in Auschwitz in the summer of 1942.⁵⁸ In the time of his employ, he had earned the trust of his fellow

⁵⁴Ibid., 161-4.

⁵⁵The first transport of Hungarian Jews arrived in Auschwitz on May 16, 1944 according to Bezwinska and Czech, 56, footnote 70; The return of Rudolf Hoss is discussed in Gutman, 499.

⁵⁶See Bauer, 273-4.; Garlinski, 247.

⁵⁷There were other men involved in the planning of the revolt. Jankiel Handelsman and Josel Warszawski (his real last name was Dorebus) are two men who are remembered among survivors to have had key roles in the organization of underground activities within the *Sonderkommando*. However, there is not much information known about them. See Gutman, 502; Garlinski, 248, footnote (*).


⁵⁸Gutman, 499-500.

Shelley, 155.; Yehuda Bauer, *A History of the Holocaust*. (New York: Franklin Watts, 1982), 274.

⁵¹See manuscript of Lewenthal in *Amidst a Nightmare of Crime*, ed. Bezwinska and Czech, 155.

⁵²Compare manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 154-1; Muller, 146.

⁵³See manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 160-1.



Kapos, as well as the SS and his workers.⁵⁹ He worked with others to form a solid plan between both crematoriums II and III, and crematoriums IV and V. The men realized that no action would work without complete cooperation and synchronization between all squads.⁶⁰ According to testimony from both Philip Muller and Salmen Lewenthal, *Kapo* Kaminski was informed on and shot by the SS. The two men both agree that *Kapo* Mietek was the one who exposed Kaminski to the Nazis. Muller writes:

Moll ordered all prisoners to go immediately to the two rooms between the changing room and the gas chambers. There we were locked in, ostensibly because there had been an air-raid warning. This was nonsense, of course, since through the barred windows we could see that the camp lights had not been switched off. Quite obviously we were locked up under a pretext, a fact which made us feel distinctly uncomfortable. Perhaps our last hour had come. The muffled sounds of two shots were ominous. Much to our surprise we were released a few minutes later and herded into the changing room where we had to line up. Then Moll announced that *Kapo* Kaminski had been shot. The SS thought that he was planning to assassinate *Oberscharfuhrer* Muhsfeld and that they had succeeded in forestalling him at the last minute . . . The news of the shooting of Kaminski came as a severe blow to us all . . . Among the bodies of dead gypsies in the pit waiting to be burned we came across Kaminski's corpse . . . it was whispered that it was Mietek. For at the request of the Resistance, Kaminski had spo-

ken to Morawa only a few days earlier in order to sound him out discreetly concerning the attitude of the five Polish prisoners in the *Sonderkommando* in case of a rebellion.⁶¹

It is unclear exactly when Kaminski's death took place. Some sources say that it occurred directly after the attempt to revolt in June 1944. However, both eyewitness testimonies state that it occurred sometime in September of 1944.⁶² It was on 23 September 1944 that the first selection of the *Sonderkommando* took place.⁶³

The First Gassing of *Sonderkommando*

According to Muller it was this time in September that *Scharfuhrer* Busch announced to the men he would be needing two hundred for a team in another camp.⁶⁴ The time had now come, and the prisoners knew what fate really awaited them. Two hundred men were selected to be a part of the transport⁶⁵ to the sub-camp at Gliwice. Ainsztein writes in his book, "two hundred members of the *Sonderkommando* were selected and told that they were being moved to Auschwitz I to become ordinary prisoners."⁶⁶ It is unclear exactly what the prisoners were told, but the outcome is the same among all reports. On 23 September 1944 the two hundred men were given provisions and loaded into vans. Smolen writes:

⁶¹See Muller, 151-2.

⁶²Compare Muller, 151-2; Manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 163, footnote 82.; Gutman, 499-500; Ainsztein, 809.

⁶³Czech, 715-6.

⁶⁴Muller, 152-3.

⁶⁵The Nazis used the term "transport" to try to fool the prisoners into thinking they were not going to be killed. The prisoners all knew the truth and, according to Muller, none stepped forward to volunteer as the Nazis had hoped they would

⁶⁶Ainsztein, 810.

⁵⁹See Reuben Ainsztein, *Jewish Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe: With a Historical Survey of the Jew as a Fighter and Soldier in the Diaspora* (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1974), 809.

⁶⁰See manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 162-3.

... instead of going to Gliwice they were taken to the railway siding of KL Auschwitz (base camp) which ran parallel to the place where building materials were stored (Bauhof). In its vicinity there stood a small building, used for disinfecting clothing, blankets and similar things, left by people murdered in gas chambers. The prisoners were taken to this building Corpses of the killed men were then taken in the self-same vans to the crematoria at Birkenau. They were identified before cremation by the fellow-prisoners still employed there. This occurrence served as a warning to the prisoners of *Sonderkommando* . . . that danger was approaching.⁶⁷



A storeroom full of boots taken from Jewish prisoners at the Auschwitz death camp.

<http://www.holocaust-info.dk/auschwitz/k3.html>.

It was in the chamber used for disinfecting that the prisoners were murdered with Zyklon-B. This incident was later recalled during the trial of SS surgeon, Dr. Horst Paul Silvester Fischer, 10-25 March 1966. Dr. Fischer is the defendant. The following is an excerpt of the court records:

Presiding judge: In connection with the description of the so-called Sauna and the cremation of

corpses, you said that working squads of prisoners were employed there which e.g. removed corpses from gas chambers and cremated them.

Defendant: Yes.

Presiding judge: What happened to the prisoners of these squads? What do you know about them?

Defendant: These squads were after a certain time liquidated, too.

Presiding judge: In what way?

Defendant: According to my knowledge, with Cyclon B, too.

Presiding judge: Could you give a more detailed description?

Defendant: I had, once, witnessed the manner of liquidating a working squad, supervised by Oberscharfuhrer Moll. I was then on duty as surgeon of the day and I had to supervise the disinfectors when they threw the crystals of that gas inside.

Presiding judge: How did it happen? Did the squad go the crematorium of their own free will or did it happen in another way?

Defendant: No, the men who supervised that squad jointly with Oberscharfuhrer Moll, were, I don't know how to put it, drinking vodka and also gave it to the prisoners of that squad. When the prisoners were drunk the premises where they stayed were shut and Cyclon B gas was thrown inside through one of the windows, killing them.

Presiding judge: As SS surgeon you were present then?

Defendant: I was on duty then and was with the disinfectors.

Judge Muhlberger: Referring to your last answer, why were the prisoners of Sonderkommando given vodka then?

Defendant: Probably in order to put their vigilance to sleep as re-

⁶⁷See Smolen, 23-5.

sult, or under the influence, of the alcohol taken and to kill them⁶⁸

After this incident the remaining members of the *Sonderkommando* became very anxious. They stepped up their plans for revolt and urged the resistance in camp to set a date immediately. The resistance still held that the Russians were not close enough yet and that the more time they waited, the better their chances of success. This theory was true for inmates of the general camp, but not of the special squad.⁶⁹ The *Sonderkommando* became very restless, and many members called for action right away, in particular the Russian POWs, who were in favor of an action.

Russian Members of the *Sonderkommando*

The Russian POWs favored a revolt no matter the circumstances. These men were trained soldiers who had an intense hatred of the Nazis and wanted to punish them in any way possible while still keeping themselves whole. They had an advantage over most of their fellow inmates in that they were fighters who knew how to plan and execute a mission of this nature, whereas most men in the squad were civilians before the war and had no concept of military strategy. Lewenthal speaks highly of the Russians, "... when we became somewhat familiar with the twenty Russians who had come from Lublin, then it became evident they could help us a lot in our action, above all thanks to their temperament

and strength . . ."⁷⁰ It was this temperament that got them into trouble at times. Muller writes in his testimony: "Their [Soviets] situation had become precarious after an incident when one of them turned on a *Kommandofuhrer* who had hit him. When the Russian's companions came to his aid, the *Kommandofuhrer* indicated that he would have them all transferred, and they all knew from experience what that meant. That the threat was not carried out was due entirely to *Unterscharfuhrer* Steinberg's intervention on their behalf."⁷¹ The Russians seemed to be the most spirited and insubordinate of the prisoners working in the special squad. Lewenthal writes about their behavior:

There were 19 Russians with us who worked together with us. They were informed of everything and were let into all secrets. By their quick temper they got themselves into some trouble with the *Kommandofuhrer*, they generally did what they pleased, not asking anybody for anything which our masters absolutely did not like. They declared it many times that the Russians would be dismissed from the *Kommando*. But everybody knew what a dismissal from the *Kommando* meant: a dismissal to the other world; but somehow they could not make up their minds on their own. They plainly could not find an excuse . . .⁷²

The Russians had even gone so far as to draft their own plan to revolt without consulting other members in the resistance.⁷³ This was because the resistance repeatedly postponed any kind of uprising. Apparently the Russians felt they had to take measures

⁷⁰See manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 157-8.

⁷¹For more information and background on *Unterscharfuhrer* Steinberg see Muller, 147.

⁷²See manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 166.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 163.

⁶⁸See Smolen, 22-3, footnotes 3-7.

⁶⁹See manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 157-8; Garlinski, 246.

into their own hands. However, such an action would probably not have been very successful. The only chance the prisoners of Auschwitz had at victory would be grounded in complete cooperation and coordination among all members in camp (involved). As it happened, the Russians never carried out their strategy. Instead, October fast approached and an incident occurred that sealed their fate. Lewenthal describes it in his manuscript:

... a few days ago one of them got drunk and started to make a row. Our *Unterscharfuhrer*, a common thug, noticed it finally and began to beat him. When the Russian ran away from him the former fired a shot and wounded him. Later, when he wanted to take away the wounded man in a car, the latter jumped out of the car and hurled himself upon the German. He wrenched the riding-whip from his hand and knocked him on the head with it. The German quickly drew his pistol and shot him dead. He took the opportunity and reported to the commandant that he was simply afraid of the Russians and demanded they should be taken away from there. It is understandable that his request was granted. As it was already earlier announced that a transport of 300 men would leave crem[atoria] IV-V, then the manager informed them they would leave with this transport. And they knew well what it meant ... ⁷⁴

At the end of this description Lewenthal alludes to the selection that led to the uprising of the *Sonderkommando* on 7 October 1944. ⁷⁵

The Announcement

⁷⁴Ibid., 166-7.

⁷⁵Ibid.

The Nazis announced in early October that another transport would be leaving, and it was decided that these three hundred men would come from the ranks of the men in crematoriums IV and V. ⁷⁶ The SS told the men that they needed a work unit to go to an Upper Silesian town to clear away rubble created by enemy bombs. ⁷⁷ *Scharfuhrer* Busch instructed the *Kapos* to draw up a list of three hundred names within 24 hours. This was a terrible task to give to the *Kapos*; now they had to choose among their own men who would live or die. Muller describes in his testimony that the *Kapos* tried to be as objective as possible in the selection of the men. They chose to keep those men who would be an asset to the group in the face of disaster or revolt. This meant that the older prisoners who had a lot of experience and knew how to react quickly in dangerous situations were those who had been kept off the list. As it turned out, the three hundred men were mostly Hungarian and Greek Jews. ⁷⁸ The list was sent back to the SS the following morning, and the identity of those men soon became known throughout the *Sonderkommando*.

Once it was revealed whose names were listed, those men declared that they would not go willingly and they were going to fight. Muller writes:

... some of these selected prisoners contacted our Resistance leaders and declared that not one of the 300 was prepared to let himself be slaughtered without resistance. They thought the time for the planned rebellion was now and requested the entire *Sonderkommando* to throw in their lot with them, and to do so whether or not the rest of the camp were to join in. They went on to say that they were determined to

⁷⁶Ibid., 164.

⁷⁷See Muller, 153.

⁷⁸Ibid., 153-4.

go it alone if nobody was prepared to support them.⁷⁹

The resistance turned the men down, saying that any uprising without coordination of the entire underground would turn out to be a disaster and would earn punishment for the entire camp. The rest of the *Sonderkommando* also declined, saying that they could not support any revolt and they were going to wait for the planned action that had been put off for so long.⁸⁰ Lewenthal writes:

So they [resistance] demanded we should display a complete indifference towards the taking away of those 300 men for the sake of the success of the action. We, again, feeling that by now we had the strength . . . but only wishing the action should end successfully . . . we decided . . . to stand . . . aside . . . We did not tell them anything, on the contrary, let them resist properly, let them do what they could do but we will stand aside, thanks to which we will not lose our chance, which would become real already in a few days.⁸¹

After the lists were sent back to the SS a few days went by during which time those three hundred men prepared for the worst.⁸² They

began stockpiling whatever weapons and materials may be useful in their attempt at revolt. Muller writes:

Two days came and went after the handing over of the list. Nothing happened. The 300 men were on tenterhooks and tried to hide their growing nervousness behind an increasing bustle of activity. Surreptitiously they began to collect things like rags, wood-alcohol, oil and other fuel, and to take them concealed under their clothing into crematorium 4. After evening roll-call they made last-minute preparations for setting crematorium 4 on fire, by stuffing rags soaked in oil and wood-alcohol in between the rafters and the felt roof, under the three-tier wooden bunks and in the coke store.⁸³

The Nazis did let some time pass before they decided to round up those listed to go on the transport, but the selection was not long in coming.

7 October 1944

It was Saturday morning when the SS issued the orders for a roll-call of crematoriums IV and V to be taken at noon.⁸⁴ This is when those three hundred men would be separated from the rest of the *Sonderkommando* to join all of those who had gone before them, to their deaths. The Soviet POWs would also be included because of the incident with the *Unterscharfuhrer* just days beforehand.⁸⁵ There is a lot of controversy and mystery surrounding the events of that day. Many scholars give different descriptions of the events and the order in which they occur.⁸⁶ The following is

⁷⁹Ibid., 154.

⁸⁰See Muller, 154-5; Bauer, 274.

⁸¹See manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 166.

⁸²It is probable that the SS asked the *Kapos* for a list of three hundred men on October 3, 1944. In reading Mullers testimony one can recount the days that passed in his description from October 7, 1944. Martin Gilbert refers to camp records on October 3; the SS had taken exact counts of all prisoners in the *Sonderkommando* working both day and night shifts. One can infer they did this because they were deciding how many men to include in the selection of October 7, 1944. See Martin Gilbert, *The Holocaust: A History of the Jews of Europe during the Second World War* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), 744.

⁸³See Muller, 155.

⁸⁴See manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 167.

⁸⁵See footnote 62.

⁸⁶In the course of the research it was found that most authors listed in the bibliography had completely

an effort to describe the events of that day, as they happened, in a logical manner based on the sources available.⁸⁷

The prisoners gathered in the yard in crematorium IV for the roll call to be taken at noon. According to Lewenthal, the Nazis showed up in the yard around 1:25 pm to separate those three hundred men from the rest of the Kommando.⁸⁸ During the separation of the men, the revolt erupted. As one of the men assigned to crematorium IV, Muller describes the events in great detail:

Towards midday, *Scharfuhrer* Busch, *Unterscharfuhrer* Gorges and several other SS men and guards arrived in the yard in front of crematorium 4. All prisoners were ordered to line up . . . Then Busch began calling out the first few numbers on the list, starting with the highest and working his way down to the lowest. Those selected for 'transfer' were made to stand on the opposite side of the yard, those not concerned, once they had been called, were allowed to return to crematorium 5. Since I had the lowest number of all assembled in the yard I was still standing there waiting to be called.⁸⁹

Muller states that the SS finished with the separation only to realize that there were men missing. Busch realized that there were approximately a dozen prisoners not present, and surmised they were probably in hiding. He gave orders to a few SS guards to go and search for the missing prisoners in cremato-

different versions of the story, therefore it was hard to tell which ones were correct and which were incorrect.

⁸⁷The description of the actual uprising comes directly from primary sources. If one reads them and compares the telling of events, one can logically piece together the puzzle to create a somewhat complete picture that makes sense. See Muller; Manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech.

⁸⁸See manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 167.

⁸⁹See Muller, 155.

rium IV.⁹⁰ At this time the selected men began throwing stones at the departing guards and some came forward and attacked the Nazis with hammers and axes.⁹¹ The SS responded by pulling their guns and firing into the crowd. During this chaos some of the prisoners managed to run back inside crematorium IV and set it on fire thanks to all of the stockpiling of the preceding days.⁹² Some also managed to recover what explosives and weapons they had and used them against the SS. However, it did not take the SS long to recover their wits, and within minutes reinforcements arrived and proceeded to machine gun all those men in the yard.⁹³

Immediately after the revolt started the SS issued a full alert throughout the entire camp. In the area of the crematoriums troops of SS went to each one to make sure that they were secure. It was when the Nazis approached crematorium II they were met with resistance. Lewenthal describes the events:


Our Kommando of crem[atoria] II-III, seeing the flames from afar and hearing the loud rifle fire was convinced that not one was left alive from that Kommando . . . It was not easy to restrain the Russians who were with us, as they were convinced they would at once be taken with the transport. Since all perish there in battle, they thought their last moments were drawing near, the more so when they noticed from afar that an armed group was coming towards us of SS men.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Martin Gilbert suggests that a Jew named Chaim Neuhof came forward and tried to talk to the SS man when he was separating the ranks. The SS man reached for his gun and Neuhof yelled 'Hurrah' which was a sort of password, and at that moment the prisoners attacked the SS guards. See Gilbert, 744-5.

⁹²See Muller, 156; Gilbert, 745; Manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 167.

⁹³Ibid.



Nazi soldiers forced all Jews to relinquish their glasses and clothing soon after arrival in the concentration camps.

<http://www.holocaust-info.dk/auschwitz/k3.html>.

They came in consideration of safety, but the Russians thought they came just to take them away. And it was impossible to restrain them in this last moment. They pounced upon the *obercapo*, a *Reichsdeutsch*, and in a flash threw him alive into the burning furnace . . . The Russians proceeded with their own action. Our comrades from crem[atorium] II, seeing they there were faced with an accomplished fact [and realizing], that retreat was no longer possible, quickly grasped the situation . . .⁹⁴

At this time those in the Kommando gathered up what weapons⁹⁵ they had and decided to break out of the camp any way they could. They had wire cutters which they used to cut through the fence and escape past the sentry line. Instead of fleeing directly, these prisoners stopped to cut the wires of the women's camp hoping that, they too, would take action. However, that was not meant to be, and only these men fled into the outer regions of the camp.⁹⁶

⁹⁴See manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 168-9.

⁹⁵The term 'weapons' used to describe those pistols, hand grenades, and bombs the prisoners had managed to acquire through the underground.

⁹⁶See manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 169-70; Gilbert, 745-6.

The SS regrouped again and went after those escaping on foot. They drove up behind them on trucks with guard dogs and shot them all down as they were running. There were some men who made it farther than just the outer yard. The SS pursued a small group of men all the way to a barn in Rajske.⁹⁷ The prisoners had stopped for a break and barricaded themselves in. The SS set fire to the barn and shot the men as they ran outside.⁹⁸

The SS brought the bodies of the men back to the camp and began to take a count of those who were killed in the uprising. After a thorough check it was discovered that there were approximately 12 men still missing. The SS were about to leave to track down the escaped inmates when the air-raid siren sounded. They were temporarily detained, and this gave the prisoners a better chance at escape. As it happened the SS set out immediately after the all-clear was given and found the men exhausted, on the other side of the Vistula River. They were killed and their bodies were brought back to Birkenau to complete the count.⁹⁹

The Investigation

The SS immediately launched an investigation to find out exactly which inmates took part in the uprising and how it was planned. The SS soon discovered that the gunpowder in the explosives the prisoners used originated in the Union. *Unterscharführer* Broch served as head of the investigation.¹⁰⁰ He sent spies out to the Union factory to uncover what had happened. Almost immediately someone informed on Ala Gertner. On 10 October the SS arrested three women from the Union factory: Ala Gertner,

⁹⁷See Gilbert, 746; Muller, 159.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*

⁹⁹For a more detailed description see Gilbert, 746-7.

¹⁰⁰See testimony of Kagan in Shelley, 288.

Estera Wajcblum, and Regina Safirsztajn.¹⁰¹ Fourteen men from the *Sonderkommando* were also arrested at that time.¹⁰² All were taken and interrogated in Block 11.¹⁰³ The SS used methods of torture and intimidation, but none of the women broke. They eventually returned to their work at the Union. Unfortunately, none of the men survived their stay in the bunker.

The women went back to work as usual but the SS had not given up on their investigation. During this time the girls working in the *Pulverraum* were under special surveillance because they were the only ones who had access to the gunpowder. The SS recruited a man to go undercover and spy for them. His name was Eugen Koch, and he frequently worked alongside Gutman and Laufer.¹⁰⁴ At one time the men considered recruiting him to be a member of the resistance, but his behavior was a bit odd and the men were cautious of asking him. Gutman recalls, "there was one thing about his conduct that put me off. Koch would demean himself before the SS men . . . My suspicion was aroused by his intimate relations with the *Kapo* of the Kommando, his frequent conversations with the SS."¹⁰⁵ Gutman was right to be wary of Koch because it turned out that he was working for the SS. After the three girls returned from their first interrogation by the SS Koch went to work on one of them to find out information: Ala Gertner.

The SS gave Koch permission to move about the Union factory freely so he could establish relationships with the girls. Koch ended up spying on Ala without her knowledge. Laufer states, "He [Koch] was

the one who enticed Alla Gartner [Ala Gertner] and informed on her."¹⁰⁶ Ala apparently was completely oblivious to the fact that Koch was acting as ally to the SS, but other girls in the Union knew that he was an informer. Herta Fuchs writes:

We had already worried because of Alla [Ala]. A new prisoner had appeared in the Kommando . . . a stylish handsome young man . . . Robert warned us that he was a Gestapo informer. I don't know how he got close to Alla . . . Alla seemed to be very excited during her rendezvous. She blushed like a teenager . . . She was in love . . . I had to stand idly by while she entangled herself more and more . . . One night . . . I saw the fellow standing next to one of the large machines together with an SS man. He seemed to be talking animatedly. An ill-boding feeling crept upon me . . . The following night I met Alla in the bathroom . . . 'I am so afraid' she whispered . . . I pulled myself together . . . and said 'Alla, whatever is going to happen, it does not help if you pull others down together with yourself' . . . the following morning when we returned to camp, she was arrested.¹⁰⁷

Three others were also arrested in the following days: Regina Safirsztajn, Estera Wajcblum, and Roza Robota. They were all thrown into the bunker¹⁰⁸ and interrogated endlessly by the Gestapo. According to Raya Kagan, all of the girls had to confess to the theft of the gunpowder and sign a declaration stating: "I knew the purpose for which the people who received the dynamite from me intended to use it. I know my action endangered the camp."¹⁰⁹ None of the girls re-

¹⁰¹Ibid., 317.

¹⁰²See Gilbert, 747.

¹⁰³Block 11 was the punishment block in Auschwitz. Inmates were brought there for torture and/or execution when they disobeyed camp rules.

¹⁰⁴See Shelley, 157, 182.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 157.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., 182.

¹⁰⁷See testimony of Herta Fuchs in Shelley, 70-1.

¹⁰⁸The 'bunker' meaning Block 11 in Auschwitz, known as the punishment block.

¹⁰⁹See testimony of Kagan, a prisoner working in the political section. Shelley, 288.

vealed any additional names, but of course nobody in the barracks knew what was being said. Members of the resistance were worried that the girls would not be able to stand the intense methods of torture employed by the Nazis.

It was at this time that a chance meeting occurred. Noah Zabłudowicz was admitted into the bunker to see Roza. Zab-



Zyklon B gas cylinders were hooked up to outlets which appeared to be showerheads in the death camps of Europe.

<http://www.holocaust-info.dk/auschwitz/k3.html>.

ludowicz says in his testimony, "One day *Kapo* Jacob came . . . and announced: 'There is a group of girls in Block 11 who were arrested and tortured. One of them repeats over and over in her feverish fantasies, 'I want to see Noah, bring me Noah.' Get me Noah, I want to save the girl.'"¹¹⁰ Zabłudowicz was told to go to Block 11 after the *Blocksperr*¹¹¹ and he would be let in to see Roza. Jacob managed to get the SS man on guard drunk, and after he passed out, Jacob led Zabłudowicz into Roza's cell. He describes their meeting:

The cell was about two meters by two meters . . . a tiny bulb glimmered on

the ceiling spreading an eerie light. Roza Robota lay on the ground, completely uncovered – no clothing, no blankets, absolutely nothing . . . Finally I began to talk. She recognized my voice. 'Noah, how did you get in here?' . . . I tried to calm and console her. 'Roza, we'll attempt anything and everything for you.' She responded matter-of-factly, without any pathos, 'Noah, who but you knows what I have done. I know I am not going to get out of here alive. But one thing I want to tell you. You remember it well and announce it to everybody. After me nobody is going to be arrested! And THEIR end is near.'¹¹²

The Execution

It was on 6 January 1945 that the four women were hanged for their participation in smuggling gunpowder. The SS hung two women at a time so that each shift, day and night, would have to witness their deaths. The SS ordered the girls working in the Union to stand in the front rows.¹¹³ The first two to be led to the gallows were Ala Gertner and Regina Safirsztajn. According to eyewitnesses, they walked on their own and were not bound in any way. *Kapo* Jacob was the executioner. According to Maria Oyrzynska:

The two condemned women mounted the platform. First one stepped on the stool underneath one noose and then the other climbed the stool beneath the second noose. They lowered their heads and removed the stools from under their feet. A general sobbing broke out amidst us. We all cried out loud while the sister fainted . . .¹¹⁴ Hossler, the commandant of the women's camp in Auschwitz, mounted

¹¹²See Shelley, 298.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, 290.

¹¹⁴'The sister' refers to Hanka Wajcblum, Estera's sister, who was in the crowd.

¹¹⁰See Shelley, 295.

¹¹¹Prisoners were not allowed to leave the blocks at this time.

the platform and stood between the two hanging corpses . . . he began his speech . . . of the supreme power of Germany, about the fact that the Germans knew all about who worked against them . . . After Hossler's pathetic speech we were allowed to return to our blocks.¹¹⁵

This process was repeated again with the return of the night shift. At 10pm Roza Robota and Estera Wajcblum were hung in front of their fellow inmates. The Nazis had set up reflectors so that everyone could see the women up on the platform. This was the last execution held at Auschwitz.¹¹⁶ On 18 January 1945 the camp was evacuated because of the approaching Soviet army.¹¹⁷

Aftermath

Those who participated in the revolt showed bravery and strength in the face of death. The Nazis were too powerful a force to challenge without complete coordination and combined efforts of all those involved in the resistance. In the event that the revolt did occur as originally planned, it is hard to say what the outcome would have been. One can only speculate. In reading the plans they seem to have been very well thought out and timely, but things have a tendency to go wrong at the worst of times. In the end, they did what they could and inspired many prisoners who they left behind. Lewenthal writes,

[N]obody has the right to belittle the greatness of spirit, courage and heroism, shown by our comrades during that unsuccessful venture the like of history of Auschwitz . . . [W]ho is able to gauge the courage of our comrades

and the heroism of their deed? Yes, yes, there the best, truly the best and the most worthy men perished who were capable of living and dying with dignity.¹¹⁸

The women who took part in the smuggling of explosives are also to be honored. They did their part for the resistance and in doing so they exhibited immense courage. It is ironic that just two weeks after the hanging of the four women, the camp was evacuated. They remained strong to the end and became a symbol for all those who were forced to watch their deaths. Today there are two memorials honoring the women. One inscription reads, "For us these women are the heroines of the Jewish resistance. Their fate is a warning for us never to lose respect for the life and dignity of others."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵See testimony of Maria Oyrzynska in Shelley, 299-30.

¹¹⁶For more detailed descriptions of the hangings see testimonies in Shelley.

¹¹⁷See Gutman, 502.

¹¹⁸See manuscript of Lewenthal in Bezwinska and Czech, 166, 170.

¹¹⁹See Shelley, 344, footnote 33.

Einsatzgruppen

Sally Pierotti

By the time the first German extermination camp was fully operational on 8 December 1941 in Chelmno, Poland, the Einsatzgruppen, in the previous five months, already had murdered over four hundred thousand Jews. The remaining five death camps subsequently added to the Nazi system, all of which were up and running by the end of summer 1942, each was responsible for tens of thousands of murders. However, none of these camps, with the exception of Auschwitz where 1.5 million Jews perished, ever matched the slaughter orchestrated by the mobile killing units of the Einsatzgruppen. At the end of almost four years of operations in the Soviet Union, this relatively small group of murderers was responsible for more than ten percent of the nearly six million Jewish lives lost to the Holocaust. Their unique role in Adolph Hitler's war machine merits distinction not only because of the number of Jews they killed, but also because killing Jews was their singular objective.¹

It was not until the invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 that the world began to comprehend that the ambitions of Adolph Hitler went beyond ending the restrictions imposed on Germany after World War I. Hitler identified with his nation's wounded pride and bitter resentment and then capitalized on this general mood with his Nazi doctrine that focused on ultra-nationalism and empire building. Yet, central to his Nazi ideology was the identification of Jews as the lazy, parasitic, subhuman "race" conspiring to dominate the world, which made them

¹Leni Yahil, *The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 270. It has been determined that at least 618,089 Jews were murdered by these groups. The estimated total of victims killed between 1941 and 1945 falls between 1 and 1.5 million, 358-9. There were German "labor" camps and concentration camps throughout Europe that claimed the lives of thousands of Jews through starvation, gassing, hanging, beating, and shooting, but the six death camps - Chelmno, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka, Majdanek and Auschwitz, were specifically designated as "death" camps and collectively claimed the majority of the six million Jewish deaths. The Simon Wiesenthal Center, Auschwitz, Courtesy of: Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, (New York: Macmillan, 1990) [database on-line]; available from <http://motlc.wiesenthal.com>.

responsible for the problems that plagued Germany.² His offer of a cure for Germany's problems, and a promise of a return to past glory with a Third Reich that would last one thousand years, made him the instrument of a collective resolve. However, to fulfill this pledge required both the forcible procurement of *Lebensraum* (living space) for Germans in Eastern Europe and the elimination of Jews from the new empire. It was a vision that commanded total domination of Europe and one that ultimately led both to war and genocide on a grand scale.

By 1941 Germany was at the peak of its power; its borders had been expanded, and the Jewish problem was receiving attention with a single-minded ferocity unknown in history. Hitler's Europe was taking shape. To realize his ultimate vision, however, meant further expansion east. On 22 June 1941 Hitler launched his most ambitious military offensive to date—the invasion of the Soviet Union—and at the same time stepped up his determined annihilation of the Jews with the inclusion of the *Einsatzgruppen* (special-action group) in his war machine.³

Prior to the Russian invasion the plan had been to remove Jews from German territories, not to exterminate them as a “race.” In the first six years of Hitler's dictatorial reign, from 1933 to 1939, a string of legislative restrictions against the Jews, designed to encourage them to emigrate, promoted the removal policy.⁴ However, by the time

Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, the policy had transformed into one of forced expulsion.⁵ And, by 1941, with the prospect of inheriting three million Russian Jews, the policy progressed into its final form, which called for the annihilation of European Jewry. In just eight years, as result of this rapid acceleration of Nazi policy, Jews evolved from ostracized citizens to an enemy targeted for extinction.

Included in Germany's three-million-man army that formed a one thousand mile front along the Soviet Union border, was the specially trained force of executioners called *Einsatzgruppen*.⁶ With approximately three thousand personnel divided among four groups, the *Einsatzgruppen* were formed prior to the invasion of the Soviet Union with the singular purpose of following on the heels of the advancing army and securing the overrun areas from “political antagonists.”⁷ In short, these were

were enacted that forbade Jews from owning property, prevented them from working in their professions, and deprived them of their rights as citizens. The Nazis promoted the emigration of Jews, but after the Evian Conference 6 July 1938, it became clear that no country was willing or “able” to take Jewish refugees.

⁵Ibid. Ghettos and labor camps were established and designed in the hope that natural attrition would wipe out a majority of Jews. Ronald Headland, *Messages of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the Security Service, 1941-1943 n.p.*, N.J.: Associated University, 1992), 52. The Nisko region of Poland and Madagascar were considered as possible sites to contain the expelled Jews.

⁶Headland, 11. In the month prior to the Soviet invasion, the men of the *Einsatzgruppen* were assembled in the town of Pretzsch and the villages of Duben and Schmiedeberg, Germany, where they received training and political instruction relative to their assignment.

⁷John Mendelsohn, ed., *The Holocaust*, vol. 10, *The Einsatzgruppen or Murder Commandos*, with an introduction by Willard Allen Fletcher (New York: Garland, 1982), intro. Yale F. Edeiken, *The Einsatzgruppen* [database online] (Electric Zen, 1998); available from www.nizkor.org. 2. Similar *Einsatz-*

²Saul Friedlander, *Nazi Germany and the Jews, Volume I: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 96-8. It is generally recognized that Hitler saw political Bolshevism as an instrument employed by Jews to dominate the world.

³Michael J. Lyons, *World War II: A Short History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1994), 117. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union had the code name of Operation Barbarossa.

⁴Yahil, 53-5, 60, 94-5, 288. The Enabling Act, which gave Hitler dictatorial powers, was passed on 24 March 1933. During the following six years, laws



Part of a report detailing murder of Jews in Nazi-occupied Baltic states and White Russia by Einsatzgruppe A, submitted 1 February 1942. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, GPO Washington.

mobile killing squads that were assigned to murder Gypsies, communists, clergy, and Jews—their principle target. Just as Hitler's war had escalated with this invasion, so had his assault on the Jews.⁸ It was a dual war in which the two main goals—a bigger Germany and the extermination of Jews—became intrinsically intertwined and fought for with equal zeal and importance. The *Einsatzgruppen* and their operations in the east marked the beginning of Germany's systematic liquidation of Jews—the first stage in a Final Solution that eventually included the Jews of Western Europe.⁹

The *Einsatzgruppen* objectives were delineated by Reinhard Heydrich, a thirty-year-old General in the *Schutzstaffel* (SS)

gruppen units were used during the invasion of Poland; however, they were assigned to arrest priests and Polish intelligentsia. They were not specifically assigned the task of mass murdering Jews as were the *Einsatzgruppen* used in the Russian invasion.

⁸Friedlander, 96-8.

⁹Yahil, 288-93. The second stage is characterized by the deportation of Jews to killing camps.

who was given control of the *Reichssicherheitshauptamt* (Reich Main Security Office or RSHA) after the invasion of Poland, on 27 September 1939. This new bureaucracy combined the *Gestapo* (Secret State Police), the SD (an intelligence service), and the *Kripo* (Criminal Police) into a centralized organization designed to better coordinate the execution of mass murder operations.¹⁰ The *Einsatzgruppen* emerged in 1941 as a newly formed unit within the multifaceted organization of the SS bureaucracy. As one of the many sub-organizations within the SS administrative network—Hitler's personal army—the *Einsatzgruppen* became an elite force that virtually superceded any directives of the German army, the *Wehrmacht*.

As head of the RSHA, Heydrich, third in a chain of command under Hitler, received orders prior to the Soviet invasion that called for extermination operations to continue until “the death of the last Jew.”¹¹ However, because the Nazis estimated that it would take three to four years to kill the approximate eleven million Jews that were living in the current Reich territory and the soon to be occupied Soviet territory, it was an operation that required careful planning. A loyal nationalist and fierce anti-Semite, Heydrich, undaunted by the staggering task assigned him, diligently accelerated the racial war when he formed the *Einsatzgruppen*

¹⁰Ibid., 11.

¹¹Edouard Calic, *Reinhard Heydrich: The Chilling Story of the Man Who Masterminded the Nazi Death Camps* (New York: William Morrow, 1982), 240-1. Earl Rice Jr., *The Holocaust Library: The Final Solution* (San Diego, Calif.: Lucent Books, 1998), 49. No written documentation exists that proves Hitler himself gave the order to exterminate the Jews. However, it is not sensible nor believable to assert that Hitler's subordinates were loose cannons with a secret agenda. It is generally surmised that he revealed his murderous intentions to a trusted few, including Heinrich Himmler head of the SS, and it was Himmler who directed Heydrich.

and created, up to that point, the most efficient system of mass murder in the Reich.¹²

Heydrich selected three thousand men, drawn from a pool of volunteers and recruits, to form four *Einsatzgruppe* units that were designated A, B, C, and D.¹³ Most of the men who formed the troops were from the various SS departments—principally from the Waffen-SS, the Order Police, and the Criminal Police. Some were chosen because they had established reputations for being brutal and callous in their prior performances, while others were given the assignment as a form of punishment for substandard performance.¹⁴ However, Heydrich applied different criteria when selecting the officers that would lead the *Einsatzgruppen*. Wanting intelligent men who possessed a sense of discipline and resourcefulness, he chose leaders drawn from the ranks of the highly educated. These men, most of them in their thirties, brought to their new assignment advanced degrees in such fields as law (the most prevalent), medicine, economics, the arts, and even the ministry.¹⁵

Chosen to lead the four units were: SS Major General Franz W. Stahlecker, commander of 1,000 men of *Einsatzgruppe* A, Major General Arthur Nebe who led *Einsatzgruppe* B with 655 men, SS Colonel Emil Otto Rasch who headed *Einsatzgruppe* C and its 750 men, and SS general Otto Ohlendorf, given command of the 600 men

of *Einsatzgruppe* D.¹⁶ Each *Einsatzgruppe* was attached to one of the four army units involved in Operation Barbarossa: *Einsatzgruppe* A to Army Group North in the Baltic countries, *Einsatzgruppe* B to Army Group Central in the Russian Republic and parts of Belorussia, *Einsatzgruppe* C to Army Group South in the northern Ukraine, and *Einsatzgruppe* D to the Eleventh Army.¹⁷ While undergoing military training in May of 1941, Heydrich's group of hand picked killers learned of the special nature of their assignment.¹⁸ They were responsible for all political security tasks within the operational army units and of the rear areas insofar as the latter did not fall under the civil administration. In addition they had the task of clearing the area of Jews, communist officials and agents. The last named task was to be accomplished by killing all racially and politically undesirable elements seized, who were considered dangerous to the security.¹⁹

Although attached to army units, the *Einsatzgruppen* were granted a clear measure of independence apart from the command of army officials because of their singular and unique objective. It was an arrangement that was initially viewed with suspicion by the military leadership of the *Wehrmacht*, who resented SS power and its seemingly militaristic ambitions.²⁰ However, the power struggle was resolved with a series of negotiations between the *Wehrmacht* and the RSHA that gave the SS *Einsatzgruppen* complete autonomy in their actions as long as their operations did not interfere with the army's military operations.²¹

¹²Calic, 240-1. The reference supports the fact that Heydrich formed the *Einsatzgruppen*. Although these killing groups would prove to be an effective mass murder system, their efficiency was eventually outmatched by the network of killing camps that later emerged.

¹³Rice, 65.

¹⁴Thomas H. Flaherty, ed., *The Apparatus of Death, The Third Reich* (Alexandria, Va.: Time Life Books, 1991), 70.

¹⁵*Ibid.* There was a professional opera singer among the group and, at least one, Otto Ohlendorf, commander of *Einsatzgruppe* D, held two advanced degrees: economics and jurisprudence.

¹⁶Rice, 65-6.

¹⁷*Ibid.*

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 64.

¹⁹Mendelsohn, 21. An excerpt pulled from a photocopy of an original affidavit signed by Ohlendorf on 24 April 1947 at Nuremberg. It is a translation of Document No. No-2890, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes APO 696-A U.S. Army.

²⁰Headland, 135.

²¹*Ibid.*, 136.

Still, there remained among military leaders a strong reluctance toward cooperating with the SS in the killing of civilians. It had been less than two years since the invasion of Poland when similar *Einsatzgruppe* squads had been used to kill aristocrats, priests and Jews. Army officials expressed outrage over the atrocities they had witnessed and how the illegal nature of the actions had forever tarnished "the centuries-old tradition of the German officer who fought with fairness, gallantry, and honor for their country."²² So infuriated was the army with Heydrich's operations in Poland, they refused to shake hands with SS officers during a meeting at Fuhrer headquarters soon after the campaign, and they filed protests with Hitler.²³

However, the friction that existed between the army and the SS dissolved with the army's preoccupation with the ongoing war and the string of military successes. Additionally, the *Einsatzgruppen* in Poland were only temporarily and loosely formed units that were soon disbanded because of the general plan, which still favored the forced emigration of Jews.²⁴ When it became clear to army officials that newly formed *Einsatzgruppen* would accompany them into the Soviet Union, their minds were drawn back to the operations in Poland. They hoped that they could distance themselves and their troops from these actions, concerned that witnessing such gruesome killings would exact a toll on soldier morale.²⁵ But, after the invasion of the Soviet Union, and as the war dragged on, the relationship between the *Wehrmacht* and the SS transformed itself from one of tolerance into one of cooperation.²⁶

Although the number of civilians killed by military troops is undetermined, it is clear that German army units operating in the Soviet Union actively participated in some of the killing episodes. This assistance was at times a crucial element in making the job of the *Einsatzgruppen* easier; however, the fact remains that the majority of victims fell to the trained men of the *Einsatzgruppen*.²⁷ Their job was defined by one simple objective: Clear the overrun areas of suspected "political antagonists," which, in reality, meant hunt down the Jews and kill them. A memo written by Commander-in-Chief Field Marshall Von Riechenau, dated 10 October 1941, outlined the conduct expected of German troops in the Eastern territories with regard to their cooperation with *Einsatzgruppen* directives.

The soldier in the Eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a ruthless bearer of national ideology and the avenger of the bestialities which have been inflicted upon Germany and racially related nations. Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but just revenge on subhuman Jewry. The Army has to aim at another purpose, i.e., the annihilations of revolts in hinterland, which, as experience proves, have always been caused by Jews.²⁸

The speed of the German advancement in the first few months of the Russian invasion set an equally swift pace for *Einsatzgruppen* actions.²⁹ In the five months between July 1941 and December 1941, 161 identifiable *Aktionen* (actions) were carried out, claiming 439,826 victims—nearly one third of all those eventually killed by the *Einsatzgruppen*.³⁰ Yet, it took these units

²²Ibid., 135.

²³Callum MacDonald, *The Killing of SS Obergruppenfuhrer Reinhard Heydrich* (New York: Free Press), 38-9.

²⁴Ibid., 39.

²⁵Headland, 145.

²⁶Ibid., 135, 139-40.

²⁷Ibid., 145.

²⁸Mendelsohn, 11. Translation of Document No. NOKW-309, presented as evidence at Nuremberg.

²⁹Yahil, 255-6.

³⁰Ibid., 270.



Jewish women and children who have already surrendered their belongings form a small group as others in the background are ordered to discard their outer clothing and possessions prior to execution on 16 October 1941 in Lubny, the Ukraine. *Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, courtesy of USHMM Photo Archives.*

another two years to reach the estimated final total of 1.4 million victims. The noticeable decline in actions throughout 1942 and 1943—seventy-one in the former and nine in the latter—could be attributed to several factors. The severe weather conditions that halted further German advancement, and the Russian counteroffensive that led to a stalemate in March 1942, restricted access to Jews beyond the front.³¹ The implementation of deportation simply removed many of them from the occupied territory where they worked and died in camps. Others were vital to economies that depended on their skills and slave labor to meet the demands of Hitler's war.³² Despite these mitigating factors,

the *Einsatzgruppen* still managed to liquidate entire villages and towns employing a near standard procedure each time.


Once an army unit had secured a city, town, or village in the Soviet Union, the *Einsatzgruppen*, following close behind, went into immediate action. First they would set up camp with the aid of technical support units that followed behind them in trucks carrying "collapsible barracks, gasoline, drinking water, and tools, such as shovels, picks and rakes."³³ Then they went to work.

difficult for Germany. Fletcher, 248-50. In a document dated 30 October 1941 from Dr. Marquart, Commissioner of the Territory of Sluzk, to the Commissioner General in Minsk, Marquart complains about the Jewish tradesmen being included in the purge because they are "indispensable for maintaining the economy." He further urges that these tradesmen and their families be spared, because if they were to lose their families, it is "doubtful these tradesmen will show any interest in their work and produce accordingly." He makes it clear that he is "not making a statement on the brutality" of this operation.

³³Calic, 240.

³¹Lyons, 123.

³²Yahil, 270, 442. Table identifying the number of *Aktionen* and number of victims. Deportation to death camps in Poland. Lyons, 122-3. By the end of December 1941, the *Wehrmacht* lost more soldiers to frostbite than the Russian soldiers who were better equipped for these conditions. Additionally, Russia was able to draw on its large population and provide fresh troops—something that was logistically more



Because the Jews were not in a centralized location but were scattered among many small towns and villages, the four *Einsatzgruppen* increased their effectiveness by first dividing into sub-units called *Einsatzkommandos* (Special Commitment Detachments), which were then divided into still smaller units called *Sonderkommandos* (Special Purpose Detachments), which, on rare occasion, were further divided into *Teilkommandos* (Unit Detachments). These divisions more than tripled the number of mobile killing units operating in the Soviet Union and, although the number of personnel in each unit was reduced, it was an arrangement that increased their effectiveness.³⁴

After entering a newly conquered town or village, the general mission of the *Einsatzgruppen* was to "register the population, establish county administrations (mayors), and set up county militias and communication service."³⁵ Restrictive measures against the Jews were established, ending with their confinement to a specific area of the city, village, or town. The prominent Jewish citizens, such as the local rabbi, were then told of a resettlement plan and ordered to notify all Jews to assemble at an established point within the village or town limits.³⁶ Once assembled, the soldiers reassured

the Jews they had nothing to fear as they led them in groups to a killing site on the outskirts of their town or village.³⁷ After being forced to surrender their valuables and clothing at gunpoint, the Jewish men, women, and children were ordered to line up side-by-side or in small clusters along the edge of a pit.³⁸

The most common pit used was an antitank ditch because it was generally the most convenient and plentiful pre-dug mass grave available, although bomb craters were utilized as well.³⁹ Yet, to accommodate the number of dead it was sometimes necessary to further excavate the antitank ditch or bomb crater and, in some instances, it was necessary to dig an entirely new pit.⁴⁰ If any such digging were required, a group of Jews would be escorted to the site where they were provided with shovels and put to work.⁴¹ Once the digging was completed, the new mass grave was christened with the dead bodies of the Jewish gravediggers—the first to be shot. Then the parade began. As each group of Jews arrived, they handed over their valuables, stripped down to their skin, and were then shot and thrown into the pit landing alongside, and on top of, friends, families and strangers.

The size of the mass graves varied in accordance with the number killed. Paul Blobel, leader of *Einsatzkommando* 4a under *Einsatzgruppe* C, described a mass grave near Kiev that measured 180 feet in length, 10 feet in width, and approximately 10 feet in depth. The sheer enormity of the pit indi-

³⁴Headland, 11; Fletcher, 28; Written and signed testimony of Otto Ohlendorf, leader of *Einsatzgruppe* D, describing the subdividing of the *Einsatzgruppen*. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews: Revised and Definitive Edition* Vol. 1 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985), 287, and [database online] (Electric Zen); available at www.us-israel.org. From the four *Einsatzgruppen* there were created a total of thirteen *Einsatzkommando* units and five *Sonderkommando* units.

³⁵Fletcher, 151. Sworn statement of Heinz Hermann Schubert, dated 7 December 1945 in Oberursel, Germany. Translation of Document No. NO-4816, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes. U.S. Army. APO 696 A.

³⁶*Ibid.*, 28; Flaherty, 72-3; Information from local collaborators, along with lists compiled by military intelligence, often made the identification of Jews

easier as much as it speeded up the collection process. Prior to the collection process, Jews in most of the towns, villages, and cities had been confined to certain areas of the towns—ghettos.

³⁷Flaherty, 73. The soldiers had been trained to reassure the Jews to avoid panic.

³⁸Yahil, 256; Fletcher, 28; Rice, 67.

³⁹Fletcher, 23. Taken from Ohlendorf's testimony at Nuremberg.

⁴⁰Rice, 67.

⁴¹Flaherty, 73.

cates quite a few people could have been buried in it, but Blobel describes only the size of the hole while making no mention of the number of victims.⁴² However, a field report issued by Karl Jager, leader of *Einsatzkommando 3* under *Einsatzgruppe A*, offers insight into the numbers that could be packed into such a grave.

The Jews were brought in groups of 500, separated by at least 1.2 miles to the place of execution. The sort of difficulties and nerve scraping work involved in all of this is shown in an arbitrarily chosen example: In Rokiskis 3,208 people had to be transported 3 miles before they could be liquidated.⁴³

As Jager's report illustrates, the place of execution was some distance from the town or village. This purposeful isolation was explained by Rudolf Werner Braune, chief of *Einsatzkommando 11b*, under *Einsatzgruppe D*, as a way "to avoid having the civilian population unnecessarily becoming a witness to such a spectacle."⁴⁴ It was a spectacle that Germans wanted to keep from local, non-Jewish civilians. Originally, however, the Germans had expected full cooperation and collaboration from local populations. When they did not get the support they anticipated, they found they could often count on local auxiliary police units for assistance when necessary.⁴⁵ Those who were involved in the killings, both soldiers and other participants, were ordered to keep silent.⁴⁶ Secrecy was further ensured through an order that forbade the presence of ordinary soldiers at killing sites.

⁴²Fletcher, 140. Translation of Document No. NO-3947, Office of U.S. Chief Counsel for War Crimes, affidavit signed by Blobel on 18 June 1947.

⁴³Rice, 67.

⁴⁴Fletcher, 144. Taken from an affidavit signed by Rudolf Werner Braune at Nuremburg on 8 July 1947.

⁴⁵Yahil, 256.

⁴⁶Flaherty, 81.

Still, hundreds of ordinary soldiers made their way to such executions and watched. The photographs they took, the letters they wrote, and the discussions they engaged in, aided in spreading the word among occupied territories.⁴⁷ Jews were being slaughtered.

The slaughtering methods took on slight variations, despite the *Einsatzgruppe* units using strikingly similar methods when they entered a town, from registration of the population to the final rounding up of all Jews. These differences, small as they may seem, are not incidental despite the fact that the same end goal was eventually achieved. Because the decision about who was to die, and how they were going to die, was up to individual commanding officers, these minor differences offer a hint of insight into the character of the men who led these killing units.⁴⁸

Some unit commanders employed the "sardine method" which called for the victims to "lie in the pits in neat lines, head to toe alternately, and there they were executed row by row."⁴⁹ Rudolf Werner Braune, a lawyer by profession and leader of *Einsatzkommando 11b*, had the groups of Jews stand before an open pit with their faces turned away from the ditch. Eight or ten men took position on the opposite side of the ditch and "the persons designated to be executed were shot dead from behind as quickly as possible."⁵⁰ The two to three thousand Jews that Ernst Emil Heinrich Biberstein, commander of *Einsatzkommando 6* under *Einsatzgruppe D*, estimated were murdered by his commando were forced to "kneel down on the edge of a grave" before being shot in the back of the neck with an automatic pistol. While Biberstein maintained that the kneeling position facilitated

⁴⁷Ibid., 81-2.

⁴⁸Fletcher, 152.

⁴⁹Yahil, 256.

⁵⁰Fletcher, 144. Statement given by Braune on 8 July 1947 at Nuremburg.



the bodies easily dropping straight into the pit, his use of the word “grave” is conspicuous. In the sworn testimonies of other *Einsatzgruppe* leaders these mass burial sites were referred to as “ditches” or “pits,” but Biberstein, an ordained Protestant minister, chose the religious vernacular.⁵¹

Otto Ohlendorf, a lawyer and economist, and leader of *Einsatzgruppen* D estimated his unit killed approximately ninety thousand people, the majority of whom were Jews. In a signed affidavit he stated that the groups of men, women, and children that had been shot were “either kneeling or standing and their corpses thrown into the ditch.”⁵² Ohlendorf did not agree with, nor did he approve of, other group leaders who demanded that “the victims lie down flat on the ground to be shot through the nape of the neck.” It was important to Ohlendorf that several men shoot a spray of bullets at the same time in order to prevent anyone of them from feeling any personal responsibility. He left it to the leaders of his sub-units to “fire the last bullet against those victims which were not dead immediately.”⁵³ However, any of his men who ap-

peared to “enjoy” the executions were removed from his *Einsatzgruppe*.⁵⁴

In spite of these minor variations, this was such an efficient murder system that the number of Jews killed in the first five weeks of this campaign “exceeded the total number killed in all the previous years of the Nazi regime.”⁵⁵ However, not all the Jews that were killed met their death under such efficient circumstances. One three-year-old Jewish boy, playing on his village street, grabbed the attention of a Kommandant who was relaxing with his wife and

children on a house porch nearby. The Kommandant ordered one of his men to grab the boy and throw him into the air like a ball, and then he shot the child as “a hunter shoots down a bird”—to the delight of his family who laughed and applauded. “His younger daughter clung to him and



Jews on their way out of the city of Kiev to the Babi Yar ravine pass corpses in the street. *Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, courtesy of USHMM Photo Archives.*

pleaded, ‘Daddy, do it again.’”⁵⁶ There were more than a few instances in which *Einsatzgruppen* soldiers beat, shot, and killed Jews openly on the streets, often inciting radical participation from local townspeople. Four days after the Germans took Kaunas in Lithuania, local police and a group of civilians were encouraged by the soldiers to beat hundreds of Jews to death with iron bars in the city’s streets.⁵⁷ A similar scene is described in a diary entry dated 28 July 1941

⁵¹Ibid., 166-7. Signed affidavit by Ernst Emil Heinrich Biberstein dated 2 July 1947. Translation of Document No. NO-4314, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes. It is curious that Biberstein stated in a manner out of context with his sworn statement that he was not an expert on these kinds of shots and that “no physician was present.”

⁵²Ibid., 28. Document No. 2620-PS, Office of U.S. Chief of Council. One of the affidavits signed by Ohlendorf. This information is derived from an affidavit he signed on 5 November 1945.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Headland, 212-3.

⁵⁵Flaherty, 74.

⁵⁶Cited in Yahil, 268-9.

⁵⁷Flaherty, 75. A photograph depicts a man hitting a fallen Jew with a bar as soldiers and civilians look on.

by Sergeant Felix Landau who happened upon the town of Drogobych.

Hundreds of Jews with bloodstained faces, with bullet holes in the head, broken limbs, gouged-out eyes, run ahead of us. They scream like pigs. Here we see things we have never seen before. It is absolutely impossible to describe them. We stand and look on.⁵⁸

It was not long after the murderous campaign began that reactions similar to Landau's were being echoed by some of the leaders of the *Einsatzgruppe* units. There were concerns with the psychological trauma exacted on soldiers who were shooting their weapons hundreds of times in a day, thousands of times in a week, and countless times in a month. Alcohol was often distributed to the soldiers as a way to release their inhibitions and calm their nerves and, consequently, many of them were drunk during these shooting episodes.⁵⁹ Some, however, were simply unable to cope. As witnesses and participants to almost daily carnage, some succumbed to nervous breakdowns, and others resorted to suicide.⁶⁰ Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS and the man to whom Heydrich reported, visibly lost his composure when he visited a killing site in the fall of 1941. One hundred Jewish men were forced to jump into a ditch, a few at a time, ordered to lie face down, and were then shot from above. When brain matter splattered onto his coat, Himmler had to be steadied by General Karl Wolff, chief of his

personal staff.⁶¹ Also present was Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, leader of *Sonderkommando 7c*, who voiced his concerns openly to Himmler after the killings.

Look at the eyes of the men in this Kommando, how deeply shaken they are. These men are finished [fertig] for the rest of their lives. What kind of followers are we training here? Either neurotics or savages.⁶²

There is no doubt there existed a healthy pocket of participants who so enjoyed their mission and whose hate of "sub-human" Jews was so thorough, they killed conscience free. A *Wehrmacht* neuropsychiatrist who later treated many *Einsatzgruppen* members with psychological disorders, estimated that twenty percent of those doing the actual killings suffered serious psychological trauma.⁶³ Although it would be dangerous to conclude that eighty percent suffered no trauma, misgivings or guilt, there is plenty of evidence that supports there were those who were unaffected by their assignment. Erwin Bingel, a transportation officer, arrived at a site near an airport in the city of Uman in September 1941 in time to witness *Einsatzgruppe C* in action. He describes the horror involved in watching Jews being herded to a ditch and gunned down by a dedicated squad of killers.

⁵⁸Ibid., 74.

⁵⁹Headland, 211; Rice, 69-72.

⁶⁰Ibid. Rudolf Hoss, commandant of the killing camp Auschwitz, is quoted here as saying, "Many members of the *Einsatzkommandos*, unable to endure wading through blood any longer, had committed suicide. Some had even gone mad." Quoted in Robert Jay Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 159.

⁶¹Flaherty, 75; Rice, 72. Quoted in Robert Jay Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), 159.

⁶²Rice, 72.

⁶³Cited in Rice, 73. Paraphrase, and partial quote. Quoted in Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors*. Lifton personally interviewed the psychologist who treated some of the men of the *Einsatzgruppen*. The *Wehrmacht* doctor said the men exhibited symptoms such as "severe anxiety, nightmares, tremors and numerous bodily complaints." He further stated that while these symptoms mimicked those of ordinary combat troops, for the men of the *Einsatzgruppen*, the symptoms lasted longer.



They were made to stand in line in front of the ditches, irrespective of the sex. The Kommandos then marched in behind the line. With automatic pistols these men moved down the line with such zealous intent that one could have supposed this activity to have been their lifework. The whole thing might have seemed to me to be a terrifying nightmare but for the sparsely covered ditches which gleamed at us accusingly.⁶⁴

It took nine hours to kill the twenty-four thousand Jews of Uman and, within two weeks, these men of *Einsatzgruppe C* left an equally lasting mark at Babi Yar, a ravine outside the Soviet Union's third largest city, Kiev, when they killed 33,771 in two days.⁶⁵ As row after row of Jews were shot, their bodies landed in the pits, one on top of the other. Dina Mironovna Pronicheva survived the blood bath and remembers the soldiers shining flashlights into the pit to detect any sign of life. "Some of them jumped down and waded through corpses, shooting anything that moved."⁶⁶ Not all were dead, but it was difficult to tell who was still alive. At Babi Yar, as in many of the mass graves, those clinging to life were commingled with the dead, causing the entire mass to gently pulsate. It was a subtle wave-like movement

that forced the bodies to settle into a deeper and tighter unit amid a sea of blood and earth. Although there were leaders, such as Ohlendorf, who insisted on "mercy" shots—a final gunshot that would end the suffering of a dying victim—there were others who ignored the torment of the near dead. In many instances, it was not until the grave was covered in dirt or sand, suffocating those still alive, that the deadly rhythm would subside.⁶⁷

Still, together with what he himself witnessed, and the expressions of concern from officers, Himmler met with his commanders to find a method that would be less traumatic for the soldiers.⁶⁸ Dynamite was considered, but after an experiment on mental patients, it was deemed unsatisfactory.⁶⁹ Then Heydrich's RSHA, drawing on Germany's previous euthanasia program, devised a seemingly feasible alternative — gas vans.

Years earlier, on 14 July 1933, Hitler passed the Law for the Prevention of Progeny of Sufferers from Hereditary Disease, a program that called for the sterilization of the mentally and terminally sick—Aryan and Jew alike. This was his first attempt at purifying the German nation by ridding it of genetic undesirables.⁷⁰ By 1939, the sterilization program had progressed into a euthanasia program that required the registration of all children born with congenital deformities—and that later called for the reg-

⁶⁴Rice, 68. Quoted in Robert Edwin Herzstein and the Editors of Time-Life Books, *The Nazi* (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1980), 142.

⁶⁵Flaherty, 77; Rice, 69; Headland, 60; Though Babi Yar is one of the more notorious of *Einsatzgruppen* actions, it was not the largest single execution. The largest massacre took place in Odessa, where an estimated 75,000-80,000 Jews were killed, mainly by Rumanian soldiers, but with the help of the *Einsatzkommandos*.

⁶⁶Flaherty, 81. Pronicheva survived by playing dead, even after a soldier "stumbled over her, yanked up her limp form for a closer look, then dropped her back down, giving her a sharp kick and stepping hard on her hand as he turned away." Because night had fallen, she managed to claw her way out of the ravine and hide in a nearby forest.

⁶⁷Rice, 68. Chloride of lime was dumped next to the ditches to hasten the decomposition of corpses. Ibid., 74. An account of a major in the German Ninth Army who witnessed a mass execution. When the major noticed that an elderly man lying in a ditch was still alive he asked a soldier to put him out of his misery. The soldier answered, "I've already plugged him seven times in the stomach. Don't worry, he won't last much longer." Quoted in G. S. Graber, *The History of the SS* (New York: David McKay, 1978).

⁶⁸Flaherty, 76.

⁶⁹Rice, 76.

⁷⁰Yahil, 308.

istration of all citizens with genetic deformities—who were deemed by appointed physicians as unfit to live.⁷¹ Under the euthanasia program, referred to as T-4 after the address of the project's administrative offices, those targeted for elimination were sent to one of twenty hospitals for disposal.⁷² From there inmates were transported to one of five euthanasia installations where, after a perfunctory medical examine designed to maintain order, they were sent in groups of twenty to thirty into a sealed room resembling a shower. Carbon monoxide was then piped into the room, the bodies were removed, and incinerated in a crematorium.⁷³ Between January 1940 and August of the following year, gassing had killed 70,273 genetically inferior German citizens.⁷⁴ It was only because of protests from relatives of the deceased and pressure from the Catholic Church that the program was halted on 14 August 1941.⁷⁵ However, the introduction of gas as a means of extermination caught the attention of those assigned to find a killing method that would relieve the psychological pressure burdening the

men of the *Einsatzgruppen*.⁷⁶ By the end of 1941 each *Einsatzgruppe* had received two gas vans specially constructed to funnel carbon-monoxide exhaust fumes through a rubber pipe into a hermetically sealed cargo area packed with people.⁷⁷

There were two types of vans in operation: the Diamond that could hold thirty people—if tightly packed—and the larger Saurer into which sixty people could be squeezed.⁷⁸ The principle victims targeted for extinction in gas vans were women and children—the two groups some soldiers had the most psychological difficulty shooting.⁷⁹ The gas vans were also used to kill Jews who had attempted escape, but were later captured and placed in “liquidation cells” in makeshift prisons. Typically, a group of Jews would be assembled and forced to strip down to their underclothes before being pushed into the van.⁸⁰ Once the engine was running the van would sit idle for five to ten minutes while the exhaust fumes entered the compartment and killed the human cargo.⁸¹ Once the occupants realized what was happening, they would scream and beat the walls of the van with their fists and feet. Most of them died within a few minutes due to a lack of oxygen to the brain, many of them vomiting and emptying their bowels in the process.⁸² The van was then driven to a burial site with an escort vehicle that carried some guards and at least four Jews. The Jews removed the dead bodies from the van, threw them into the pit, and then they were

⁷¹James M. Glass, *Life Unworthy of Life: Racial Phobia and Mass Murder in Hitler's Germany* (New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 61. All Reich health agencies were required to report children who were born with such congenital deformities as idiocy, Mongolism, microcephaly, hydrocephaly, missing limbs, malformation of the head, spina bifida, muscular dystrophy, mental retardation, and any other incurable deformity or condition.

⁷²*Ibid.*, 61. Family members were told their loved ones were being transferred for medical treatment. Soon after, they received a letter of sympathy informing them their loved one had died.

⁷³Yahil, 309; Glass, 61; There were those who never made it to the killing installation, instead killed at the hospital by an injection of morphine, injection of phenol into the heart, or chemical warfare agents.

⁷⁴Yahil, 309.

⁷⁵*Ibid.* The installations were shut down, but killing continued in hospitals with individuals being put to death by sleeping pills, fatal injections, and through starvation.

⁷⁶Eugen Kogon, ed., *A Documentary History of the Poison Gas* (London: Yale University Press, 1993), 54.

⁷⁷Yahil, 259.

⁷⁸Kogon, 54. Continually refining their method of extermination, the Nazis successfully moved from a euthanasia program, on to gas vans, which ultimately led to gas chambers being installed in death camps.

⁷⁹Fletcher, 29; Headland, 66.

⁸⁰Kogon, 65.

⁸¹*Ibid.*

⁸²*Ibid.*



shot, their bodies landing on the corpses they had just unloaded.⁸³

In June 1942 the RSHA received a report that read: "Since December 1941, ninety-seven thousand have been processed, using three vans, without any defects showing up in the vehicles."⁸⁴ Based on this report an additional ten vehicles were ordered and within a few months approximately thirty gas vans were operating in the Soviet Union.⁸⁵ However, as successful as the gas van was perceived to be by the RSHA, there were *Einsatzgruppen* leaders who refused to use them. The vans were often impossible to maneuver over uneven terrain and, in the rainy season, they were inoperable on muddy roads. It was easier to have the Jews march themselves to a killing site. An added problem was the limited capacity of the vans, which made the extermination process more time consuming and less productive than a firing squad that could eliminate hundreds in short order. Ironically, from a psychological standpoint, soldiers preferred shooting: witnessing gassing victims whose contorted faces and bodies were often covered in bodily excretions took an emotional and physical toll, with soldiers complaining that the stench brought on headaches after each unloading.⁸⁶

The inventor of the vans, Dr. August Becker, an SS Lieutenant, discovered that instead of opening the carbon-monoxide valves all at once, they should be gradually opened. This change in procedure alleviated the suffering of the victims and allowed them to "fall asleep peacefully" before dying which, in turn, eliminated contorted faces and the filth from defecation.⁸⁷ Still, despite

this improvement, the vans simply could not handle the mass extermination of millions of more Jews in a feasible time frame and, many *Einsatzgruppe* leaders still shunned their use because of the logistical problems.⁸⁸ Although the gas vans largely failed to meet the expectations of the killing units, death by gassing remained a viable killing method. Just as the *Einsatzgruppen* had ushered in Germany's mass extermination plan, their trials with the gas vans became the precursor to the most efficient killing method in history—gas chambers.⁸⁹

By 1942, with the gas chambers in extermination camps killing thousands a day in German occupied Poland, the men of the *Einsatzgruppen* added to the mounting death toll with their continued rampage in the Soviet Union. Seven days a week reports were filed by unit leaders and sent to Heydrich who demanded constant updates on the number of victims and the methods used to kill them. Apparently satisfied with the ongoing operation, by October 1941 Heydrich scaled back the required reporting to three days a week.⁹⁰ Although three types of reports flooded the RSHA office, the Operational Situation Reports were the most numerous and remain the most telling.⁹¹ The 195 reports issued between June 1941 and April 1942 closely resemble an accountant's ledger—with the number of killed in each city and town carefully recorded and the

the vans in some areas are so recognizable, that authorities and civilians alike refer to them as "Death Vans." He further states that he "gave instructions that all personnel should stay as far away as possible from the vans when the gassing is in progress to prevent damage to their health in the event of gas leaking out." Taken from The Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE), at www.us-israel.org.

⁸⁸Ibid.

⁸⁹Kogon, 107.

⁹⁰Calic, 251; Headland, 207.

⁹¹Headland, 13; There were "Activity and Situation Reports" and "Reports from the Occupied Eastern Territories."

⁸³Ibid., 65-6.

⁸⁴Kogon, 54-5. Quoted from original in Federal Archives, ref. R 58/871; certified copy in ZSL Coll., vol. 1, fols. 9ff.

⁸⁵Kogon, 54; Yahill, 260.

⁸⁶Yahil, 259; Rice, 75.

⁸⁷Rice, 75; Becker "thought of himself as a humanitarian." In a report dated 16 May 1942, he states that

victims categorized by gender, age, Jew, and non-Jew.⁹²

Another striking feature of the reports is the accompanying editorials. Some are written in an indifferent tone, others with enthusiasm, all, however, are laced in euphemisms to cloak the harshness of the words "murder" and "kill."⁹³ Additional attempts to cover up the murder of Jews are evident in the common justifications used for such actions. Jews were killed for creating "unrest and discontent," for exhibiting "an impudent and provocative attitude," for "spreading rumors" and for "sabotage" efforts.⁹⁴ One of the most frequent justifications used to kill Jews was the danger of epidemics—in line with the Nazi belief that Jews, as vermin, were the bearers of disease.⁹⁵

Karl Jager, commander of *Einsatzkommando 3* (CEK) who on 1 December 1941, reported that his unit had killed 137,346 in its five months of operation, wrote one of the most notorious reports. In cold detail Jager recorded the number of Jews, number of "Jewesses," and the number of Jewish children killed in the various Lithuanian towns and villages. In one instance, his group returned to a town they had already visited, Rasainai, to do what he termed "mopping up." He finished the report by stating: "Today I can confirm that our objective, to solve the Jewish problem

for Lithuania, has been achieved by EK (*Einsatzkommando*) 3."⁹⁶

As Jager's report reveals, Jews were the specific targets of the *Einsatzgruppen*. While many of the reports noted the execution of communists, the primary purpose of the reports was to detail the actions against the Jews whose deaths far outnumbered those of non-Jews. In a report dated 29 August 1941, a Kommando unit reports that after shooting 1,265 Jews, "partly younger ones," 3,105 more Jews and 34 communists were "liquidated" in Chernovtsy.⁹⁷ Another report, filed by *Sonderkommando 7* on 23 September 1941, stated that in a "large-scale anti-Jewish action," 920 Jews in the village of Lahoyks were "executed." The report finished with the assurance that the "village may now be described as 'free of Jews.'"⁹⁸ *Einsatzkommando 9*, on 4 September 1941, reported that it was "forced to execute another 46 persons, among them 38 intellectual Jews who had tried to create unrest."⁹⁹ In these reports, as in the hundreds of others filed, the central focus of the correspondence is on the number of Jews killed: 7,800 Jews "liquidated" in Kuanas, 40,699 Jews "executed" by *Einsatzgruppen D* in a two week period, 30,000 "liquidated" in Kiev, and 140 "had" to be shot in an area near Leningrad because they "belonged to the Jewish race."¹⁰⁰

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Ibid., 75. A representative list of the euphemisms would include: action, special action, large-scale action, reprisal action, pacification action, radical action, special treatment, special measures, overhauling, rendered harmless, Jewish problem solved, and more.

⁹⁴Glass, 110-1. Quoted in Yitzhak Arad, and other eds., *The Einsatzgruppen Reports: Selections from the Dispatches of the Nazi Death Squads' Campaign Against the Jews, July 1941 – January 1943* (New York: Holocaust Library, 1989).

⁹⁵Headland, 81.

⁹⁶The "Jager" Report, Jewish Student Online Research Center (JSOURCE), [database online] available at <http://www.us-israel.org>. "Jewesses" refers to Jewish adult women.

⁹⁷Glass, 111. Quoted in Arad, *The Einsatzgruppen Reports*, 149, 151.

⁹⁸Ibid., 110.

⁹⁹Ibid., 111.

¹⁰⁰Excerpts from various Operational Situation Reports. See JSOURCE. The 7,800 figure derived from Operational Situation Report USSR No. 19, 11 July 1941; the 40,699 figure is taken from Operational Situation Report USSR No. 117, 18 October 1941; the 30,000 figure is taken from Operational Situation Report USSR No. 126, 27 October 1941; the 140 that "had" to be shot is described in Opera



Nazi Soldiers of the Waffen-SS and the Reich Labor Service look on as a member of Einsatzgruppe D prepares to shoot a Ukrainian Jew kneeling on the edge of a mass grave filled with the bodies of previous victims. Library of Congress, courtesy of USHMM Photo Archives.

tional Situation Report USSR No. 173, 25 February 1941.

The full extent of Nazi destruction was unknown when allied forces discovered a two-ton collection of documents in the Gestapo building in Berlin at the end of World War II. After more than a year of sorting through these documents, a damning set of two thousand nine hundred pages detailing the murderous actions of the *Einsatzgruppen* was uncovered. It is from these records, together with court testimonies of unit commanders, Reich personnel and eyewitnesses at the Nuremberg Trials in 1947, that their intentions and the breadth of their actions became indisputably clear.¹⁰¹

Despite the evidence provided by the reports, the exact number of people killed by the *Einsatzgruppen* remains unknown. Although, based largely on these reports it is estimated that these mobile killing squads murdered 1.4 million Jews before the end of the war in 1945. The leaders who filed the reports later claimed they had exaggerated the numbers.¹⁰² When Case 9, *United States vs. Otto Ohlendorf et al.*, of the United States Military Tribunals began in Nuremberg on 15 September 1947, twenty-four commanders and officers of the *Einsatzgruppe* were forced to defend themselves against three indictments.¹⁰³ Count one accused them of crimes against humanity—specifically extermination acts against civilian populations based on religious, political, and racial criteria. Count two charged them with conventional war crimes, i.e., the ill treatment of prisoners and civilians in German occupied territories. Count three charged them with membership in German

organizations that had been declared illegal—principally the SS and Gestapo.¹⁰⁴

The seven members of the prosecution team took just two days to present their case, confident that the reports—which the defense team agreed, were authentic—provided such incriminating evidence that a guilty verdict was certain.¹⁰⁵ But, while the reports provided proof of *Einsatzgruppen* actions, it was Ohlendorf's testimony that offered insight into the general mentality of the accused murderers. Prosecutors pressed a resistant Ohlendorf to explain what, if any, moral judgments he was forced to confront in the performance his duties. After repeated questioning, Ohlendorf finally insisted that "as a soldier and, therefore a wheel in a low position, relatively, of a great machinery," he was forced to "surrender" his moral conscience like any other soldier, in any other army, in war-time. When asked by the judge how this justified the killing of defenseless people during the Russian invasion, he answered:

...With my own eyes I saw 60,000 people die within 24 hours – that I am not prepared, or in a position to give today a moral judgment about that order, because in the course of this connection these factors seem to me to be above a moral standard. These years are for me a unit separate from the rest. Full of ruthlessness to destroy and to be inhuman – until today, your Honor, and I am not in a position to take one occurrence or rather a small event of what I experienced and to isolate it, and to value it morally in this

¹⁰¹Headland, 14.

¹⁰²JSOURCE.

¹⁰³John Mendelsohn, United States National Archives and Records Service. *Nuremberg: War Crimes Trials Records of Case 9. United States of America v. Otto Ohlendorf, et al.* (Washington D.C.: General Services Administration, 1978), 1.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., 3. "The third count embodied membership after September 1, 1939, in organizations declared illegal by the International Military Tribunal" held prior to the U.S. Military Tribunal that heard the *Einsatzgruppen* case.

¹⁰⁵Headland, 165. The prosecution presented its evidence on 29 and 30 September 1947.

connection. I ask you to understand that from a human point of view.¹⁰⁶

Each of the defendants had their own team of lawyers that, over a sixty-one day period, collectively presented 753 exhibits, (two-thirds of which were personal affidavits), 51 witnesses, and excerpts from the *Einsatzgruppen* reports.¹⁰⁷ The thrust of the defense argument was that, despite the authenticity of the reports, the factual errors and exaggerated figures made them unreliable.¹⁰⁸ Ohlendorf, who earlier as a witness before the International Military Tribunal stated his unit killed approximately ninety thousand people, testified in this trial that only about half that number were killed.¹⁰⁹ Arthur Nebe, leader of *Einsatzgruppen* B, though not a defendant in this trial, was singled out by one defendant as having been “not very exact with his zeros,” and by another who said he increased the figures “in order to improve his position in Berlin.” Paul Blobel, commander of *Sonderkommando* 4a, testified that the number of Jews killed in the massacre at Babi Yar was only half of the 33,771 reported.¹¹⁰ However, there were defendants, such as Walter Blume, leader of *Sonderkommando* 7a, and Willy Seibert, Deputy Chief of *Einsatzgruppen* D, who stood by their reported figures, claimed they felt it “unworthy to file a false

report.”¹¹¹ Still, while the reported figures



The Einsatzgruppen in action: Mother and child become victims during a mass shooting near Ivangorod, Ukraine, 1942.

www.ascension-research.org.aimee.html

were disputed in open court, none of the defendants, and none of their lawyers, denied killings took place. The strategy of focusing on the exaggerated numbers was an attempt to reduce the enormity of the crime, and spare the lives of the accused.¹¹²

On 10 April 1948, 22 of the original 24 accused stood before the tribunal for sentencing. (One defendant had been “severed from the case” earlier because of a reduced physical state brought on by Parkinson’s Disease, and another had committed suicide).¹¹³ Fourteen of the 22 defendants were sentenced to death by hanging, two were given life in prison, three were sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, two received 10 year sentences and one was released for time already served.¹¹⁴ All defendants, with the exception of one, filed clemency petitions to the military governor, General Lucius D. Clay, who confirmed all the

¹⁰⁶Dr. S. D. Stein, *The Einsatzgruppen Case, Military Tribunal, Case No. 9, Testimony of Otto Ohlendorf* 302-8 of court transcripts. Available at: <http://www.ess.uwc.ac.uk/Einsatz3b.htm>. Prosecutors had a difficult time getting Ohlendorf to directly answer questions regarding the morality of his actions. When asked, “You refused to make any moral judgment then, and you refuse now to make any moral judgment?” Ohlendorf replied, “Yes.”

¹⁰⁷Mendelsohn, 195; List of defense teams representing each of the twenty-four defendants. Headland, 165.

¹⁰⁸Headland, 166.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 171. Mendelsohn, 2.

¹¹⁰Headland, 171.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Mendelsohn, 3.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

sentences on 4 and 25 March.¹¹⁵ However, on 31 January 1951, at the recommendation of the Advisory Board on Clemency for War Criminals, High Commissioner John J. McCloy, reduced the sentences of 16 of the men and, by 9 May 1958, all had been released from prison. Of the remaining five, one was extradited to Belgium where he was tried and sentenced to death for crimes he had committed there. High Commissioner McCloy refused to grant clemency to four of the men sentenced to death because, "the responsibility of the defendants is so clear and direct and the nature of the offenses so shocking that the clemency has no meaning as applied to them."¹¹⁶

More shocking is that while all of the *Einsatzgruppen* members who stood trial were admitted murderers, none of them joined Paul Blobel, Werner Braune, Eric Naumann, and Otto Ohlendorf on the gallows 7 June 1951.¹¹⁷ It is difficult to comprehend that people personally involved in such a large-scale murder operation would be assigned varying degrees of culpability when there existed no varying degrees of dead for the millions of Jews and other innocents who fell to the men of the *Einsatzgruppen*. Why Commissioner McCloy acquiesced to the recommendations of the Advisory Board on Clemency for War Criminals and excused the majority of those found guilty only a few years earlier, is a curious question. At sentencing the defendants' guilt and the atrocity of their crimes was not lost on presiding judge, Justice Michael

Musmanno who, at the end of the trial, wrote:


One reads and reads these accounts of which here we can give only a few excerpts and yet there remains the instinct to disbelieve, to question, to doubt. There is less of a mental barrier in accepting the weirdest stories of supernatural phenomena, as for instance, water running up hill and trees with roots reaching toward the sky, than in taking at face value these narratives which go beyond the frontiers of human cruelty and savagery. Only the fact that the reports from which we have quoted came from the pens of men within the accused organizations can the human mind be assured that all this actually happened. The reports and the statements of the defendants themselves verify what otherwise would be dismissed as the product of a disordered imagination.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁵Ibid. The single defendant who did not appeal to the mercy of the court was Gustav Nosske, Commander of *Einsatzkommando* 12, who had been handed a life sentence.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

¹¹⁷Ibid, 3-4; Headland, 163; "Not all those persons who had been *Kommando* leaders for the 1941-1944 period were defendants at the *Einsatzgruppen* trial. Some had not yet been discovered and were tried in later trials."

¹¹⁸Edeiken, 13; Reference taken from the Judgment of the Tribunal, 50.



**American Holocaust: The
Conquest of the New World**
By David E. Stannard

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)

In 1992 Europeans and Americans had occasion to celebrate the 500th anniversary of Columbus's arrival in the Western Hemisphere, an event long heralded for its epochal significance in the material and intellectual advance of Western civilization. Despite persistence of the popular mythology surrounding the "discovery" of the New World, understanding of the importance of the European expansion that occurred after 1492 has been radically and irreversibly transformed by the events of the last century. One such event was the systematic extermination of six million Jews by the Nazi regime, an event that has become universally recognized by the term "holocaust." The fact that the Columbian Quincentennial concurs with the fiftieth anniversary of the institution of Hitler's Final Solution at Auschwitz is a coincidence not lost upon David Stannard. In *American Holocaust*:

The Conquest of the New World, Stannard asserts, "the destruction of the Indians of the Americans was, far and away, the most massive act of genocide in the history of the world" (x). The origin of this destruction, like that of the Jewish Holocaust and numerous other genocides, is located in both the immediate historical context and the "religio-cultural traits" of European society that "prophesied, prepared for, and brought to maturity a frame of mind" that justified four centuries of genocide against the native peoples of the Americas (184).

The central purpose of Stannard's blistering account of the European conquest of the Americas is to provide comprehension of the magnitude of native destruction and the causes of a purposeful genocide long ignored or distorted by European and American historical narratives. To this extent, Stannard begins with a survey of the historical origins, cultural diversity, and demographic characteristics of the indigenous populations of North, South, and Meso-America. Combining dramatic developments in recent scholarship with the earliest firsthand European accounts of Native American life, Stannard demonstrates the world that has been lost, an element often diminished by the overwhelming statistical calculations involved. At the same time, Stannard's survey of pre-Columbian civilizations and cultures is an assault on the ethnocentric, morally legitimizing, and willfully distorted nature of Western characterizations of the native peoples of the Americas. Though recognition of the civilizations of the Aztecs and Incas is summarily given, the rest of the Americas has been frequently dismissed as a barbaric wasteland. Stannard cites eminent scholars such as Bernard Bailyn and Hugh Trevor-Roper as examples of authors who present the Eurocentric racial contempt and cultural conceit that has relegated indigenous American peoples and their territories to the status of a handful of backward peo-

ples, without a significant history or future, roaming an empty wilderness (13).

On the contrary, Stannard contends that pre-Columbian America likely exceeded late fifteenth century Europe in population, and certainly surpassed the Old World in terms of cultural diversity and material well-being. Claiming there is "no benefit to be gained" by countering the long established anti-Indian tradition of Western historiography with "pro-Indian propaganda of equally dubious veracity," Stannard suggests the people of the Americas prior to 1492 should be approached as "just human" (51). The relative nature of cultural tastes and attitudes should naturally indicate that some of their social practices may appear abhorrent in light of our present standards, but no more so than certain practices of their European or Asian counterparts. Even so, in Stannard's comparative perspective, European civilization is often found wanting. For example, Native American social practices of child rearing, codes of friendship and loyalty, concerns for the environment, and culturally transcendent capacities for hospitality appear to Stannard as "far more enlightened than do many of the dominant ideas that we ourselves live with today" (52). For Stannard, the tragic irony of European contact with the indigenous peoples of the Americas was that their cultural and material achievements, particularly their extraordinarily good health provided by millennia of isolation from epidemic Old World diseases, were the ingredients of their undoing, exploited against them by their European conquerors.

After describing the cultural wealth and diversity of the peoples of the Western Hemisphere, Stannard narrates the catastrophic consequences of the European's arrival in 1492. "[F]rom almost the instant of first human contact between Europe and the Americas, firestorms of microbial pestilence and purposeful genocide began laying

waste the American natives" (xii). Stannard admits that of the twin forces of destruction inaugurated by European contact, disease was the greatest cause of death in quantitative terms, but the story of the deliberate racist purge perpetrated by Europeans over the four and half centuries following their arrival in the New World is his primary concern. Stannard's relentless determination to expose the causes and consequences of this genocide is intended as a corrective to existing scholarship that has displaced moral responsibility by explaining of the near extinction of indigenous populations as the inadvertent and inevitable consequence of human migration and disease, and more often has ignored the genocidal element entirely. Stannard's account of the genocide that began under the Spanish and Portuguese in Central and South America and continued under the Anglo-Americans in North America is a sordid and horrific story drawn from the firsthand accounts of the perpetrators themselves and quantified by current demographic scholarship. Stannard estimates the European conquest took the lives of one hundred million Native Americans, a number that represents an average of 95 percent of the various indigenous populations of the Western Hemisphere.

The last part of Stannard's work is devoted to a discussion of the ideological justifications and material causes of the American Holocaust. For the purpose of comparative analysis, Stannard makes reference to other historical examples of genocide, particularly the Jewish Holocaust and European anti-Semitism. In this manner, Stannard identifies the key to explaining the motivations behind both the Jewish and American Holocausts in a statement made by Elie Wiesel regarding the perpetrators of the Jewish Holocaust that "all the killers were Christian" (153). Thus Stannard locates the ideological roots of the genocide carried out against the inhabitants of the New World in

Christianity, the core of European thought and culture, and specifically in its socio-cultural attitudes towards sex, race, and violence. The "European adventurers and colonists who rushed through the breach were representatives of a religious culture that was as theologically arrogant and violence-justifying as any the world had ever seen" (242).

In a sweeping survey of the history of Christian European culture, Stannard summarizes the European worldview at the dawn of the Age of Discovery as self-despising and repulsed by sex and the body. Its exemplars, obsessed with pain and degradation, held a conceptualization of an external and internal wilderness to be feared and pursued at the same time. Its vision of fallen humanity was the product of its mythical progenitors who had succumbed to sensual temptation as unclothed inhabitants of an innocent Earthly Paradise. They held these beliefs with an absolute certainty, which justified intolerance and holy war against heretics and pagans as part of divine providence. Their belief system also demonstrated a set of antithetical tendencies: "revulsion from the terror of pagan or heretical pollution and, simultaneously, eagerness to make all the world's repulsive heretics and pagans into followers of Christ" (242). Stannard asserts this Christian European tradition underlying racism and genocide was modified by Protestant Capitalism and secularized into the political ideology of Imperialism in the late eighteenth century.

Stannard judiciously observes that "it is the particular conditions of a given time and place that bring on events of historical consequence," and that long-term and deeply imbedded cultural themes placing "the burden of historical explanation solely on evolved collective consciousness, . . . by itself cannot explain why individual events occurred when and where they did" (184). Again making a parallel to the Jewish Holo-

caust of the twentieth century, Stannard contends that both the Jewish and American Holocausts require a multi-level exploration that considers the historical, cultural, political, economic, and military aspects of genocide. The remainder of Stannard's analysis of the causes of the genocide against Native Americans focuses on the dynamism of ideas, contemporary upheaval, and religious, socio-economic, and military circumstances that marked the final years of fifteenth century Europe. Stannard comments that the era of Christopher Columbus was marked by near economic and social collapse wrought by war and pestilence, as well as corrupt political and religious leadership thirsty for wealth and power. Religious sentiments reflected apocalyptic and millennialistic anticipations and a boiling point that soon erupted in the Reformation and over a century of subsequent religious warfare and persecution. In Stannard's estimation, Columbus himself, as evidenced by his actions and writings, serves as "an especially active and dramatic embodiment of the European mind and soul of his time" (199).



The continuing evolution of Western ideology and material realities influenced the course of the conquest of the New World, and also distinguished the earlier genocide inflicted by the Spanish from the later one at the hands of Anglo-Americans. For the Spanish, genocide of the indigenous population was not the primary goal. It was the consequence of their virtual enslavement of the Indians, more often than not by mass murder, torture, and mutilation, to accomplish their economic objectives of reaping quick profits of bullion with minimal expenditure of labor and capital. Stannard argues the Spanish justified their definition of the natives as subhuman natural slaves by appealing to ancient Christian and European truths from Aristotle to Aquinas. In contrast the British and Americans had little economic use for Indian servitude since wealth

in North America required a more individual and long-term investment in land, and large-scale agricultural enterprises had secured their labor force through the African slave trade. For Anglo-Americans hungry for land, extermination of Native Americans was the end goal. Stannard contends they appealed "to other Christian and European sources of wisdom to justify their genocide" (247). They defined the Indians as Satan's helpers, savages, and vermin, beyond conversion to Christianity or civility, the inevitable casualties of American progress.

David Stannard's survey of the destruction of humanity that followed in wake of Columbus's landing in the Western Hemisphere, and his stinging indictment of the European cultural and religious attitudes that justified what he calls the greatest genocide in the history of the world is a striking example of the transformation of the historiography of European and American expansion in the New World. It is perhaps no small irony that Frederick Jackson Turner's famous presentation to the American Historical Association occurred at the World's Columbian Exposition at Chicago in 1893. In that era of world dominance by the West, the nationalistic and triumphalist overtones of Turner's influential thesis had academic and popular appeal to a nation seeking to establish its own place in the constellation of great Western nation-states. Though the United States' star would continue to rise, other cataclysmic events—the First and Second World Wars, the Great Depression, the break-up of European Colonialism, and the struggle for civil, minority, and women's rights—have eroded Eurocentric and Anglo-American notions of ideological and cultural superiority. The historiographical consequence of this transformation has been the abandonment of historical narratives that emphasize political, economic, and military themes and chronicle the march of European and American progress. In the wake of

postmodernist thought, historians have affirmed a multicultural and humanistic approach, which on one hand has sought the revision of established interpretations, and on the other breaking of new ground on peoples and subjects long neglected by cultural and racial myopia. Concerning the history of European expansion into the Western Hemisphere and the American West, recent scholarship is no longer content to discuss the significance of Turner's thesis or the longstanding debate of interpretation it has engendered. The story scholars now wish to tell is that of the world that has been lost, of the human and environmental consequences of the world that we have gained, and of the experience of those participants who have been neglected. Herein lies the value of David Stannard's contribution to the history of the European and American conquest of the Western Hemisphere. It is a grim tale, but one which needs to be told if we are to accurately comprehend the historical legacy of the events that have transpired since that fateful October day in 1492. While one can clearly disagree with Stannard's interpretation of the ideological origins and possibly the extent of intentional genocide and even accuse him of romanticizing Native American culture while demonizing its European counterpart, his appropriation of J. Robert Oppenheimer's reflection from the *Bhagavad-Gita* rings true. A world with millennia of its own history and untold human diversity was irretrievably shattered.

- Mike Brown



Spectacular Realities: Early Mass Culture in fin-de-siècle Paris. By Vanessa R. Schwartz

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998)

Vanessa R. Schwartz, an assistant Professor of history at American University, conceived of this work as her dissertation for the history department at U. C. Berkeley. It has been revised and expanded into this current volume. The book itself is organized into five chapters and includes a lengthy introduction and conclusion. Each chapter builds on the previous as the author constructs her argument to explain the formation of a new mass culture transcending class and gender in *fin de siècle* Paris. She asserts that this new crowd was undergoing a cultural revolution unified by the act of consumerism rather than by acts of violence and political uprising which some argue has defined "The Crowd" in revolutionary Paris. In the introduction Schwartz lays out her theoretical assertions regarding modernity and discusses the social theories to which this work responds. She

refutes the theories of modernity proposed by postmodernist and deconstructionist philosophers and historians. Schwartz takes aim particularly at the notion advocated by Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, T. J. Clark, and Guy Debord that the alienation of the members of this new consumer society was a defining characteristic of modernity.

Schwartz is a cultural historian influenced by the postmodernist climate. She emphasizes semiotic analysis and promotes the importance of representations of forms and their primacy in understanding mass culture. This is articulated in the introduction as she states "any history is a history of representation because modes of representation constituted rather than merely characterized modern urban culture (4)." The author undertakes the difficult task of defining concepts like modernity, mass culture, spectacle, and "the crowd" as she writes her narrative of the development of mass culture in late nineteenth century Paris. The book is written in a readable, literary style thankfully lacking postmodernist jargon. *Spectacular Realities* will enjoy a wide readership including the general audience and students of history interested in learning more about the unique culture of *fin-de-siècle* Paris. This is due in part to the easy to follow narrative but more expressly because of her unique approach to analyzing the social and political implications of *fin-de-siècle* Parisian popular culture through bizarre topics including dead babies, dismembered women, and wax museum exhibits of murder and mystery that culminate with the emergence of cinema. However, this work will also appeal to professional and academic social scientists and historians as it provides a theoretical analysis of mass society.

Spectacular Realities is an examination of the development of a "new collectivity" through popular cultural forms including newsprint, exhibitions at the city


morgue, the wax museum, the proliferation of dioramas and panoramas, and cinema (3). These spectacles created a new urban crowd unified by consumerism and the “spectacular realities” of their Paris lives which differed from the previous collective that was unified through political revolution and violence (4-5). Schwarz proves that the experience of belonging to an urban collectivity did not disappear at the turn of the century. Moreover, this “new crowd” expanded to include men and women of all classes thus blurring class and gender distinctions in the formation of this new mass culture.

The author directly refutes the work of Foucault who argues for the individuation and alienation of people in society as a reaction to modernity, which incorporates the uncertainty of the end of the century, the implications of the industrial revolution, and expanding capitalism in the form of consumerism (5). T. J. Clark (*The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and His Followers*) echoes this idea of alienation in his analysis of late nineteenth century society through impressionist painting where members of the community are alone in a crowd. However, he also asserts that society experienced a blurring of the lines between classes with particular attention paid to the rising petit bourgeois. Inspired by the work of Clark, Schwartz also blurs the lines of class distinction as she argues that the spectacular exhibits in Paris drew Parisians together regardless of class or gender. She draws on the work of Benedict Anderson in *Imagined Communities*, who impressed upon the reader the power of newsprint to create a collective identity. Schwartz promotes the idea that “a newspaper created an ‘imagined community’ through which its otherwise unconnected readers were able to participate in a shared community—evoked and constructed in the newspaper (26).”

The linking of written and visual texts is the primary theme connecting the five chapters “as word and image generated the spectacular realities described here (3).” The first two chapters nicely link the author’s assertion of the necessary relationship between text and image in the formation of the “new crowd.” With the increased literacy of the population and mass circulation, the newspaper created an image of reality. The public morgue provided graphic images to the newspaper text and invited the visitors of the morgue to vicariously live the sensationalism they read about in the newspapers. The morgue, a public institution purporting to provide a public service of allowing visitors to help identify anonymous bodies, became a free theater in which the viewers became participants in the spectacular reality of Parisian life created through text and image (82).

Chapter three, focusing on the *Musee Greven*, addresses spectacle as a commodity. It is here that the author rejects Charles Baudelaire’s concept of *Flaneur* as male and middle class acting as an aloof and detached spectator. She redefines the term as a position of power exercised by the new mass culture rather than a “person of any particular class or gender (9, 131).” As the author analyzes the wax museum exhibits and the interest they generated, she asserts that the spectator was then able to participate in the spectacle and “command it at the same time (10).” This section is a bridge between the first two chapters and the last two chapters that trace the development of cinema.

The last two chapters expand on the concept of visuality as a part of modern urban life. The panorama and diorama enhanced the reality effect and paved the way for the emergence of cinema. It is argued effectively that early cinema evolved from other forms of visual mass culture,



namely, newsprint, the morgue, the Musée Grévin, and the "O-rama craze." The author concludes that a new mass culture did emerge in *fin de siècle* Paris, that it transcended class and gender, and this commodity culture defines modernity.

Through both primary and secondary sources, Schwartz analyses cultural theory. Schwartz should be commended for her archival research and use of primary source material that supports her presentation of the spectacles. However, Schwartz is speculating about how these Parisian participants reacted to the spectacle. She lacks the evidence to support her claim that social bonds were developed among the members of the "new crowd." Diaries, correspondence, police reports, and judicial reports to name a few could have been utilized to support the main argument of "belonging" in this new urban society. Secondary sources are used effectively to expose the social theories she refutes. The work of Foucault, Debord, T. J. Clark, and others becomes part of the author's historiographical discussion in which she asserts her own theory of the development of mass culture and its relation to modernity in turn of the century Paris.

This work is an interesting and innovative approach to the development of mass culture; however, the general thesis of defining modernity through the development of mass culture becomes complicated by the long list of goals found in the introduction that the author purports to address. Several assertions are neither completely developed nor adequately addressed in the body of the work. The introduction is filled with statements asserting what the book "attempts" to accomplish and what the author "suggests." Unfortunately Schwartz has bitten off more than she can chew. She has "attempted" but not necessarily accomplished what she set out to do. The idea that "spectacular realities" should be


included in the definition of mass society along with the democratization of politics, the fruitlessness of mass uprising, and increased standards of living is a bold assertion but lacks adequate development. Flanerie as a "liberating and even democratizing effect" is introduced on page six and only again briefly discussed. Also, the opinion that the spectator commanded the spectacle is not adequately supported. Participation in the spectacle does not necessitate controlling the spectacle. Schwartz also attests to argue that Paris was an innovator of mass cultural forms (8). However, this is not addressed in the body of the work.

Schwartz leaves the reader with several unanswered questions. How did the spectator command the spectacle? How did this new collective displace class conflict? Are we to believe it was simply through the act of simultaneously viewing the spectacles Paris had to offer? Also, was this "new crowd" actually enjoying sociability or were they only unified by participation in the spectacle but alienated from each other? Also lacking is a discussion of the fetishness of the commodity culture.

Schwartz achieves success in her analysis of the development of mass culture and she provides the reader with a vivid picture of the unique characteristics of the leisure activities enjoyed by Parisians. The author also provides a viable alternative to the alienation theory of modern society put forth by proponents of postmodernism and deconstructionism. The themes of modernity, consumerism, mass culture formation, urban spectacle, and class distinction are brought to the attention of the reader. However, the significant link between word and image and its connection to modern cinema is Schwartz's greatest achievement in this book. This is a worthwhile and entertaining book to read. Not only does it give the reader insights in

to *fin de siècle* Parisian culture, but it also exposes us to several important social theories that effect the study of history.

-Allison Rubalcalva



Westering Women and the Frontier Experience, 1800-1915. By Sandra L. Myres.

(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982)

A Few Good Women: An Unconvincing Thesis

Sandra Myres' *Westering Women* is a comprehensive study of the women who settled the region west of the Mississippi River during the nineteenth century. She describes their participation in the frontier experience by examining what ordinary women themselves had to say about it in their diaries, journals, and letters. Included are Spanish, French, and English colonial frontiers and the region west of the Appalachians as well as the perceptions of Indian, Hispanic, and Negro women, but the book focuses mainly on the trans-Mississippi west and white women of English ancestry. Some of the topics documented include the overland journey, frontier homemaking, community activities, the struggle for suf-

frage, and entrepreneurial attempts. She does not discuss immigrant women, demographic distribution, or comparisons between Western and Eastern women. The author describes her book as "an account of women's participation in a unique human experience—the settlement and development of the North American continent—based on what women wrote about their experiences" (xvi).

Myres begins with discussion of the traditional images of frontier women that have influenced historical writing. She ridicules the stereotype of the "frightened, tearful woman wrenched from home and hearth and dragged off into the terrible West where she is condemned to a life of lonely terror among savage beasts and rapine Indians" (1). She dismisses the equally erroneous yet positive image of the "Madonna of the Prairies", the determined, sturdy, civilizing helper, bravely facing unknown dangers (3). A third image rejected is the portrayal of frontier women as bad characters similar to "the Calamity Jane who drank, smoked, and cursed and was handy with a poker deck, a six-gun, and a horse" (4).

Myres's work is an attempt to understand the variety of women's frontier experiences by recognizing the existence of the brave Madonna, the drudge, and the Calamity Jane as stereotypes but not myths. They existed but their stories were exceptions. She believes that the truth lies in the fact that frontierswomen comprised a variety of personalities rather than any one type. Emphasizing the different backgrounds, experiences, and responses of westering women, Myers examines their preconceptions about the frontier, Indians, Mexican-Americans, and other groups. She asks how these ideas were changed or adapted by experience. Considering women's ideas about their role in the family and the community, she explores how experience in the West changed their views of themselves. Finally, she con-

siders whether women's reactions and adaptations to the frontier were different from those of men. Always, in reaching conclusions, she refers to the voluminous words written by educated middle-class women traveling west in the nineteenth century.


Woven throughout the narrative is the author's primary theme: that frontier conditions allowed women opportunities to expand their activities beyond the traditionally accepted sphere of women's domain, defined by the nineteenth century "cult of true womanhood" (6). The traditional conception of the ideal woman at that time included piety, purity, submissiveness, and domesticity. Women were expected to be the moral guardians of the family, to be morally superior, and especially, to be protected inside the safety and privacy of the family. But this idealized image of females became unrealistic because frontier women were unable to remain on a pedestal. Survival in the wilderness required their labor and ingenuity. Myres believes that although Western women's roles in society did not change radically, they steadily increased in importance to the family and community throughout the nineteenth century as a result of the frontier experience. Political and economic activities expanded as a result of enfranchisement, reform of legal codes, and women's utilization of new economic opportunities.

A corollary theme is that the Western experience for women did not differ significantly from that of men. Myres demonstrates that both men and women expressed ambivalent feelings about traveling west. They both admitted fear of the unknown and displayed regret and sadness at leaving friends and family behind, yet most articulated an overall enthusiasm for the journey because they recognized the potential opportunity it offered. Indians were perceived ambivalently by both sexes as either "bestial savages" who deserved only extermination,

or they were idealized as noble primitives who lived naturally in a condition of goodness.

Not surprisingly, Myres documents discrimination and intolerance toward Indians, Mexicans, Mormons, poor whites, and the few African-Americans who traveled West during the nineteenth century. She claims that both men's and women's diaries, journals, and letters reflected this with relative equality. The author admits a possible exception in the sentiment toward Mormons, noting that female criticism directed at the practice of polygamy seemed more bitter than that of men. Yet, she proposes that intolerance overall was less pronounced on the frontier than in the East or the South.

One of the strengths of the book is its humorous citation of source material in support of the conclusions concerning the Overland Trail and frontier homemaking. Myres maintains that many men, as well as women, were inexperienced at frontier life when they began traveling west. Her description of men and women as they learned new chores and skills is delightful and entertaining. She quotes women's complaints in their diaries about the men's inept handling of stock, lack of expertise in repairing wagons, fording streams, and setting up camps. The women noted men's lack of experience in using weapons and related that accidental shootings were common. One woman recalled, "Yesterday evening we killed a beef," adding, "The boys shot at it about 50 times before they got it" (104). On the female side, the author relates stories about women's inexperience and difficulty in cooking on the trail. Overcoming their squeamishness in order to cook with "buffalo chips" was just the beginning. One woman wrote that chips made "an excellent mosquito repellent" and that they "smoked the mosquitoes out" of the wagon because they could tolerate it longer than the mosquitoes (106). Apart from the adaptation to



buffalo chips, many women had never cooked over an open fire, and Myres's description of frontier attempts to wrestle with a kettle until it stood upright, while keeping the smoke out of the eyes, and ashes out of the food, elicits humor and sympathy from the reader.

Myres challenges feminist historians who have focused on the drudgery of frontier wives, the failure of husbands to appreciate their efforts, and their exclusion from the decision-making process. She concludes that the evidence disputes this interpretation, claiming that most women felt that their work was respected and that their role was a cooperative and an important one within the family. Frontier women found new ways to express themselves and new avenues of personal development and satisfaction, she believes.

Although Myres points out that men as well as women often suffered from loneliness, isolation, and separation from family and friends, she admits that men often had more freedom of movement than women, whose work usually confined them to the home. The traditional nonparticipation of women in community activities gradually changed in Western communities as women began to participate in public affairs through schools and churches. Women were active in voluntary associations that attempted to reform frontier society and when these failed, they organized political pressure groups that lobbied for a variety of reform measures. Myres views these activities as exceeding the limited sphere of women's accepted place. Thus, she credits the frontier environment with offering new opportunities for women to expand the traditional definition of the female sphere.

The wealth of primary source material cited in support of Myres's arguments is another of the book's outstanding strengths. Some are published and well known, but most are little known manuscripts from

more than four hundred collections located in various libraries, state historical societies, and archives. The footnotes identify specific quotations yet also refer to additional source material available on related topics. Most sources cited on Mexican and Indian women are oral histories from provincial archives in California, New Mexico, and Texas, or from the Federal Writer's Project. Myres's research and writing benefited from grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Huntington Library, among others. In addition, the selection of black and white photographs and drawings nicely illustrate the author's themes. Stereotypical images of women such as the Madonna of the Prairie are depicted as well as more realistic images of frontier women.

Unfortunately, Myres is only partially successful in presenting her thesis. She is convincing in her argument that women expanded their sphere of activities during the nineteenth century, but she is less persuasive in her claim that this change occurred primarily as a result of the frontier environment. Without a comparison with Eastern or Southern women of the same period, the reader remains uncertain that the frontier condition was responsible for the changes discussed.


The lack of significant quantitative analysis also weakens the arguments. Specific studies giving a clear idea of the number of women involved in a particular activity, occupation, or opinion are rare. Perhaps this is inherent in the source material cited, but the continuous reference to "some, many, most, a number of, and a surprising number of" women is detrimental to the author's point.

The most serious weakness of the book is that it is greatly overextended. Myres attempts to include women from every area of the West, from all different cultures, for a period of more than a hundred years. The ambition of her endeavor is il-

illustrated by the title of the fourth chapter, "The Savage Within: Women, Race, Religion, and Class on the Frontier." A thorough discussion of women and religion would have been wiser than a superficial treatment of all of these topics.

Despite the limitations of an extended framework and lack of quantitative analysis, Sandra L. Myres is a competent historian and deserves commendation for her outstanding and exhaustive research. *Westering Women* is a seminal work—part of the burst of interest in women's history that included Julie Roy Jeffrey's *Frontier Women*, Glenda Riley's *Women on the American Frontier*, and John Mack Faragher's *Women and Men on the Overland Trail*. It undoubtedly has served as an influential example for the stunning explosion of output in the historical discipline on the subject of western women. Lillian Schlissel, Vicki Ruiz, and Janice Monk's *Western Women: Their Land, Their Lives* provides a more sophisticated analysis of different women in different cultures, and Jeffrey has recently revised her earlier work, *Frontier Women*. Riley has continued to publish in the field—her most recent work titled *Building and Breaking Families in the American West*, was published in 1996. Both of these works are examples of the specialization that has followed the larger interest of the subject of women in the West that first developed in the late seventies and early eighties. They provide further evidence of how the field is growing and of the impetus given it by Sandra Myres' path-breaking work, *Westering Women and the Frontier Experience*.

-Sharon Evanshine



**Contested Eden: California
Before the Gold Rush. Edited by
Ramon A. Gutierrez and Richard J.
Orsi**

(Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1998)

Ramon A. Gutierrez and Richard J. Orsi, working with the California Historical Society, enthusiastically submit a representative history of the state for the California Sesquicentennial. This first volume, in a series of four, reviews early California history to the year 1848, by analyzing the interplay of key relationships among the environment, Native peoples, Californios, the economy, race and gender, the missions, foreign immigration, and war. The editors have gathered together a number of essays written by a multi-disciplinary task force of anthropologists, historians, ecologists, geologists, and educators in order to present a model survey of contemporary thought to both scholar and lay reader.

Initially daunting for its size and all-encompassing subject matter, this edition is appreciated for its brisk and pleasant reading. Each chapter is an independent essay that allows the reader to pick up the book at

any point without confusion. This does, of course, lead to some repetition of subject matter, but the outcome is effective. Only Castaneda and Preston, (in chapters nine and ten respectively), tend to be somewhat repetitive in examining their most stimulating subjects of, correspondingly, gender relationships and environmental change. Many chapters offer conclusions facilitating perusal of the articles, enabling the browser to scan the essential points. The comprehensive endnotes, in addition, establish the extensive research that went into the essays and facilitate the refreshing sources. The articles offer, as well, historiographical information suggesting possible lines of inquiry and areas of research that leave the reader eagerly awaiting results of further studies. This soft-cover edition sets the scenario for a "Contested Eden" with a cover illustration of *Discovery of San Francisco Bay*, portraying the arrival of a small band of Spanish soldiers accompanied by priests. Weary travelers sit in the shade resting beside a man fallen either by the hardships of the trail or by illness. The players appear in place at this beginning of a tumultuous era in the history of California, representing the potential for (often-violent) conquest by those willing to take the risk in an unfamiliar domain.

Ongoing themes in *Contested Eden* stress the role of the Native Californians in the manipulation and use of ecological resources, the extensive variety of Indian languages and customs, their impressive adjustments in response to drastically changing social, economic, and political conditions, and the fact that California was not "found empty" by Europeans and Americans, but that "each had to fight the Indians for it" (202). The various authors also stress the importance of continuing research into untold histories and viewpoints of Indians, women, and even Californios in general, groups often ignored by the popular American version of the history of the area. Inter-

esting subjects such as the role of scientific knowledge and the Enlightenment (97), as well as motivations and reality regarding trade and colonization (97), whet the appetite for further inquiry into a "Pacific world worthy of research" (78).

While authors at times become zealous in emphasizing their most worthy arguments, a balance is achieved in the overall effect of the book. Anderson, Barbour and Whitworth (in chapter two) tend to overstate the ideal of the ecological balance between the Indian and nature while admitting that the impact of the initial settlers from across the Bering Straits is unknown. Assigning such incontestably positive (horticulture) practices to any culture lacks credibility, although the apparent balance with nature achieved by the Native Californians is impressive and undeniable. Preston, however, clarifies the role of the native by making the distinction of Indians as domesticators rather than farmers, vital to "ecological stability" (265), eventually and essentially decimated by "deadly germs, exotic plants and animals, and new economic practices (272). Also, while warning against "fantasies invented by their conquerors" (174). Monroy stresses the importance of looking at historiographical studies "in the Californio spirit of honor and grace" (192), even as Sandos insists that this history "must include the stories . . . behind the stories" (198), in the historical point of view. Simmons' suggestions of the limited use of "memory culture" (50), and Monroy's warnings regarding testimonials and "narrator's agendas . . . interviewer's biases and limited understanding of Spanish" (174) are designed to encourage responsible research by increasing awareness of pitfalls and assumptions. Another thought provoking approach is that of Sandos' recognition of a "simultaneity of (frontier) processes" in relating "contrasting views of the past" (199).

Various themes offer insight into frequently unrecognized subjects. In ac-

knowledge of the Spanish, Engstrand (in chapter four) brings to the force the bravery and daring which led to the impressive achievements of these explorers and their role in the scientific research under the influence of the Enlightenment. The efforts of these explorer/scientists have been overlooked as, initially, "events at home defeated their ambitious undertakings" (96), and continued disinterest on the part of researchers has not credited their findings. Also interesting is the treatment of Indians, Californio, and gender-related resistance and adaptation to their conquerors by Sandos, Castaneda, and Nunis (chapters eight, nine, and eleven, respectively) opening up a field of inquiry into psychological realms.

Contested Eden does not limit its themes solely to the past, but firmly connects this history with contemporary issues and topics. Hackel suggests "the charged current economic ties between Mexico and California" (137), are present day concerns dealing with similar historical issues. Gonzalez presents another image suggesting an attempt to establish a New World identity and pride through the identification with the Aztec culture supported even by eighteenth century *criollos* and Catholic friars (160). Sandos also reminds the reader that California had movers and shakers such as Vallejo, Sutter, Lugo, Yount, and Bidwell who made their presence felt in contemporary affairs through economic, political, and social spheres (271). Castaneda further puts to rest the fable that all Californios welcomed Americans (illegal aliens) with open arms by highlighting the women's resistance to "Euro-Americans" (251). And Nunis demonstrated that "keeping up with the Joneses" was just as much a California image in the early rancho period as today (310). With this historical tie in mind, it might be wise to remember Hass's essay (chapter twelve) giving the reader the distinct message that those who disturb the land and people will



eventually pay the price by way of displacement.


Illustrations and maps throughout the book enhance and enliven the narrative with visual cues, and they are well spaced within the essays. The black and white photographs are sufficiently full of detail as to add to the overall examples of California life, and the color prints in the last chapter of the book add dimension to the work by giving eyewitness observations of the era and instilling a first person intensity into the ongoing saga. For those readers who tend to be geographically and temporarily impaired, a general chronology of people and events as well as a comprehensive map of California labeled with appropriate landmarks would be an additional helpful reference. However, the list of contributors at the end of the book gives useful biographical sketches of the credentials and affiliations of the contributors and the index facilitates referencing topics between the different authors.

Quickly read, *Contested Eden* is remarkable for the few mistakes found in the editing. Yet, some distractions do occur. Those readers who should have paid attention to their thesaurus desk calendar and unfamiliar with terms such as *adzes* and *mauls* (34), *hide droughers* (134), *amanuenses* (148), and *palimpsest* (197-8), may benefit from reading the tome with a dictionary by their side. Other distractions include an incorrect dating regarding, "(Perez) sailed the Santiago . . . and on August 9, 1774 . . ." and, surely, Castaneda must have intended "developed thus far" (245). Douglas Monroy also makes reference to "the previously cited Angustias" (184), which is not found even in the endnotes. More extensive use of Native American and Spanish terms may have added to the expressive nature of the book as well as emphasized the ongoing theme of the importance of cultural variety. However, such expressions as "the priests revived enthusiasm by whipping" (152), "to

today's eyes (the happy Indians) seem to have been eager to wave the strangers on to other places," (156), and "*gente de razon* swarmed . . . as did *flies over the cowpies* in the mission pastures," (181), add a dimension of not only humor, but descriptively humanizes a portrait of these people long gone.

Thus, in a series of essays organized into twelve well-constructed chapters, *Contested Eden* examines the influence of the environment, Native peoples, Europeans exploration, colonial economy, the role of the missions, Californio society, the relationship between white and Indians, gender, sexuality, and the family, immigration, and war with the United States on the evolution of California. This book succeeds in its attempt to encourage readers to go beyond the standard readings relating to a period of California history often mythologized by its American conquerors. Gutierrez and Orsi address the study of a state that has and continues to influence the nation and the world with an enthusiastic ("this volume represents the best . . . work", 6), appeal that breaches conventional state histories and encourages a continued multi-disciplinary approach to further research.

-Carlotta F. Haider



Little Professor Book Center

725 N. Placentia Avenue

Fullerton, Ca 92831

(714) 996-3133

Fax (714) 528-1888

<http://home.earthlink.net/~lpbc/>

Email: lpbc@earthlink.net

Little Professor Book Center has been selling CSUF textbooks for the past 16 years. It all started when a few English professors requested that we carry some of their textbooks for their classes. Now there are about 100 professors who order from our store each semester.

Most are from the English, History and Psychology departments, but others include Accounting, American Studies, Biology, Criminal Justice, Foreign Language Education, Geology, Liberal Studies, Mathematics, Music, Philosophy, Political Sciences, Religious Studies, Speech Communications and Theater.

We buy back books EVERYDAY!
THE BEST TIME TO SELL BACK YOUR
TEXTBOOKS IS AT END OF EACH SEMESTER.

Please call for times and pricing.

Closed on Sunday



VISA, Master Card, AMEX, ATM

History Journals from University of California Press

Agricultural History

The official quarterly journal of the Agricultural History Society. Since 1927 Agricultural History has provided an in-depth scholarly platform for innovative research in national and international agricultural and rural history.

ISSN: 0002-1482 Students: \$20
Individuals: \$35 Institutions: \$89

Pacific Historical Review

The official quarterly journal of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Society. Since 1932, Pacific Historical Review has published articles on the history of American expansionism, the post-frontier developments of the 20th-century American West, and the interconnections between American overseas expansion and the recent West.

ISSN: 0030-8684 Students: \$19
Individuals: \$29 Institutions: \$75

The Public Historian

The official quarterly journal of the National Council on Public History. The voice of the public history community, The Public Historian publishes the results of research and case studies, and addresses the broad substantive and theoretical issues in the field.

ISSN: 0272-3433 Students: \$23
Individuals: \$49 Institutions: \$85

Oral History Review

The official biannual publication of the Oral History Association. Since 1979, the Oral History Review has explored the recording, transcribing, and preserving of conversations with people who have participated in important political, cultural, and economic social developments in modern times.

ISSN: 0094-0798 Students: \$35
Individuals: \$60 Institutions: \$75

FOR A FREE SAMPLE ISSUE

E-mail: jorders@ucpress.ucop.edu or Fax: 510/642-9917

FOR FREE ABSTRACTS AND TABLES OF CONTENTS


Point your Web browser to <http://www.ucpress.edu/journals>

University of California Press
2000 Center Street, Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704-1223

PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW

*A Journal of American
and Pacific History*

Published quarterly
by the University of
California Press
for the Pacific Coast
Branch of the
American Historical Association



For over sixty years, *Pacific Historical Review* has provided a forum for award-winning articles and discussions devoted to the history of American expansionism to the Pacific and beyond and the postfrontier developments of the twentieth-century American West. In addition to articles, *PHR* features historio-graphical and review essays, notes and documents, reviews of books, and professional news.

ORDER FORM—15% OFF INTRODUCTORY OFFER

☐ Yes, start my quarterly subscription to
Pacific Historical Review.

☐ Individual: ~~\$29~~ \$24.65

☐ Student/Retired: ~~\$19~~ \$16.15 (Students must enclose copy of ID.)

☐ Institution: ~~\$76~~ \$63.75

Methods of Payment (choose one)

☐ Check enclosed (Please make your check payable to UC Regents.)

☐ Visa ☐ MasterCard

Add \$20 postage Outside North America

Canada residents add 7% GST (R122058662)

Name _____

Address _____

Card No. _____

Exp. date _____

Authorized Signature _____

PH0AWB

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS JOURNALS • 2000 CENTER STREET, BERKELEY, CA 94704-1223

TEL: 510/643-7154 • FAX: 510/642-9917 • E-MAIL: JORDERS@UCPRESS.UCOP.EDU

WWW.UCPRESS.EDU/JOURNALS

Associated Students, Inc. 2000-2001

California State University, Fullerton

Executive Staff

President

Mary Grace Cachuela

Executive Vice President

Linda Luna

Board Of Directors

College of Humanities & Social Sciences

Young S. Kim

Dante Gomez

College of the Arts

Evan Mooney

David Atilano

College of Business and Economics

Alexander Lopez

(Position to be filled)

College of Communication

Vincent Amaya

Adam Brynes

College of Engineering and Computer Science

Karen Marquez

Geoffrey Roberts

College of Human Development and Community Services

Christina Machado

James McKinney

College of Natural Sciences and Mathematics

Richard Dahlhoff

Mike Bourdaa

University President's Representative

John Beisner

Academic Senate Representative

Gangadharappa Nanjundappa



California State University, Fullerton
Titan Student Union 250
Fullerton, CA 92834-6828
(714) 278-7200, Fax (714) 278-4568

THE ASSOCIATION FOR INTER-CULTURAL AWARENESS

"Making World History Here At C.S.U.F."

**Promoting communication, cooperation, and the exchange of
cultural and ethnic ideas throughout the CSU Fullerton Community.**



**Afro-Ethnic Student Association
Arab Student Union
Asian Pacific Student Association
Cambodian Student Association
Independent Latino Student Association
India International Student Association
Inter-Tribal Student Council
Japanese Student Association
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Association
Muslim Student Association
Pakistani Student Association
Partners International Club
Pilipino American Student Association
Sister Talk
Spanish Club
Taiwanese Student Association
Vietnamese Student Association
Women's Islamic Network
HILLEL**

Chicano Mexicano Mexica Empowerment Committee

For more information call A.I.C.A. (714) 278-2914

2000 Paper Prize Winners

Theta Pi Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta has awarded prizes this year for the best paper in the following categories: Best Overall Paper, Western History, and European History. An awards committee selects the winners. The final edited versions are printed in this year's *Welebaethan*. A total of \$150.00 is awarded to the winning authors. The 2000 prizes were awarded as follows:

Lawrence B. de Graaf Prize for Best Overall Paper:

Lauren Parker

"To Make Oneself Riche and the World Happie":
The Long Search for a Viable Northwest Passage

Best United States History Paper:

Amy Lefkowitz

Walking a Thin Line: The Religion Clauses
and the Question of Religious Programming in Popular Media

Ric Miller Prize in European History:

Sharon Evanshine

Joan of Arc: Heroine and Heretic

"Building bridges to the past" is the theme for this year's *Welebaethan*. We are especially proud of our own past, that of this journal and that of the History Department at California State University, Fullerton.

In September 1957 California authorized the establishment of an Orange County state college campus. The History Department was created the following year, and in 1959 Dr. William B. Langsdorf was appointed president of the Orange County State College by the State Board of Education. At the time there were 452 students attending only upper division and graduate courses; by 1974 enrollment had passed 20,000. After several name changes, the college became known as California State University, Fullerton. In 1989 a satellite campus opened in Mission Viejo, and in 1993 the one hundred thousandth degree was awarded.

Phi Alpha Theta came to the California State University Fullerton campus in 1962 and in 1974 the *Welebaethan* began as a simple, staple-bound compilation of student papers produced within the History Department. The journal evolved into a spiral-bound edition. In 1992 the *Welebaethan* staff began an effort to professionalize the quality of copy, editing, and layout of the journal. The *Welebaethan* you see today is the result of the past twenty-six years of learning experiences, advances in technology, and a commitment on the part of the History Department students, faculty and staff.

California State University, Fullerton

Phi Alpha Theta
International Honor Society in History
Theta Pi Chapter
California State University, Fullerton
Department of History, Box 4150
Fullerton, CA 92834

You are invited to apply for membership in Phi Alpha Theta,
the International Honor Society in History.

What Phi Alpha Theta Offers to Members:

- ❖ Affiliation with a prestigious, internationally known honor society.
- ❖ A connection to historical trends through regional and national conferences, the quarterly journal, *The Historian*, and a newsletter.
- ❖ The Opportunity to participate in social and scholarly events with faculty and students interested in history.
- ❖ Your academic achievements recognized by your peers both locally and nationally.

Requirements for Membership:

Graduate Students:

At least nine units of history at CSUF with a minimum GPA of 3.2 in those courses

Undergraduate Students:

At least twelve units of history courses at CSUF, six of which must be upper division, with a minimum GPA of 3.2 in these courses.

A minimum GPA of 3.0 (A person whose GPA falls below this minimum may be accepted with two letters of recommendation from professors and a review of the student's application by the executive board and the faculty advisor of the chapter.)

History Department


A degree in history serves as preparation for historical writing, teaching, law, government, and other professions. A history degree is also the foundation for advanced study at the graduate level.

Degrees offered: B.A., M.A.

Possible Career opportunities: Advertising Manager, Criminal Investigator, Editor, Foreign Service Officer, Intelligence Analyst, Political Campaign Aide, Public Historian, and Public Policy Advisor.

Special programs offered: History Internship, Oral History Program, and Public History.

**Theta Pi Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta
and the
History Students Association**



Juan C. Perez