

could not do so thereafter for two reasons: first, almost nothing had been done to help evacuees solve the many personal problems inevitable in a quick removal; and second, there was a very open and rapidly spreading hostility among governments and populations of interior areas to the free settlement of Japanese in their midst.⁸³

That the first of these reasons for the failure of voluntary migration was the fault of the federal government as a whole seems evident from Secretary Stimson's record of a Cabinet discussion on 27 February concerning Japanese evacuation:

The President brought this up first of all and showed that thus far he has given very little attention to the principal task of the transportation and resettlement of the evacuees. I outlined what DeWitt's plan was and his proclamation so far as I could without having the paper there. Biddle supported us loyally, saying that he had the proclamation already in his hands. I enumerated the five classes in the order which are being affected and tried to make clear that the process was necessarily gradual, DeWitt being limited by the size of the task and the limitations of his own force. The President seized upon the idea that the work should be taken off the shoulders of the Army so far as possible after the evacuees had been selected and removed from places where they were dangerous. There was general confusion around the table arising from the fact that nobody had realized how big it was, nobody wanted to take care of the evacuees, and the general weight and complication of the project. Biddle suggested that a single head should be chosen to handle the resettlement instead of the pulling and hauling of all the different agencies, and the President seemed to accept this; the single person to be of course a civilian and not the Army. . . .⁸⁴

The person chosen for this assignment was Mr. Milton S. Eisenhower of the Department of Agriculture. Mr. Eisenhower worked informally on the evacuation problem from the end of February until 18 March, when President Roosevelt named him director of the newly created War Relocation Authority. Before its establishment, General DeWitt had acquired a civil affairs organization of his own to handle evacuation problems. The directives of 20 February in effect put the Western Defense Command's evacuation operations under the direct supervision of the Secretary of War, and, as noted, Colonel Bendtsen had been chosen as co-ordinator of matters between Washington and San Francisco.⁸⁵ During a visit of Mr. McCloy to

⁸³ War Department, *Final Report*, pp. 41-43; H. Doc. 1911, 77th Cong., 2d sess., 19 Mar 42, pp. 27-30; Memo, SW for President Roosevelt, 15 Apr 42, ASW 014.311 West Coast-WDC, Apr-May 42; Ltr and Incl, Dir WRA to ASW, 8 Jun 42; Ltr, Dir WRA to ASW, 11 Mar 43. Last two in ASW 014.311 WDC Gen.

⁸⁴ SW's Notes after Cabinet Mtg, 27 Feb 42, WDCSA 334 Mtgs and Confs. The DeWitt plan referred to in this quotation was the plan proposed to Washington in drafts of Public Proclamation 1 and the accompanying press release.

⁸⁵ tenBrock *et al.*, *Prejudice, War and the Constitution*, pp. 118-22; Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Clark, 26 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43); G-4 Memo for Rcd, 1 Mar 42, G-4 file 32860. The last two items reflect the War Department's own confusion