

authoritative Army and Navy views were passed on to the Wallgren subcommittee, but they do not seem to have made much impression.<sup>39</sup>

On this same day, 4 February, the federal government's Office of Facts and Figures completed an analysis of a hasty survey of public opinion in California and concluded: "Even with such a small sample, . . . one can infer the situation in California is serious; that it is loaded with potential dynamite; but that it is not as desperate as some people believe."<sup>40</sup> A contemporary Navy report described what was happening to the Japanese population in the Los Angeles area in these words: ". . . loss of employment and income due to anti-Japanese agitation by and among Caucasian Americans, continued personal attacks by Filipinos and other racial groups, denial of relief funds to desperately needy cases, cancellation of licenses for markets, produce houses, stores, etc., by California State authorities, discharges from jobs by the wholesale, [and] unnecessarily harsh restrictions on travel including discriminatory regulations against all Nisei preventing them from engaging in commercial fishing." While expressing opposition to any mass evacuation of the Japanese, the report concluded that if practices such as those described continued there would "most certainly be outbreaks of sabotage, riots, and other civil strife in the not too distant future."<sup>41</sup>

### *The Decision for Mass Evacuation*

It was within this setting that Colonel Bendtsen on 4 February addressed a long memorandum to General Gullion which concluded that an enemy alien evacuation "would accomplish little as a measure of safety," since the alien Japanese were mostly elderly people who could do little harm if they would. Furthermore, their removal would inevitably antagonize large numbers of their relatives among the American-born Japanese. After considering the various alternatives that had been suggested for dealing with citizens, Colonel Bendtsen recommended the designation of military areas

<sup>39</sup> Memo for Rcd, Chief, WD Liaison Br, 6 Feb 42, GHQ file, WDC: Protection of Vital Installations; Grodzins, *Japanese Evacuation*, pp. 71-73; H. Doc. 1911, 77th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 2-3.

<sup>40</sup> Memo, Bur of Intelligence for Dir OFF, 4 Feb 42, copy in ASW 014.311 Enemy Aliens on the West Coast (EAWC).

<sup>41</sup> Rpt, Lt Comdr K.D. Ringle, Eleventh Naval District, through Commandant to CNO, no date, copy in ASW 014.311 EAWC. From the contents of this report, the author concludes that it was written about 1 February 1942, rather than ten days later as indicated in Grodzins, *Japanese Evacuation*, p. 146, note 46. The substance of this report, the most detailed and sympathetic military analysis of the Japanese problem in early 1942, was anonymously published in *Harper's Magazine*, October 1942, pp. 489-97.