

# California Ends the Nixon Era

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The results of the California election are by now a matter of history. Nixon's defeat and Brown's victory were headlined in papers throughout the world. With the exception of the office of U.S. Senator, the Democrats won every major office, took 25 of the 38 Congressional seats, and maintained a heavy majority in the State Assembly and Senate. The only statewide GOP victories--Senator Tom Kuchel and Secretary of State Frank M. Jordan--were the offices on which labor was not solidly united. In addition, Kuchel was the only important GOP nominee who refused to capitulate to the ultra-Right pressures within his own party. He proved to be a more perceptive politician than Nixon, more sensitive to the people's moods.

An arithmetical summary does not provide the essence of the campaign. Thus, the defeat of Congressmen Hiestand and Rousselot, avowed Birch Society members, cannot be measured simply by subtracting from the Republican side and adding two to the Democrats; again, the election of a Negro and a Mexican-American to Congress is not simply two more Democratic votes; and three out of four congressmen supported by peace, civil rights and civil liberties organizations were elected, and in the process new independent political centers were created.

Unmistakably, the majority of Californians had blunted the thrust of the ultra-Right by defeating most of its candidates and retiring Nixon to private life, and became the first electorate to reject an extension of McCarranism by defeating Proposition 24, the proposed anti-Communist amendment to the California State Constitution and doing that by a margin of two to one.

## THE REAL RICHARD NIXON

When Richard Nixon appeared at the press conference in the wake of his defeat, his alternating bullying and whining shocked even many longtime supporters. Newspapers could bemoan their "misplaced trust," but the identity of the Real Richard Nixon had been no secret to the millions who recognized him as a main protagonist for reaction.

The AFL-CIO had said: "... Richard Nixon's nomination pretty well epitomizes the working man's stake in this general election. ... An unholy alliance of bankers, big oil men, private utilities and real estate lobbyists back Nixon."

There were no easy guarantees that Nixon would be defeated. Shortly before November 6, the polls showed him leading Governor Pat Brown. Moreover, Nixon had taken the state from Kennedy. Further, the combined vote of Nixon and Joe Shell in the primary, including their write-in votes on the Democratic ballot, had totalled more than Governor Brown's vote.

Nixon made Communism his main campaign issue. He claimed that the issue of anti-Communism "lit up the crowds," and boasted of his sponsorship of the McCarran Act. He proposed to go further than that Act by urging that anyone who took the Fifth Amendment before any investigating body (including grand juries) be forbidden to speak on any campus in the state.

The campaign cry "soft on Communism" did as much for Nixon in 1962 as "Rum, Romanism and Rebellion" did for Blaine in 1884!

## WHAT HAPPENED TO THE APATHY?

The high turn-out of voters disproved the charge that they were not interested because "they had nothing to choose between parties and candidates." It is true that there was less precinct work and a greater reliance on mailing and phone campaigns than usual. And this, coupled with greater use of TV and radio, gave the appearance of apathy. The ILWU and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, who did more to mobilize their members than most unions, worked mainly out of their own officers or the candidates'. While COPE had more area headquarters than in any previous election, there was not as much visible manpower until the final weekend. But the unity of labor was important in influencing the total outcome; labor unity meant that workers were not confused or divided by conflicting endorsements within the labor movement.

There is no way to measure what impact the "Cuba week" had in influencing the high percentage of voters in an off-election year. But there is a general consensus on its impact as far as candidates were concerned. The great majority of voters supported the President's action during that first week. But when the Soviet Union acted with sobriety and responsibility, a huge sigh of relief swept the state. Observers estimate that if the high state of tension present in the first week had continued the Democrats would have suffered from the charge of being the "war party." In spite of the strong support for the blockade speech, the underlying dread of nuclear warfare was already starting to come to the surface, and part of the support for Kennedy's action came because people believed he would be willing to enter into negotiations.

Evidence of this is forthcoming from the failure of Nixon and the ultras to get any "credit" from the voters for their boast that they had long advocated forceful action against Cuba. Nixon had a special state-wide television broadcast devoted solely to asserting this claim. And, on November 5, nine GOP candidates signed a large advertisement which said, "The man listed below has been de-

manding a Cuban blockade for months . . . Your candidate listed below will strive to keep the blockade until all the atomic submarine bases are removed . . . until the Russian troops and Castro's Communist government are out of Cuba. He can't do this unless you vote for him. Vote for the one listed below so we can keep the blockade . . . until Cuba is free."

The voters answered: Six of the nine were defeated!

## McCARRANISM COMES TO CALIFORNIA

The Democrats learned firsthand that the weapons used against the Communist Party under the McCarran Act could be turned against them--first, labeling by an FBI stool-pigeon, then the technique of guilt by association. Extensive use was made of stoolpigeon Karl Prussion's pamphlet, which charged (1) that the California Democratic Council was initiated and controlled by Communists (proof: didn't the CDC pass resolutions against HUAC and for seating China in the United Nations?); (2) Democratic nominees were "soft on Communism" (chapter title: "Brown Is A Red Appeaser"); and (3) the Kennedy administration was suspect (proof: the 1954 platform of the Communist Party had planks comparable to that of the Democratic platform of 1960, and the Communists had used the phrase "new frontiers" six years before Kennedy).

The American Legion, at its state convention in Fresno, passed a resolution which urged that the Attorney-General "classify certain California organizations, councils or clubs as subversive." They listed a series of resolutions which included action in support of police review boards and disarmament as the evidence of subversion. They concluded by saying: "Anyone who is a member of, subscribes to, and actively participates in said organizations cannot in good faith uphold and defend the mandates of the American Legion."

The ferocity of the red-baiting campaign surprised even those who were familiar with the Nixon-Murray Chotiner technique. When the courts stopped the distribution of the Karl Prussion pamphlet, it was reproduced in full-page ads. Television shows denouncing the "indirect" Communists (civil libertarians, peace workers, etc.) were put on with monotonous regularity. Quotes from *People's World* editorial were reproduced by Nixon campaigners (and increased the circulation of the paper!) The attacks were a real tribute to the fine reportage and cogent editorials of the *People's World*, attested to by its increased influence among politically-minded people.

Along with this attack came the concentration of the ultras for Pro-

position 24, an initiative measure which they had qualified for the ballot by securing over 600,000 valid signatures on petitions circulated by volunteers. Most of it was a re-write of the McCarran Act; Section 3 went beyond that Act by providing that any governmental body or appointed official could name "Communists or Communist frontiers."

#### THE VOTERS TURN THUMBS DOWN

In the past, except for right-to-work legislation, bad initiative measures were rarely defeated and good ones seldom won. The reason was simple—with the mass media of communication firmly controlled by big business the truth about the real content of a proposition rarely reached the voters. With this in mind, opponents of Proposition 24 concentrated on getting out material in the millions of copies. The broadest coalition in California's history opposed the measure, ranging from the *Los Angeles Times* on the Right, to the *Peoples' World* on the Left; from Nixon (who, along with the *Times*, said that he agreed with the objectives of the proposition, but thought Section 3 unconstitutional) through Governor Pat Brown, and over to Longshoreman Archie Brown.

Brown's and Nixon's opposition, though important, was not decisive; both supported Proposition 23 (State reapportionment) which was defeated.

Every sample ballot put out by unions, the Democratic Party or independent organizations urged a "NO" on 24. Students on most campuses singled out the measure for concentrated opposition and provided manpower for its defeat. Women's organizations instituted chain telephone campaigns. Civil liberties organizations provided both the initiating push and the follow-through until the last day. Undoubtedly, the massive turn-out on November 6 helped defeat it, and with that defeat, the voters indicated they were fed up with the anti-communist hysteria.

Governor Brown refused to capitulate to the Republican efforts to picture CDC as the "Left-wing counterpart" to the Birch Society. In spite of Nixon's attacks, Brown refused to repudiate CDC, although he did disassociate himself from some of its past resolutions. He led the great majority of Democratic Party candidates who refused to fill out a questionnaire circulated by the Anti-Communist Voters League, a front organization set up by the ultras for the campaign.

Attorney General Stanley Mosk was the only important Democrat to fall on his face in response to the red-baiting pressures. Hoping to get sufficient conservative votes to lead the state Democratic ticket once more, he filled out the questionnaire. This action aroused indignation within the Democratic Clubs, and elsewhere. The results demonstrated that his gamble was costly to his

future ambition—he trailed by a considerable margin Controller Alan Cranston, who had been bitterly attacked by reactionaries because of his past presidency of the World Federalists and his founding of CDC.

#### THE ULTRAS COME A CROPPER

While Hiestand, Rousselot and Richardson were the only avowed members of the John Birch Society running for office, there were other representatives of the ultra-Right who had won the GOP nomination in the primaries. Charles "Steve" Foote in the 22nd and Robert Geier, in the new 34th, were typical of such candidates. Most of them were defeated. Since the elections, ultra-Right apologists have stated that reapportionment was responsible for their defeat. While this helped considerably, it is evident from other contests that reapportionment can't have full credit. In San Francisco, for instance, liberal John O'Connell was running against GOP incumbent William Maillard in a reapportioned Democratic district, and yet O'Connell lost. The difference was that Maillard enjoyed the reputation of being a moderate Republican, like Kuchel.

The ultra-Right can claim one state-wide victory in the defeat of Dr. Ralph Richardson by Max Rafferty for State Superintendent of Public Instruction.

With campaign oratory against "progressive education," "life adjustment" courses, and inattention to the three R's, Rafferty took advantage of a growing, but inadequately informed, parental dissatisfaction with the school system. Richardson, a thoughtful educator, realistically aware of the limitations on policy-making inherent in the post of Superintendent, was willy-nilly identified with the status quo.

However, whatever affinity Rafferty may have had for the ultras is already being tempered by the lack of an accompanying Right-wing sweep.

The Birchers were not thoroughly routed, not only because such a Congressman as James Utt, No. 1 white-supremacist and labor-baiter, was re-elected, but, mainly, because the ultras have become an *organized* sector of the Republican Party.

Little noted was their infiltration into the Prohibition Party. They were so successful in capturing it that they managed to alter that party's historic opposition to Demon Rum. It is quite a change from demanding full prohibition to meekly suggesting that grocery stores be denied the right to sell liquor—only full-fledged liquor stores should have that privilege!

#### THE PRIMACY OF PRIMARIES

There was an early recognition that the first step toward victory was through serious attention to the primary elections. Hence, attention and activity was directed toward the

selection of candidates within the party primaries who would tackle more advanced issues and around whom broad alliances could be established. It was in the primaries that the first notable victories for minority representation were achieved, and it was in the primaries that candidates committed to a pro-peace, civil rights and civil liberties platform defeated their more conservative Democratic opponents.

But, defeats were also suffered in the primaries, which left scars in the final elections. This was most noticeably true in the campaigns of Everett Burkhalter and Ron Cameron, running against Birchers Hiestand and Rousselot. In both districts, the final campaigns suffered from a lack of unity which can be summarized in two concepts: One—"Let the Bircher win now. He'll be easier to defeat with a better candidate in 1964." (People with a long memory might recall similar expressions in pre-Hitler Germany, "What if Hitler does win now—he'll be thrown out in six weeks.") Two—"What's the difference, the Democrats are only the lesser of two evils?" It would seem that the urgency of defeating Nixon and the ultra-Right would have been obvious to any democratic-minded voter. But one of the serious immobilizing factors was the oft-repeated idea that a vote for a "lesser evil" provides no advantage to the voter.

The *National Guardian* presented this viewpoint in its pre-and post-election editorials and analyses. Its views are singled out for comment because its presentation summarizes the viewpoint of others. The critique of these views is presented within an over-all appreciation of the *Guardian's* staunchness and integrity in the struggle for peaceful coexistence and democratic rights.

After November 6, it said, "... that the scales balanced out and the situation remained static." This analysis is a logical continuation of its pre-election editorial position. It claimed then that because of the Cuban war crisis, the "elections of 1962 are largely meaningless ... On other issues the elections ... have but little more significance. In the first place, liberal domestic stands become empty gestures when coupled with cold war economics and politics. ... For most progressive citizens, the 1962 elections permit no real choice and no chance of domestic expression." I think this is an example of how the distorted use of radical phraseology can lead to frustration and passivity.

Perhaps one of the reasons Californians were not as overwhelmed by the action of candidates who supported Kennedy's blockade (including some who took advanced positions on questions of Berlin, nuclear testing and disarmament) was that they remembered a similar situation in 1950. Helen Gahagan Douglas, running on a generally progressive domestic platform, supported the opening stages of the Korean War. And progressives decided, therefore,



that there was no difference between her and Richard Nixon in their race for the U.S. Senate. But they learned from that debacle. When a candidate opposes HUAC, he is opposing a powerful *pro-war* domestic weapon, one that stifles dissent on foreign policy. When a candidate supports the shorter work week, he is objectively opposing a war economy. We have long stated that a country bent on war will retreat from social progress at home. The converse also has validity.

Further, *without a mass peace movement*, the only candidates who maintain a full peace platform are those running primarily to educate the voters, not expecting to win.

Some of the most militant figures for Negro freedom are not yet among the conscious peace fighters. Should their demands be shunted aside? The Negro and Mexican-American candidates in California were among those who supported the blockade. Should support have been withdrawn from them? Progressive Californians, including those who agree that peace is the most decisive issue, refused to be boxed in by a rigid formula.

#### LESSER EVIL OR GREATER DANGER?

The old cliché, "the lesser evil" got its real start in pre-Hitler Germany. Germany had a mass Communist and Socialist Party and a working class that was conscious of itself as a class. Unity then could have defeated Hitler. In short, there was an *alternative* to Hitler and Von Hindenburg.

And the U.S.A., circa 1962? Why, if a labor party were to come into immediate existence, based upon the trade unions today, its program would undoubtedly echo, at least in foreign policy, that of its present leadership. And people who today satisfy themselves with the "simple" formula of calling for a labor party would then have the identical problem that they face with most Democratic Party candidates.

In California we had some "classic" examples of how this theory operates. Everett Burkhalter is a run-of-the-mill Democrat. At no time in the past has he advocated any forceful or consistent liberal program. His future congressional career will probably be limited to a support of the Kennedy administration—unless he feels the hot breath of an organized constituency on his neck. Yet, opposing Edgar Hiestand, he made the issue of Birchism the main issue of his campaign.

The pressures of the "lesser evil" theory had considerable support in this district, and helped to demobilize and disunite some circles. But in their greater number Left-progressives understood that the slogan, "Defeat the ultra-Right," was not coined as a Madison Avenue catchword. Its message is direct: He who does not fight fascism in its early stages may not be able to defeat it later. And so, in spite of the obstacles, there was enough unity to de-

feat Hiestand, and the "lesser evil" Burkhalter was elected.

Pat Brown's campaign for governor had comparable problems. While Governor Brown has a more consistent liberal record than Burkhalter, and a record of practical achievement, he, nevertheless, did his own back-tracking on some issues in the beginning of the campaign. And when he, too, supported the blockade against Cuba, the reaction in some circles was immediate: He's only a "lesser evil"; there is no difference, etc. But those who recognized that Nixon's defeat would represent a decisive rebuff to the worst war-mongers and reactionary forces refused to be overwhelmed. They fought a two-front policy—to mobilize pressures upon Brown to prevent his retreats, while keeping the sharpest attack aimed at Nixon. Did Brown's victory represent a victory for a lesser evil over a greater evil? Yes, indeed. And this victory, coupled with the movements that were developed to defeat Proposition 24 and to elect candidates who would improve the quality of the congressional delegation, has strengthened the possibility for more advanced gains and candidates in 1964.

The California Democratic Council, with its independent position, will undoubtedly play a role in 1964, although efforts to disparage the CDC are legion. Even the *National Guardian* averred that the CDC's successes were limited to "scattered races," and said that Jesse M. Unruh, Speaker of the Assembly, had "proved" the CDC "is not the key to California politics." Like Unruh's own public relations staff, the *Guardian* credited Unruh's \$2.5 million war chest with having gotten out the voters (81.75%), thereby winning the election!

#### FACT AND FANCY FREE

The fact is that while Unruh's much-heralded get-out-the-vote campaign had some results, it was concentrated primarily within the 31st and 25th Congressional Districts, where Unruh-committed Democrats were running. Secondly, the huge turn-out started early, long before 3:00 P.M. when the paid workers arrived at the polls. Third, CDC and labor volunteers were also concentrating on voter turn-out; their results are shown by the fact that in Edward Royal's and George Brown's districts the victory margin was greater than in the 31st and 25th. Fourth, many CDC devotees accepted Unruh money for what they always do voluntarily.

The CDC participated in the election victory; the defeat of Don Rose for Secretary of State, and of Richard Richards for U.S. Senator was a loss, not only to the CDC, but to the regular Democratic Party apparatus, of which they are part.

The *Guardian* also credits Unruh with plotting "the defeat of Representative Gordon McDonough by liberal Edward Roybal, patron of Los Angeles' Mexican-American

population and a peace candidate." Actually, Unruh *opposed* Roybal in the primaries, and gave him scant support in the finals. Confronted by the narrowest Democratic margin of any of the Los Angeles reapportioned districts, Roybal won with the support of more volunteer workers than any other candidate in the state—volunteers from CDC, labor, MAPA (Mexican-American Political Association), SANE and Californians for Liberal Representation.

The progressives quite properly refrained from picturing Jesse Unruh as the main danger. The challenge was to defeat Nixon and the ultra-Right. Necessary rebukes to Unruh were administered within the Democratic Party. When he proposed a motion to the State Democratic Central Committee to remove all Birchers and Communists from any Democratic Party organization, he was defeated on grounds that this was simply a witchhunting device. This defeat marked a real turning point in the campaign. There was no further capitulation by any major candidate to Nixon and the ultras.

CDC does face a problem, but it is not a new one. Unless it strengthens its alliance with labor and the minorities, the professionals will increase their pressure to transform it into their loyal and unquestioning handmaiden. Unless it increases day-to-day educational activities among all voters, its convention resolutions have insufficient meaning.

But the most significant fact is that one of the campaign's important victories was that CDC never backed away from the ferocious assault on it. CDC fought for its right to take independent positions—and won.

#### DOES ONLY THE GOAL COUNT?

There were times during the election (including the reading of the *Guardian's* election-eve editorial) that one felt that Eduard Bernstein's slogan was being turned upside down, and would result in the same confusion. "The end is everything; the movement to get there nothing."

There is general agreement among the Left that America needs an independent party, led by labor joined with its allies. But how to achieve it? Ah, there's the rub—and the cause for more disunity among the Left than any other single issue.

In California, one school of thought argued that the Communist Party should content itself with joining those who were telling the working-class voter that there was no difference between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, and, therefore, it mattered little if Nixon or Brown won. The Party replied: These are not monolithic parties; there is, therefore, a difference between the role of the parties on a national scale and their role in the fifty states. They are not homogeneous parties; therefore, coalitions still operate within them, which in other countries are expressed by separate political parties with fairly well defined class interests. And, because of

this, the two parties respond to their vastly differing social bases.

In politics one must proceed from facts as they are, and not as one would like them to be, or as they will be eventually. The alternative is the use of a seemingly radical phraseology and program; but, because neither is attuned to reality the results can lead to passivity or frustration. This r-r-revolutionary approach ducks the basic responsibility—"being able to convince the backward; to know how to work among them and not to fence ourselves off under a barrier of Left slogans."

To say "the movement is everything, the end nothing" is wrong; and to say "the end is everything, and the movement is nothing" is also wrong. The goal is socialism and that is far from nothing; it is decisive. The movement is one seeking that end; this consciousness is basic both to the nature of the movement and the achievement of the end. At the same time, the reality of the movement and its being attuned to the requirements of time and place also are elementary necessities. Without this, there is no movement, and there will be no reaching of the "end."

To ignore these facts is to play a game with the goal of a new political realignment in the country. Who is to compose it? The working class? Minorities? But the elections proved again that in their great majority they still identify with and work through the Democratic Party to achieve their goals. The peace organizations? But these are predominantly middle-class and could provide only the narrowest base. However, they faced up to the problem of overcoming the chasm that exists between them and the masses of people during the elections. SANE, at its western regional conference, discussed its participation in the elections, saying, "... to remain in the role of only a protest movement against disastrous governmental directions was inviting futility and discouragement. Therefore, the answer was inevitable. To join with the healthiest community currents and together search out those political incumbents and candidates who would be responsive to a common sense approach on how to preserve a world in peace. Immediately we found a warm response by liberal democrats, disillusioned democrats, minority, religious and civil liberties groups who were concerned and grappling with the same problem. ... Many of us had healthy fears that messing around with politicians and candidates was begging for trouble and betrayal. Nevertheless we could not escape the conclusion that remaining on the outside had no future."

Their conclusions: "... Peace issues by themselves do not stand up in an electoral campaign. They must be joined to constructive domestic measures. Therefore, peace organizations must associate with our "natural" allies, women's, church, labor and minority groups. ... Any go-it-alone electoral policies represented by promotion of independent 'peace' candidates has proved not only a dismal failure, but also serves to isolate the peace movement."

We would argue with them about the complete dismissal of independent peace candidates, while agreeing with them that unless they have a community base they are of limited value. Their approach, however, not only answers their own needs for effective political peace action that broadens their community relations, but is an additional example of how *movements on issues, organized independently*, can effectively utilize the existing two-party system.

#### ILLUSION CREATORS?

Other voices on the Left reproached us, "Your policy creates illusions; the only correct policy is one that urges workers not to have anything to do with a capitalist party." If the logic of this argument was followed, then the Left would have to abandon support for trade unions, civil rights or full civil liberties; the demand and the support for these issues can be said to create illusions that capitalism can be "reformed." (Actually, only the SLP is, by these standards, fully "principled"; at the Democratic Party Convention in 1960, they distributed a leaflet calling upon workers to leave the AFL-CIO because it serves the interests of the capitalists.)

No, it is capitalism that creates the illusions; and it is because of the *existence* of illusions that Marxists have struggled with the challenge of building the united front. Without such illusions, workers would march as a conscious class under the banner of Socialism.

There are no short-cuts to reaching that even closer objective—a new party for independent political action. One cannot issue ultimatums to the worker or the Negro or the Mexican-American that he should promptly cease and desist from his allegiance to the Democratic Party. Nor will he learn this solely through the education provided by independent candidates (as we learned from the Progressive Party), important though that channel can be for mass propaganda. Neither ultimatums nor propaganda can substitute for the lessons that must be learned directly through political experience. Certainly, experience alone is not enough; to think that it is, is to believe in spontaneity. There must be correct theory, there must be the Marxist component in its organized form; but an absolute prerequisite for greater political maturity is the actual experience derived from effort and struggle.

#### MINORITY REPRESENTATION

One of the most remarkable aspects of the campaign was the upsurge in the Negro and Mexican-American communities. The electoral gains that were achieved reflected pre-primary activity that was present in both areas and demonstrated the effectiveness of non-partisan organizations operating within and without the Democratic Party. The election to the State Assembly of Reverend F. D. Ferrell over white, liberal, long-time incumbent Vernon Kilpatrick was one indication of this. Ferrell joins newly elected Mervyn Dymally and incumbent Bryan Rumford in strengthening Negro representation in the State Legislature.

But the greatest political expansion took place in the Mexican-American community during both the primary and the final elections. More Mexican-American candidates filed for more offices than during any previous election. In addition to Congressman Roybal's victory, for the first time, two Mexican-Americans were elected to the State Assembly.

Coalitions rarely develop in equal proportions and seldom share equally in victories. Further, each mainly sees only its own interests. The unique responsibility of the Left, whether working within labor, liberal or minority and independent organizations, is to represent the general interests of the *whole* alliance.

For years, the Democratic Party, labor and liberals, have relied on the minority voter as an indispensable guarantee for their success. But when nominations or appointments were to be made, neither the liberal CDC, labor, nor the Democratic politicians recognized the demands for minority representation. "Strangely," no minority candidate was ever "good" enough to be supported, though the same criteria were rarely applied to other candidates.

This double standard brought forth its own distortion — the counter-theory developed that any minority candidate was better than any non-minority one. Understandable as this expression for representation was, it too, tended to frustrate minority representation. Candidates who had no community support, or who did not express its real needs, ran unsuccessfully. During the campaign, passionate partisans for a particular "minority representation" or "independent" candidate showed little regard for the overall alliances, within and without the district. The idea of "any minority candidate" did considerable damage to the unity within the Mexican-American community in the primaries, and remained a serious problem in the final election. Further, the alliance with labor and liberals was damaged, leaving scars that will be difficult to eradicate. Labor and "Anglo" liberals will have to recognize the new stage of strength in the minority communities, which insist on self-representation; at the same time, the minority communities will recognize that the fulfillment of their aspirations is related to the strength of their ties with their allies.

Candidates, bourgeois or independent, cannot, of course, be relied upon as the guarantors of progress, and the victory of a particular candidate is not the only yardstick of a campaign. Did a campaign result in the strengthening of the component parts of the potential anti-monopoly alliance? Did it provide a channel for bringing forward the issues which affect the security and well-being of the people and the nation? Did it advance, in either form or content, the perspective for independent political action? If a campaign has few accomplishments in this direction, then the "victory" can be shallow. And, while there is an awareness of the shortcomings and weaknesses that were present, California's 1962 elections will be recorded as increasing the strength of the growing alliance of the people.