

and the "Battle of Los Angeles" added a strong fillip to the local temper of opinion.⁷⁸ Even after General DeWitt's public announcement of evacuation plans at the beginning of March, the San Francisco representative of the Office of Government Reports held there was a "serious possibility of mob violence and vigilante committees if the Army does not work fast enough."⁷⁹

On 23 February Colonel Bendetsen arrived in San Francisco to serve as a liaison officer between General DeWitt and Assistant Secretary of War McCloy and to help in the execution of the War Department directives. With his assistance, General DeWitt drafted and obtained War Department approval of his first public proclamation of the new program and of an explanatory press release, both of which were issued on 2 March. The proclamation established two military areas, a Military Area No. 1, which encompassed the western halves of the three Pacific states and southern Arizona and a Military Area No. 2, which covered the eastern halves of the Pacific states and northern Arizona. The press release forecast the exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1, and the subsequent exclusion of German and Italian aliens at least from the prohibited zones within Area No. 1.⁸⁰

Apparently, in late February and early March both the War Department and General DeWitt hoped that the mere announcement of prohibited and restricted zones would induce a voluntary migration out of these zones, as had been the case in the California prohibited zones previously announced by the Department of Justice. General DeWitt estimated that 15,000 persons (of whom many must have been Japanese citizens) had moved out of these zones by midnight, 24 February. Most of them had moved into adjacent restricted zones in urban areas.⁸¹ In his press release of 2 March, General DeWitt urged the Japanese to move voluntarily into the interior from Military Area No. 1 and stated that those who did so would "in all probability not again be disturbed." But only about 2,000 Japanese residents actually moved out of Area No. 1 before it was announced that voluntary migration would soon cease.⁸² Although large numbers of Japanese appear to have been willing before 1 March to migrate voluntarily into the interior, most of them

⁷⁸ Stimson Diary, entry of 26 Feb 42. See above, pp. 87-88.

⁷⁹ Telg. W. L. Wheeler to Phillip C. Hamblet, Exec Officer, Office of Govt Rpts, 5 Mar 42, ASW 014.311 EAWC.

⁸⁰ Public Proclamation 1, and accompanying press release, 2 Mar 42, AG 014.311 (1-13-41), sec. 10; Memo, GHQ, unsigned and undated, summarizing Gen DeWitt's new plan of action, GHQ file, WDC: Enemy Aliens.

⁸¹ Tel Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Clark, 26 Feb 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43).

⁸² War Department, *Final Report*, p. 107.