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POSITION PAPER ON ARMS CONTROL-----SENATOR EUGENE J. McCARTHY

The Problem:

In 1959 the Antarctic Treaty barred nuclear weapons from the Antarctic continent and provided for free and open inspection of Antarctic bases. The test-ban treaty of 1963 prohibited nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in the seas and in outer space. The 1967 treaty governed the exploration and use of outer space. And just recently, after years of negotiation, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.

These have been necessary steps toward a more peaceful world. But we will have to do better in the future. There is today special urgency for sustained progress.

First, broader arms control measures among the great powers may be essential to convince other nations to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Second, we are at a particularly critical period in terms of technological development. At present there exists a strategic stability which results from the presence, on both sides of invulnerable deterrent forces capable of inflicting substantial damage in a retaliatory attack. But the introduction of sophisticated anti-ballistic missile systems and new missiles equipped with multiple warheads threaten to make the situation unstable. With the deployment of such weapons systems, each side will become concerned as to whether in the event of a preemptive attack it will be able to inflict sufficient damage in retaliation--if not, its deterrent will not be credible. The arms race will thus be impelled to a new intensity. In crises, there could be an incentive to launch a first strike--an incentive which does not now exist because each side can have confidence in its deterrent.

Further progress, then, is particularly urgent today. There is also reason to believe it is possible. Agreement on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Soviet ratification of the consular agreement, implementation of direct airline routes between the United States and the U.S.S.R., the Soviet proposals to discuss other specific measures at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, and most importantly the Soviet acceptance of our offer to conduct discussions on the control of strategic offensive and defensive weapons, all suggest that much more significant steps might be taken.

It is imperative that we exploit the momentum of these events. Highest priority should be given to the achievement of international agreements. We must invite China to participate in all disarmament and arms control discussions. This makes a change in our overall diplomatic policy desirable--by recognizing China, by opening up trade and cultural exchange, and by revising our general military policy in Asia. In the meantime, important arms control agreements can be safely reached without the participation of China.

International Agreements

Implementation of a comprehensive arms control and disarmament program will require the following initial steps:

- 1) We must seek an immediate international moratorium--a freeze--on the number and characteristics of strategic weapons, both offensive and defensive. Such a moratorium would prevent ABM deployments by the United States and the Soviet Union. It would mean there would be no deployment by the United States of new offensive missiles, for example the multiple warhead missiles, Minuteman III and Poseidon. The Soviet Union in turn would terminate the very considerable expansion of its offensive strategic program that is now underway. It is particularly important that this moratorium come into effect before there is any major ABM deployment by the United States and before the Soviet ABM is extended.

So long as the moratorium is effective there should also be an agreement that there shall be no flight testing of new ICBMs, or new submarine-launched missiles. Fortunately it appears feasible to verify compliance with all these prohibitions--on ABM deployment, on significant new offensive missile deployment and on flight testing of new offensive missiles--without there being any need for intrusive verification procedures. Both sides now have other verification capabilities, including observation satellites, which are sufficiently dependable to minimize the risks of significant undetected evasions even in the absence of specific inspection agreements.

As an initial step toward reaching agreements to limit strategic armaments we should announce that we are delaying deployment of the Sentinel ABM system and the Poseidon and Minuteman III ICBM pending speedy agreement with the U.S.S.R. We can do this without putting our security in jeopardy, since neither the Chinese nuclear threat against which we are deploying Sentinel, nor the Soviet ABM which is the rationale for the Poseidon and Minuteman III developments, are moving ahead perceptibly. At the very least we would be deferring expenditures in a year when our economy is seriously strained; and if our restraint should promote an agreement on strategic forces we would have gained greatly from our unilateral initiatives in this area.

- 2) As part of a freeze on strategic offensive and defensive systems, we should also seek an international agreement to prohibit both development and deployment of new intercontinental bombers. Compliance in this case too could be easily verified.
- 3) Following a freeze on strategic offensive systems and ABMs, there should be an agreement to reduce the number of strategic weapons. Reaching agreement on this point may be more difficult because of the problems of establishing the levels to be retained, and balancing dissimilar weapons systems. Reductions of strategic systems to very low levels will be extremely difficult and we should not make the mistake of believing otherwise. It will be necessary but not easy to persuade all countries having nuclear weapon capabilities to accede to such agreements. It will also be difficult to secure agreement on the intrusive inspection procedures that will be necessary when the retained levels are so low that small evasions could affect the strategic balance. These problems, however, are not beyond solution if they are not beyond political will.
- 4) A freeze on strategic delivery systems and ABMs should significantly reduce the military demand for production of additional nuclear warheads, and encourage the Soviets to agree finally to prohibit further production of fissionable material for military purposes. Such an agreement too could be verified without intrusive inspection. It would require merely the same International Atomic Energy Agency controls on reactors and on the facilities that are used for peaceful purposes.

With a reduction or elimination of the production of fissionable materials, there could also be a program wherein both sides would transfer specified amounts of fissionable Material to stockpiles to be used for peaceful purposes under International Atomic Energy Agency controls.

- 5) The time has come for a renewed effort to achieve a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. There is now only a marginal need for testing nuclear warheads. If we secure a moratorium on deployment of new strategic systems, virtually all need for testing will have been eliminated. Capabilities for detecting underground tests and for discriminating between tests and earthquakes have greatly improved in recent years. Both factors suggest that agreement can now be more easily achieved.

We have almost certainly reached the point where any clandestine explosions that could escape detection and identification would be militarily insignificant. However, an agreement with provision for two or three on-site inspections (a number at one time acceptable to the Soviet Union) or some system of inspection by challenge, would be more viable, because means would be available for resolving doubts about the origin of some unidentified seismic events.

- 6) Unrestricted use of chemical and biological weapons could lead to the development of devices which would be at least as great a threat to life as thermonuclear bombs. It is therefore vital to implement all measures which would inhibit the initiation of chemical and biological warfare. The United States is the only major power which is not at this time a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons. We should be prepared to accede to an updated version of the Protocol. Under the auspices of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference, a meeting of technical experts should be convened immediately to establish the criteria which specify chemical and biological weapons and thereby make it possible to update the 1925 protocol consistent with more recent developments.

- 7) We should support the establishment of a technical committee of members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference as a forum where parties to arms control agreements may raise questions concerning the activities of other parties in areas where the treaty is applicable. This would be particularly important in the case of a comprehensive test ban treaty verified only by unilateral means.

- 8) A conscientious and vigorous effort should be made to strengthen the role of the United Nations in peace keeping operations.

All these measures are made more possible by a confluence of interest now developing between the United States and the Soviet Union which may well express itself in the area of arms control and disarmament. In view of this confluence, the initial steps suggested above are far more feasible than is generally acknowledged. There is no question that they can be taken without affecting our national security adversely.

Unilateral Actions:

While we are attempting to reach agreements to limit armaments through international agreements, it is important to recognize that there is a great deal we can achieve simply by having the courage to exercise self-restraint on our own military activities. We must recognize that if we continue to equate security with ever growing weaponry we may be marching toward disaster.

We should also recognize that our decisions to procure certain weapon systems will normally provoke equivalent responses by our potential adversaries which, if one judges by the past record, negate our own efforts. We must consider military expenditures as critically as we do those for non-military programs. There are indications that the Congress is at long last beginning to do this. It should continue to do so.

With respect to our commitments abroad there are also important opportunities for us to profit by restraining our military activities unilaterally.

First, there is our military presence in Europe. To adjust to the change of Soviet strategy we must seek to reduce tensions further. In addition to dealing with the problems of men and conventional armaments in Europe, we must attend to the problem of tactical nuclear weapons. The situation could be improved considerably by our withdrawing from Europe large quantities of unneeded nuclear weapons.

Second, there are our activities in the developing nations of Asia, Latin America and Africa. In these countries we have competed with both our allies and our adversaries in the sale and supply of arms. An alarming increase has taken place, particularly within the past few years, in the number and sophistication of arms we supply to the developing countries. Across the globe, wars are being fought with American weapons - often on both sides. We have become the principal weapon suppliers of the world. And that policy must change.

We have often in the past acceded to requests for military aid simply because a military clique desired to maintain its influence and position. We have too often been motivated by our desire to buy or maintain influence in recipient countries, to secure military bases, or to generate sales to help our balance of payments problems. None of these reasons can justify our arms sales program.

Ideally, this problem should be dealt with by international agreements. The United States should use its influence to persuade other major suppliers to agree to some sort of arms moratorium. In any case, the United States must unilaterally limit its arms sales abroad.

Conclusion:

We seek, finally, a new era for arms control and disarmament. The United States should again become the leader in the search for a rational world security system. There is good reason for optimism. Many of the obstacles in the past have been the product

of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The detente between the two great powers, interrupted by the war in Vietnam, can be renewed with peace in Southeast Asia. If each of the powers is willing to enter accords in a spirit of conciliation, arms control agreements can be the principal expression of a renewed detente. An end to the war in Vietnam must occasion a complete reappraisal of our diplomacy and a new thrust toward peace.