

beginning in mid-January 1942, public and private demands for federal and state action increased rapidly in tempo and volume.¹⁸ Among the first of these were letters of 16 January addressed by Representative Leland M. Ford of Santa Monica, California, to the Secretary of War and to other members of the Cabinet, urging that all Japanese—citizens as well as aliens—be moved inland from the coast and put in concentration camps for the duration of the war.¹⁹ Behind this and similar suggestions lay a profound suspicion of the Japanese population, fanned, of course, by the nature and scope of Japan's early military successes in the Pacific. A GHQ intelligence bulletin of 21 January, for example, concluded that there was an "espionage net containing Japanese aliens, first and second generation Japanese and other nations . . . thoroughly organized and working underground."²⁰ In conversations with General Clark of GHQ on 20 and 21 January, General DeWitt expressed his apprehension that any enemy raid on the west coast would probably be accompanied by "a violent outburst of coordinated and controlled sabotage" among the Japanese population.²¹ In talking with General Gullion on 24 January, General DeWitt stated what was to become one of the principal arguments for mass evacuation. "The fact that nothing has happened so far is more or less . . . ominous," he said, "in that I feel that in view of the fact that we have had no sporadic attempts at sabotage that there is a control being exercised and when we have it it will be on a mass basis."²²

The publication of the report of the Roberts Commission, which had investigated the Pearl Harbor attack, on 25 January had a large and immediate effect both on public opinion and on government action. The report concluded that there had been widespread espionage in Hawaii before Pearl Harbor, both by Japanese consular agents and by Japanese residents of Oahu who had "no open relations with the Japanese foreign service."²³ The latter

¹⁸ Grodzins, *Japanese Evacuation*, contains the most detailed analysis of the pressures that developed during January and February for Japanese evacuation. Most of the large number of communications addressed to the War Department on this subject, and its responses, are in AG 014.311 files. The first written communication of this sort received by the War Department was dated 6 January 1942.

¹⁹ Ltr, Representative Ford to SW, 16 Jan 42; Ltr, SW to Representative Ford, 26 Jan 42. Both in AG 014.311 (1-16-42).

²⁰ GHQ G-2 Infor Bull 6, 21 Jan 42, copy in ASW 014.311 WDC Gen.

²¹ Memo, Gen Clark for Judge Advocate GHQ, 24 Jan 42, GHQ file, WDC: Enemy Aliens.

²² Tel^w Conv, Gen DeWitt with Gen Gullion, 24 Jan 42, WDC-CAD 311.3 Tel Convs (DeWitt, 42-43).

²³ The Roberts Report is published in *Pearl Harbor Attack: Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack* (39 parts) (Washington, 1946) (hereafter cited as *Pearl Harbor Attack*), pt. 39, pp. 1-21.