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Wallen, Arch (audio interview #2 of 2)
INTERVIEW DESCRIPTION - This second interview was conducted in Wallen's home in Palos Verde. He was very gracious, accommodating, and pleased to assist the Rosie the Riveter project. In preparation for the interview, he had gathered a variety of documents and photographs, to which he referred in the interview. The discussion of production planning and implementation is at times highly technical and might not be understood by the uninitiated. Note: the sound quality of tape 2f is poor. 1/16/1980
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- 2021-04-01
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- SUBJECT BIO - Arch Wallen was on the management team of Douglas (in Santa Monica) and was intimately involved with the planning of the new Douglas, Long Beach plant. He was interviewed as part of the Rosie the Riveter project for his expertise on aircraft production and to provide background on the establishment of the Long Beach plant. He was eager to assist the project and helped the staff to understand some of the technical aspects of aircraft production. Portions of the two interviews detail very complicated production procedures that might not be of interest to the uninitiated. However, in other portions of the interviews, he provides insights into how production was broken down in order to accommodate an unskilled work force; women's roles; the demographic breakdown of the work force, etc. TOPICS - industrial relations practices and production objectives;production process, C74 airplane; fabrication and assembly schedules; changes in production processes; airplane fabrication in automotive industry; military changes to production during WWII; weaponry changes duriproduction process, C47s; engineering procedures; and outline of production contracts;production processes; Douglas Long Beach facilities; and labor distribution at Long Beach plant;Industrial Engineering Costing Approach; time sequence studies for production; managerial and supervisory roles; production processes; and worker resistance to time and cost schedules;worker resistance to time and cost schedules; work processes; job performance evaluations; women's work assignments; and allocation of direct and indirect costs; Note: the audio quality on this side of the tape i
- *** File: rrrawallen4.mp3 Audio Segments and Topics: (0:00-4:07)... For three years during WWII, Wallen was responsible for providing military officials with a tour of the Douglas Long Beach plant and lecturing on the detailed production of the C74, a cargo airplane. He describes the handbook he used for the production program, which becomes the focus of the interview as a way to provide understanding of the production process and plant procedures employed at Douglas during the war years. (4:07-8:33)... During WWII, twenty percent of airplane production was fabrication and eighty percent was subassembly and installation work. Wallen explains how these production procedures changed over time. The Long Beach plant was organized into eighteen decentralized buildings that handled different areas of production. Long Beach was the first plant to be built without windows and with air conditioning. (8:33-14:58)... Wallen reads and explains the five basic objectives of production from the Handbook for the Production Program of the C74 airplane, the largest cargo airplane built at that time. These production objectives had to be followed in order to maintain a balanced manufacturing plan. (14:58-23:39)... Suggestions for projects either came from clients or Douglas marketed specific ideas to clients. Once the program was developed, the client would provide a "letter of intent" to begin production on a specific number of aircraft. When approximately ten airplanes were built, the letter of intent was negotiated into a contract. On many occasions, the project would be scrapped because the client could not afford to finance production. During the proposal stages, a three view drawing was created to simulate the features of the airplane. When the client agreed to finance the project, a "work release order" was initiated to fulfill the contract. Wallen describes the process of production after the first work release order was established. If airplane provisions were not adequately planned, as happened on occasion during WWII, production would stall and create manpower problems at the plant. (23:39-27:18)... Wallen continues to discuss production procedures, noting that once design plans and blueprints were completed, these were sent to the Engineering Release Group, which was responsible for checking and recalculating the design to determine if the plan could be implemented. This process usually created a bottleneck in the production process. In turn, this caused the production schedule to fall behind and led to manpower problems, as occurred during the Berlin Airlift. (27:18-30:49)... When the engineering drawing and blueprints were released for production, assembly planners prepared assembly outlines that were then forwarded to fabrication engineers who produced the tools necessary to complete the project. Wallen explains how the original engineering plans were modified when they reached the assembly planners. End of tape. *** File: rrrawallen5.mp3 (0:00-5:34)... If fabricators were unable to provide necessary parts in time for production schedules, production might even stop. Gradually, Douglas developed a shortage control system to resolve these fabrication issues. When there was a shortage of certain parts, fabrication planners informed engineers that their designs would have to use a different part. Otherwise, the plant carved the part out of a chunk of metal which was costly for the company. (5:34-8:04)... Whenever any changes were made to the design of the airplane, management issued a "negotiating chain schedule," which required the signatures of the heads of the production departments. By implementing this policy, Douglas employees worked together in building better airplanes on schedule. (8:04-14:28)... Most of airplane production involved installation. The fuselage and wings were assembled on the airplane, at which time everything inside the airplane was installed from engines to ashtrays. During WWII, the military wanted Douglas to build more C47s for the invasion of Europe. Douglas decided to break down the production phases to make installation work easier for women. Approximately eighty-percent of installation work was completed by women. By utilizing women in subassembly and assembly work, Douglas produced approximately eleven C47s per day. (14:28-21:44)... In addition to fabricating parts in house, many parts were supplied by other manufacturers. Automotive workers were dedicated to providing high quality parts on schedule because the men were concerned they would be flying the airplanes for which they were producing parts. Dividing the production process into single assembly components began with the engineering design. Changing to single skill production made it easier for "young people and women coming out of the kitchen" to assemble an airplane. Simplifying jobs made it possible to employ both skilled and unskilled laborers. Wallen digresses regarding changes in the production schedule for the B17. (21:44-28:19)... When the military wanted more or less aircraft produced, Douglas implemented the change when it would have the least impact on labor. The company tried to plan for retrenchment but it was a frustrating process. In many cases, airplanes were stockpiled because the military's needs often changed. This occurred when the army switched from 75mm cannons to 55 caliber machine guns for use in the South Pacific. Douglas production included equipping the war planes with weapons. To deal with design changes, modification centers were developed. Douglas and the military encountered problems with Henry Ford because he wanted to produce B24s using a fixed design. However, Ford's philosophy did not coincide with the frequency of military changes and many of Ford's planes were sent to modification centers during the war. (28:19-30:44)... The fuselage of the C74 airplane was broken down into ninety structural subassemblies. Wallen explains how each subassembly section was defined. *** File: rrrawallen6.mp3 (0:00-1:56)... Wallen describes the various parts of the wing and tail sections of the airplane. When these sections were attached to the fuselage, installation began on the other pieces of the aircraft. Installation was inspected and when an area was ready to be "closed out," the inspector issued the authority to do so. (1:56-6:38)... Note: there is an interruption in this segment when someone enters the room to advise Wallen he has a telephone call. Excluding the nose section, an airplane fuselage was made up of sub-assembled panels that were fastened to seven major assemblies. The seven major assemblies were connected to a large piece of the fuselage and the wing was joined to the fuselage. The wing included ten major assemblies. The construction of a 175,000 pound C74 included more than 3,000 assemblies that required 80,000 fabricated tools. A panel could be riveted by two people standing on either side. In the round sections of the airplane, people were required to stand up and lean over the top of the fuselage in order to rivet. The "skin," or surface of the fuselage was treated with a protective coating to lessen the occurrence of scratches from belt buckles or wristwatches. (6:38-9:01)... Even though a project started off with more than 80,000 tools, this number grew as people simplified tasks. The key was to develop the proper tooling that was both easy to handle and guaranteed that parts would fit together; however, this did not always occur. For instance, when Douglas built the 747 the doors were pounded out by hand into a perfect curve to fit the fuselage. (9:01-18:51)... Wallen details the production process, noting that the C47 design was created by the Lofting Department of the Tooling Division. A production breakdown was then created by the manufacturing and engineering staff to determine how the panels would be assembled. Each panel section was marked by a number so that everyone knew where the installation would fit and inspectors could determine "what the tolerance should be to build the tools." Some sections of the airplane were elevated requiring the construction of wooden platforms for employees to stand on while installing the pieces of the airplane. When China Aircraft came to the plant during WWII, Douglas built platforms because the employees were relatively short. When employees were under production deadlines and budget restrictions, they worked without platforms and other supplementary equipment even though it compromised production efficiency and quality. There was no "integrator" who toured the plant and evaluated whether or not employees were working under proper conditions. Whenever Wallen noticed that operation changes should be made, he pulled an employee aside and told him to request the change in the suggestion box. (18:51-30:10)... Wallen outlines the implementation of a production contract from planning, completion, delivery, and inspection. When the war began, government inspection procedures were time consuming and inefficient. Wallen believes the government occasionally rejected airplanes as a way of coercing Douglas to dismiss supervisors that government inspectors did not like. Inspectors were present at the plant from delivery of materials to delivery of the product. Towards the middle of the war, the government ran surveillance on the company to make sure it was working in accordance with directives. This improved the inspection process by requiring only spot checks and test flights. End of tape. *** File: rrrawallen7.mp3 (0:00-6:28)... Wallen continues to discuss production procedures, including the flow chart in the manual they used, which illustrates the production schedule and a diagram of the way the airplane was assembled. The production flow chart was followed by charts depicting the various stages of aircraft production, including tooling and engineering. (6:28-17:14)... Following the production flow charts, the next phase of planning involved determining what facilities would be allocated for production. Wallen reviews flow charts to demonstrates how production was apportioned at the Douglas Long Beach plant. During WWII, Douglas produced four types of airplanes, which meant that plant facilities had to handle the production of more than one type of aircraft at the same time. Although this was not a problem in terms of subassembly, it was an inefficient process to fabricate parts and tools for three or four different airplanes in the same building. If another war occurred, he would allocate separate fabrication facilities for each aircraft. (17:14-22:46)... The entire line of major subassembly and major assembly up to and after the fuselage pieces were joined involved riveting and assembly installation work. When engines were installed, the electrical and hydraulic system for the flaps, the control cables, and the cockpit instruments were also installed. Only highly skilled employees were placed at the end of the line to do this type of installation work. Wallen describes some of the other procedures associated with the end of production. In order to evaluate installation procedures, Douglas initiated a system of "configuration management," which involved checking and documenting every part that was installed in the airplane. People tended to make mistakes when they installed parts and employees occasionally installed parts incorrectly on purpose. (22:46-28:10)... When parts were moved from the fabrication building to the assembly and installation building, employees completed installation work and also fabricated parts. There were certain types of machines stationed along the assembly line for employees if they needed to grind out parts. The company was flexible when it came to fabricating parts. Douglas adopted production tactics that made sense and would result in efficient production. Wallen digresses regarding the process of moving an airplane along the production line, indicating that there were advantages and disadvantages to using a mechanized track system versus a track system manually operated by employees. (28:10-30:10)... During WWII, twenty percent of labor was apportioned to fabrication and eighty percent to subassembly and assembly work. Even when fabricators worked on the assembly floor they were included in the fabrication total. These numbers were helpful in establishing rates of pay for assemblers and fabricators. End of tape. *** File: rrrawallen8.mp3 (0:00-9:41)... The Industrial Engineering Costing Approach was used by Douglas to determine how many assembly and installation hours were required to complete production on an airplane. Wallen explains how this approach was calculated and the labor and production issues. (9:41-22:01)... Wallen continues his discussion regarding the allocation of hours to assembly and installation production. Foremen were integral in helping management develop time sequences. In addition to supervising employees, foremen were responsible for a stock room, or tool shed, which stored the equipment and tools used on his section of the production line. Wallen explains how employees were classified and distributed within a particular section of production. Once the employees were distributed into positions based on an experience curve, they received their job assignments. The time allocated for each job varied and the combined time of these jobs usually did not total the four-hour production sequence established by Douglas. (22:01-27:32)... Depending on the section of production, leadmen supervised anywhere from four to twelve people. Over time, the company changed the job description from leadman to foreman because the leadmen were covered under the union. Before the union came in, "working leadmen" were expected to complete eighty percent of the work in addition to supervising the employees in their sections. Leadmen were used in both the subassembly and installation sections of the production line. Parts were stored in stock rooms in each section of the production line. It was typical for certain departments to stockpile parts because they anticipated shortages, which in turn, created shortages within the company. (27:32-30:44)... Employees in a single position were defined as crews. Crews often competed with each other over production schedules. Often, the times set during time studies were unrealistic. Employees developed strategies to counteract management's dependence on time and cost. One such strategy was "banking," in which employees banked their hours to be used towards repairing damaged assemblies. One crew used bank time for nine months before they were caught. End of tape. *** File: rrrawallen9.mp3 (0:00-4:07)... Note: the audio quality of this segment is quite poor, making it difficult to understand the conversation. Wallen continues to discuss the strategies used by employees to work around budget and time schedules. (4:07-10:45)... Note: the poor audio quality makes it difficult to understand the conversation. The size and number of holes riveted in a panel was determined by foremen. Wallen discusses job performance evaluations, indicating that employees were not necessarily fired if their work was poor. In most cases, people were moved into other sections of production or put on probation. If their performance did not improve during the probationary period, they were dismissed from Douglas. (10:45-15:31)... Note: the poor audio quality makes it difficult to understand the conversation. Wallen discusses the responsibilities of production inspectors; and the process of riveting and bucking. (15:31-16:12)... Note: the poor audio quality makes it difficult to understand the conversation. Wallen discusses the use of safety glasses. (16:12-21:08)... Note: the poor audio quality makes it difficult to understand the conversation. I The ratio of women to men employed in fabrication was 1:5. There was a tendency to keep women out of fabrication because it was much more complicated to make parts and tools than it was to complete assembly work. (21:08-29:09)... Note: it is difficult to understand the conversation in this segment because of poor audio quality. Fabrication, assembly, and installation were direct costs and clerical, management, and supervision were indirect costs. The only difference between indirect and direct costs were that direct costs contributed to the profit of the company. Wallen further elaborates on what operations fell within the definition of direct and indirect costs. End of tape.
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